

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

December 23, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 7. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON JANUARY 21, 2014 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY JANUARY 13, 2013, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY JANUARY 6, 2014. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 8 THROUGH 22. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON DECEMBER 30, 2013, AT 2:30 P.M.

December 23, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 13-35623-E-13 CAMEO GILMER MOTION FOR
KAG-1 RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY O.S.T.
JOHN BALMA VS. 12-16-13 [10]
- ☐ Telephone Appearance
☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The movant or the movant's predecessor in interest completed a nonjudicial foreclosure sale before the bankruptcy case was filed. Under California law, once a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has occurred, the trustor has no right of redemption. Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App.4th 822, 831 (1994). In this case, therefore, the debtor has no right to ignore the foreclosure. If the foreclosure sale was not in accord with state law, this should be asserted as a defense to an unlawful detainer proceeding in state court or as an independent action to set aside the foreclosure.

However, in this case the movant has already commenced and prevailed in an unlawful detainer action, establishing his right to possess the subject property.

Given the filing of the unlawful detainer judgment and the notice to quit that necessarily preceded it, the debtor's right to possession has terminated and there is cause to terminate the automatic stay. In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Smith, 105 B.R. 50, 53 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989). The debtor no longer has an interest in the subject property which can be considered either property of the estate or an interest deserving of protection by section 362(a).

The court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived.

2. 13-31170-A-13 KIM BRITTON MOTION TO
PGM-3 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. HYUNDAI MOTOR FINANCE 11-25-13 [57]
- ☐ Telephone Appearance
☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied.

This valuation motion addresses the value of a 2009 Hyundai Accent that secures Hyundai Motor Finance's Class 2 claim. While the debtor has opined that the vehicle has a value of \$3,700 based on the vehicle's model year, 79,511 miles, and fair condition, no specific information is given in the motion regarding equipment and accessories. As to the vehicle's fair condition, this appears based on the fact that the vehicle needs approximately \$3,000 in repairs. However, there is no admissible evidence corroborating the cost of these repairs, nor has the debtor explained how the need for the repairs has impacted value. For instance, if repaired, what would the value be?

Hyundai Motor Finance counters that the value of the vehicle is \$7,804 based on a retail evaluation by the Kelley Blue Book.

To the extent the objection urges the court to reject the debtor's opinion of value because the debtor's opinion is not admissible, the court instead rejects the objection. As the owner of the vehicle, the debtor is entitled to express an opinion as to the vehicle's value. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Any opinion of value by the owner must be expressed without giving a reason for the valuation. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08). Indeed, unless the owner also qualifies as an expert, it is improper for the owner to give a detailed recitation of the basis for the opinion. Only an expert qualified under Fed. R. Evid. 702 may rely on and testify as to facts "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 703. "For example, the average debtor-homeowner who testifies in opposition to a motion for relief from the § 362 automatic stay, should be limited to giving his opinion as to the value of his home, but should not be allowed to testify concerning what others have told him concerning the value of his or comparable properties unless, the debtor truly qualifies as an expert under Rule 702 such as being a real estate broker, etc." Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08).

The creditor has come forward with evidence that the replacement value of the vehicle, based on its retail value as reported by the Kelley Blue Book, is \$21,775. This valuation, however, presumes the condition of the vehicle is excellent. See <http://www.kbb.com> (indicating that retail "value assumes the vehicle has received the cosmetic and/or mechanical reconditioning needed to qualify it as 'Excellent'" and that "this is not a transaction value; it is representative of a dealer's asking price and the starting point for negotiation").

The vehicle must be valued at its replacement value. In the chapter 13 context, the replacement value of personal property used by a debtor for personal, household or family purposes is "the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined." See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).

The retail value suggested by the creditor cannot be relied upon by the court to establish the vehicle's replacement value. First, the creditor's retail value assumes that the vehicle is in excellent condition. This is not based on any facts, at least facts proven to the court. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) asks for "the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined." That is, what would a retailer charge for the vehicle as it is?

Nor has the debtor proven to the court's satisfaction the replacement value of the vehicle. The debtor asserts a value but has failed to establish that this value is a replacement value for the car in its present condition.

While neither party has persuaded the court as to the replacement value of the vehicle under section 506(a)(2), it is the debtor who has the burden of proof. Accordingly, the valuation motion must be denied.

3. 13-34474-A-13 JOHN/BEATRIZ MARKHAMA
CBT-1
CALIFORNIA BANK & TRUST VS.

MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
12-6-13 [40]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the creditor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the other creditors, the debtor, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted insofar as it asks for prospective relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) provides that:

"On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay . . .

with respect to a stay of an act against real property under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real property, if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved either-

(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, such real property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; or

(B) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property."

Section 362(d)(4) implicates 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(20). Section 362(b)(20) is an "in rem" exception to the automatic stay. If the court grants relief in this case under section 362(d)(4), but then another petition is filed by any debtor who claims an interest in the subject real property, section 362(b)(20) provides that the automatic stay does not operate in the second case so as to prevent the enforcement of a lien or security interest in the subject real property. The exception to the automatic stay in the second case is effective for 2 years after the entry of the order under section 362(d)(4) in the first case.

A debtor in the subsequent bankruptcy case, however, may move for relief from the in rem order. The request for relief from the in rem order may be premised upon "changed circumstances or for other good cause shown. . . ."

Here, the original borrower and owner of the property transferred interests in the subject property without the consent of the movant to this debtor as well as to others. These transferees have filed multiple bankruptcies as has the original borrower. All of these bankruptcy cases have been dismissed due to

their failure to prosecute them diligently, such as by failing to file schedules and other required court documents.

The court concludes that the purpose of making the transfers and filing of the repetitive cases was to acquire the automatic stay but with any intention of reorganizing. These facts evidence a clear scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving the subject property.

Therefore, the court will grant relief from the automatic stay that will be effective for a period of two years in any future case filed by anyone claiming an interest in the subject property, provided the recordation requirements of section 362(d) (4) are satisfied by the movant or its successor.

The court also will terminate the automatic stay in this case for cause due to the debtor's bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1). The debtor has failed to propose a plan on the court's mandatory form as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(a) and has filed this case without demonstrating eligibility for chapter 13 relief. The debtor has not filed a certificate showing completion of a prebankruptcy credit briefing. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(h). Also, as is apparent from this motion and the other motions for relief from the automatic stay appearing on the docket, the debt encumbering the various properties in which the debtor has an interest exceeds the debt caps set by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a) (3) will be waived.

4.	13-34474-A-13 JOHN/BEATRIZ MARKHAMA DO-1 VALLEY COMMUNITY BANK VS.	MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY O.S.T. 12-6-13 [28]
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- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the creditor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f) (2). Consequently, the other creditors, the debtor, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted insofar as it asks for prospective relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (4).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (4) provides that:

"On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section,

such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay . . .

with respect to a stay of an act against real property under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real property, if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved either-

(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, such real property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; or

(B) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property."

Section 362(d)(4) implicates 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(20). Section 362(b)(20) is an "in rem" exception to the automatic stay. If the court grants relief in this case under section 362(d)(4), but then another petition is filed by any debtor who claims an interest in the subject real property, section 362(b)(20) provides that the automatic stay does not operate in the second case so as to prevent the enforcement of a lien or security interest in the subject real property. The exception to the automatic stay in the second case is effective for 2 years after the entry of the order under section 362(d)(4) in the first case.

A debtor in the subsequent bankruptcy case, however, may move for relief from the in rem order. The request for relief from the in rem order may be premised upon "changed circumstances or for other good cause shown. . . ."

Here, the original borrower and owner of the property transferred interests in the subject property without the consent of the movant to this debtor as well as to others. These transferees have filed multiple bankruptcies as has the original borrower. All of these bankruptcy cases have been dismissed due to their failure to prosecute them diligently, such as by failing to file schedules and other required court documents.

The court concludes that the purpose of making the transfers and filing of the repetitive cases was to acquire the automatic stay but with any intention of reorganizing. These facts evidence a clear scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving the subject property.

Therefore, the court will grant relief from the automatic stay that will be effective for a period of two years in any future case filed by anyone claiming an interest in the subject property, provided the recordation requirements of section 362(d)(4) are satisfied by the movant or its successor.

The court also will terminate the automatic stay in this case for cause due to the debtor's bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The debtor has failed to propose a plan on the court's mandatory form as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(a) and has filed this case without demonstrating eligibility for chapter 13 relief. The debtor has not filed a certificate showing completion of a prebankruptcy credit briefing. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(h). Also, as is apparent from this motion and the other motions for relief from the automatic stay appearing on the docket, the debt encumbering the various properties in which the debtor has an interest exceeds the debt caps set by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived.

5. 13-34474-A-13 JOHN/BEATRIZ MARKHAMA MOTION FOR
JLS-1 RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
CHEVRON FEDERAL CREDIT UNION VS. 12-9-13 [48]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the creditor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the other creditors, the debtor, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted insofar as it asks for prospective relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) provides that:

"On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay . . .

with respect to a stay of an act against real property under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real property, if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved either-

(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, such real property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; or

(B) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property."

Section 362(d)(4) implicates 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(20). Section 362(b)(20) is an "in rem" exception to the automatic stay. If the court grants relief in this case under section 362(d)(4), but then another petition is filed by any debtor who claims an interest in the subject real property, section 362(b)(20) provides that the automatic stay does not operate in the second case so as to prevent the enforcement of a lien or security interest in the subject real property. The exception to the automatic stay in the second case is effective for 2 years after the entry of the order under section 362(d)(4) in the first case.

A debtor in the subsequent bankruptcy case, however, may move for relief from the in rem order. The request for relief from the in rem order may be premised upon "changed circumstances or for other good cause shown. . . ."

Here, the original borrower and owner of the property transferred interests in the subject property without the consent of the movant to this debtor as well

as to others. These transferees have filed multiple bankruptcies as has the original borrower. All of these bankruptcy cases have been dismissed due to their failure to prosecute them diligently, such as by failing to file schedules and other required court documents.

The court concludes that the purpose of making the transfers and filing of the repetitive cases was to acquire the automatic stay but with any intention of reorganizing. These facts evidence a clear scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving the subject property.

Therefore, the court will grant relief from the automatic stay that will be effective for a period of two years in any future case filed by anyone claiming an interest in the subject property, provided the recordation requirements of section 362(d)(4) are satisfied by the movant or its successor.

The court also will terminate the automatic stay in this case for cause due to the debtor's bad faith. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The debtor has failed to propose a plan on the court's mandatory form as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(a) and has filed this case without demonstrating eligibility for chapter 13 relief. The debtor has not filed a certificate showing completion of a prebankruptcy credit briefing. See 11 U.S.C. § 110(h). Also, as is apparent from this motion and the other motions for relief from the automatic stay appearing on the docket, the debt encumbering the various properties in which the debtor has an interest exceeds the debt caps set by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

Finally, to the extent there may be a stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1301 benefitting any nonbankrupt codebtor, it also is vacated for the same cause the automatic stay has been terminated.

Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived.

6.	13-33385-A-13 SHERRIE CUNNINGHAM TJS-1 CIG FINANCIAL, LLC VS.	MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 11-21-13 [24]
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- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be granted.

This is the third chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. Two prior cases, Case Nos. 13-43828 and 13-30247, were filed and dismissed within 1 year of the filing of the third case on October 16.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A) provides that when an individual debtor has filed 2 or more prior cases that were pending during the previous year, but were dismissed, the automatic stay never goes into effect. Section 362(c)(4)(A) further provides that "on request of a party in interest the court shall promptly enter an order confirming that no stay is in effect. . . ." See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(j).

The debtor may request that the court impose the automatic stay despite the

filing and dismissal of multiple prior petitions. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B). Such a request must be made with notice and a hearing and must be made within 30 days of the filing of the petition. To obtain the automatic stay, the party in interest must demonstrate that the latest case has been filed in good faith. If shown, the court may impose conditions on the imposition of the automatic stay.

A review of the docket reveals no motion to impose the automatic stay and it is now too late to file such a motion. Therefore, pursuant to section 362(j), the court confirms the absence of the automatic stay.

7. 13-33991-A-13 OSIRIS HENDERSON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
12-5-13 [28]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will remain pending but the court will modify the terms of its order permitting the debtor to pay the filing fee in installments.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the \$70 installment when due on December 2. While the delinquent installment was paid on December 6, the fact remains the court was required to issue an order to show cause to compel the payment. Therefore, as a sanction for the late payment, the court will modify its prior order allowing installment payments to provide that if a future installment is not received by its due date, the case will be dismissed without further notice or hearing.

THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

8. 13-31704-A-13 STANLEY IBARRA MOTION TO
SJS-2 CONFIRM PLAN
10-17-13 [25]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

9. 13-34114-A-13 MANUEL CISNEROS AND MARIA MOTION TO
EWV-40 ALCALA VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC 11-20-13 [16]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$214,822 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Central Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$363,935 as of the petition date. Therefore, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If

the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$214,822. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

10.	10-21918-A-13 MAUREEN/REGIDOR SANTIAGO JPJ-2	NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND APPLICATION TO DISMISS 11-5-13 [62]
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Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The case will remain pending.

It was unnecessary to set a hearing on the trustee's notice of default. This procedure, as authorized by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g), which provides:

(1) If the debtor fails to make a payment pursuant to a confirmed plan, including a direct payment to a creditor, the trustee may mail to the debtor and the debtor's attorney written notice of the default.

(2) If the debtor believes that the default noticed by the trustee does not exist, the debtor shall set a hearing within twenty-eight (28) days of the mailing of the notice of default and give at least fourteen (14) days' notice of the hearing to the trustee pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(2). At the hearing, if the trustee demonstrates that the debtor has failed to make a payment required by the confirmed plan, and if the debtor fails to rebut the trustee's evidence, the case shall be dismissed at the hearing.

(3) Alternatively, the debtor may acknowledge that the plan payment(s) has(have) not been made and, within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the notice of default, either (A) make the delinquent plan payment(s) and all subsequent plan payments that have fallen due, or (B) file a modified plan and a motion to confirm the modified plan. If the debtor's financial condition has materially changed, amended Schedules I and J shall be filed and served with the motion to modify the chapter 13 plan.

(4) If the debtor fails to set a hearing on the trustee's notice, or cure the default by payment, or file a proposed modified chapter 13 plan and motion, or perform the modified chapter 13 plan pending its approval, or obtain approval of the modified chapter 13 plan, all within the time constraints set out above, the case shall be dismissed without a hearing on the trustee's application.

Thus, a debtor receiving a Notice of Default has three alternatives: (1) Cure the default within 30 days of the notice of default; (2) within 30 days of the notice of default, file a motion to confirm a modified plan and a modified plan in order to cure/suspend the default stated in the notice of default; or (3) contest the notice of default by setting a hearing within 28 days of the notice of default on 14 days of notice to the trustee.

In this case, the debtor exercised the second alternative - the debtor proposed a modified plan to resolve the plan default. That modified plan and a motion to confirm it were filed November 6, one day after the notice of default. Having filed a timely motion to modify the plan, it was unnecessary to request a hearing on the notice of default.

11. 10-21918-A-13 MAUREEN/REGIDOR SANTIAGO
TJW-3

MOTION TO
MODIFY PLAN
11-6-13 [65]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the condition that the plan is further modified in the confirmation order to account for all prior payments made by the debtor under the terms of the prior plan, and to provide for 45 monthly plan payments. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b),

1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

12. 13-30825-A-13 CHRISTOPHER/WENDY THOMAS MOTION TO
JRH-2 CONFIRM PLAN
11-8-13 [31]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on condition that the plan is modified in the confirmation order to provide for payment in full of the priority claim of the FTB. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

13. 13-30825-A-13 CHRISTOPHER/WENDY THOMAS MOTION TO
JRH-3 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. 11-21-13 [35]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$5,098 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$5,098 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$5,098 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

14. 09-31126-A-13 NAJJIYYA ARNOLD MOTION TO
PGM-5 APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTOR'S
ATTORNEY (FEES \$1,190)
11-22-13 [82]

Final Ruling: This compensation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(a)(6). The failure of the trustee, the debtor, the United States Trustee, the creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual

hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion seeks approval of \$1,190 in additional fees incurred principally in connection with an attempt to modify the debtor's home loan. The foregoing represents reasonable compensation for actual, necessary, and beneficial services rendered to the debtor. Any retainer may be drawn upon and the balance of the approved compensation is to be paid through the plan in a manner consistent with the plan and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1, if applicable.

15. 13-28129-A-13 KAISER BEKHIT MOTION TO
MET-2 CONFIRM PLAN
11-9-13 [37]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

16. 13-32140-A-13 IOAN/FLOARE DEJEU MOTION TO
BLF-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 11-15-13 [25]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$169,075 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Green Tree. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$186,508.87 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's

principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$169,075. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

17. 13-32140-A-13 IOAN/FLOARE DEJEU
BLF-2

MOTION TO
CONFIRM PLAN
11-25-13 [33]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(3) and (b)(1) require that when the debtor files and serves a motion to confirm a chapter 13 plan, the motion to confirm it must be set for hearing on 42 days of notice to all creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, and the U.S. Trustee. If any of these parties in interest wish to object to the confirmation of the plan, they must file and serve a written objection at least 14 days prior to the hearing. See Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1)(B). The debtor's notice of the hearing on the motion to confirm the plan must advise all parties in interest of the deadline for filing written objections. See Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(d)(3).

This procedure complies with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(b), which requires a minimum of 28 days of notice of the deadline for objections to confirmation as well as the hearing on confirmation of the plan. Because Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) requires that written opposition be filed 14 days prior to the hearing but Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b) requires 28 days of notice of the deadline for filing opposition, the debtor must give 42 days of notice of the hearing.

Here, the debtor gave only 28 days of notice of the hearing. Therefore, parties in interest received only 14 days notice of the deadline for filing and serving written opposition to the motion. Notice was insufficient.

18. 10-25344-A-13 JOHN/LYNN WHITLOCK
JT-4
VS. UNITED GUARANTY RES. INS. CO. ETC.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
11-22-13 [70]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$153,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Nationstar Mortgage LLC. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$258,459.78 as of the petition date. Therefore, United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company Of North Carolina's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re

Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$153,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

19. 13-33657-A-13 STEVEN HERRON

ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
10-31-13 [10]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be discharged because it is moot given the December 6 dismissal of the case.

20. 13-34069-A-13 KAREN MCCORD
RAC-1
VS. SOLANO FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
11-18-13 [15]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$341,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Bank of America, N.A. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$520,206 as of the petition date. Therefore, Solano First Federal Credit Union's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Barte, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation

motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$341,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

21.	13-34069-A-13 KAREN MCCORD RAC-2 VS. SUNTRUST BANK	MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL 11-18-13 [19]
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Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property, rental real property in North Carolina. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$115,000 and is encumbered by a senior lien of \$121,780. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004).

Therefore, the respondent's collateral, after deducting the senior lien, has no value and its secured claim need be paid nothing. Subject to the completion of the plan, the respondent's secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

22.	13-34474-A-13	JOHN/BEATRIZ MARKHAMA	MOTION FOR
	KAF-1		RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
	WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. VS.		11-27-13 [16]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

The notice of hearing informs potential respondents that written opposition must be filed and served within 14 days prior to the hearing if they wish to oppose the motion. Because less than 28 days of notice of the hearing was given [27 days' notice was given], Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2) specifies that written opposition is unnecessary. Instead, potential respondents may appear at the hearing and orally contest the motion. If necessary, the court may thereafter require the submission of written evidence and briefs. By erroneously informing potential respondents that written opposition was required and was a condition to contesting the motion, the moving party may have deterred a respondent from appearing. Therefore, notice was materially deficient.