

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus  
Bankruptcy Judge  
Sacramento, California

**May 5, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.**

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THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 11. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON JUNE 2, 2014 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY APRIL MAY 19, 2014, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY MAY 27, 2014. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 12 THROUGH 28. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON MAY 12, 2014, AT 2:30 P.M.

**Matters to be Called for Argument**

1.	14-22204-A-13 BILLY GORBET JPJ-1	OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE 4-17-14 [25]
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- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

First, because the debtor has claimed exemptions pursuant to Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 703.140(b), the debtor must file the spousal waiver required by Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 703.140(a). This has not been done. Therefore, the debtor's exemptions will be disallowed. Without exemptions, unsecured creditors would receive more than \$60,000 in a chapter 7 case. The proposed plan will pay them nothing in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).

Second, Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(b)(6) provides: "Documents Required by Trustee. The debtor shall provide to the trustee, not later than the fourteen (14) days after the filing of the petition, Form EDC 3-088, *Domestic Support Obligation Checklist*, or other written notice of the name and address of each person to whom the debtor owes a domestic support obligation together with the name and address of the relevant state child support enforcement agency (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 464 & 466), Form EDC 3-086, *Class 1 Checklist*, for each Class 1 claim, and Form EDC 3-087, *Authorization to Release Information to Trustee Regarding Secured Claims Being Paid By The Trustee*." Because the plan includes a class 1 claim, the debtor was required to provide the trustee with a Class 1 checklist. The debtor failed to do so.

Third, the debtor has not proven the plan is feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). The plan assumes that a home lender has agreed to a home loan modification. Absent that agreement, the claim cannot be modified. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). Instead, the debtor is limited to curing any pre-petition default while maintaining the regular monthly mortgage installment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

2. 13-28605-A-13 JUAN RIGGINS OBJECTION TO  
JPJ-2 CLAIM  
VS. USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK 3-18-14 [45]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The objection will be dismissed because it is moot. The claimant has withdrawn its proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3006. Absent a meritorious objection by the trustee or the debtor, the court will approve such withdrawal even though this objection preceded it.

3. 11-45014-A-13 IMOGENE ESPINOZA MOTION TO  
PLC-4 APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTOR'S  
ATTORNEY  
3-25-14 [77]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be granted. The fees represent reasonable compensation for actual, necessary, and beneficial services rendered to the debtor. Any retainer may be drawn upon and the balance of the approved compensation is to be paid through the plan in a manner consistent with the plan. The court notes, however, that the plan does not provide for payment of the fees and, if it did, the plan as confirmed would not be completed within 60 months. Therefore, while the fees are approved, they may not be paid absent confirmation of a modified plan.

4. 14-22621-A-13 MIKE/SANDRA HANSBROUGH OBJECTION TO  
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO  
DISMISS CASE  
4-17-14 [22]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

First, if requested by the U.S. Trustee or the chapter 13 trustee, a debtor must produce evidence of a social security number or a written statement that such documentation does not exist. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4002(b)(1)(B). In this case, the debtor has breached the foregoing duty by failing to provide evidence of the debtor's social security number. This is cause for dismissal.

Second, the plan's feasibility depends on the debtor successfully prosecuting a motion to value the collateral of Wells Fargo in order to strip down or strip

off its secured claim from its collateral. No such motion has been filed, served, and granted. Absent a successful motion the debtor cannot establish that the plan will pay secured claims in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) or that the plan is feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(j) provides: "If a proposed plan will reduce or eliminate a secured claim based on the value of its collateral or the avoidability of a lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the debtor must file, serve, and set for hearing a valuation motion and/or a lien avoidance motion. The hearing must be concluded before or in conjunction with the confirmation of the plan. If a motion is not filed, or it is unsuccessful, the Court may deny confirmation of the plan."

Third, the debtor has failed to accurately complete Form 22. The debtor has taken the following impermissible deductions from current monthly income:

- the debtor has taken a \$517 deduction for the cost of acquiring a second vehicle. The debtor is not entitled to the deduction because the debtor has no expense associated with acquiring the second vehicle. See Ransom v. MBNA Am. Bank (In re Ransom), 562 U.S. , 2011 WL 66438 (2011).
- the debtor has deducted \$517, the allowed IRS standard for acquiring a vehicle, and also deducted a payment of \$500 on an auto loan. The latter must be deducted from the former.
- the debtor is deducting \$1,000 a month for voluntary retirement savings. The debtor may not make those contributions and deduct them from the debtor's current monthly income. Accord Parks v. Drummond (In re Parks), 475 B.R. 703 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2012).
- the debtor has deducted \$300 a month from current monthly income for expenses to care for and support 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(3) and 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II) permits a debtor to deduct reasonable and necessary actual expenses paid for the care and support of an "elderly, chronically ill, or disabled . . . member of the debtor's immediate family (including parents, grandparents, siblings, children, and grandchildren of the debtor . . . who is unable to pay such reasonable and necessary expenses." While such expenses are deductible, the debtor has not produced to the satisfaction of the court, documentation and corroboration of the amount of these expenses, their necessity, the duration these expenses are likely to persist, and of the assisted person(s)' financial inability to pay these expenses themselves.
- the debtor has taken a \$1,302.42 monthly deduction for a mortgage obligation as well as the standard deduction for housing of \$1,596. The former must be deducted from the later, reducing it to \$293.58.
- the debtor has taken a \$51 deduction for food and clothing above and beyond what the IRS standards permit without demonstrating both that the expenses are actually incurred and that they are reasonably necessary.

With these deductions eliminated, the debtor must pay no less than \$96,605.40 to Class 7 unsecured creditors. Because the plan will pay these creditors only \$14,304.84, it does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b). And, because the debtor admitted at the meeting of creditors that Form 22 does not report all actual income earned or received in the six months prior to bankruptcy, Form 22 further understates projected disposable income to the detriment of unsecured

creditors.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

5. 10-23022-A-13 RAYMOND/ESTHER ESCALANTE                      OBJECTION TO  
WW-9    CLAIM AND TO NOTICE OF MORTGAGE  
VS. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON                                      PAYMENT CHANGE  
12-26-13 [98]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The objections will be sustained in part.

The claimant holds a first prior deed of trust encumbering the debtor's residence. When the case was filed, the debtor had failed to make monthly payments to the claimant for the period October 2009 through February 2010. This chapter 13 case was filed on February 9, 2010. The note provides for a variable interest rate.

The claimant filed a proof of claim on February 18, 2010. It demands \$8,609.19 for the five missed monthly installments, as well as \$310.88 in late charges, \$28.50 in inspection fees and \$1,035.34 in an escrow shortage. The proof of claim also indicates that the principal and interest monthly installment, which was subject to fluctuation due to the variable interest rate, was \$1,324.27. Inasmuch as the insurance for the dwelling is paid by the debtor, the escrow shortage relates only to real property taxes.

On June 11, 2013, the claimant filed a notice that the mortgage payment would change effective July 2013. The principal and interest component of the installment would be \$1,022.15 and escrow impound would be \$625.45, for a total of \$1,647.58.

The debtor objects to the original proof of claim because it overstates the escrow arrears. The claimant has included the escrow shortage in its arrearage demand for the period October 2009 through February 2010 as well as a separate line item in its claim. And, regardless of how it is calculated in the proof of claim it is overstated.

The principal and interest component of the October 2009 installment was \$972.03, for November 2009 through January 2010 it was \$904.22, and for February 2010 it was \$927.02. Subtracting these amounts (a total of \$4,611.71) from the \$8,609.19 in monthly installments demanded by the claimant in its proof of claim yields \$3,997.48 for escrow impounds.

In 2010 (the record does not include the amount for 2009) the debtor's property taxes were \$3,734.79. If collected over 12 months, this would make the escrow impound approximately \$311.23 a month. Hence, during the five month period before bankruptcy, the failure to make the monthly installment should have resulted in an arrearage of \$4,611.71, principal and interest, and \$1,556.15 for escrow impounds, a total of \$6,167.86. Thus, included in the pre-petition arrearage is \$2,441.33 for past due escrow impounds. When this is added to the

separately claimed escrow shortage of \$1,035.34, the proof of claim demands \$3,476.67 for escrow shortages.

However, the claimant sent to the debtor on February 1, 2010, an escrow analysis [Exhibit B] indicating that the escrow shortage was a total of \$1,080.35. This is suspiciously close to the \$1,035.34, escrow shortage demanded separately in the proof of claim. Therefore, whether the \$3,476.67 hidden in the demand for the delinquent monthly installments is a duplicate demand for an escrow shortage or something else, the claim will be reduced by \$3,476.67. To the extent the claimant may have been paid more than this amount, if it will not voluntarily refund it to the debtor, the debtor and/or the trustee must file an adversary proceeding. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001.

The objection to the notice of a change in the mortgage payment is likewise sustained in part. The claimant is and has been demanding an amount, now approximately \$625.43 a month, for ongoing real property taxes. Annualized, this is \$7,505.16. Yet, the debtor's taxes for the four years of the chapter 13 case have been \$3,748.79 in 2010, \$3,911.57 in 2011, \$3,765.59 in 2012, \$2,248.74 in 2013. It is clear, then, that the current demand for escrow impounds is more than double than is necessary to pay taxes and that the creditor has over-collected and not accounted for all of the impounds.

While the court cannot order a refund without an adversary proceeding, it will sustain the objection to the amount of the monthly installment. It is \$1,022.71 principal and interest, and \$188, 1/12th of the current taxes.

Thus far, this ruling makes no reference to the claimant's response to the objection. It filed a response but it says nothing of note. Basically, the claimant says only that when it can understand its own financial records, it will refund any overpayments to the debtor.

6. 14-23928-A-13 REBECCA/MARLON LAWAS MOTION TO  
LDD-1 EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY  
4-18-14 [8]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. A prior case was dismissed within one year of the filing of the current case.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and

if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30<sup>th</sup> day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30<sup>th</sup> day after the filing of the petition. The motion will be adjudicated before the 30-day period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, the motion fails to explain why the first case was dismissed and then fails to show that whatever caused the first case to be dismissed will not prevent confirmation and consummation of a plan in this case. In short, this motion does not establish that the debtor will be any more successful in this case. The court cannot conclude that this case is more apt to succeed.

7. 13-27681-A-13 RODNEY/MICHELLE HYLTON                      OBJECTION TO  
PLC-4    CLAIM  
VS. THE ANNUITY STORE    3-17-14 [51]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:**    The objection will be overruled.

The creditor filed a claim for an outstanding unsecured debt owed when this case was filed. After the case was filed, the debtor paid the debt "in the ordinary course of business." Ignoring the fact that the Bankruptcy Code contains nothing permitting a chapter 13 debtor to pay a pre-petition debt other than pursuant to the terms of a confirmed plan, the fact that a claim has been paid is not a ground for its disallowance. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b), 1322. In fact, the contrary assertion is a non sequitur - disallowed claims are paid nothing, whether through a chapter 13 plan or directly by the debtor. If there is a problem it is with the debtor's payment of an unsecured claim directly to a creditor without such payment being mandated by a confirmed plan. The solution is to modify the plan to provide for the payment already made, and not to object to a claim that has been paid. Admittedly, this may be difficult inasmuch as the confirmed plan provides only a 10.27% dividend to other unsecured claims. Hence, the debtor must justify the discrimination in favor of the claimant who has received a 100% dividend. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).

8. 14-23882-A-13 LAWRENCE/DONNA LOCKWOOD  
MRL-1  
VS. HSBC BANK USA, N.A.

MOTION TO  
VALUE COLLATERAL  
4-16-14 [10]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$90,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$160,777 as of the petition date. Therefore, HSBC Bank USA, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a



contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$90,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

9. 14-22184-A-13 LAWRENCE/JANET BROWN OBJECTION TO  
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO  
DISMISS CASE  
4-17-14 [20]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The debtor has not met the burden of proving that unsecured creditors will be paid the present value of what would be paid to them in a chapter 7 case as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). Specifically, the trustee has requested evidence of the values ascribed by the debtor to the debtor's residence, and other acreage.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

10. 14-20086-A-13 DANETTE PALLADINO MOTION TO  
RJ-2 VACATE DISMISSAL  
4-18-14 [35]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

The debtor received permission to pay the filing fee in installments. By an order filed January 16, the debtor was to pay \$70 on February 5, \$70 on March 7, \$70 on April 7, and \$71 on May 6.

The first installment was not paid and on February 10, the clerk issued an order requiring the debtor to show cause at a hearing on March 3 why the case should not be dismissed. Counsel for the debtor appeared at the March 3 hearing. At the request of counsel, the court did not dismiss the case and instead ordered the debtor to pay the delinquent \$70 installment no later than March 7. And, because the debtor had failed to pay the first installment, the court further ordered that if the first installment was not paid by March 7 or if any future installment was not paid when due, the case would be dismissed without further notice or hearing. This order was entered on March 4 and served on counsel and the debtor by mail on March 4.

The debtor then paid the first installment on March 4 and the second installment on March 6. However, the third installment was not paid on April 7 and the clerk dismissed the case on April 14. No good excuse has been offered for the failure to make a timely payment.

11. 13-33089-A-13 PRISCILLA BEINTKER MOTION TO  
SDH-4 APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION  
4-16-14 [40]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule

9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

**THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE**

12. 11-31808-A-13 TOMMY/PEGGY GILES MOTION TO  
SDB-2 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. U.S. BANK TRUST, N.A. 4-3-14 [31]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$260,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$353,215.29 as of the petition date. Therefore, U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.

3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$260,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

13. 11-34816-A-13 CHARLES/ROSEMARY MCMASTER MOTION TO  
JMC-3 MODIFY PLAN  
3-20-14 [57]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

14. 13-25916-A-13 STEPHANIE ANGWENYI MOTION TO  
CAH-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. HSBC BANK USA, N.A. 4-7-14 [29]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered

as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$100,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Deutsche Bank Trust Company. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$192,751.10 as of the petition date. Therefore, HSBC Bank USA, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court

will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$100,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

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| 15. | 14-22621-A-13 MIKE/SANDRA HANSBROUGH<br>VS-1<br>VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. | MOTION TO<br>VALUE COLLATERAL<br>4-16-14 [18] |
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**Final Ruling:** The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

The motion does not comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(e)(3) because when it was filed it was not accompanied by a separate proof/certificate of service. Appending a proof of service to one of the supporting documents (assuming such was done) does not satisfy the local rule. The proof/certificate of service must be a separate document so that it will be docketed on the electronic record. This permits anyone examining the docket to determine if service has been accomplished without examining every document filed in support of the matter on calendar. Given the absence of the required proof/certificate of service, the moving party has failed to establish that the motion was served on all necessary parties in interest.

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| 16. | 13-36128-A-13 MORTISHIA FAIRCHILD<br>MET-1 | MOTION TO<br>CONFIRM PLAN<br>3-23-14 [24] |
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**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

17. 14-23032-A-13 MISAEAL VERDUZCO  
TOG-1  
VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

MOTION TO  
VALUE COLLATERAL  
4-4-14 [15]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$91,594 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by PNC Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$92,700 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Barte, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an



adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$91,594. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

18. 13-29637-A-13 JERMAINE/BAILEY ARMSTEAD MOTION TO  
SJS-1 MODIFY PLAN  
3-27-14 [22]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

19. 13-30043-A-13 STEVEN/JUDY KLUG OBJECTION TO  
JPJ-1 CLAIM  
VS. STATES RECOVERY 3-18-14 [66]  
SYSTEMS/HIGH SIERRA DENTAL CARE

**Final Ruling:** This objection to the proof of claim of States Recovery Systems, et al., has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf.

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained. The creditor has filed two different proofs of claim for the same debt. The first was filed on August 19, 2013. The second proof of claim was filed on September 24, 2013. The later proof of claim does not indicate that it is amending or replacing the earlier proof of claim. However, from the information in the proofs of claim, it is clear that they are duplicative. Therefore, the earlier proof of claim is disallowed and the latest proof of claim is allowed.

20. 12-26344-A-13 ELIAS/JENNIFER AREVALO MOTION TO  
SJS-2 MODIFY PLAN  
3-28-14 [49]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

21. 11-43145-A-13 DOROTHY SMITH MOTION TO  
SJS-3 INCUR DEBT  
4-1-14 [49]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to modify a home loan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

22. 13-35558-A-13 WILLIAM/MICHELLE COYA

ORDER TO  
SHOW CAUSE  
4-14-14 [43]

**Final Ruling:** The order to show cause will be discharged and the case shall remain pending.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay \$1 of an installment when due. However, after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent amount was paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.

23. 12-23663-A-13 JOE/YVETTE MARCH  
PGM-11

MOTION TO  
MODIFY PLAN  
3-27-14 [130]

**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The debtor's request for a continuance is granted. The debtor shall provide the financial information requested by the trustee and file and serve an amended Schedule I no later than May 12. The hearing on the objection is continued to May 19 at 1:30. The trustee will be permitted to amend his objection at the continued hearing in order to incorporate the financial information and amended Schedule I.

24. 12-22472-A-13 SUSAN DUNGAN  
NLG-1  
JPMORGAN MORTGAGE ACQUISITION CORP. VS.

MOTION FOR  
RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY  
4-4-14 [31]

**Final Ruling:** This motion for relief from the automatic stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor and the trustee to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The motion will be granted in part pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) in order to permit the movant to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and to obtain possession of the subject real property following the sale. All other relief is denied. The subject real property has a value of \$320,000 and is encumbered by a perfected deed of trust or mortgage in favor of the movant. That security interest secures a claim of \$537,186.33. After considering all other liens and security interests, if any, there is no equity and there is no evidence that the subject real property is necessary to a reorganization.

Further, the court will grant prospective relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) provides that:

"On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay . . .

with respect to a stay of an act against real property under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an interest in such real property, if the court finds that the filing of the petition was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors that involved either-

(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other interest in, such real property without the consent of the secured creditor or court approval; or

(B) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such real property."

Section 362(d)(4) implicates 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(20). Section 362(b)(20) is an "in rem" exception to the automatic stay. If the court grants relief in this case under section 362(d)(4), but then another petition is filed by any debtor who claims an interest in the subject real property, section 362(b)(20) provides that the automatic stay does not operate in the second case so as to prevent the enforcement of a lien or security interest in the subject real property. The exception to the automatic stay in the second case is effective for 2 years after the entry of the order under section 362(d)(4) in the first case.

A debtor in the subsequent bankruptcy case, however, may move for relief from the in rem order. The request for relief from the in rem order may be premised upon "changed circumstances or for other good cause shown. . . ."

Here, the original borrower and owner of the property transferred interests in the subject property without the consent of the movant to this debtor shortly before this bankruptcy case was filed. Then, the debtor failed to schedule the property or to provide for the movant's claim in the plan.

The court concludes that the purpose of making the transfer was to acquire the automatic stay but with any intention of reorganizing the movant's claim. These facts evidence a clear scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors involving the subject property.

Therefore, the court will grant relief from the automatic stay that will be effective for a period of two years in any future case filed by anyone claiming an interest in the subject property, provided the recordation requirements of section 362(d)(4) are satisfied by the movant or its successor.

25. 13-29372-A-13 TERRY ARNOLD  
FF-3

MOTION TO  
MODIFY PLAN  
3-27-14 [55]

**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the condition that the plan is further modified in the confirmation order to account for all prior payments made by the debtor under the terms of the prior plan, and to provide for a plan payment of \$3,338.68 beginning April 2014. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

26. 13-29082-A-13 KEITH/TINA COOK  
JPJ-1  
VS. SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING

OBJECTION TO  
CLAIM  
3-18-14 [29]

**Final Ruling:** This objection to the proof of claim of Specialized Loan Servicing has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained. The creditor has filed two different proofs of claim for the same debt. The first was filed on September 18, 2013. The second proof of claim was filed on October 13, 2013. The later proof of claim does not indicate that it is amending or replacing the earlier proof of claim. However, from the information in the proofs of claim, it is clear that they are duplicative. Therefore, the earlier proof of claim is disallowed and the latest proof of claim is allowed.

27. 13-24886-A-13 ROBERT/ROSALINA MURTI  
WW-3

MOTION TO  
MODIFY PLAN  
3-31-14 [41]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

28. 10-24598-A-13 JACOB/JOEY FIELD  
RPB-6

MOTION TO  
MODIFY PLAN  
3-5-14 [127]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.