

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus  
Bankruptcy Judge  
Sacramento, California

September 3, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

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THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 11. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY SEPTEMBER 16, 2013, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY SEPTEMBER 23, 2013. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 12 THROUGH 33. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON SEPTEMBER 9, 2013, AT 2:30 P.M.

September 3, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

**Matters to be Called for Argument**

- |    |  |   |
|----|--|---|
| 1. | 09-22608-A-13   DIANE YONG<br>PGM-10<br>VS. CITIBANK, N.A.   | OBJECTION TO<br>CLAIM<br>10-16-12 [146] |
|    | <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone Appearance<br><input type="checkbox"/> Trustee Agrees with Ruling |   |

**Tentative Ruling:**    The objection will be sustained in part.

In this case, the claimant filed a claim on March 2, 2009. It is secured by the debtor's home. Other than unmatured principal, the claim demanded arrears of \$6,763.12 and an ongoing mortgage payment of \$1,822.60.

The county filed a proof of claim for delinquent real property taxes on June 17, 2009 in the amount of \$9,936.80. These taxes are for 2006, 2007, and 2008.

During this case, the claimant has periodically given notice of changes in the mortgage payment. Some are due to the variable interest feature of its note. Others are due to escrow shortages. The latter are in issue here.

The modified plan filed on February 12, 2010 and confirmed on April 5, 2010 provided for the maintenance of the ongoing mortgage payment (\$1,797.61 as adjusted downward from \$1,822.60 during the case due to an decrease in the variable interest rate) to the claimant and the cure of the arrears (a \$118 monthly dividend).

That plan also provided for the cure of the 2006, 2007, and 2008 real estate taxes owed on the county at the rate of \$210 a month.

Even though the plan provided for the cure of the delinquent taxes, the claimant paid the delinquent real property taxes during the pendency of this case. It also paid 2009 taxes that accrued after the case had been filed because the debtor failed to pay them.

The suggestion by the debtor that the claimant's cure of the taxes was somehow wrongful is rejected. Because its claim was junior to the taxes, it was within its rights to pay the taxes. Indeed, because these taxes accrue interest at a rate of 18% by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 511, the claimant did the debtor a favor by paying the delinquent taxes inasmuch as the interest rate on the mortgage is much lower. [The interest due on delinquent California real property taxes is set by statute. For each installment of real property taxes not timely paid, a 10% penalty is assessed. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 2617, 2618, 2705. In addition, a "redemption" penalty of 1 1/2% per month is added to the tax bill. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(a). For purposes of a claim in a bankruptcy case, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(b) provides that "the assessment of penalties . . . constitutes the assessment of interest."]

However, what the claimant could not do was increase the monthly installment payment due from the debtor to it in order to recoup the advance for the pre-petition taxes. Instead, the amount payable to the County under the plan is payable to creditor. It is the plan that governs what is due on account of the pre-petition tax default.

By the same token, the amounts advanced by the claimant for post-petition taxes could be recouped by increasing the monthly payment in a manner consistent with

the loan documentation.

The evidence before the court does not permit it to calculate the monthly amount due to the claimant. That installment is the current principal and interest amount, the impound for current year taxes and insurance, and the amount to recoup the advance for 2009 taxes. Because it is clear that the claimant has also attempted to recoup the advance of the delinquent pre-petition taxes, the objection will be sustained to require that it receive this cure through the plan.

2. 09-22608-A-13 DIANE YONG MOTION TO  
PGM-9 MODIFY PLAN  
9-26-12 [140]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied.

While the plan purports to provide for the maintenance of the contract installment payment to JPMorgan Chase, the amount provided in the plan, \$1,797.61, is less than the \$2,257.56 demanded by such creditor. While the amount demanded by the creditor is too high because it includes the cure of the debtor's pre-petition taxes, the debtor's assertion that the creditor is owed only principal and interest also is in error. The creditor advanced post-petition taxes that it is entitled to recoup by adjusting the installment because the plan does not provide for the cure. As to the advance of the pre-petition taxes, the plan should be amended to direct the cure to the creditor rather than the county.

3. 12-41715-A-13 LESLIE CREED MOTION TO  
HLG-3 MODIFY PLAN  
7-26-13 [78]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

First, to pay the dividends required by the plan and the rate proposed by it will take 71 months which exceeds the maximum 5-year duration permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).

Second, the plan fails to provide for the seven monthly payments already made by the debtor.

4. 13-26220-A-13 DALE/STACEY O'NEAL MOTION TO  
PGM-2 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. KITSAP CREDIT UNION 7-22-13 [25]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$6,500 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$6,500 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$6,500 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

OBJECTION TO  
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO  
DISMISS CASE  
8-12-13 [23]

- Tentative Ruling:** Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

First, the debtor failed to appear at the meeting of creditors. Appearance is mandatory. See 11 U.S.C. § 343. To attempt to confirm a plan while failing to appear and be questioned by the trustee and any creditors who appear, the debtor is also failing to cooperate with the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3). Under these circumstances, attempting to confirm a plan is the epitome of bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). The failure to appear also is cause for the dismissal of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6).

Second, the debtor has failed to commence making plan payments and has not paid approximately \$2,590 to the trustee as required by the proposed plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. This is cause to deny confirmation of the plan and for dismissal of the case. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Third, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and Local Bankruptcy Rule

1007-1(c) the debtor has failed to provide the trustee with employer payment advices for the 60-day period preceding the filing of the petition. The withholding of this financial information from the trustee is a breach of the duties imposed upon the debtor by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4) and the attempt to confirm a plan while withholding this relevant financial information is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

Fourth, 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(B) & (C) requires the court to dismiss a petition if an individual chapter 7 or 13 debtor fails to provide to the case trustee a copy of the debtor's federal income tax return for the most recent tax year ending before the filing of the petition. This return must be produced seven days prior to the date first set for the meeting of creditors. The failure to provide the return to the trustee justifies dismissal and denial of confirmation. In addition to the requirement of section 521(e)(2) that the petition be dismissed, an uncodified provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 found at section 1228(a) of BAPCPA provides that in chapter 11 and 13 cases the court shall not confirm a plan of an individual debtor unless requested tax documents have been turned over. This has not been done.

6. 11-45537-A-13 HEATH/KRISTINE HELMAN MOTION TO  
CA-3 INCUR DEBT  
8-14-13 [60]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion to incur a loan to pay for medical care will be granted. The motion establishes a need for the loan, the debtor's budget includes a reserve for medical expenses that will permit repayment of the plan, and it does not appear that repayment of the loan will unduly jeopardize the debtor's performance of the plan.

7. 13-30646-A-13 MARK/TAMMIE MANSFIELD MOTION TO  
MOH-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. BENEFICIAL FINANCIAL, INC. 8-19-13 [8]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the

hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$62,217 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Beneficial Financial, Inc. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$73,469.51 as of the petition date. Therefore, Beneficial Financial, Inc.'s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court

will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$62,217. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

8. 10-40252-A-13 SEAN MUSGROVE MOTION TO  
RECONSIDER  
8-19-13 [120]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

In this case, the debtor confirmed a plan but failed to make all payments required by it. This default prompted the trustee to serve a Notice of Default and Application to Dismiss on June 27, 2013. In it, the trustee alleged that as of June 26, 2013, the debtor had failed to make \$12,140.21 in plan payments. With the July plan payment, the debtor would owe \$19,094.21 to the trustee on July 27. The trustee informed the debtor that absent the timely exercise of one of the options outlined below, he would ask the court to dismiss the case without further notice or hearing.

This procedure for noticing a default and potentially dismissing a chapter 13 case is authorized by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g) which provides:

*(1) If the debtor fails to make a payment pursuant to a confirmed plan, including a direct payment to a creditor, the trustee may mail to the debtor and the debtor's attorney written notice of the default.*

*(2) If the debtor believes that the default noticed by the trustee does not exist, the debtor shall set a hearing within twenty-eight (28) days of the mailing of the notice of default and give at least fourteen (14) days' notice of the hearing to the trustee pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(2). At the hearing, if the trustee demonstrates that the debtor has failed to make a payment required by the confirmed plan, and if the debtor fails to rebut the trustee's evidence, the case shall be dismissed at the hearing.*

*(3) Alternatively, the debtor may acknowledge that the plan payment(s) has(have) not been made and, within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the notice of default, either (A) make the delinquent plan payment(s) and all subsequent plan payments that have fallen due, or (B) file a modified plan and a motion to confirm the modified plan. If the debtor's financial condition has materially changed, amended Schedules I and J shall be filed and served with the motion to modify the chapter 13 plan.*

*(4) If the debtor fails to set a hearing on the trustee's notice, or cure the default by payment, or file a proposed modified chapter 13 plan and motion, or perform the modified chapter 13 plan pending its approval, or obtain approval of the modified chapter 13 plan, all within the time constraints set out above, the case shall be dismissed without a hearing on the trustee's application.*

Thus, a debtor receiving a Notice of Default has three alternatives: (1) Cure the default within 30 days of the notice of default; (2) within 30 days of the notice of default, file a motion to confirm a modified plan and a modified plan in order to cure/suspend the default stated in the notice of default; or (3) contest the notice of default by setting a hearing within 28 days of the notice of default on 14 days of notice to the trustee.

In this case, the debtor exercised none of these options. Instead, on July 25, the debtor filed a "reply" to the notice of the default. In it, the debtor asserted that after the notice of default was served, the debtor had paid to the trustee \$5,086.21 and thereafter promised to make a further payments of \$6,954 on July 25 and \$6,954 on August 15. Because this did not comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g), the trustee requested dismissal and the court dismissed the case on August 5.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g) makes no provision for this type of response to a notice of default. Essentially, this debtor admitted the default, made a partial cure and promised to pay the remainder more than 30 days after the service of the notice of default. If the debtor wanted to cure the default over a period longer than 30 days, he should have exercised the option of modifying the plan.

This motion overs no excuse for the failure to respond to the notice of default in a manner consistent with the local rule. The default is admitted. The default has not been cured. There is no cause to reconsider the dismissal.



9. 13-28557-A-13 KEVIN MEADOWS  
JPJ-1

OBJECTION TO  
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO  
DISMISS CASE  
8-15-13 [18]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

the debtor has failed to give the trustee documentation for business expenses and for the valuation of his home as he agreed to furnish. This is a breach of the duties imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4). To attempt to confirm a plan while withholding relevant financial information from the trustee is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be prejudicial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

10. 13-22380-A-13 EDEN SANA  
MET-3

MOTION TO  
SELL  
8-9-13 [38]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion to sell real property will be granted on the condition that the sale proceeds are used to pay all liens of record in full in a manner consistent with the plan. If the proceeds are not sufficient to pay liens of record in full (including liens ostensibly "stripped off"), no sale may be completed without the consent of each lienholder not being paid in full.

11. 13-23991-A-13 STEVEN JACQUES  
EAT-1  
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSN. VS.

MOTION FOR  
RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY  
7-31-13 [53]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

The movant purchased the subject property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale before the bankruptcy case was filed. Under California law, once a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has occurred, the trustor has no right of redemption. Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App.4th 822, 831 (1994).

When the debtor refused to vacate the property, the movant filed a notice to quit the premises. When the debtor did not quit the premises, an unlawful detainer action was filed and served. No trial was had on the complaint because of the intervention of this bankruptcy case.

Therefore, the debtor has no right to ignore the foreclosure. If the debtor wishes to contest the validity of the foreclosure sale, he has two choices. First, he can file a complaint in a court of competent jurisdiction to set aside the sale or have it declared void. Second, he can defend the unlawful detainer on the basis that the foreclosure was invalid. As part of either course of action, he should seek the necessary relief to prevent the creditor from taking possession. The bankruptcy may not be substituted for this purpose.

Further, the debtor confirmed a plan in this case. That plan makes no provision for the claim formerly secured by the property and it provides that all property reverted in the debtor upon confirmation. Hence, the subject property is not integral to the performance of the plan.

**THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE**

|                                |                  |
|--------------------------------|------------------|
| 12. 13-28605-A-13 JUAN RIGGINS | MOTION TO        |
| PGM-1                          | VALUE COLLATERAL |
| VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.  | 8-2-13 [18]      |

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$410,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$591,067 as of the petition date. Therefore, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobby, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.

3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$410,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

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| 13. | 13-28506-A-13 LONNIE/MARIA FINK<br>PGM-1<br>VS. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE | MOTION TO<br>VALUE COLLATERAL<br>8-2-13 [15] |
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**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$350,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$440,000 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage's other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's

principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$350,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

14. 13-27707-A-13 ROBERT/NANCY ALEXANDER  
CK-1

MOTION TO  
CONFIRM PLAN  
7-25-13 [18]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

15. 13-29808-A-13 SUSAN KELLY  
RK-1  
VS. SAFE CREDIT UNION

MOTION TO  
VALUE COLLATERAL  
7-29-13 [8]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$114,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by SAFE Credit Union. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$192,761 as of the petition date. Therefore, SAFE Credit Union's other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$114,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

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| 16. | 13-29811-A-13    ANDREW MACIVER<br>RK-1<br>VS. SCHOOLS FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION | MOTION TO<br>VALUE COLLATERAL<br>7-29-13 [8] |
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**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See

Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$12,400 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$12,400 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$12,400 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

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| 17. | 10-31414-A-13 DEWEY FORD<br>JMC-4<br>VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. | OBJECTION TO<br>CLAIM<br>7-18-13 [54] |
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**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The creditor response concedes the merit of the objection and indicates that claim 2-1 has been superceded by claim 5-1. Therefore, the objection to claim 2-1 will be sustained.

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| 18. | 09-35520-A-13 BARON/RAQUEAL DARNELL<br>MET-3<br>VS. HSBC BANK NEVADA, N.A. | MOTION TO<br>VALUE COLLATERAL<br>7-11-13 [63] |
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**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property, to the extent it has not been consumed, had a value of \$500 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$500 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$500 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

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| 19. | 13-26220-A-13 DALE/STACEY O'NEAL<br>PGM-1 | MOTION TO<br>CONFIRM PLAN<br>7-22-13 [30] |
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**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the



notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

20. 12-38027-A-13 WILLIAM/DENISE PERKINS MOTION TO  
WW-1 MODIFY PLAN  
7-29-13 [30]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

21. 09-27528-A-13 KEITH/JANET OLSEN MOTION TO  
DBJ-6 SELL  
8-2-13 [94]

**Final Ruling:** The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1(c) provides that notices in adversary proceedings and contested matters that are served on the IRS shall be mailed to three entities at three different addresses: (1) IRS, P.O. Box 7346, Philadelphia, PA 19101-7346; (2) United States Attorney, for the IRS, 501 I Street, Suite 10-100, Sacramento, CA 95814; and (3) United States Department of Justice, Civil Trial Section, Western Region, Box 683, Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044.

Service in this case is deficient because the IRS was not served at the second and third addresses listed above.

22. 13-30028-A-13 ELISA DINALLO MOTION TO  
JGD-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 8-20-13 [20]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and

the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$288,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Nationstar Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$296,441 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Barte, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan

is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$288,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

23. 13-28629-A-13 STEVEN/JANENE MICHALK MOTION TO  
SLH-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. BANCO POPULAR NORTH AMERICA 8-1-13 [16]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$247,131 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by PNC Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$275,288 as of the petition date. Therefore, Banco Popular North America's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the

claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$247,131. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

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| 24. | 08-37830-A-13    SUSAN HACKETT<br>JT-3<br>VS. REAL TIME RESOLUTIONS, INC. | MOTION TO<br>VALUE COLLATERAL<br>8-1-13 [52] |
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**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to

the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$285,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Countrywide Home Loans. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$314,429 as of the petition date. Therefore, Real Time Resolutions, Inc's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan

is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$285,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

25. 13-24839-A-13 JANET LYTLE ORDER TO  
SHOW CAUSE  
8-12-13 [42]

**Final Ruling:** The order to show cause will be discharged and the case will remain pending.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the \$70 installment when due on August 7. However, after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent installment was paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.

26. 09-39258-A-13 RICHARD/LORETTA MOTION TO  
WW-3 RETHERFORD MODIFY PLAN  
7-29-13 [64]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

27. 13-25864-A-13 LA KEISHA MATLOCK  
PGM-1

MOTION TO  
CONFIRM PLAN  
7-19-13 [64]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

28. 09-32378-A-13 MICHAEL/LORI ALLRED  
HLG-2

MOTION TO  
MODIFY PLAN  
7-23-13 [62]

**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted and the objection will be overruled on the condition that the plan is further modified to account for the \$154,832.56 in payments already made through July 25, 2013 and to require a monthly payment of \$2,892 for the remaining 11 months of the plan. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

29. 13-28483-A-13 CHARLENE LEWIS-WILLIAMS  
PGM-1  
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

MOTION TO  
VALUE COLLATERAL  
8-2-13 [16]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$250,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Green Tree Servicing, LLC. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$279,744 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$250,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of



property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

30. 13-26985-A-13 MANUEL ARCH MOTION TO  
RAC-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 6-26-13 [14]

**Final Ruling:** The parties have resolved this matter by stipulation.

31. 10-43586-A-13 MAEZOLA WEST MOTION TO  
EJS-4 MODIFY PLAN  
7-30-13 [63]

**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted and the objection will be overruled on the condition that the plan is further modified to require monthly payments through September 2015. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

32. 13-29894-A-13 AARON/THERESA PELICAN MOTION TO  
MRL-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP RESORTS, INC. 7-29-13 [8]

**Final Ruling:** The parties have continued the hearing to September 9, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

33. 13-29894-A-13 AARON/THERESA PELICAN MOTION TO  
MRL-2 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. MARRIOTT OWNERSHIP RESORTS, INC. 7-29-13 [11]

**Final Ruling:** The parties have continued the hearing to September 9, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.