

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Ronald H. Sargis
Bankruptcy Judge
Modesto, California

October 2, 2014 at 10:00 a.m.

1. [13-91701](#)-E-7 MARVAIS WADEN AND SHAIMA MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
KMF-2 KAKAR AUTOMATIC STAY
 David Foyil 9-17-14 [[87](#)]
DAMON REED, GUARDIAN AD
LITEM FOR PAYTEN E. REED, A
MINOR VS.

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the Debtor, Creditors, the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion.

Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. If there is opposition presented, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2)(iii).

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(2) Motion.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on September 17, 2014. By the court's calculation, 15 days' notice was provided. 14 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). The Debtor, Creditors, the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. At the hearing -----.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

Payten E. Reed, a minor by her Guardians ad Litem, Damon Reed and Aura Plowman ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to a state court proceeding for damages against Marvais Waden and Shaima Kakar ("Debtors") for injuries Payten Reed suffered during a dog attack on Debtors' property by Debtors' dog. The moving party has provided the Declaration of Kenneth Foley to introduce evidence as a basis for Movant's contention that Debtors do not have an ownership interest in the insurance proceeds that should cover the damages. Movant asserts it will pursue the state court action only to the extent that the damages are covered by Debtors' insurance.

Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the potential insurance coverage for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). Additionally, proceeds of liability insurance policies are generally not property of the bankruptcy estate. *In re Endoscopy Ctr. Of S. Nev., LLC*, 451 B. R. 527, 544 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011). In such situations, "the debtor will not have a cognizable interest in the proceeds of the policy" because the "proceeds will normally be payable only for the benefit of those harmed by the debtor under the terms of the insurance contract." *Id.* at 545 (quoting *Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth)*, 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Movant has presented a colorable claim for damages covered by Debtors' insurance. As stated by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in *Hamilton v. Hernandez*, No. CC-04-1434-MaTK, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005), relief from stay proceedings are summary proceedings which address issues arising only under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d). *Hamilton*, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 at *8-*9 (citing *Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson)*, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court does not determine underlying issues of ownership, contractual rights of parties, or issue declaratory relief as part of a motion for relief from the automatic stay Contested Matter (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014).

The court may grant relief from stay for cause when it is necessary to allow litigation in a nonbankruptcy court. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[3][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds. 16th ed.). The basis for such relief when there is pending litigation in another forum is predicated on factors of judicial economy including whether the suit involves multiple parties or is ready for trial. See *Packerland Packing Co., Inc. v. Griffith Brokerage Co. (In re S. Kemble)*, 776 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1985); *Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.)*, 912 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); *Santa Clara County Fair Ass'n, Inc. v. Sanders (In re Santa Clara County Fair Ass'n, Inc.)*, 180 B.R. 564 (9th Cir. BAP 1995); *Truebro, Inc. v. Plumberex Specialty Products, Inc. (In re Plumberex Specialty Products, Inc.)*, 311 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Payten E. Reed, a minor by her Guardians ad Litem, Damon Reed and Aura Plowman, and her agents, representatives and successors, to exercise its rights to pursue her state court action, as well as appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies limited by the terms of Debtors' insurance coverage.

The Movant has not alleged adequate facts and presented sufficient

evidence to support the court waving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a) (3).

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by the creditor having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are modified to allow Payten E. Reed, a minor by her *Guardians ad Litem*, Damon Reed and Aura Plowman, and her agents, representatives and successors, to file and prosecute state court litigation, California Superior Court Action 13CV39123, County of Calaveras, against the Debtors, to final judgment, including all appeals, to assert claims for injury stated therein, for which Debtors have insurance coverage, and to enforce such judgment to the extent of, and to recovery money from, such insurance.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the automatic stay is not modified with respect to the enforcement of the judgment against the Debtors other than to recover insurance proceeds, the Trustee, or property of the bankruptcy estate. Any judgment obtained shall be brought back to this court for the proper treatment of any claims under the Bankruptcy Code.

No other or additional relief is granted.

2. [14-90917-E-7](#) STEVEN BROWN AND JOSETTE MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
PPR-1 ALOMIA-BROWN AUTOMATIC STAY
Patrick Greenwell 8-13-14 [[10](#)]
STEVEN BROWN VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, and Chapter 7 Trustee on August 13, 2014. By the court's calculation, 50 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

Steven Brown and Josette Alomia-Brown ("Debtors") commenced this bankruptcy case on June 26, 2014. Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2002 Alfa Ideal trailer, VIN ending in 0981 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Tara Evans to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Evans Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made one (1) post-petition payments, with a total of \$538.51 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are 12 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$6,462.12.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$23,855.55, as stated in the Evans Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$18,550.00, as stated in the NADA Valuation Report for the Vehicle supplied by Movant.

Movant has also provided a copy of the NADA Valuation Report for the Vehicle. The Report has been properly authenticated and is accepted as a market report or commercial publication generally relied on by the public or by persons in the automobile sale business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(17).

OPPOSITION TO MOTION

Debtors have not filed an opposition to this motion. In fact, Debtors' statement of intention indicates that Debtors intend to surrender the Vehicle. Dckt. 1; Dckt. 14, Exh. D.

RULING

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay since the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Bank of America, N.A., and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and

upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2002 Alfa Ideal ("Vehicle"), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.

3. [14-90718](#)-E-7 MELVA PONCE
JFL-1 James D. Pitner

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
9-13-14 [[12](#)]

SETERUS, INC. VS.

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the Debtor, Creditors, the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion.

Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. If there is opposition presented, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2)(iii).

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(2) Motion.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on September 12, 2014. By the court's calculation, 20 days' notice was provided. 14 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). The Debtor, Creditors, the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. At the hearing -----.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.
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Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), care of its agent Seterus, Inc., ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 3931 Belgian Drive, Riverbank, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Rose Ngi to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Ngi Declaration states that there are three (3) post-petition defaults

in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$2,894.31 in post-petition payments past due. Another monthly payment of \$964.77 is due September 1, 2014. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are eight (8) pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$7,718.16.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$240,106.23 (including \$223,178.23 secured by Movant's first deed of trust), as stated in the Ngi Declaration and Schedule D filed by Melva Ponce ("Debtor"). The value of the Property is determined to be \$202,000.00, as stated in Schedules A and D filed by Debtor.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments which have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).]

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), care of its agent, Seterus, Inc., ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and

upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), care of its agent Seterus, Inc., its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 3931 Belgian Drive, Riverbank, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived for cause shown by Movant.

No other or additional relief is granted.

4. [14-90920](#)-E-7 JOSHUA BROWN
JFL-1 Brian Haddix

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
9-12-14 [[22](#)]

SETERUS, INC. VS.

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the Debtor, Creditors, the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion.

Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. If there is opposition presented, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2)(iii).

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(2) Motion.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on September 12, 2014. By the court's calculation, 20 days' notice was provided. 14 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). The Debtor, Creditors, the Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. At the hearing -----.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is denied.

Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), care of its agent, Seterus, Inc., ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 1229 Fiori Avenue, Modesto, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Rose Ngi to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Ngi Declaration states that there are two (2) post-petition defaults in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$2,072.64 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides

evidence that there is one (1) pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$1,036.32.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$139,390.46 (including \$139,390.46 secured by Movant's first deed of trust), as stated in the Ngi Declaration and Schedule D filed by Joshua Brown ("Debtor"). The value of the Property is determined to be \$145,200.00, as stated in Schedules A and D filed by Debtor.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments which have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

The existence of defaults in post-petition or pre-petition payments by itself does not guarantee Movant obtaining relief from the automatic stay. In this case, the equity cushion in the Property for Movant's claim provides adequate protection such claim at this time. *In re Avila*, 311 B.R. 81, 84 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004). Movant has not sufficiently established an evidentiary basis for granting relief from the automatic stay for "cause" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

Because the Debtor has equity in the property and delinquent payments, standing alone, do not constitute cause, the Motion for Relief from Stay is denied.

Additionally, because there is equity in the property, the requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) have not been met. Costs of sale may not be added to the loan balance in order to reduce a Debtor's equity in the Property.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is also not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"), care of its agent, Seterus, Inc., ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(a) are not vacated on the real property commonly known as 1229 Fiori Avenue, Modesto, California.

No other or additional relief is granted.

5. [14-91131](#)-E-7 **PATTY CARMO**
ADR-1 **Pro Se**

**MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY AND/OR MOTION
FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION
8-19-14 [[20](#)]**

JAMKE VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor (*pro se*), Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on August 15, 2014. By the court's calculation, 48 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is denied as moot.

JAMKE ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 601 S. Indiana Avenue, Modesto, California (the "Property"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Ken Elving to introduce evidence as a basis for Movant's contention that Patty Carmo ("Debtor") does not have an ownership interest in or a right to maintain possession of the Property. Movant presents evidence that it is the owner of the Property. Movant asserts it purchased the Property at a pre-petition Trustee's Sale on April 24, 2014. Based on the evidence presented, Debtor would be at best tenant at sufferance. Movant commenced an unlawful detainer action in California Superior Court, but the Elving Declaration provides no more information about this filing.

Movant has provided a properly authenticated copy of the recorded Trustee's Deed Upon Sale to substantiate its claim of ownership. Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

Movant has presented a colorable claim for title to and possession of this real property. As stated by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in *Hamilton v. Hernandez*, No. CC-04-1434-MaTK, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005), relief from stay proceedings are summary proceedings which address issues arising only under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d). *Hamilton*, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 at *8-*9 (citing *Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson)*, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court does not determine underlying issues of ownership, contractual rights of parties, or issue declaratory relief as part of a motion for relief from the automatic stay Contested Matter (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014).

Though JAMKE has shown sufficient evidence for this court to grant relief from the automatic stay in regard to the Property, Debtor's case was dismissed on August 26, 2014. Dckt. 27. Upon dismissal of a case, the stay expires. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B). There is no stay left for the court to grant relief from in this case, rendering the motion is moot.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by JAMKE ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that to the extent the Motion seeks relief from the automatic stay as to Patty Carmo ("Debtor"), the case having been dismissed, the Motion is denied as moot pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(B).

No other or additional relief is granted.

6. [14-91038](#)-E-7 PAUL/SHIRLEY HENDERSON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
APN-1 Joel M. Feinstein AUTOMATIC STAY
8-22-14 [[10](#)]

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.
VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtors, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on August 22, 2014. By the court's calculation, 41 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

Paul and Shirley Henderson ("Debtors") commenced this bankruptcy case on July 18, 2014. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2013 Dodge Ram 2500, VIN ending in 2276 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Jorge Escalante to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Escalante Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made one (1) post-petition payments, with a total of \$769.73 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are six (6) pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$4,581.03.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$41,180.50, as stated in the Escalante Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$31,325.00, as stated in the NADA Valuation Report supplied by Movant.

Movant has also provided a copy of the NADA Valuation Report for the Vehicle. The Report has been properly authenticated and is accepted as a market report or commercial publication generally relied on by the public or by persons in the automobile sale business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(17).

OPPOSITION TO MOTION

Debtor has not filed an opposition to this motion.

RULING

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay since the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).]

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Santander Consumer USA, Inc., and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

NRZ Pass-Through Trust I, U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee, ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 8882 Bell Court, Valley Springs, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Patrice Fields to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Fields Declaration states that there is one (1) post-petition default in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$1,687.14 in post-petition payments past due. Additional payments are due for August, September, and October 2014 on the first of the month. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are 35 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$59,049.90.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$245,524.44 (including \$245,524.44 secured by Movant's first deed of trust), as stated in the Fields Declaration and Schedule D filed by Michelle Howard ("Debtor"). The value of the Property is determined to be \$260,000.00, as stated in Schedules A and D filed by Debtor.

On July 25, 2014, the Trustee filed Chapter 7 Trustee's Report of No Distribution. The Notice of Filing Report of No Distribution Combined with Order Fixing Deadline to Object Thereto states that "The trustee in the above case as filed a 'Report of No Distribution,' stating there is no funds available for distribution to creditors." Dckt. 10.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments which have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted and the fact that there are no funds available from the estate for distribution based on the Chapter 7 Trustee's Report of No Distribution, the court determines that there is no equity in the Property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

Debtor was granted a discharge in this case on September 23, 2014. Granting of a discharge to an individual in a Chapter 7 case terminates the automatic stay as to that debtor by operation of law, replacing it with the discharge injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). There being no automatic stay, the motion is denied as moot as to Debtor. The Motion is granted as to the Estate.

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

Because of Debtor's intention to surrender the Property, Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by NRZ Pass-Through Trust I, U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow NRZ Pass-Through Trust I, U.S. Bank, N.A. as Trustee, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 8882 Bell Court, Valley Springs, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent the Motion seeks relief from the automatic stay as to Michelle Howard ("Debtor"), the discharge having been entered in case, the Motion is denied as moot, the automatic stay having been terminated as to the Debtor by operation of law pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C), Debtor having been granted her discharge.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is waived for cause shown by Movant.

No other or additional relief is granted.

8. [14-91161](#)-E-7 ANDREW LUJAN
ABG-1

**MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY AND/OR MOTION
FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION
8-29-14 [[10](#)]**

**KINECTA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
VS.**

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on August 29, 2014. By the court's calculation, 34 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.
--

Andrew Mario Lujan ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on August 18, 2014. Kinecta Federal Credit Union ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2009 Acura MDX Sport Utility Vehicle, VIN ending in 9923 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Marchaun Logan-Larry to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Logan-Larry Declaration provides evidence that there are three pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$1,916.88.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$31,972.86, as stated in the Logan-Larry Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$21,254.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor.

Movant has also provided a copy of the Kelly Blue Book Valuation Report for the Vehicle. The Report has been properly authenticated and is accepted as a market report or commercial publication generally relied on by the public or by persons in the automobile sale business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(17). The Kelly Blue Book Valuation Report values the Vehicle at \$27,408.00.

RULING

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay since the debtor and the estate have not made pre-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted and under both valuations, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Kinecta Federal Credit Union, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Kinecta Federal Credit Union ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a) (3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived.

2007 Chevrolet Silverado Truck, VIN ending in 1548 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Marshaun Logan-Larry to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Logan-Larry Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made two post-petition payments, with a total of \$1,015.72 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there is an unpaid principal of \$5,061.79, late charges of \$25.39, and attorneys' fees of \$751.00.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$5,893.52, as stated in the Logan-Larry Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$4,500.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor.

RULING

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted and not including the attorneys' fees in determining the amount due on the debt, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Kinecta Federal Credit Union, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Kinecta Federal Credit Union ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C.

§ 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2007 Chevrolet Silverado Truck ("Vehicle"), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a) (3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived.

No other or additional relief is granted.

10. [13-91581](#)-E-7 WESTON/SHANNON POWELL
PPR-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
8-15-14 [[32](#)]

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f) (1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, and Chapter 7 Trustee on August 15, 2014. By the court's calculation, 48 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f) (1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f) (1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.
--

Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 596 Murdoch Court, Oakdale, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Marie Keys to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Keys Declaration states that there are three post-petition defaults in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$3,190.59 in post-petition payments past due.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$125,735.63, as stated in the Keys Declaration and Schedule D filed by Weston Duane Powell and Shannon Lee-Ann Powell ("Debtor"). The value of the Property is determined to be \$133,000.00 as stated in Schedules A and D filed by Debtor.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

The existence of defaults in post-petition or pre-petition payments by itself does not guarantee Movant obtaining relief from the automatic stay. In this case, the equity cushion in the Property for Movant's claim provides adequate protection such claim at this time. *In re Avila*, 311 B.R. 81, 84 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004). However, calculating in an estimated costs of sale of \$10,640.00 (which is an 8% estimated gross sales price) to the \$125,735.63 of the lien, Movant has sufficiently established an evidentiary basis for granting relief from the automatic stay for "cause" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

Debtor was granted a discharge in this case on December 16, 2013. Granting of a discharge to an individual in a Chapter 7 case terminates the automatic stay as to that debtor by operation of law, replacing it with the discharge injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). There being no automatic stay, the motion is denied as moot as to Debtor. The Motion is granted as to the Estate.

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by

Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow Bank of America, N.A., its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 596 Murdoch Court, Oakdale, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent the Motion seeks relief from the automatic stay as to Weston Duane Powell and Shannon Lee-Ann Powell ("Debtor"), the discharge having been entered in case, the Motion is denied as moot pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived for cause shown by Movant.

No other or additional relief is granted.

11. [14-91082](#)-E-7 JUANITA DAWSON
JHW-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
8-21-14 [[16](#)]

AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL
SERVICES, INC. VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on August 21, 2014. By the court's calculation, 42 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.
--

Juanita Raye Dawson ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on July 29, 2014. Americredit Financial Services dba GM Financial ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2010 Ford Edge, VIN ending in 4477 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Aaron Rangel to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Rangel Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made two post-petition payments, with a total of \$964.32 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there is one pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$482.16.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$21,214.32, as stated in the Rangel Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$20,000.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor.

RULING

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay since the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).]

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Americredit Financial Services dba GM Financial, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Americredit Financial Services dba GM Financial ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2010 Ford Edge ("Vehicle"), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived.

No other or additional relief is granted.

12. [13-91994-E-7](#) **THERESA FINLEY**
MBB-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
8-18-14 [[15](#)]

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. VS.

Tentative Ruling: The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995).

Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Below is the court's tentative ruling.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - Hearing Required.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on August 18, 2014. By the court's calculation, 45 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). The defaults of the non-responding parties are entered.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.
--

Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 2300 Steinbeck Drive, Modesto, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Irene Frenes to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases

the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Frenes Declaration states that there are three post-petition defaults in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$4,263.12 in post-petition payments past due.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$209,706.84, as stated in the Frenes Declaration and Schedule D filed by Theresa Marie Finley ("Debtor"). The value of the Property is determined to be \$200,000.00, as stated in Schedules A and D filed by Debtor.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments which have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

Debtor was granted a discharge in this case on February 24, 2014. Granting of a discharge to an individual in a Chapter 7 case terminates the automatic stay as to that debtor by operation of law, replacing it with the discharge injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C). There being no automatic stay, the motion is denied as moot as to Debtor. The Motion is granted as to the Estate.

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow Bank of America, N.A., its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 2300 Steinbeck Drive, Modesto, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that to the extent the Motion seeks relief from the automatic stay as to Theresa Marie Finley ("Debtor"), the discharge having been entered in case, the Motion is denied as moot pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived for cause shown by Movant.

No other or additional relief is granted.

13. [14-90895](#)-E-7 GARY/LYNEL CASTILLO
ASW-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
8-22-14 [[15](#)]

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the October 2, 2014 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, and Chapter 7 Trustee, on August 22, 2014. By the court's calculation, 41 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 1551 Rose Avenue, Ceres, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Whitney Burbank to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Burbank Declaration states that there are one post-petition defaults in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$1,257.17 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are 55 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$67,887.18.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$311,643.11 (including \$224,957.31 secured by Movant's deed of trust), as stated in the Burbank Declaration and Schedule D filed by Gary Benjamin Castillo and Lynel Susan Castillo ("Debtor"). The value of the Property is determined to be \$124,500.00, as stated in Schedules A and D filed by Debtor.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the

bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments which have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).]

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. See *In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

Because of Debtor's intention to surrender the Property, Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 1551 Rose Avenue, Ceres, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is waived for cause shown by Movant.

No other or additional relief is granted.