UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Ronald H. Sargis

Chief Bankruptcy Judge Sacramento, California

October 5, 2017, at 10:00 a.m.

1. <u>14-27351</u>-E-7 .JHW-1 DAVID/JANNAVIE HICKMAN Mikalah Liviakis MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM

AUTOMATIC STAY

9-7-17 [<u>57</u>]

AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. VS.

ATTENDANCE OF SHERYL K. ITH, ESQ. AND JENNIFER H. WANG, ESQ.,

THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR MOVANT STATED ON THE MOTION IS REQUIRED FOR THE OCTOBER 5, 2017 HEARING

TELEPHONIC APPEARANCE PERMITTED

Tentative Ruling: Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on September 7, 2017. By the court's calculation, 28 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. dba GM Financial ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2013 Nissan Pathfinder, VIN ending in 3487 ("Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Angelo Aguilar to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by David Hickman and Jannavie Hickman ("Debtor").

The Angelo Aguilar Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made thirty-two post-petition payments, with a total of \$26,255.68 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also seeks to introduce evidence establishing the Vehicle's value. Though the NADA Valuation Report is attached as an Exhibit, it is not properly authenticated.

Though the court will *sua sponte* take notice that the NADA Valuation Report can be within the "market reports and similar commercial publications" exception to the hearsay rule (Federal Rule of Evidence 803(17)), it does not resolve the authentication requirement. FED. R. EVID. 901. In this case, and because no opposition has been asserted by Debtor, the court will presume the Declaration of Angelo Aguilar to be that he obtained the NADA Valuation Report and is providing that to the court under penalty of perjury. Movant and counsel should not presume that the court will provide *sua sponte* corrections to any defects in evidence presented to the court.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$25,900.54, as stated in the Aguilar Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$21,825.00, as stated in the Declaration, which is less than the \$30,000.00 retail value as stated on Schedule B.

DISCUSSION

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.), 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Busch, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because "cause" is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); In re Silverling, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), aff'd sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling), No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. See In re J E Livestock, Inc., 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting In re Busch, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan), 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis), 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); In re Ellis, 60 B.R. 432.

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property's value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See Ramco Indus. v. Preuss (In re Preuss)*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Failure to State Grounds for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from the automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests, for no particular reason, that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court. With no grounds for such relief specified, the court will not grant additional relief merely stated in the prayer.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

As with the failure to properly authenticate exhibits, Movant and Movant's counsel fail to state grounds for relief they demand in the prayer of their Motion. Given that the court has repeatedly addressed this issue over the last seven years, but orphan requests for relief just appear in prayers to motions, several inferences can be drawn, none of which are positive for Movant or counsel.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc. dba GM Financial ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2013 Nissan Pathfinder ("Vehicle"), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

IT IS ORDERED that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is not waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.