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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

July 29, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 22. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON AUGUST 26, 2013 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY AUGUST 12, 2013, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY AUGUST 19, 2013. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 23 THROUGH 48. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON AUGUST 5, 2013, AT 2:30 P.M.

July 29, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1.	10-45705-A-13 GREGORY FOLSOM AND CA-5 GEORGIANNA WELLS VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.	MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL 7-15-13 [103]
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- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$334,500 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Chase Home Finance LLC. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$405,537.81 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$334,500. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

2. 09-22608-A-13 DIANE YONG OBJECTION TO
PGM-10 CLAIM
VS. CITIBANK, N.A. 10-16-12 [146]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: None. The parties have filed a document indicating the objection has been settled but nothing appears on the docket describing the terms of the settlement and impact on the claim of the creditor.

3. 09-22608-A-13 DIANE YONG MOTION TO
PGM-9 MODIFY PLAN
9-26-12 [140]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: None.

While the plan purports to provide for the maintenance of the contract installment payment to JPMorgan Chase, the amount provided in the plan, \$1,797.61, is less than the \$2,257.56 demanded by such creditor. Absent a settlement regarding, or a successful objection to, the secured claim, the plan

either is not feasible - it will not pay the amount owed on the claim - or it will take more than 5 years to be completed in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).

The parties have filed a document indicating the objection to the claim has been settled but nothing appears on the docket describing the terms of the settlement or its impact on the claim of the creditor and the confirmability of the plan.

4. 12-36210-A-13 KENNETH/KATHLEEN KEEHNER OBJECTION TO
JPJ-3 CLAIM
VS. CREDIT BUREAU ASSOCIATES 6-11-13 [31]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be overruled.

The objection seems to be that on October 5, 2012, the Folsom Cordova USD Student Care Center filed a timely proof of claim for a priority unsecured debt of \$2,489.93. Then, on December 19, 2012, Credit Bureau Associates filed a proof of claim for a general unsecured debt of \$2,333.63. The trustee asserts that these proofs of claim are duplicative and asks that only the latest claim be allowed.

However, there is nothing in the Credit Bureau's proof of claim indicating on whose behalf it was filed. Further, given the difference in amount and the fact that the district's claim is a priority claim, the court cannot conclude that these claims are for the same debt.

5. 13-25215-A-13 SHARILYNN BONNARD OBJECTION TO
MBB-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
U.S. BANK, N.A. VS. 5-30-13 [30]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be sustained.

Even though 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) prevents the proposed plan from modifying a claim secured only by the debtor's home, like the claim of U.S. Bank, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) & (b)(5) permit the plan to provide for the cure of any defaults on such a claim while ongoing installment payments are maintained. The proposed plan, however, does not provide for a cure of the arrears owed to U.S. Bank. The claim is classified in Class 4 which is reserved for long-term secured claims not modified by the plan nor in default when the case is filed. By failing to provide for a cure, the debtor is, in effect, impermissibly modifying a home loan. Also, the failure to cure the default means that U.S. Bank's secured claim will not be paid in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B). The claim belongs in Class 1.

6. 13-25215-A-13 SHARILYNN BONNARD
SDB-1
VS. BH FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC

MOTION TO
AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN
5-15-13 [20]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). The subject real property has a value of \$270,000 as of the date of the petition. The unavoidable liens total \$213,000. The debtor has an available exemption of \$53,170.02. The respondent holds a judicial lien created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment in the chain of title of the subject real property. After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is remains equity of \$3,829.98 to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of this judicial lien does not impair the debtor's exemption of the real property and its fixing cannot be avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

7. 13-29025-A-13 FELIPE/AVELINA MIGUEL
PGM-1

MOTION TO
EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
7-12-13 [11]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. A prior case was dismissed within one year of the filing of the current case. The prior case was dismissed approximately two months prior to the filing of the most recent case at the trustee's request because, among other things, the debtor was unable to maintain the payments required by a confirmed plan.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30th day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30th day after the filing of the petition. The motion will be adjudicated before the 30-day period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, it appears that the debtor was unable to maintain plan payments in the first case. This motion does not establish that the debtor will be any more successful in this case. The motion admits that the debtor's income has decreased dramatically, by \$6,000, but maintains that because the debtor's expenses have decreased by approximately \$7,000, the debtor can afford to make an even higher plan payment that the debtor could not make in the last case. The court does not find this credible without a detailed explanation of the expenses that have been reduced and why those expenses were not reduced in the prior case in an effort to salvage that case.

Further, the debtor filed a chapter 13 case in 2009 that was dismissed in 2011 because the debtor failed to make plan payments. Hence, the dismissal of the second case was by no means an aberration.

The court cannot conclude that this case is more apt to succeed.

8. 13-23326-A-13 LAKSHMI/NEENA DUTT MOTION TO
PGM-2 CONFIRM PLAN
6-17-13 [34]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objections will be sustained in part.

The plan neither devotes all projected disposable income to the payment of unsecured claims nor pays unsecured claims in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). First, the debtor's repayment of a 401k loan will end before the plan is completed. Yet, the money devoted to the repayment of the loan will not be used to pay unsecured claims once the 401k loan is repaid. Instead, the debtor is inflating expenses to avoid paying all of this money to creditors. Second, the debtor is over-withholding income taxes. This, in effect, shelters the money from creditors and provides the debtor with a year-end windfall.

9. 13-24737-A-13 DANNY RUE MOTION TO
DWR-2 CONFIRM PLAN
5-21-13 [38]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained in part.

First, the debtor has failed to make \$200 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that

the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Second, even if the plan payments were current, the plan would not be feasible because the monthly plan payment of \$1,580 is less than the \$1,771.99 in dividends and expenses the plan requires the trustee to pay each month.

Third, to pay the dividends required by the plan and the rate proposed by it will take 129 months which exceeds the maximum 5-year duration permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d).

The objection that the plan does not require the debtor to name the trustee as an additional insured on all insurance policies will be overruled. The plan provides that the property of the estate will not revert in the debtor upon plan confirmation. This is consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b). However, the trustee demands that the debtor add the trustee as an insured to all insurance policies covering the debtor's property and business. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requires this and it is not necessary inasmuch as the trustee has no dominion and control over the property of the estate other than plan payments. See 11 U.S.C. § 1303.

10. 13-24737-A-13 DANNY RUE COUNTER MOTION TO
DWR-2 DISMISS CASE
7-15-13 [50]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be prejudicial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

11. 13-20943-A-13 CRISTIE TALBOTT MOTION TO
SJJ-3 CONFIRM PLAN
5-31-13 [61]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan's feasibility depends on the debtor successfully prosecuting a motion to value the collateral of Bank of America in order to strip down or strip off its secured claim from its collateral. No such motion has been filed, served, and granted. Absent a successful motion the debtor cannot establish that the plan will pay secured claims in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) or that the plan is feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(j) provides: "If a proposed plan will reduce or eliminate a secured claim based on the value of its collateral or the avoidability of a lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the debtor must file, serve, and set for hearing a valuation motion and/or a lien avoidance motion. The hearing must be concluded before or in conjunction with the confirmation of

the plan. If a motion is not filed, or it is unsuccessful, the Court may deny confirmation of the plan."

12. 09-31152-A-13 PARMINDER SINGH OBJECTION TO
JPJ-4 CLAIM
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 6-11-13 [82]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be sustained.

The last date to file a timely proof of claim was September 30, 2009. The proof of claim was filed on April 16, 2013. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

While opposition to the objection was filed, it fails to establish that the proof of claim was filed timely.

13. 13-27454-A-13 SHANE/SARA NEWSON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
7-9-13 [22]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will be dismissed.

The debtor was given permission to pay the filing fee in installments pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b). The installment in the amount of \$70 due on July 1 was not paid. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(2).

14. 13-20962-A-13 STEVEN/SUSANN MCCULLOUGH MOTION TO
JT-2 CONFIRM PLAN
6-17-13 [50]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The debtor has failed to make \$1,663 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

15. 13-20962-A-13 STEVEN/SUSANN MCCULLOUGH COUNTER MOTION TO
JT-2 DISMISS CASE
7-15-13 [57]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be prejudicial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

16. 08-32267-A-13 DARRYL/DONNA JAIME MOTION TO
CA-1 INCUR DEBT
7-15-13 [48]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion to incur a purchase money loan in order to purchase a new home will be granted. The motion establishes a need for the home and it does not appear that repayment of the loan will unduly jeopardize the debtor's performance of the plan given that the debtor's performance of the plan is complete or nearly complete.

17. 12-20070-A-13 GUILLERMO LOPEZ AND NORMA MOTION TO
TOG-6 TAPIA APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION
7-2-13 [47]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on

the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

18. 12-39573-A-13 JOSEPH/ROBI ROGERS
DBJ-4

MOTION TO
CONFIRM PLAN
5-3-13 [90]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan does not provide for the objecting creditor's secured claim. Ordinarily, this is not a problem.

11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) is the section of the Bankruptcy Code that specifies the mandatory provisions of a plan. It requires only that the debtor adequately fund the plan with future earnings or other future income that is paid over to the trustee (section 1322(a)(1)), provide for payment in full of priority claims (section 1322(a)(2) & (4)), and provide the same treatment for each claim in a particular class (section 1322(a)(3)). But, nothing in section 1322(a) compels a debtor to propose a plan that provides for a secured claim.

11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) specifies the provisions that a plan may, at the option of the debtor, include. With reference to secured claims, the debtor may not modify a home loan but may modify other secured claims (section 1322(b)(2)), cure any default on a secured claim, including a home loan (section 1322(b)(3)), and maintain ongoing contract installment payments while curing a pre-petition default (section 1322(b)(5)).

If a debtor elects to provide for a secured claim, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) gives the debtor three options: (1) provide a treatment that the debtor and secured creditor agree to (section 1325(a)(5)(A)), provide for payment in full of the entire claim if the claim is modified or will mature by its terms during the term of the plan (section 1325(a)(5)(B)), or surrender the collateral for the claim to the secured creditor (section 1325(a)(C)). However, these three possibilities are relevant only if the plan provides for the secured claim.

When a plan does not provide for a secured claim, the remedy usually is not denial of confirmation. Instead, the claim holder may seek the termination of the automatic stay so that it may repossess or foreclose upon its collateral. The absence of a plan provision is good evidence that the collateral for the claim is not necessary for the debtor's reorganization and that the claim will not be paid. This is cause for relief from the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

This case presents a different picture. The objecting creditor's claim is secured by a motorhome. The debtor asserts that it was surrendered to the creditor before the case was filed. The creditor asserts it never received the motorhome. The debtor now says the debtor assumed the creditor took possession of the vehicle and if it did not it must have been stolen.

The creditor believes the debtor continues to possess the motorhome and is hiding it from the creditor. This can be inferred from several facts.

First, the debtor has testified in connection with this motion that the motorhome went missing in early 2008. However, in an declaration earlier declaration the debtor stated under penalty of perjury that it was surrendered to the movant in 2007.

Second, whether it went missing in 2007 or early 2008, the debtor's insurance coverage was effective until at least June 2008. Yet, the debtor never made a claim.

Third, the debtor has never filed a police report to report the alleged theft.

Fourth, the debtor made payments to the creditor in February 2008. The account went delinquent in the following month, March 2008. Therefore, it makes no sense that the motorhome would have been surrendered in 2007 or that the creditor would have attempted to repossess it in early 2008. This is corroborated by the creditor's file which indicates that the creditor's representatives were in touch with the debtor in April 2008 and the debtor was stilling making up his mind as to whether he intended to surrender the motorhome or catch up the payments. Further when asked the location of the motorhome in May 2008, he refused to tell the creditor and in December 2009, the creditor was still attempting to locate the property.

The court concludes that the debtor is not being truthful. The debtor either has the motorhome or simply refuses to make it available to the creditor. This bankruptcy is part of his efforts to defraud the creditor. This case and the plan have been filed in bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) and (a)(7).

19. 09-24386-A-13 DAVID/NANCY PUMMILL MOTION TO
JT-5 APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION
7-12-13 [76]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

20. 10-43586-A-13 MAEZOLA WEST
JPJ-2
VS. THE RYAN LAW GROUP

OBJECTION TO
CLAIM
6-11-13 [57]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be overruled.

The claimant represented the debtor's minor child in the debtor's divorce proceeding. The state court ordered the debtor to pay the child's attorney's fees. This is an obligation in the nature of support. The minor did not have the financial means to pay an attorney. The debtor had the legal obligation to support the child. And, the state court ordered the debtor to meet that obligation by paying for the child's attorney. This is a debt entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).

21. 13-26196-A-13 ELSA NORIEGA AND HIGINIO
PGM-1 NAVARRO
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
6-7-13 [17]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

This motion concerns the value of the debtor's home. In the opinion of the debtor, it has a value of \$98,000. In the opinion of Wells Fargo Bank's expert, the home has a value of \$152,500.

To the extent the objection urges the court to reject the debtor's opinion of value because the debtor's opinion is not admissible, the court instead rejects the objection. As the owner of the vehicle, the debtor is entitled to express an opinion as to the vehicle's value. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Any opinion of value by the owner must be expressed without giving a reason for the valuation. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08). Indeed, unless the owner also qualifies as an expert, it is improper for the owner to give a detailed recitation of the basis for the opinion. Only an expert qualified under Fed. R. Evid. 702 may rely on and testify as to facts "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 703. "For example, the average debtor-homeowner who testifies in opposition to a motion for relief from the § 362 automatic stay, should be limited to giving his opinion as to the value of his home, but should not be allowed to testify concerning what others have told him concerning the value of his or comparable properties unless, the debtor truly qualifies as an expert under Rule 702 such as being a real estate broker, etc." Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08).

Here, the court has been given the debtor's lay opinion and an expert opinion. That opinion is supported by the expert's declaration and a summary of the expert's qualifications. The court has reviewed the appraisal by the expert, finds no flaw in it, and concludes that the value is as determined by the

expert, \$152,500.

22.	13-26196-A-13	ELSA NORIEGA AND HIGINIO	OBJECTION TO
	APN-1	NAVARRO	CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
	VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.		6-13-13 [23]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be sustained.

The plan provides for the objecting creditor's claim on the assumption that the property securing it has no value. However, the court has concluded that the property has a value of \$152,500. After deducting a senior lien, the objecting creditor's claim is at least partially secured. Therefore, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) as interpreted by Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993), prevents the debtor from using 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) to strip down the creditor's claim to the net value of its security. The claim must be treated as completely secured in order to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).

23.	12-29403-A-13	TOM/SHERRY STEVENS	OBJECTION TO
	JPJ-2		CLAIM
	VS. CITIMORTGAGE, INC.		6-11-13 [41]

The last date to file a timely proof of claim was September 19, 2012. The proof of claim was filed on April 26, 2013. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$75,746 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Seterus, Inc. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$154,772 as of the petition date. Therefore, Chase Bank's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840

(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$75,746. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$36,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Seterus, Inc. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$48,211 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an

adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$36,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

26. 10-39408-A-13 PAUL/CHRISTINA MATCHAM MOTION TO
JMC-9 MODIFY PLAN
6-14-13 [118]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1(c) provides that notices in adversary proceedings and contested matters that are served on the IRS shall be mailed to three entities at three different addresses: (1) IRS, P.O. Box 7346, Philadelphia, PA 19101-7346; (2) United States Attorney, for the IRS, 501 I Street, Suite 10-100, Sacramento, CA 95814; and (3) United States Department of Justice, Civil Trial Section, Western Region, Box 683, Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044.

Service in this case is deficient because, according to the certificate of service, the IRS was not served at the Dept. of Justice address and the U.S. Attorney address.

27. 13-27311-A-13 SANTOKH MAHAL ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
7-3-13 [25]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be discharged.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the \$70 installment when due on June 28. However, after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent installment was paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.

28. 12-40323-A-13 FRANK MANZANO
JKU-2

MOTION TO
CONFIRM PLAN
6-10-13 [63]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 2002-1(c) provides that notices in adversary proceedings and contested matters that are served on the IRS shall be mailed to three entities at three different addresses: (1) IRS, P.O. Box 7346, Philadelphia, PA 19101-7346; (2) United States Attorney, for the IRS, 501 I Street, Suite 10-100, Sacramento, CA 95814; and (3) United States Department of Justice, Civil Trial Section, Western Region, Box 683, Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044.

Service in this case is deficient because, according to the certificate of service, the IRS was not served at the Dept. of Justice address and the U.S. Attorney address.

29. 13-23223-A-13 GLENN HAGELE
JJC-2

MOTION TO
CONFIRM PLAN
5-30-13 [58]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed because it is moot. The court has granted the trustee's motion to dismiss the case. The order is pending.

30. 13-27523-A-13 BRENDA/MARK LOPES
HDR-1
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
6-27-13 [14]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$225,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Yolo Federal Credit Union. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$287,581 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840

(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$225,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

31. 11-46027-A-13 WARD/KATHLEEN ALLEN OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CLAIM
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 6-11-13 [32]

Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Bank of America has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The last date to file a timely proof of claim was March 7, 2012. The proof of claim was filed on March 21, 2013. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

32. 12-38039-A-13 TONY MILO MOTION TO
NBC-5 CONFIRM PLAN
6-10-13 [100]

Final Ruling: The movant has voluntarily dismissed the motion.

33. 10-32446-A-13 TYLER WILLIAMS OBJECTION TO
JPJ-3 CLAIM
VS. RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES 6-11-13 [55]

Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Resurgent Capital Services has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The last date to file a timely proof of claim was August 28, 2010. The proof of claim was filed on September 22, 2010. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

34. 13-22347-A-13 LYNNE MONTGOMERY MOTION TO
MAC-1 CONFIRM PLAN
5-22-13 [45]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the

notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

35. 09-48554-A-13 RONALD/STACIE ROE
JT-3
VS. HSBC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
6-28-13 [46]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$400,400 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Nationstar Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$460,279.88 as of the petition date. Therefore, HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes

provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$400,400. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

36.	10-38654-A-13	ANTONIO TORRES AND	MOTION TO
	PGM-2	VIRGINIA NORIEGA	APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION
			6-25-13 [59]

Final Ruling: This motion to modify a home loan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

37. 09-21062-A-13 JEANNETTE PATTERSON OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CLAIM
VS. ALLAN R. FRUMKIN, INC. 6-11-13 [50]

Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Allan R. Frumkin, Inc., has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The last date to file a timely proof of claim was June 3, 2009. The proof of claim was filed on September 10, 2010. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

38. 13-27063-A-13 MARK/ROXANE JOHNSON MOTION TO
SDB-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 6-25-13 [16]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$** as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$518,478.72 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re

Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$385,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$300,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by JPMorgan Chase Bank. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$340,283.11 as of the petition date. Therefore, JPMorgan Chase Bank's other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an

adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$300,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

40.	12-35269-A-13 ROLANDA REED JPJ-2 VS. SALLIE MAE, INC.	OBJECTION TO CLAIM 6-11-13 [22]
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Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Sallie Mae, Inc., has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

Assuming the government bar date applies, the last possible date to file a timely proof of claim was February 23, 2013. The proof of claim was filed on April 26, 2013. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

41.	10-28976-A-13 PAMELA CUMMINGS PGM-6	MOTION TO INCUR DEBT 6-28-13 [102]
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Final Ruling: This motion to borrow has been set for hearing on the notice

required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion to incur a purchase money loan to purchase a vehicle will be granted. The motion establishes a need for the vehicle and it does not appear that repayment of the loan will unduly jeopardize the debtor's performance of the plan.

42. 08-27682-A-13 WILLIAM/JAZETTE LEWIS MOTION TO
PGM-2 MODIFY PLAN
5-3-13 [56]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

SMUD holds a long term secured claim. The plan provides for that claim in Class 4. Claims in Class 4 are not impaired by the plan and were not in default when the case was filed. Consequently, the debtor pays each Class 4 claim directly to the holder of the claim.

In this case, while SMUD's claim was not in default when the bankruptcy case was filed, the debtor has failed to make direct payments since January 2009. The confirmed plan, then, is in default - the debtors failed to make direct payments it required. And, as initially filed, the modified fails to cure the post-petition default. Nonetheless, since the motion was filed, SMUD and the debtor have agreed to modify the long term obligation such that the need to cure the arrears is eliminated because the loan has been reamortized beyond the duration of the proposed modified plan. Consequently, the claim will not be discharged and will be paid directly by the debtor during the remainder of this case and after it is completed.

Given the consensual refinance of the SMUD loan, the modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

43. 13-26985-A-13 MANUEL ARCH MOTION TO
RAC-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 6-26-13 [14]

Final Ruling: The respondent's request for a continuance will be granted. The hearing is continued to September 3, 2013 AT 1:30 P.M. Further evidence in opposition to the motion must be filed and served by August 19, 2013. Any reply shall be filed and served by August 26.

44. 13-26987-A-13 CHARLIE COOPER
RAC-1
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
6-24-13 [14]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$267,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$294,627 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an

adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$267,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

45.	13-23991-A-13 STEVEN JACQUES JPJ-2	OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS 5-7-13 [25]
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Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. The court set a briefing schedule to give the debtor additional time to produce evidence. Nothing was filed. Because the court has conducted one hearing on the record previously made by the parties, further argument will not aid the court. Accordingly, the objection is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained.

The required spousal waiver has been filed and so the debtor may claim exemptions under Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 703.140 assuming he is otherwise eligible to claim.

However, as the trustee notes in the objection, the debtor has a Nevada driver's license, is registered to vote in Nevada, is licensed to operate a business in Nevada, and resided in Nevada for the prior three years. He is not domiciled in California.

The court continued the hearing on the objection to give the debtor the opportunity to produce evidence that he has been domiciled in California. His initial response to the trustee objection was conclusory - he made the naked assertion that he has been domiciled in California for two years. The reference to a two-year period apparently is an effort to avoid the application of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).

The court gave the debtor another opportunity to establish that he is a California domicile by filing additional evidence that identifies, by reference to specific periods of time, his connections to California. He failed to do so. Therefore, based on the debtor's admissions to the trustee at the meeting and in the schedules and states, the court concludes that by virtue of section 522(b)(3)(A), the debtor may not claim California exemptions because he has not been domiciled in California for the two years prior to bankruptcy.

46. 13-27891-A-13 ERIK MAIDEN AND LILYBETH MOTION TO
HLG-1 BAUTISTA VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. CITIMORTGAGE, INC. 6-28-13 [24]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$222,979 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by America's Servicing Co. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$294,516 as of the petition date. Therefore, Citimortgage, Inc.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real

property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

47.	13-27891-A-13	ERIK MAIDEN AND LILYBETH	MOTION TO
	HLG-2	BAUTISTA	VALUE COLLATERAL
	VS. WELLS FARGO BANK NV, N.A.		6-28-13 [19]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditors to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditors are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's real property at a fair market value of \$188,908 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$312,816 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank NV's claim secured by a second priority deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed by the fact that it is not the debtor's residence.

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$188,908. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

48. 13-27891-A-13 ERIK MAIDEN AND LILYBETH MOTION TO
HLG-3 BAUTISTA VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC. 6-28-13 [14]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and

the respondent creditors to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditors are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's real property at a fair market value of \$188,908 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$312,816 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage's claim is partially secured. The under-collateralized portion of the claim will be allowed as an unsecured claim, not a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed by the fact that it is not the debtor's residence.

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11

U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$188,908. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).