UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of California
Honorable René Lastreto II
Department B – Courtroom #13
Fresno, California
Hearing Date: Thursday, July 9, 2026

Unless otherwise ordered, all matters before the Honorable René Lastreto II, shall be simultaneously: (1) **In Person** at, Courtroom #13 (Fresno hearings only), (2) via **ZoomGov Video**, (3) via **ZoomGov Telephone**, and (4) via **CourtCall**. You may choose any of these options unless otherwise ordered or stated below.

All parties or their attorneys who wish to appear at a hearing remotely must sign up by **4:00 p.m. one business day** prior to the hearing. Information regarding how to sign up can be found on the **Remote Appearances** page of our website at https://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/Calendar/CourtAppearances. Each party/attorney who has signed up will receive a Zoom link or phone number, meeting I.D., and password via e-mail.

If the deadline to sign up has passed, parties and their attorneys who wish to appear remotely must contact the Courtroom Deputy for the Department holding the hearing.

Please also note the following:

- Parties in interest and/or their attorneys may connect to the video or audio feed free of charge and should select which method they will use to appear when signing up.

- Members of the public and the press who wish to attend by ZoomGov may only listen in to the hearing using the Zoom telephone number. Video participation or observing are not permitted.

- Members of the public and the press may not listen in to trials or evidentiary hearings, though they may attend in person unless otherwise ordered.

To appear remotely for law and motion or status conference proceedings, you must comply with the following guidelines and procedures:

1. Review the Pre-Hearing Dispositions prior to appearing at the hearing.
2. Parties appearing via CourtCall are encouraged to review the CourtCall Appearance Information. If you are appearing by ZoomGov phone or video, please join at least 10 minutes prior to the start of the calendar and wait with your microphone muted until the matter is called.

Unauthorized Recording is Prohibited: Any recording of a court proceeding held by video or teleconference, including "screen shots" or other audio or visual copying of a hearing is prohibited. Violation may result in sanctions, including removal of court-issued media credentials, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the court. For more information on photographing, recording, or broadcasting Judicial Proceedings, please refer to Local Rule 173(a) of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRE-HEARING DISPOSITIONS

Each matter on this calendar will have one of three possible designations: No Ruling, Tentative Ruling, or Final Ruling. These instructions apply to those designations.

No Ruling: All parties will need to appear at the hearing unless otherwise ordered.

Tentative Ruling: If a matter has been designated as a tentative ruling it will be called, and all parties will need to appear at the hearing unless otherwise ordered. The court may continue the hearing on the matter, set a briefing schedule, or enter other orders appropriate for efficient and proper resolution of the matter. The original moving or objecting party shall give notice of the continued hearing date and the deadlines. The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions.

Final Ruling: Unless otherwise ordered, there will be **<u>no hearing on these matters</u>**. The final disposition of the matter is set forth in the ruling and it will appear in the minutes. The final ruling may or may not finally adjudicate the matter. If it is finally adjudicated, the minutes constitute the court's findings and conclusions.

Orders: Unless the court specifies in the tentative or final ruling that it will issue an order, the prevailing party shall lodge an order within 14 days of the final hearing on the matter.

Post-Publication Changes: The court endeavors to publish its rulings as soon as possible. However, calendar preparation is ongoing, and these rulings may be revised or updated at any time prior to 4:00 p.m. the day before the scheduled hearings. Please check at that time for any possible updates.

9:30 AM

1. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
   BB-2

   MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR BURNS BAIR LLP, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
   6-5-2026 [816]

   BURNS BAIR LLP/MV
   HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
   JESSE BAIR/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Denied without prejudice.

ORDER: The court will issue an order.

Burns Bair LLP ("Applicant"), special insurance counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case, requests interim compensation of fees and reimbursement of expenses pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 328 and 331 for the period of March 1, 2026 through and including April 30, 2026. This motion will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to comply with the Local Rules of Practice ("LBR").

LBR 9004-2(a)(6), (b)(5), (b)(6), (e)(3), LBR 9014-1(c), and (e)(3) are the rules about Docket Control Numbers ("DCN"). These rules require a DCN to be in the caption page on all documents filed in every matter with the court and each new motion requires a new DCN. The DCN shall consist of not more than three letters, which may be the initials of the attorney for the moving party (e.g., first, middle, and last name) or the first three initials of the law firm for the moving party, and the number that is one number higher than the number of motions previously filed by said attorney or law firm in connection with that specific bankruptcy case. Each separate matter must have a unique DCN linking it to all other related pleadings.

On March 19, 2026, Applicant filed its *First Interim Fee Application*, Doc. #662 *et seq.* The DCN for that motion was BB-2. On June 5, 2026, Applicant filed this *Second Interim Fee* Application, for which the DCN is also BB-2, and therefore, it does not comply with the local rules. Each separate matter filed with the court must have a different DCN.

For the above reason, this motion will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
FTI-3

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR FTI CONSULTING, INC., OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
6-5-2026 [824]

FTI CONSULTING, INC./MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

FTI Consulting, Inc., together with its wholly owned subsidiaries (collectively "Applicant" or "FTI"), financial advisor for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case (the "Committee"), requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 in the sum of **$99,828.00.** Doc. #652. This amount consists of **$99,828.00** in fees and **$0.00** in expenses from **March 1, 2026, through April 30, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

This Application is supported by the declaration of Conor P. Tully, Senior Managing Director for FTI and by exhibits which include, *inter alia*, billing records for the representation. Docs. ##826-827.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as general bankruptcy counsel was authorized pursuant to 11

U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #188. The Committee retained Applicant for financial advice through an order approving the motion for employment seeking retroactive employment for all work performed by FTI from the petition date through the date of the hearing. Doc. #403.

This is FTI's second request for compensation. On May 10, 2026, the court granted FTI's first fee application on April 23, 2026, awarding $282,329.45 in fees and $0.00 in expenses on an interim basis. Doc. #760.

Applicant requests fees for **169.2** billable hours of legal services totaling **$135,723.00**, less a voluntary reduction of **$35,895.00**, for a total award sought in the amount of **$99,828.00**. Doc. #827. The specific attorneys and professional staff who billed during this Application Period and their hourly rates are identified in the moving papers. Docs. #824, ##826-827. Applicant does not seek expense reimbursement in this application.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3).

Applicant's services included but are not limited to. (listing only the most significant): current operating results & events (4.4 hours; $2,385.50); cash & liquidity analysis (76.6 hours; $57,286.50); real estate issues (37.7 hours; $29,702.00); analysis of claims/liabilities subject to compromise ($16.7 hours; $15,578.00); case management (44.4 hours; $41,918.66); general meetings with Committee and Committee counsel (12.5 hours; $12,380.00). The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. After the reduction requested by the UST is applied, Applicant will be awarded **$99,828.00** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **$0.00** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **$99,828.00** for fees and expenses for the Application Period.

3. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
MB-48

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION BY THE LAW OFFICE OF MCCORMICK, BARSTOW, SHEPPARD, WAYTE & CARRUTH LLP FOR HAGOP T. BEDOYAN, DEBTORS ATTORNEY(S)
6-4-2026 [792]

HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP ("Applicant" or "MB"), general bankruptcy counsel for the Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 in the sum of **$225,611.75**. Doc. #792. This amount consists of **$225,339.00** in fees and **$272.75** in expenses from **March 1, 2026, through April 30, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #794.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as general bankruptcy counsel was authorized pursuant to 11

U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #188. This is Applicant's fifth fee application, the Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [MB-22]	11/14/25 Doc. #414	7/1/25-8/31/25	$186,164.00	$1,134.25	$187,298.25
2nd [MB-30]	12/17/25 Doc. #496	9/1/25-10/31/25	$127,499.00	$317.46	$127,816.46
3rd (MB-36)	2/26/26 Doc. #609	11/1/25-12/31/25	$131,417.50	$1,089.86	$132,705.36
4th (MB-40)	Doc. #737	1/1/26-2/28/26	$140.486.00	$481.00	$141,896.00

Applicant requests fees for **560.9** billable hours of legal services totaling **$225,339.00** in fees. Doc. #796 (Exhibits). The attorneys and other professionals and their billing rates are identified in the moving papers. Docs. #792, #795-796.

Applicant also incurred **$272.75** in expenses for copy fees and filing fees. *Id.* The total sought by this Application is **$225,611.75.** On June 24, 2026, Applicant filed a *Notice of Voluntary Reduction of Fees Request*, advising that, after consultation with the U.S. Trustee, Applicant had agreed to accept a voluntary reduction of $2,034.00 in the fees requested.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included (listing only the most significant): case administration (208.9 hours; $86,454.00); fee/employment applications (47.9 hours; $18,440.00); business operations (109.8 hours; $44,025.00); employee benefits/pensions (56.3 hours; $23,093.00); analysis/strategy (39.2 hours; $15,670.00); and settlement/non-binding ADR (25.1 hours; $8,575.00). The court finds the services and expenses and the other, less time-intensive services and expenses listed in the moving papers to be reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **$225,339.00** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **$272.75** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. After applying the voluntary fee reduction, Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **$223,577.75** for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

4. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
MB-49

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR GLASSRATNER ADVISORY AND CAPITAL GROUP LLC, FINANCIAL ADVISOR(S)
6-4-2026 [797]

GLASSRATNER ADVISORY AND CAPITAL GROUP, LLC/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 for GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC ("Applicant" or "GACG"), Debtor's financial adviser, in the sum of **$84,436.50**. Doc. #797. This amount consists of **$84,436.50** in fees and **$0.00** in expenses from **March 1, 2026, through April 30, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by the declaration of Wayne P. Weitz, senior managing director with GACG ("the Weitz Declaration"), and by exhibits consisting of GACG's billing records for the Application Period. Docs. #799, #801. Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #800.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as financial advisor was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #206. This is Applicant's fifth fee application.

Applicant requests fees for **144.20** billable hours of financial advisement services totaling **$84,436.50** in fees. Doc. #801 (Exhibits). The attorneys and other professionals and their billing rates are identified in the moving papers. Docs. #797, #799, #801.

Applicant does not seek expense reimbursement in this application.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: asset analysis; business analysis; case administration; creditor meetings/communications; debtor meetings/communications; employment/fee applications; litigation support; and monthly operating reports. Doc. #799 (Weitz Declaration). The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **$84,436.50** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **$0.00** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **$84,436.50** for fees and for this Application Period.

5. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
MB-50

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR TERENCE J. LONG, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
6-4-2026 [802]

TERENCE LONG/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 for Terence J. Long ("Applicant" or "Long"), Debtor's Restructuring Coordinator, in the sum of **$31,193.85.** Doc. #801. This amount consists of **$31,116.25** in fees and **$77.60** in expenses from **March 1, 2026, through April 30, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by Applicant's declaration ("the Long Declaration") and Exhibits consisting of Long's Invoices for the Application Period and his Task Code Summary. Docs. ##805-806. Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #804.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as Restructuring Coordinator was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #189. This is Applicant's fifth fee application, Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [MB-24]	11/14/25 Doc. #416	7/1/25-8/31/25	$46,547.25	$260.40	$46,807.65
2nd [MB-32]	12/17/25 Doc. #498	9/1/25-10/31/25	$17,225.00	$91.00	$17,316.00
3rd (MB-35)	2/25/26 Doc. #610	11/1/25-12/31/25	$22,84300	$144.90	$22,987.90
4th (MB-42)	4/24/26 Doc. #733	1/1/26-2/28/26	$18,347.50	$77.50	$18,425.10
5th (MB-50)	Pending	3/1/26-4/30/26	$31,116.25	$77.60	$31,193.85

Applicant requests fees for **115.1** billable hours of Long's services for a total of **$31,116.25**. Doc. #650 (Long Declaration). Applicant also seeks expense reimbursement for travel in the amount of **$77.60.** *Id.* These combined fees and expenses total **$31,193.85.**

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: case administration, fee/employment applications, non-working travel, business operations, and work on employee benefits/pensions. Docs. #805-806.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **$31,116.25** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **$77.60** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **$31,193.85** for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

6. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
MB-51

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR BLANK ROME LLP, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
6-4-2026 [807]

BLANK ROME, LLP/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 for Blank Rome LLP ("Applicant" or "Blank Rome"), Debtor's special insurance counsel, in the sum of **$45,265.10.** Doc. #807. This amount consists of **$45,255.80** in fees and **$9.30** in expenses from **March 1, 2026, through April 30, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by the declaration of Barron L. Weinstein, of counsel with Blank Rome ("the Weinstein Declaration"), and by exhibits consisting of Blank Rome's invoices for the Application Period (Exh. A), a Summary of Customary and Comparable Compensation, and the attorney fee budget. Docs. #809, #811. Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #810.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as special insurance counsel was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 15, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #236. This is Applicant's fifth fee application, Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	**Approved**	**Period**	**Fees**	**Costs**	**Total**
1st [MB-25]	11/14/25 Doc. #417	7/1/25-8/31/25	$28,256.20	$0.00	$28,256.20
2nd [MB-33]	12/17/25 Doc. #497	9/1/25-10/31/25	$17,033.20	$0.00	$17,033.20
3rd (MB-37)	2/26/26 Doc. #612	11/1/25-12/31/25	$36,534.00	$0.00	$35,534.00
4th (MB-43)	4/24.26 Doc. #735	1/1/26-2/28/26	$32,939.90	$95.52	$33,035.42
5th (MB-51)	Pending	3/1/26-4/30/26	$42,255.80	$9.30	$45,265.10

Applicant requests fees for **81.9** billable hours of legal services totaling **$42,255.80** in fees. Doc. #811 (Exhibits). The attorneys and other professionals and their billing rates are identified in the moving papers. Docs. #807, #809, #811. Applicant seeks expense reimbursement in the amount of **$9.30** for docket searches. *Id.*

On June 23, 2026, Applicant filed a *Notice of Voluntary Reduction of Fees Request*, advising that, after consultation with the U.S. Trustee, Applicant had agreed to accept a voluntary reduction of $750.00 in the fees requested. The total interim compensation sought after the reduction is applied is **$44,515.10.**

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: asset analysis and recovery (insurance proceeds); bankruptcy procedure; employment/fee applications; and mediation. Docs. #809, #811. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **$$42,255.80** in fees and **$9.30** in expenses as reasonable compensation for services rendered on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. After application of the voluntary reduction, Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **$44,515.10** for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

7. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
   SRR-1

   MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR STOUT RISIUS ROSS, LLC, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
   6-5-2026 [820]

   STOUT RISIUS ROSS, LLC/MV
   HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
   ROBERT KUGLER/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Denied without prejudice.

ORDER: The court will issue an order.

Stout Risius Ross LLC ("Applicant" or "Stout"), expert consultant on valuation of sexual abuse claims for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case (the "Committee"), requests compensation of fees and reimbursement of expenses as valuation expert for the Committee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 328, and 331 for the period of January 26, 2026, through and including April 30, 2026. Doc. #820 *et seq.* This motion will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to comply with the Local Rules of Practice ("LBR").

LBR 9004-2(a)(6), (b)(5), (b)(6), (e)(3), LBR 9014-1(c), and (e)(3) are the rules about Docket Control Numbers ("DCN"). These rules require a DCN to be in the caption page on all documents filed in every matter with the court and each new motion requires a new DCN. The DCN shall consist of not more than three letters, which may be the initials of the attorney for the moving party (e.g., first, middle, and last name) or the first three initials of the law firm for the moving party, and the number that is one number higher than the number of motions previously filed by said attorney or law firm in connection with that specific bankruptcy case. Each separate matter must have a unique DCN linking it to all other related pleadings.

On January 26, 2026, the Committee filed a *Motion to Employ* Stout Burns Bair LLP ("Applicant"). Doc. #550. The DCN for that motion was SRR-1. On June 5, 2026, Stout filed this *First Interim Fee* Application, for which the DCN is also SRR-1. Doc. #820. Because the instant application carries the same DCN as the earlier motion to employ, it does not comply with the local rules. Each separate matter filed with the court must have a different DCN.

For the above reason, this motion will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

8. 25-12231-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
STI-6

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION BY THE LAW OFFICE OF STINSON LLP FOR EDWIN H. CALDIE, CREDITOR COMM. ATY(S)
6-5-2026 [812]

HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
EDWIN CALDIE/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Stinson LLP ("Stinson"), counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case (the "Committee"), requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 in the sum of **$123,554.50.** Doc. #7. This amount consists of **$123,354.50** in fees and **$200.00** in expenses from **March 1, 2026, through April 30, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by the declaration of Edwin H. Caldie, counsel for the Committee ("the Caldie Declaration"), and by exhibits consisting of the attorney fee budget, Stimson's invoices for the Application Period, a Summary of Customary and Comparable Compensation. Docs. ##814-815.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. On July 15, 2025, the U.S. Trustee appointed seven survivor creditors to be members of the Committee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a). On August 14, 2025, the Court entered the Order Approving Application to Employ Stinson LLP as Counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, effective as of the Retention Date. Doc. #228. This is Applicant's fourth fee application, Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [STI-2]	12/19/25 Doc. #499	7/24/25-10/31/25	$256,941.50	$2,560.79	$259,501.79
2nd [STI-3]	2/27/26 Doc. #615	11/1/25-12/31/25	$142,635.25	$2,029.34	$144,664.59
3rd (STI-4)	5/10/26 Doc. #759	1/1/26-2/28/26	$157,107.80	$200.00	$157,307.80
4th (STI-6)	Pending	3/1/26-4/30/26	$123,354.50	$200.00	$123,554.50

Applicant requests fees for **231.40** billable hours of legal services totaling **$123,354.50** in fees. Doc. #815 (Exhibits). The attorneys and other professionals and their billing rates are identified in the moving papers. Docs. #814-815. Applicant seeks expense reimbursement as follows:

Relativity Database Charges	$200.00
TOTAL	**$200.00**

Id.

On June 29, 2026, Applicant filed a Notice advising that, in order to resolve potential objections by the U.S. Trustee's Office ("UST"), Applicant would voluntarily reduce its fee request by $913.75 to a total interim award of **$122,440.75.** Doc. #854.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: case administration; mediation; asset analysis and recovery; relief from stay; meetings and communications with creditors; employment/fee applications and objections; other contested matters; financing/cash collections; claims administration and objections; plan/disclosure statement; and appeals. Docs. ##814-815. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded the reduced amount of **$122,440.75** in fees and **$200.00** in expenses as reasonable compensation for services rendered on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **$122,640.75**for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

9. 26-12340-B-12 **IN RE: DAVID/MONICA FANTOZZI**
   DCJ-2

   MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO FILE SCHEDULES OR PROVIDE REQUIRED INFORMATION
   6-17-2026 [18]

   MONICA FANTOZZI/MV
   DAVID JOHNSTON/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

10. 26-12348-B-11 **IN RE: HUNDAL FARMS, INC.**
    CAE-1

    STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 VOLUNTARY PETITION
    5-21-2026 [1]

    RILEY WALTER/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

11. 26-12349-B-11 **IN RE: PARVINDER HUNDAL AND AMERJIT**
    JOHL-HUNDAL
    CAE-1

    STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 VOLUNTARY PETITION
    5-21-2026 [1]

    RILEY WALTER/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

12. 26-12350-B-11 **IN RE: AGQUEST LLC**
CAE-1

STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 VOLUNTARY PETITION
5-21-2026 [1]

RILEY WALTER/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

13. 26-12351-B-11 **IN RE: AGQUIP LLC**
CAE-1

STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 VOLUNTARY PETITION
5-21-2026 [1]

RILEY WALTER/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

14. 25-26371-B-11 **IN RE: SCRIPPS TWO, LLC**
CAE-1

CONTINUED STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 VOLUNTARY PETITION
11-12-2025 [1]

GABRIEL LIBERMAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Continued to August 4, 2026, at 9:30 a.m.

ORDER: The court will issue the order.

The court notes that it has approved a stipulation for stay relief and that said stipulation was docketed on June 23, 2026. Since the stipulation includes the timing of a foreclosure sale and contains other provisions, the court does not see the necessity for a status conference currently. The stay relief hearing has been continued until August 4, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. This status conference will be continued to the same date and time.

Debtor shall file and serve a status report on or before July 28, 2026.

1:30 PM

1. 25-14035-B-7 **IN RE: ROBERT/NICHOLE BRODSLY**
   DGR-2

   CONTINUED MOTION TO COMPEL ABANDONMENT
   5-1-2026 [36]

   NICHOLE BRODSLY/MV
   DEAN RALLIS/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The moving party will prepare the order in congruity with the opinion below.

This matter was previously heard on June 9, 2026. Doc. #44.

Robert ("Robert") and Nichole Brodsly (collectively "Debtors"), Chapter 7 debtors in the above-styled case, move for an order compelling chapter 7 trustee Jeffrey M. Vetter ("Trustee") to abandon the estate's interest in residential property located at 6105 Prescott Forest Court, Bakersfield, CA ("the Residence"). Docs. #36 *et seq*.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). Thus, pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B), the failure of any party in interest (including but not limited to creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other properly-served party in interest) to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing may be deemed a waiver of any such opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). When there is no opposition to a motion, the defaults of all parties in interest who failed to timely respond will be entered, and, in the absence of any opposition, the movant's factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary when an unopposed movant has made a prima facie case for the requested relief. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).

11 U.S.C. § 554(b) provides that "on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate."

To grant a motion to abandon property, the bankruptcy court must find either that: (1) the property is burdensome to the estate or (2) of inconsequential value and inconsequential benefit to the estate. *In re Vu*, 245 B.R. 644, 647 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000). As one court noted, "an order compelling abandonment is the exception, not the rule. Abandonment should only be compelled in order to help the creditors by assuring some benefit in the administration of each asset . . . Absent an attempt by the trustee to churn property worthless to the estate just to increase fees, abandonment should rarely be ordered." *In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co.*, 816 F.2d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1987). In evaluating a proposal to abandon property, it is the interests of the estate and the creditors that have primary consideration, not the interests of the debtor. *In re Johnson*, 49 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the debtor is not mentioned in § 554). *In re Galloway*, No. AZ-13-1085-PaKiTa, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3626, at *16-17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014).

Debtors seek to compel Trustee to abandon the Residence, which Debtors value at $700,000.00. Doc. #1 (Schedule A/B). The Residence is encumbered by a deed of trust in favor of PNC Bank ("PNC Bank") on which $291,118.96 is owed. Doc. #1 (Schedule D). Debtors have claimed an exemption in the Residence in the amount of $412,716.95 pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 703.730. Doc. #34 (Amended Schedule. C).

In his Declaration, Robert asserts that, if the Residence were to be sold, the ordinary costs of sale would be 8.5% of the gross sale price (6% in brokers' commissions and approximately 2.5% for escrow, title, and other costs). Doc. #36. Assuming a sale price of $700,000.00, those estimated costs of sale would equal $59,500.00. *Id.* Thus, the non-exempt equity in the Residence may be calculated as follows:

Residence's Value (Sch. A/B)	$700,000.00
Estimated sale costs	($59,500.00)
Outstanding liens	($291,118.96)
Debtors' claimed exemption	($412,716.95)
Non-exempt Equity	($63,535.91)

Id. Robert argues that "Trustee has not undertaken action to administer the Residence and has not taken steps toward listing the Residence for sale" and thus "the retention of the Residence imposes administrative burdens on the estate without the prospect of any benefit to the unsecured creditors." *Id.*

This matter was originally heard on June 9, 2026, at which time the court noted that all the requirements for abandonment had been met save for certain deficiencies in the filings which prevented the court from granting the motion at that time. Doc. #44. Specifically,

> [a]bsent from Robert's declaration and the rest of the moving papers is any certification that Debtors are qualified and eligible to claim the exemptions under applicable law and that they understand that if for any reason it is determined that Debtors are not qualified to claim an exemption in the property listed, or if there is some other error in the exemption claimed, Trustee may demand that Debtors compensate the estate for any damage caused by the claimed exemption. Likewise, there is no statement averring that Debtors agree to not amend the exemptions affecting the Business Assets unless Trustee stipulated to that amendment or such relief is granted by further order of the court.

Id. The court continued the matter to July 9, 2026, to afford Debtors time to supplement the record with declarations that correct those deficiencies. *Id.* Debtors have since done so with a declaration by Robert attesting to the qualifications and eligibility requirements alluded to in the quoted paragraph. Doc. #48.

No party in interest has responded, and the defaults of all nonresponding parties are entered. The court finds that the Residence of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. The Residence was accurately scheduled and is encumbered or exempted in their entirety. This motion will be GRANTED.

2. 26-10650-B-7 **IN RE: ROSA ZACARIAS**
RH-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
6-3-2026 [22]

ALLY BANK/MV
RAYMOND PEREZ/ATTY. FOR DBT.
ROSEMARY HONG/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Ally Bank ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to a 2018 Porsche Macan Sport Utility 4D (VIN: WP1AA2A54JLB14007) ("Vehicle"). Doc. #22. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

Rosa Orozco Zacarias ("Debtor") nor any other party in interest filed opposition and the Vehicle was surrendered to the Movant. Doc. #24.

Movant repossessed Vehicle on April 24, 2026. *Id.* This motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtor has missed three (3) post-petition payments totaling $2,531.82. Docs. ##24-26. Additionally, Movant recovered possession of the Vehicle post-petition on April 24, 2026. *Id.* Since the Vehicle has been recovered, the only issue is disposition of the collateral.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Vehicle and the Vehicle is not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. The Vehicle is valued at $21,800.00 and Debtor owes $31,979.12. Docs. ##24-26.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because Debtor has failed to make three (3) post-petition payments to Movant and the Vehicle is a depreciating asset.

3. 26-12359-B-7 **IN RE: JARROD/DAYSHA RUTH**
SLL-1

MOTION TO COMPEL ABANDONMENT
5-29-2026 [12]

DAYSHA RUTH/MV
STEPHEN LABIAK/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The moving party will prepare the order in conformance with the opinion below.

Jarron Franklin Ruth and Daysha Renee Ruth ("Daysha," and collectively "Debtors") move for an order compelling chapter 7 trustee Irma C. Edmonds ("Trustee") to abandon the estate's interest in certain property (collectively, the "Business Assets") used in the operation of Debtors' sole proprietorship known as Built To Last Custom Tile and Stone ("the Business"). Docs. #12 *et seq*.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). Thus, pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B), the failure of any party in interest (including but not limited to creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other properly-served party in interest) to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing may be deemed a waiver of any such opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). When there is no opposition to a motion, the defaults of all parties in interest who failed to timely respond will be entered, and, in the absence of any opposition, the movant's factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary when an unopposed movant has made a prima facie case for the requested relief. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).

No party in interest timely filed written opposition, and the defaults of all nonresponding parties will be entered. This motion will be GRANTED.

11 U.S.C. § 554(b) provides that "on request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate."

To grant a motion to abandon property, the bankruptcy court must find either that: (1) the property is burdensome to the estate or (2) of inconsequential value and inconsequential benefit to the estate. *In re Vu*, 245 B.R. 644, 647 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000). As one court noted, "an order compelling abandonment is the exception, not the rule. Abandonment should only be compelled in order to help the creditors by assuring some benefit in the administration of each asset . . . Absent an attempt by the trustee to churn property worthless to the estate just to increase fees, abandonment should rarely be ordered." *In re K.C. Mach. & Tool Co.*, 816 F.2d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1987). In evaluating a proposal to abandon property, it is the interests of the estate and the creditors that have primary consideration, not the interests of the debtor. *In re Johnson*, 49 F.3d 538, 541 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the debtor is not mentioned in § 554). *In re Galloway*, No. AZ-13-1085-PaKiTa, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3626, at *16-17 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014).

Debtors own and operate the Business, which is engaged in custom tile and stonework. Doc. #14 (Declaration of Daysha Ruth). Debtors seek to compel Trustee to abandon the Business Assets, which are listed in the schedules as follows:

Asset	Value	Exempt	Lien	Net
Noble 1 C.U. Account #6221	$300.00	$300.00 CCP § 703.140(b)(5)	$0.00	$0.00
Ford F250 2017 Truck	$3,500.00	$0.00	$38,670.02	$0.00
Dump Trailer Big Tx	$2,500.00	$2,500.00 CCP § 703.140(b)(5)	$0.00	$0.00
Accounts Receivable	$900.00	$900.00 CCP § 703.140(b)(5)	$0.00	$0.00
Hand Tools for business	$500.00	$500.00 CCP § 703.140(b)(5)	$0.00	$0.00
Tile Saw, Table Saw used in business	$500.00	$500.00 CCP § 703.140(b)(5)	$0.00	$0.00

Doc. #14. The court notes some minor inconsistencies between the Debtors' valuation of the Business Assets as listed above in both the moving papers and the original Schedules and in the Amended Schedules filed approximately three weeks after the instant motion was filed. *Compare* Docs. #1 (Schedules A/B), #14, *and* #16 (Schedules A/B).

First, the Ford F250 has a value in both versions of Schedule A/B of $36,500.00, not $3,500.00 as listed above. *Id.* The court assumes this to be a scrivener's error and $36,500.00 is the correct value. Regardless, Debtors owe more on the Ford F250 than it is worth under either valuation. Second, the amount in the Noble Credit Union account shrank from $300.00 to $25.56 by the time of the Amended Schedule A/B, though this does not affect the disposition, as the sum in the account is still less than the exemption limit. *Id.*

Only the Ford F250 is encumbered, specifically by a lien held by Noble Credit Union in the amount of $38,650.02, which is greater than the Debtors' valuation of that vehicle. Doc. #1 (Schedule D). The remaining Business Assets are not encumbered by any secured creditors. *Id.* Debtor exempted all the unencumbered Business Assets for their full value under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 703.140(b)(5). Doc. #16 (Sched. C).

Daysha certifies that she is qualified and eligible to claim the exemptions under applicable law and understands that if for any reason it is determined that Debtors are not qualified to claim an exemption in the property listed, or if there is some other error in the exemption claimed, Trustee may demand that Debtors compensate the estate for any damage caused by the claimed exemption. Doc. #14. Debtors agree to not amend the exemptions affecting the Business Assets unless Trustee stipulated to that amendment or such relief is granted by further order of the court. *Id.*

No party in interest has responded, and the defaults of all nonresponding parties are entered. The court finds that the Business Assets are of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. The Business Assets were accurately scheduled and are either encumbered or exempted in their entirety. Therefore, this motion will be GRANTED.

4. 26-11683-B-7 **IN RE: MANUEL CHAVEZ AVILA AND EMILY AVILA**

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE - FAILURE TO PAY FEES
6-23-2026 [20]

T. O'TOOLE/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: The OSC will be vacated.

ORDER: The court will issue an order.

The record shows that the $34.00 filing fee was paid on June 24, 2026. Accordingly, this order to show cause will be VACATED

5. 26-12387-B-7 **IN RE: JASON/TINA TUFF**
CS-1

MOTION TO REDEEM
6-1-2026 [14]

TINA TUFF/MV
ANTHONY ROTHMAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Continued to July 28, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

ORDER: The court will prepare the order.

Jason ("Jason") and Tina Tuff (collectively "Debtors") move for authority to redeem personal property under 11 U.S.C. § 722. Doc. #14 *et seq.* The property in question is a 2012 Nissan Armada SV ("the Vehicle") which secures the claim of One Main Financial ("Creditor"). *Id.* The motion as supported by Jason's Declaration and by an Exhibit consisting of a print-out of an online J.D. Power valuation of the Vehicle. Docs. ##16-17.

Debtors complied with Fed. R. Bankr. Pro. Rules 3012(b) and 7004(b)(3) by serving Creditor a copy of the motion by first-class mail to the attention of an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process, in this case Creditor's agent for service. Doc. #21l.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). Thus, pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B), the failure of any party in interest (including but not limited to creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other properly-served party in interest) to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing may be deemed a waiver of any such opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). When there is no opposition to a motion, the defaults of all parties in interest who failed to timely respond will be entered, and, in the absence of any opposition, the movant's factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary when an unopposed movant has made a prima facie case for the requested relief. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).

No party in interest timely filed written opposition, and the defaults of all nonresponding parties will be entered. Nevertheless, for the reasons outline below, the court will not grant the motion but will instead continue this matter to allow Debtors to supplement the record.

11 U.S.C. § 722 states:

> An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of this title [11 USCS § 522] or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title [11 USCS § 554], by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien in full at the time of redemption.

Jason declares that the Vehicle is "tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family or household use." Doc. #16. Debtors have submitted a J.D. Power report valuing the Vehicle at $6,475.00, and Jason declares that he would not pay more than that to replace the Vehicle based on his "personal knowledge of the condition and marketability" of the Vehicle. Docs. #16-17. A debtor is competent to testify as to the value of the Vehicle. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value may be conclusive. *Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally)*, 368 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004).

However, even if the court uncritically accepts Debtors' $6,475.00 valuation for the Vehicle as accurate, the court still cannot grant the motion because that valuation is higher than the valuation given for the Vehicle in the Schedules and, specifically, higher than the amount which Debtors exempted. *See* Doc. #1 (Schedules A/B, C, and D). Those Schedules reflect that, as of the petition date, Debtors valued the Vehicle at only $3,625.00 and claimed an exemption of $0.00 on it. *Id.*

Presumably, this is because Debtors owed more ($13,336.00) on the Vehicle than they thought it was worth ($3,625.00), so they declined to apply their statutory exemptions to it. However, before the court can authorize a debtor to redeem personal property, there must be a showing that it has either been fully exempted or has been abandoned from the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 722.

Here, the Vehicle has not been abandoned. The Trustee has entered a Report of No Distribution (Doc. #23), but that is not the same thing as abandonment, and the case has not yet been closed. And, as noted, Debtors have failed to fully exempt the Vehicle for its higher valuation.

For the foregoing reasons, this matter is CONTINUED to July 28, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. to afford Debtors opportunity to either amend the Schedules so that the Vehicle is fully exempted or else to file a motion to compel the Trustee to abandon the Vehicle from the estate.

6. 26-12089-B-7 **IN RE: CAROL/PATRIC JONES**
KGR-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
6-10-2026 [14]

NUVISION FEDERAL CREDIT UNION/MV
BENNY BARCO/ATTY. FOR DBT.
KAREL ROCHA/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Nuvision Federal Credit Union ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to a 2018 ford F150 (VIN: 1FTEW1CP9JKF82057) ("Vehicle"). Doc. #14. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

Neither Carol Jones nor Patric Jones ("Debtors") nor any other party in interest filed opposition, and the Vehicle was surrendered to the Movant on March 24, 2026. Doc. #16. This motion will be GRANTED.

As an informative matter, the court notes the presence of two procedural defects in Movant's notice of hearing.

First, the notice did not comply with LBR 9014-1(d)(3)(B)(i), which requires the notice of hearing to include the names and addresses of persons who must be served with any opposition. Movant's notice only lists Movant's counsel as person to serve with opposition. Doc. #15.

Second, the notice did not contain the language required under LBR 9014-1(d)(3)(B)(iii), which requires Movant to notify respondents that they can determine whether the matter has been resolved without oral argument or if the court has issued a tentative ruling by checking the Court's website at www.caeb.uscourts.gov after 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. Doc. #15.

Also, Movant's declaration refers to exhibits but no exhibits have been filed.

Counsel is advised to review the local rules and ensure procedure compliance in subsequent matters.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtor has missed six (6) pre-petition payments totaling $4,261.74 and one (1) post-petition payment of $710.29. Doc. #17. Additionally, Movant recovered possession of the Vehicle post-petition on March 24, 2026. Doc. #16. Since the Vehicle has been recovered, the only issue is disposition of the collateral.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Vehicle and the Vehicle is not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. The Vehicle is valued at $16,100.00 and Debtor owes $27,954.94. Docs. ##16-17.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because Debtor has failed to make three (3) post-petition payments to Movant and the Vehicle is a depreciating asset.

7. 26-11394-B-7 **IN RE: LOURDES CHAVEZ**
KMM-1

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
6-4-2026 [19]

TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION/MV
SCOTT LYONS/ATTY. FOR DBT.
KIRSTEN MARTINEZ/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Toyota Motor Credit Corporation ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to a 2025 Toyota Camry (VIN: 4T1DAACK8SU103711 ("Vehicle"). Doc. #19.

Lourdes Chaves ("Debtor") did not file opposition and no party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED. Debtor called Movant on May 5, 2026, and stated an intent to surrender the property.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that “cause” exists to lift the stay because the property is a rapidly depreciating asset and Movant is not receiving adequate protection for its collateral. Debtor intends to voluntarily surrender possession of the Vehicle to Movant. Docs. ##21-23.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Vehicle and the Vehicle is not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. The Vehicle is valued at $36,975.00 and Debtor owes $39,308.38. Docs. ##21-23.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.