



**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of California
Honorable René Lastreto II
Department B – Courtroom #13
Fresno, California
Hearing Date: Thursday, April 23, 2026**

Unless otherwise ordered, all matters before the Honorable René Lastreto II, shall be simultaneously: (1) **In Person** at, Courtroom #13 (Fresno hearings only), (2) via **ZoomGov Video**, (3) via **ZoomGov Telephone**, and (4) via **CourtCall**. You may choose any of these options unless otherwise ordered or stated below.

All parties or their attorneys who wish to appear at a hearing remotely must sign up by **4:00 p.m. one business day** prior to the hearing. Information regarding how to sign up can be found on the **Remote Appearances** page of our website at <https://www.caeb.uscourts.gov/Calendar/CourtAppearances>. Each party/attorney who has signed up will receive a Zoom link or phone number, meeting I.D., and password via e-mail.

If the deadline to sign up has passed, parties and their attorneys who wish to appear remotely must contact the Courtroom Deputy for the Department holding the hearing.

Please also note the following:

- Parties in interest and/or their attorneys may connect to the video or audio feed free of charge and should select which method they will use to appear when signing up.
- Members of the public and the press who wish to attend by ZoomGov may only listen in to the hearing using the Zoom telephone number. Video participation or observing are not permitted.
- Members of the public and the press may not listen in to trials or evidentiary hearings, though they may attend in person unless otherwise ordered.

To appear remotely for law and motion or status conference proceedings, you must comply with the following guidelines and procedures:

1. Review the [Pre-Hearing Dispositions](#) prior to appearing at the hearing.
2. Parties appearing via CourtCall are encouraged to review the [CourtCall Appearance Information](#). If you are appearing by ZoomGov phone or video, please join at least 10 minutes prior to the start of the calendar and wait with your microphone muted until the matter is called.

Unauthorized Recording is Prohibited: Any recording of a court proceeding held by video or teleconference, including "screen shots" or other audio or visual copying of a hearing is prohibited. Violation may result in sanctions, including removal of court-issued media credentials, denial of entry to future hearings, or any other sanctions deemed necessary by the court. For more information on photographing, recording, or broadcasting Judicial Proceedings, please refer to Local Rule 173(a) of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRE-HEARING DISPOSITIONS

Each matter on this calendar will have one of three possible designations: No Ruling, Tentative Ruling, or Final Ruling. These instructions apply to those designations.

No Ruling: All parties will need to appear at the hearing unless otherwise ordered.

Tentative Ruling: If a matter has been designated as a tentative ruling it will be called, and all parties will need to appear at the hearing unless otherwise ordered. The court may continue the hearing on the matter, set a briefing schedule, or enter other orders appropriate for efficient and proper resolution of the matter. The original moving or objecting party shall give notice of the continued hearing date and the deadlines. The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions.

Final Ruling: Unless otherwise ordered, there will be **no hearing on these matters**. The final disposition of the matter is set forth in the ruling and it will appear in the minutes. The final ruling may or may not finally adjudicate the matter. If it is finally adjudicated, the minutes constitute the court's findings and conclusions.

Orders: Unless the court specifies in the tentative or final ruling that it will issue an order, the prevailing party shall lodge an order within 14 days of the final hearing on the matter.

Post-Publication Changes: The court endeavors to publish its rulings as soon as possible. However, calendar preparation is ongoing, and these rulings may be revised or updated at any time prior to 4:00 p.m. the day before the scheduled hearings. Please check at that time for any possible updates

9:30 AM

1. [25-13513](#)-B-11 **IN RE: RIVERDALE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, INC.**
[CAE-1](#) **RIVERDALE, CALIFORNIA**

CONTINUED STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 SUBCHAPTER V
VOLUNTARY
10-17-2025 [[1](#)]

PETER FEAR/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

2. [25-13513](#)-B-11 **IN RE: RIVERDALE ASSEMBLY OF GOD, INC.**
[FW-2](#) **RIVERDALE, CALIFORNIA**

CONTINUED CONFIRMATION HEARING RE: CHAPTER 11 SMALL BUSINESS
SUBCHAPTER V PLAN
1-15-2026 [[25](#)]

PETER FEAR/ATTY. FOR DBT.

NO RULING.

3. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[BB-2](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR BURNS BAIR LLP, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
3-19-2026 [[662](#)]

BURNS BAIR LLP/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
JESSE BAIR/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Burns Blair LLP ("Applicant" or "Burns Blair"), special insurance counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case (the "Committee"), hereby submits this application for compensation of fees and reimbursement of expenses (the "Application") in the amount of **\$4,349.00** pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 328 and 331 for the period of January 14, 2026 through and including February 28, 2026 (the "Application Period"). Doc. #662. This amount consists of **\$4,349.00** in fees and **\$0.00** in expenses from

January 1, 2026, through February 28, 2026 ("the Application Period").
Id.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as special insurance counsel was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on January 14, 2026. Doc. #614. This is Applicant's first fee application, the Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [BB-2]	Pending	1/14/26- 2/27/26	\$4,349.00	\$0.00	\$4,349.00

Docs. #664 (Declaration of Jesse Blair); #665 (Exhibits).

Applicant requests fees for **5.40** billable hours of legal services at the following rates, totaling **\$131,417.50** in fees:

Professional	Rate	Hours	Amount
Jesse Blair	\$900.00	4.00	\$3,600.00
Erin Quick	\$550.00	1.30	\$715.00
Kren Dempski	\$340.00	.10	\$34.00
Totals		5.4	\$4,349.00

Docs. #539, #543 (Exhibits A & B). Applicant does not seek expense reimbursement as part of this Application.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a]

professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a) (3) (A) through (E). § 330(a) (3).

Applicant's services included (listing only the most significant): participating in Committee meetings; general administration; and insurance recovery actions. Docs. #539, #543. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **\$4,349.00** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **\$0.00** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$4,349.00** for fees and expenses from November 1, 2025, through December 31, 2025.

4. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[FTI-2](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR FTI CONSULTING, INC.,
OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
3-20-2026 [[652](#)]

FTI CONSULTING, INC./MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
ROBERT KUGLER/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

FTI Consulting, Inc., together with its wholly owned subsidiaries (collectively "Applicant" or "FTI"), financial advisor for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case (the "Committee"), requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 in the sum of **\$285,973.00**. Doc. #652. This amount consists of **\$285,973.00** in fees and **\$0.00** in expenses from **September 17, 2025** ("the Retention Date"), **through February 28, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

This Application is supported by the declaration of Conor P. Tully, Senior Managing Director for FTI and by exhibits which include, *inter alia*, billing records for the representation. Docs. ##654-55.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as general bankruptcy counsel was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #188. The Committee retained Applicant for financial advice through an order approving the motion for employment seeking retroactive employment for all work performed by FTI from the petition date through the date of the hearing. Doc. #403. This is FTI's first request for compensation.

Applicant requests fees for **484.7** billable hours of legal services at the following rates, totaling **\$285,973.90**:

Professional	Rate	Hours	Amount
Tully, Conor	\$1,494.00	9.9	\$14,790.50
Dunee, Mark	\$1,110.00	1.0	\$1,110.00
Berkin, Michael	\$1,188.00	63.2	\$75,104.00
Steele, Benjamin	\$940.00	3.2	\$3,008.00
Scheff, William	\$837.00	186.7	\$156,319.00
Sogn, Abigail	\$581.00	102.4	\$59,544.00
Chapman, Amelia	\$533.00	109.1	\$58,160.50
Cipriano, Giuliana	\$470.00	7.3	\$3,431.00
Hellmund-Mora, Marili	\$355.00	1.9	\$674.00
SUBTOTAL		484.7	\$372,141.00
Less Voluntary Reduction			(85,168.40)
GRAND TOTAL			\$285,973.00

Doc. #654 (Tully Decl.) Applicant does not seek expense reimbursement in this application.

In addition to the voluntary reduction in fees which FTI already subtracted in the filing of the Application, FTI advises by a Notice filed on April 9, 2026, that, after consultation with the U.S. Trustee's ("UST") Office, FTI has agreed to further reduce the amount of compensation sought by \$3,653.46 from \$285,973.00 to **\$282,329.54**. Doc. #699.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3).

Applicant's services included (listing only the most significant): current operating results & events (124.6 hours; \$87,972.41); cash & liquidity analysis (21.7 hours; \$16,458.51); real estate issues (73.9 hours; \$52,241.64); analysis of SOFAs and SOALs (121.2 hours; \$93,522.00); case management (44.4 hours; \$41,918.66); general meeting with Debtor and Debtor's professionals (30.5 hours; \$29,861.66); general meetings with Committee and Committee counsel (10.8 hours; \$10,104.61); firm retention (21.8 hours; \$18,316.43); and preparation of the fee application (31.1 hours; \$17,567.78). The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. After the reduction requested by the UST is applied, Applicant will be awarded **\$282,329.54** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **\$0.00** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$282,329.54** for fees and expenses for the Application Period.

5. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[MB-40](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION BY THE LAW OFFICE OF MCCORMICK,
BARSTOW, SHEPPARD, WAYTE & CARRUTH LLP FOR HAGOP T. BEDOYAN,
DEBTORS ATTORNEY(S)
3-19-2026 [[637](#)]

HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in
conformance with the ruling below.

McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth LLP ("Applicant" or
"MB"), general bankruptcy counsel for the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled
case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 in
the sum of **\$141,896.00**. Doc. #637. This amount consists of **\$141,415.00**
in fees and **\$481.00** in expenses from **January 1, 2026, through February**
28, 2026 ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that
she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed
payment. Doc. #541.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by
Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13
trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file
written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required
by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the
granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir.
1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief
requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See
Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore,
the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered
and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default,
factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to
amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915,
917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a
plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the
relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will
be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's
retention as general bankruptcy counsel was authorized pursuant to 11

U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #188. This is Applicant's second fee application, the Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [MB-22]	11/14/25 Doc. #414	7/1/25- 8/31/25	\$186,164.00	\$1,134.25	\$187,298.25
2nd [MB-30]	12/17/25 Doc. #496	9/1/25- 10/31/25	\$127,499.00	\$317.46	\$127,816.46
3rd (MB-36)	2/26/26 Doc. #609	11/1/25- 12/31/25	\$131,417.50	\$1,089.86	\$132,705.36
4th (MB-40)	Pending	1/1/26- 2/28/26	\$141,415.00	\$481.00	\$141,896.00

Applicant requests fees for **319.5** billable hours of legal services at the following rates, totaling **\$141,415.00** in fees:

Professional	Rate	Hours	Amount
Hagop T. Bedoyan (2026)	\$600.00	104.4	\$62,640.00
Hagop T. Bedoyan (no charge)	\$0.00	0.1	\$0.00
Mart Oller, IV (2026)	\$400.00	122.0	\$48,800.00
Mart Oller, IV (No charge)	\$0.00	0.7	\$0.00
Shane G. Smith (2026)	\$425.00	0.2	\$85.00
Garrett R. Leatham (2026)	\$350.00	6.3	\$2,205.00
Garrett R. Leatham (no charge)	\$0.00	0.2	\$0.00
Garrett J. Wade (2026)	\$350.00	79.1	\$27,685.00
Garrett J. Wade (No charge)	\$0.00	6.5	\$0.00
Totals		319.5	\$141,415.00

Docs. #637, #640 (Exhibits A & B). Applicant also incurred **\$481.00** in expenses:

Court Call fees	\$72.00
USTPO Fees	\$125.00
Photocopies	\$9.00
Settlement Administration	\$275.00
Subtotal	\$481.00

Docs. #637, #650 (Exhibit C). These combined fees and expenses total **\$141,896.00**.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall

consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a) (3) (A) through (E). § 330(a) (3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included (listing only the most significant): case administration (102.1 hours; \$50,335.00); fee/employment applications (63.2 hours; \$23,605.00); business operations (47.7 hours; \$19,450.00); employee benefits/pensions (19.6 hours; \$11,735.00); claims administration and objections (18.4 hours; \$7,570.00); and analysis/strategy (37.0 hours; \$14,685.00). All other services combined represented 31.5 hours totaling \$21,605.00 *Id.* The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **\$141,415.00** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **\$481.00** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$141,896.00** for fees and expenses from January 1, 2026, through February 28, 2026.

6. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[MB-41](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR GLASSRATNER ADVISORY AND
CAPITAL GROUP LLC, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
3-19-2026 [[642](#)]

GLASSRATNER ADVISORY AND CAPITAL GROUP, LLC/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests a fourth interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 for GlassRatner Advisory & Capital Group LLC ("Applicant" or "GACG"), Debtor's financial adviser, in the sum of **\$68,496.00**. Doc. #642. This amount consists of **\$68,397.00** in fees and **\$99.00** in expenses from **July 1, 2025, through August 31, 2025** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by the declaration of Wayne P. Weitz, senior managing director with GACG ("the Weitz Declaration"), and by exhibits consisting of GACG's billing records for the Application

Period. Docs. ##301-02. Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #303.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as financial advisor was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #206. This is Applicant's fourth fee application.

Applicant requests fees for **163.90** billable hours of financial advisement services at the following rates, totaling **\$68,397.00** in fees:

Professional	Rate	Hours	Amount
Wayne P. Weitz	\$775.00	9.80	\$7,595.00
Wayne P. Weitz	\$815.00	5.10	\$4,156.50
Joseph Pegnia	\$625.00	8.00	\$5,000.00
Joseph Pegnia	\$650.00	9.30	\$6,045.00
Adriana Plitz	\$495.00	6.30	\$3,118.50
Karyn Kalita	\$325.00	48.40	\$15,730.00
Karyn Kalita	\$350.00	75.20	\$26,320.00
Ashlee Peal	\$240.00	1.80	\$432.00
Total		163.90	\$68,397.00

Doc. #648 (Exhibits). Applicant also incurred **\$99.00** in expenses, consisting entirely of Applicant's annual subscription to "Splashtop," which is apparently an online service used by Applicant to remotely

access Debtor's computer systems. Doc. #645. *Id.* These combined fees and expenses total **\$ 68,496.00**.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: asset analysis; business analysis; case administration; creditor meetings/communications; debtor meetings/communications; employment/fee applications; litigation support; and monthly operating reports. Doc. #645 (Weitz Declaration). The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **\$68,397.00** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **\$99.00** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$68,496.00** for fees and for this Application Period.

7. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[MB-42](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR TERENCE J. LONG, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
3-19-2026 [[647](#)]

TERENCE LONG/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 for Terence J. Long ("Applicant" or "Long"), Debtor's Restructuring Coordinator, in the sum of **\$18,425,10**. Doc. #647. This amount consists of **\$18,347.50** in fees and **\$77.50** in expenses from **January 1, 2026, through February 28, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by Applicant's declaration ("the Long Declaration") and Exhibits consisting of Long's Invoices for the Application Period and his Task Code Summary. Docs. ##650-51. Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #649.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as Restructuring Coordinator was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 4, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #189. This is Applicant's fourth fee application, Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [MB-24]	11/14/25 Doc. #416	7/1/25- 8/31/25	\$46,547.25	\$260.40	\$46,807.65
2nd [MB-32]	12/17/25 Doc. #498	9/1/25- 10/31/25	\$17,225.00	\$91.00	\$17,316.00
3rd (MB-35)	2/25/26 Doc. #610	11/1/25- 12/31/25	\$22,84300	\$144.90	\$22,987.90
4th (MB-42)	Pending	1/1/26- 2/28/26	\$18,347.50	\$77.50	\$18,425.10

Applicant requests fees for **70.1** billable hours of Long's services for a total of **\$18,347.50**. Doc. #650 (Long Declaration). That total includes 4.0 hours for "Non-Working Travel" at a rate of \$132.50 for 2.4 hours and \$237.50 for 1.6 hours (half his normal rate of \$265.00 for 36.8 hours and \$375.00 for 29.3 hours) for a total of \$538.00. *Id.*

Applicant also seeks expense reimbursement for Travel in the amount of **\$77.60**. *Id.* These combined fees and expenses total **\$18,425,10**.

On April 8, 2026, Applicant filed a *Notice of Voluntary Reduction of Fees* stating that, in order to resolve an objection raised by the U.S. Trustee, Applicant has agreed to reduce the compensation sought by \$450.50 to a reduced fee award of **\$17,897.00**.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: case administration, fee/employment applications, non-working travel, and business operations. Doc. #6507 (Long Declaration).

No party in interest opposes the application (subject to the U.S. Trustee's objection resolved by the voluntary fee reduction), and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **\$17,897.00** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **\$77.50** in reimbursement of actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$17,974.00** for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

8. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[MB-43](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR BLANK ROME LLP, OTHER PROFESSIONAL(S)
3-20-2026 [[671](#)]

BLANK ROME, LLP/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 for Blank Rome LLP ("Applicant" or "Blank Rome"), Debtor's special insurance counsel, in the sum of **\$33,035.42**. Doc. #671. This amount consists of **\$32,939.90** in fees and **\$95.52** in

expenses from **January 1, 2026, through February 28, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by the declaration of Barron L. Weinstein, of counsel with Blank Rome ("the Weinstein Declaration"), and by exhibits consisting of Blank Rome's invoices for the Application Period (Exh. A), a Summary of Customary and Comparable Compensation, and the attorney fee budget. Docs. ##673-74. Cynthia Martin, Debtor's CFO, submitted a declaration indicating that she has reviewed the application and has no objection to the proposed payment. Doc. #675.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. Applicant's retention as financial advisor was authorized pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(a) and 329-31 on August 15, 2025, effective as of the petition date. Doc. #236. This is Applicant's fourth fee application, Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [MB-25]	11/14/25 Doc. #417	7/1/25- 8/31/25	\$28,256.20	\$0.00	\$28,256.20
2nd [MB-33]	12/17/25 Doc. #497	9/1/25- 10/31/25	\$17,033.20	\$0.00	\$17,033.20
3rd (MB-37)	2/26/26 Doc. #612	11/1/25- 12/31/25	\$36,534.00	\$0.00	\$35,534.00
4th (MB-43)	Pending	1/1/26- 2/28/26	\$32,939.90	\$95.52	\$33,035.42

Applicant requests fees for **55.0** billable hours of financial advisement services at the following rates, totaling **\$32,939.90** in fees:

Professional	Rate	Hours	Amount
Barron L. Weinstein	\$820.00	4.4	\$3,608.00
Kevin L Cifarelli	\$525.00	32.0	\$16,800.00
Jeffrey L. Schulman	\$836.00	2.4	\$2,006.40
Robyn Michaelson	\$808.00	8.5	\$6,868.00
Kevin Rogers	\$457.00	7.7	\$3,657.50
Total		55.0	\$32,939.90

Doc. #674. Applicant seeks expense reimbursement in the amount of **\$95.52** for LEXIS Access/Document Charges. *Id.*

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following: asset analysis and recovery (insurance proceeds); employment/fee applications; mediation; recovery of defense costs from carriers; and discovery. Docs. #673-74. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **\$32,939.50** in fees and **\$95.52** in expenses as reasonable compensation for services rendered on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$33,035.42** for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

9. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[MB-44](#)

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME
3-26-2026 [[680](#)]

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO/MV
HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in
conformance with the ruling below.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Fresno ("RCBF" or "Debtor"), chapter 11 debtor in the above-styled case, comes before the court on this *Second Motion* for an order extending the deadline for the removal of civil actions ("the Removal Deadline") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006 and 9027. Doc. #680. The motion is supported by *the Declaration of Cynthia Martin in Support of Chapter 11 Petition and the Debtor's First Day Motions* (Doc. #7, "the Martin Background Decl."), *the Declaration of Mart B. Oller, IV in Support of Chapter 11 Petition and the Debtor's First Day Motions*. (Doc. #9, "the Oller Background Decl."), and the second Declaration of Cynthia Martin accompanying the instant motion (Doc. #682, "the Second Martin Decl.")

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

The court finds that the information in the three declarations outlining the voluminous nature of the many pending and potential lawsuits against the Debtor arising from sexual abuse claims represents cause for further extending the deadline for removal of civil actions against Debtor.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED. The Removal Deadline is hereby extended to September 28, 2025.

10. [25-12231](#)-B-11 **IN RE: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF FRESNO**
[STI-4](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION BY THE LAW OFFICE OF STINSON LLP FOR
EDWIN H. CALDIE, CREDITOR COMM. ATY(S)
3-19-2026 [[657](#)]

HAGOP BEDOYAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
EDWIN CALDIE/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Stinson LLP ("Stinson"), counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors in the above-captioned case (the "Committee"), requests interim compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331 in the sum of **\$159,400.00**. Doc. #657. This amount consists of **\$159,200.00** in fees and **\$200.00** in expenses from **January 1, 2026, through February 28, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

The Application is supported by the declaration of Edwin H. Caldie, counsel for the Committee ("the Caldie Declaration"), and by exhibits consisting of the attorney fee budget, Stinson's invoices for the Application Period, a Summary of Customary and Comparable Compensation. Docs. ##659-60.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. ("Rule") 2002(a)(6). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a

plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

RCBF commenced this case on July 1, 2025. Doc. #1. On July 15, 2025, the U.S. Trustee appointed seven survivor creditors to be members of the Committee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a). On August 14, 2025, the Court entered the Order Approving Application to Employ Stinson LLP as Counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, effective as of the Retention Date. Doc. #228. This is Applicant's third fee application, Applicant having previously been awarded interim compensation as follows:

Appl.	Approved	Period	Fees	Costs	Total
1st [STI-2]	12/19/25 Doc. #499	7/24/25- 10/31/25	\$256,941.50	\$2,560.79	\$259,501.79
2nd [STI-3]	2/27/26 Doc. #615	11/1/25- 12/11/25	\$142,635.25	\$2,029.34	\$144,664.59
3rd (STI-4)	2/26/26 Doc. #612	11/1/25- 12/31/25	\$36,534.00	\$0.00	\$35,534.00
4th (MB-43)	Pending	1/1/26- 2/28/26	\$159,200.00	\$200.00	\$159,400.00

Applicant requests fees for **293.8** billable hours of legal services at the following rates, totaling **\$159,200.00** in fees. Docs. ##659-60. Applicant seeks \$2,650.29 in expense reimbursement as follows:

Relativity Database Charges	\$200.00
TOTAL	\$200.00

Id. On April 9, 2026, Applicant filed a Notice advising that, in order to resolves potential objections by the U.S. Trustee's Office ("UST"), Applicant would voluntarily reduce its fee request from \$159,200.00 to \$157,107.80. Doc. #697.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). The previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331 are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services included the following (some of which Applicant did not bill for in this application): case administration; mediation; asset analysis and recovery; relief from stay; meetings and communications with creditors; employment/fee applications and

objections; other contested matters; financing/cash collections; claims administration and objections; and appeals. Docs. ##659-60. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest opposes the application, and this motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded the reduced amount of **\$157,107.80** in fees and **\$200.00** in expenses as reasonable compensation for services rendered on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 and 331. Debtor will be authorized to pay Applicant a total of **\$157,307.80** for fees and expenses for this Application Period.

11. [25-11642](#)-B-12 **IN RE: TONY/JULIE JORGE**
[FW-5](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION BY THE LAW OFFICE OF FEAR WADDELL, P.C.
FOR PETER L. FEAR, DEBTORS ATTORNEY(S)
3-25-2026 [\[49\]](#)

PETER FEAR/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Peter L. Fear of Fear Waddell, P.C. ("Applicant"), attorney for Tony and Julie Jorge ("Debtors"), debtors in the above-styled Chapter 12 bankruptcy, seeks interim compensation in the sum of **\$42,702.19** under 11 U.S.C. § 331, subject to final review pursuant to § 330. Doc. #49. This amount consists of **\$42,282.50** in fees and **\$419.69** in expenses from **May 20, 2025, through February 28, 2026** ("the Application Period"). *Id.*

Debtor executed a statement of consent dated March 25, 2026, indicating that Debtor has read the fee application and approves the same. Doc. #51.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). Thus, pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B), the failure of any party in interest (including but not limited to creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other properly-served party in interest) to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing may be deemed a waiver of any such opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). When there is no opposition to a motion, the defaults of all parties in interest who failed to timely respond will be entered, and, in the absence of any opposition, the movant's factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to

amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary when an unopposed movant has made a prima facie case for the requested relief. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

Debtors' *First Modified Chapter 12 Plan* ("the Plan"), which was confirmed on October 2, 2025, states that:

Debtors estimate that Debtors' attorney fees in this case will be approximately \$80,000 above the pre-filing retainer paid by Debtor. Debtors' attorney fees and costs approved pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Sec. 330 but remaining unpaid upon the completion of the case, if any, shall not be discharged and shall be paid directly by the Debtors to counsel for the Debtors before and/or after entry of the discharge.

Doc. #45 (Chapter 12 Plan, Section 2.01); Doc. #46 (Confirmation Order).

This is Applicant's first interim fee application. Applicant's firm provided 104.00 billable hours of legal services at the following rates, totaling \$42,282.50 in fees:

Professional	Rate	Hours	Fees
Peter L. Fear (2025)	\$475.00	66.40	\$31,540.00
Peter L. Fear (2026)	\$495.00	0.50	\$247.50
Peter A. Sauer (2025)	\$315.00	24.80	\$7,812.00
Katie Waddell (2025)	\$295.00	4.90	\$1,445.50
Kayla Schlaak (2025)	\$175.00	6.30	\$1,102.50
Laurel Guenther (2025)	\$150.00	0.50	\$75.00
Mandi Abrams (2025)	\$100.00	0.60	\$60.00
Total Hours & Fees		104.00	\$42,282.50

Doc. #53. Applicant also incurred **\$419.69** in expenses for copying (\$282.43) and postage (\$137.26). *Id.* These combined fees and expenses total **\$42,702.19**.

Applicant holds in trust the sum of \$15,263.62 as part of the initial retainer and proposes that the balance (**\$27,438.57**) be paid directly through the Plan.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual,

necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a) (3) (A) through (E). § 330(a) (3).

Applicant's services here included, without limitation: case administration; Asset disposition; meetings of and communications with creditors; fee/employment applications; claims administration and objections. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition, and the defaults of all non-responding parties are entered. This motion will be GRANTED. Applicant will be awarded **\$42,282.50** in fees as reasonable compensation for services rendered and **\$419.69** in reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses on an interim basis under 11 U.S.C. § 331, subject to final review pursuant to § 330. After application of the retainer held in trust, **\$27,438.57** remains to be paid as an administrative expense of the estate by the Debtors for services rendered during the Application Period.

12. [26-10888](#)-B-11 **IN RE: BIG VALLEY COLD STORAGE LLC**
[CAE-1](#)

STATUS CONFERENCE RE: CHAPTER 11 VOLUNTARY PETITION
3-2-2026 [[1](#)]

DISMISSED 4/8/26

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Concluded and dropped from the calendar.

NO ORDER IS REQUIRED.

On April 8, 2026, the court entered an order dismissing this case. Doc. #22. Accordingly, this Status Conference will be CONCLUDED and DROPPED from the calendar.

11:00 AM

1. [25-14282](#)-B-7 **IN RE: GUY/SANDRA SCHIEBELHUT**

REAFFIRMATION AGREEMENT WITH TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION
3-5-2026 [\[18\]](#)

TIMOTHY SPRINGER/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Denied.

ORDER: The court will issue an order.

No appearance is necessary.

A Reaffirmation Agreement between Guy and Sandra Schiebelhut ("Debtors") and Toyota Motor Credit for a 2024 Toyota Tundra C4X was filed on March 5, 2026. Doc. #18.

Debtor was represented by counsel when Debtor entered into the reaffirmation agreement. However, on Part C of the Reaffirmation Agreement, Debtor's counsel marked through the following language: "this agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or any dependent of the debtor." Doc. #18, pg. 9. Debtor's counsel signed the certification and initialed the struck language. *Id.* This is further proof to the court that even in the absence of a presumption of undue hardship, the court finds undue hardship which precludes approval.

The reaffirmation agreement, in the absence of a complete certification by Debtors' counsel, does not meet the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) and is not enforceable. Accordingly, this motion will be DENIED.

1:30 PM

1. [25-11401](#)-B-7 **IN RE: FRANCISCO/LAURA CORRAL**
[JSP-4](#)

MOTION TO AVOID LIEN OF CAPITAL ONE BANK (USA), N.A.
2-25-2026 [[45](#)]

LAURA CORRAL/MV
JOSEPH PEARL/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Francisco and Laura Corral ("Debtors") move for an order avoiding a judicial lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) encumbering real property located at 334 Redwood Drive, Shafter, California ("the Property").

This motion is one of two motions to avoid judicial liens filed roughly contemporaneously by Debtor and presently pending before the court. See *Items ##1-2*. These motions address outstanding judicial lienholders as follows, in descending order of priority:

1. **DCN JSP-5** (Item #2, Docs. ##50-53, #55). **TD Bank, Inc. ("TD Bank")**, judgment lien in the amount of \$1,916.44, recorded in Kern County on June 16, 2017.
2. **DCN JSP-4** (Item #1, Docs. ##45-48, #54). **Capital One Bank ("Capital One")**, judgment lien in the amount of \$3,759.69, recorded in Kern County on December 8, 2017.

(collectively "the Two Liens").

The lienholder in the instant motion (DCN FW-JSP-4) is Capital One. Docs. ##45-48, #54. Debtor complied with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(3) by serving Creditor's registered agent for service of process via first class mail on March 21, 2026. Doc. #54. Debtor also complied with Rule 7004(h), which requires service to be made on an insured depository institution by certified mail and addressed to an officer except where the three exceptions specified in subsections (h)(1)-(3) apply. *Id.*

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 7 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not

materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

To avoid a lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), the movant must establish four elements: (1) there must be an exemption to which the debtor would be entitled under § 522(b); (2) the property must be listed on the debtor's schedules as exempt; (3) the lien must impair the exemption; and (4) the lien must be either a judicial lien or a non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in personal property listed in § 522(f)(1)(B). § 522(f)(1); *Goswami v. MTC Distrib. (In re Goswami)*, 304 B.R. 386, 390-91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (quoting *In re Mohring*, 142 B.R. 389, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992), *aff'd*, 24 F.3d 247 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Regarding this Creditor, a judgment was entered against Debtor in favor of Capital One Bank in the amount of \$3,759.69 on October 3, 2017. Doc. #48. The abstract of judgment was issued on November 13, 2017, and was recorded in Kern County on December 8, 2017. *Id.* That lien attached to Debtor's interest in Property. *Id.*; Doc. #47. Debtor estimates that the current amount owed on account of this lien is \$387,380.05. Doc. #47 (Decl. of Francisco Corral).

The Property is listed on Debtors' Schedule A/B on line 1.1 with a value as of the petition date of \$478,000.00. Doc. #1 (Sched. A/B). Debtors claimed a \$282,649.00 exemption in Property pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ("CCP") § 704.730. Doc. #1 (Sched. C).

In addition to the Two Liens, the Property is encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of Freedom Mortgage ("Freedom") in the amount of \$195,351.00. Doc. #1 (Sched. D).

When a debtor seeks to avoid multiple liens under § 522(f)(1) and there is equity to which liens can attach, the liens must be avoided in the reverse order of their priority. *Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Hanger (In re Hanger)*, 217 B.R. 592, 595 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), *aff'd*, 196 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1999). Ordinarily, liens already avoided are excluded from the exemption impairment calculation. *Ibid.*; § 522(f)(2)(B). Perfected judicial liens which were recorded prior to the junior-most lien to be avoided are grouped with the unavoidable liens.

Here, the most senior of the Two Liens is that of TD Bank, which holds a judgment lien in the amount of \$1,916.44. See Docs. #50 et seq. If there is insufficient equity with which to pay anything towards the TD Bank lien, then it follows there is no equity to pay the Capital One lien either. That appears to be the case, as the sum of the amount owed under Freedom's deed of trust and the exemption to which Debtors are entitled greatly exceeds the value of the Property.

Property's encumbrances can be illustrated as follows:

Creditor	Amount	Recorded	Status
1. Freedom's Deed of Trust	\$195,351.00	n/a	Unavoidable
2. TD Bank	\$1,916.44	6/16/17	Avoidable
3. Capital One	\$3,759.69	12/8/17	Avoidable

"Under the full avoidance approach, as used in *Brantz*, the only way a lien would be avoided 'in full' was if the debtor's gross equity were equal to or less than the amount of the exemption." *Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Hanger (In re Hanger)*, 217 B.R. 592, 596 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), *aff'd*, 196 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1999), citing *In re Brantz*, 106 B.R. 62, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) ("Avoidance of all judicial liens results unless (3) [the result of deducting the debtor's allowable exemptions and the sum of all liens not avoided from the value of the property] is a positive figure."), citing *In re Magosin*, 75 B.R. 545, 547 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (judicial lien was avoidable in its entirety where equity is less than exemption).

The total of Freedom's Deed of Trust and Debtors' statutory exemption is \$478,000.00, which is exactly equal to the fair market value of the Property. Even if the junior-most lien was avoided, leaving only the \$1,915.44 lien of TD Bank, there would be insufficient equity to pay anything towards that lien. Strict application of the § 522(f)(2) formula with respect to the Road 28, LLC lien is illustrated as follows:

Amount of judgment lien		\$1,915.44
Total amount of unavoidable liens (incl. liens not yet avoided)	+	195,351.00
Debtor's claimed exemption in Property	+	\$282,649.00
<i>Sum</i>	=	\$479,915.44
Debtor's claimed value of interest absent liens	-	\$478,000.00
Extent lien impairs exemption	=	\$1,915.44

All Points Capital Corp. v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 373 B.R. 84, 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); *accord. Hanger* 217 B.R. at 596, *Higgins v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Higgins)*, 201 B.R. 965, 967 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); *cf. Brantz*, 106 B.R. at 68, *Magosin*, 75 B.R. at 549-50, *In re Piersol*, 244 B.R. 309, 311 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000). Since there is no equity for any of the Six Liens to attach and this case does not

involve fractional interests or co-owned property with non-debtor third parties, the § 522(f)(2) formula can be re-illustrated using the Brantz formula with the same result:

Fair market value of Property		\$478,000.00
Total amount of unavoidable liens (incl. liens not yet avoided)	-	\$195,351.00
Homestead exemption	-	282,649.00
Remaining equity for judicial liens	=	\$0.00
Creditor's judicial lien	-	\$1,915.44
Extent Debtor's exemption impaired	=	(\$1,915.44)

After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is insufficient equity to support either of the Two Liens which Debtor presently seeks to avoid. Therefore, the fixing of this Creditor's judicial lien impairs Debtor's exemption in the Property and its fixing will be avoided.

Debtor has established the four elements necessary to avoid a lien under § 522(f)(1). Accordingly, this motion will be GRANTED. The proposed order shall state that the lien of **Capital One Bank** recorded on December 8, 2017, is avoided from the subject Property only and include a copy of the abstract of judgment as an exhibit.

2. [25-11401](#)-B-7 **IN RE: FRANCISCO/LAURA CORRAL**
[JSP-5](#)

MOTION TO AVOID LIEN OF TD BANK USA, N.A.
3-17-2026 [[50](#)]

LAURA CORRAL/MV
JOSEPH PEARL/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Francisco and Laura Corral ("Debtors") move for an order avoiding a judicial lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) encumbering real property located at 334 Redwood Drive, Shafter, California ("the Property").

This motion is one of two motions to avoid judicial liens filed roughly contemporaneously by Debtor and presently pending before the court. See *Items ##1-2*. These motions address outstanding judicial lienholders as follows, in descending order of priority:

1. **DCN JSP-5** (Item #2, Docs. ##50-53, #55). **TD Bank, Inc. ("TD Bank")**, judgment lien in the amount of \$1,916.44, recorded in Kern County on June 16, 2017.
2. **DCN JSP-4** (Item #1, Docs. ##45-48, #54). **Capital One Bank ("Capital One")**, judgment lien in the amount of \$3,759.69, recorded in Kern County on December 8, 2017.

(collectively "the Two Liens").

The lienholder in the instant motion (DCN FW-JSP-4) is TD Bank. Docs. ##50-53, #55. Debtor complied with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(3) by serving Creditor's registered agent for service of process via first class mail on March 21, 2026. Doc. #54. Debtor also complied with Rule 7004(h), which requires service to be made on an insured depository institution by certified mail and addressed to an officer except where the three exceptions specified in subsections (h)(1)-(3) apply. *Id.*

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the chapter 7 trustee, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

To avoid a lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), the movant must establish four elements: (1) there must be an exemption to which the debtor would be entitled under § 522(b); (2) the property must be listed on the debtor's schedules as exempt; (3) the lien must impair the exemption; and (4) the lien must be either a judicial lien or a non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in personal property listed in § 522(f)(1)(B). § 522(f)(1); *Goswami v. MTC Distrib. (In re Goswami)*, 304 B.R. 386, 390-91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (quoting *In re Mohring*, 142 B.R. 389, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992), *aff'd*, 24 F.3d 247 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Regarding this Creditor, a judgment was entered against Debtor in favor of TD Bank in the amount of \$1,916.44 on March 29, 2017. Doc. #53. The abstract of judgment was issued on May 25, 2017, and was

recorded in Kern County on June 16, 2017. *Id.* That lien attached to Debtor's interest in Property. *Id.*; Doc. #52. Debtor estimates that the current amount owed on account of this lien is \$387,380.05. Doc. #52 (Decl. of Francisco Corral).

The Property is listed on Debtors' Schedule A/B on line 1.1 with a value as of the petition date of \$478,000.00. Doc. #1 (Sched. A/B). Debtors claimed a \$282,649.00 exemption in Property pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. ("CCP") § 704.730. Doc. #1 (Sched. C).

In addition to the Two Liens, the Property is encumbered by a Deed of Trust in favor of Freedom Mortgage ("Freedom") in the amount of \$195,351.00. Doc. #1 (Sched. D).

When a debtor seeks to avoid multiple liens under § 522(f)(1) and there is equity to which liens can attach, the liens must be avoided in the reverse order of their priority. *Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Hanger (In re Hanger)*, 217 B.R. 592, 595 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), *aff'd*, 196 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1999). Ordinarily, liens already avoided are excluded from the exemption impairment calculation. *Ibid.*; § 522(f)(2)(B). Perfected judicial liens which were recorded prior to the junior-most lien to be avoided are grouped with the unavoidable liens.

Here, the most senior of the Two Liens is that of TD Bank, which holds a judgment lien in the amount of \$1,916.44. *See Docs. #50 et seq.* It appears that the sum of the amount owed under Freedom's deed of trust and the exemption to which Debtors are entitled exceeds the value of the Property.

Property's encumbrances can be illustrated as follows:

Creditor	Amount	Recorded	Status
1. Freedom's Deed of Trust	\$195,351.00	n/a	Unavoidable
2. TD Bank	\$1,916.44	6/16/17	Avoidable
3. Capital One	\$3,759.69	12/8/17	Avoidable

"Under the full avoidance approach, as used in *Brantz*, the only way a lien would be avoided 'in full' was if the debtor's gross equity were equal to or less than the amount of the exemption." *Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Sav. Ass'n v. Hanger (In re Hanger)*, 217 B.R. 592, 596 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), *aff'd*, 196 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1999), citing *In re Brantz*, 106 B.R. 62, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) ("Avoidance of all judicial liens results unless (3) [the result of deducting the debtor's allowable exemptions and the sum of all liens not avoided from the value of the property] is a positive figure."), citing *In re Magosin*, 75 B.R. 545, 547 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (judicial lien was avoidable in its entirety where equity is less than exemption).

The total of Freedom's Deed of Trust and Debtors' statutory exemption is \$478,000.00, which is exactly equal to the fair market value of the Property. Even if the junior-most lien was avoided, leaving only the \$1,915.44 lien of TD Bank, there would be insufficient equity to pay anything towards that lien. Strict application of the § 522(f) (2) formula with respect to the Road 28, LLC lien is illustrated as follows:

Amount of judgment lien		\$1,915.44
Total amount of unavoidable liens (incl. liens not yet avoided)	+	195,351.00
Debtor's claimed exemption in Property	+	\$282,649.00
<i>Sum</i>	=	\$479,915.44
Debtor's claimed value of interest absent liens	-	\$478,000.00
Extent lien impairs exemption	=	\$1,915.44

All Points Capital Corp. v. Meyer (In re Meyer), 373 B.R. 84, 91 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); accord. *Hanger* 217 B.R. at 596, *Higgins v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Higgins)*, 201 B.R. 965, 967 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996); cf. *Brantz*, 106 B.R. at 68, *Magosin*, 75 B.R. at 549-50, *In re Piersol*, 244 B.R. 309, 311 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000). Since there is no equity for any of the Six Liens to attach and this case does not involve fractional interests or co-owned property with non-debtor third parties, the § 522(f) (2) formula can be re-illustrated using the *Brantz* formula with the same result:

Fair market value of Property		\$478,000.00
Total amount of unavoidable liens (incl. liens not yet avoided)	-	\$195,351.00
Homestead exemption	-	282,649.00
Remaining equity for judicial liens	=	\$0.00
Creditor's judicial lien	-	\$1,915.44
Extent Debtor's exemption impaired	=	(\$1,915.44)

After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2) (A), there is insufficient equity to support either of the Two Liens which Debtor presently seeks to avoid. Therefore, the fixing of this Creditor's judicial lien impairs Debtor's exemption in the Property and its fixing will be avoided.

Debtor has established the four elements necessary to avoid a lien under § 522(f) (1). Accordingly, this motion will be GRANTED. The proposed order shall state that the lien of **TD Bank** recorded on June 16, 2017, is avoided from the subject Property only and include a copy of the abstract of judgment as an exhibit.

3. [25-13103](#)-B-7 **IN RE: ADRIENNE CARNERO**

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
3-18-2026 [[44](#)]

ADRIENNE CARNERO/MV
NICHOLAS WAJDA/ATTY. FOR DBT.
RESPONSIVE PLEADING

TENTATIVE RULING: This hearing will proceed as scheduled.

DISPOSITION: Denied.

ORDER: The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions. Order preparation determined at the hearing.

This cause comes before the court on the motion of Adrienne Carnero ("Debtor") for reconsideration of this court's Order dated March 3, 2026 ("the Order") which denied Debtor's motion to convert her Chapter 7 case to Chapter 13. Doc. #44; see Doc. #40 ("the Order").

As an informative matter, the court would customarily deny this motion without prejudice on procedural grounds. Debtor failed to include a Docket Control Number ("DCN") when filing the instant motion as required by LBR 9004-2(a)(6), (b)(5), (b)(6), (e)(3), LBR 9014-1(c), and (e)(3). Also, Debtor failed to use the proper Certificate of Service Form EDC 007-005 as required by LBR 7005-1, opting instead to simply add a paragraph to the end of the motion stating, "Debtor's counsel certifies that a copy of this Motion will be served on the Chapter 7 trustee, the United States Trustee, and all parties in interest as reflected on the Court's matrix."

Finally, Debtor's Notice was deficient for multiple reasons. It did not notify respondents that they can determine (a) whether the matter has been resolved without oral argument; (b) whether the court has issued a tentative ruling that can be viewed by checking the pre-hearing dispositions on the court's website at <http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov> after 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing; and (c) parties appearing telephonically must view the pre-hearing dispositions prior to the hearing. And it did not notify respondents that any opposition to the motion must be in writing and filed with the court at least 14 days preceding the date of the hearing.

Any one of these errors is grounds for denial without prejudice. However, as the Trustee has responded to the motion substantively, the court will overlook the procedural errors and allow this matter to be heard.

The underlying facts giving rise to this motion were, for the most part, explicated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing which the

undersigned conducted on March 3, 2026, which gave rise to the Order. See Doc. #39. To summarize, Debtor filed a motion to convert this Chapter 7 case to one under Chapter 13. Irma Edmonds ("Trustee") opposed on the following grounds:

1. Debtor's conduct over the course of the Chapter 7 case demonstrated bad faith conduct.
2. Conversion would be futile because, while unsecured creditors would be paid in full through liquidation of "the Armona Property," Debtor would need to pay significantly more than her monthly net income could provide in order to fund a 100% plan. In other words, Debtor could not satisfy the liquidation test in Chapter 13.
3. Relatedly, Debtor does not have regular income to fund a Chapter 13 plan at all.

The court agreed with the Trustee's arguments, relying on Debtor's own statements in her filings which, in the court's view, demonstrated bad faith. Most notably, Debtor sought to exempt the Armona Property as her homestead, but Trustee objected on the grounds that Debtor did not actually reside there and did not intend to. Debtor did not oppose the Objection. Only after the court sustained the unopposed Objection, thereby leaving the Armona Property vulnerable to liquidation, did Debtor seek to convert. The court agreed with Trustee that the timing of the motion to convert under those circumstances, combined with the fact that Debtor's own filings demonstrated that she would not be able to meet the liquidation test in a Chapter 13 case.

Debtor filed this motion for reconsideration on March 18, 2026. Doc. #44. Contemporaneously, Debtor also filed an Amended Schedule I & J, which purports to show that Debtor's monthly net income has increased by \$1,537.00. Compare Doc. #46 and Doc. #1 (Schedules I & J). Among other developments that allow for this improved financial situation, Debtor's "Other Income" has increased by \$200.00 without explanation (Schedule I, line 9), and Debtor's "Other: Rent for Work" expense has dropped from \$1,100.00 per month to \$500.00 per month (Schedule J, line 21). No evidentiary support has been offered to explain or justify these significant changes to Debtor's financial affairs which were only set forth in the context of this motion for reconsideration.

The Trustee, in opposition to the motion, is even more thorough in pointing out the evidentiary deficiencies which plague Debtor's filings throughout this case and up to the present matter.

Hearing in this matter will proceed as scheduled, and the court is strongly disinclined to accept new evidence at this late date, especially in light of the uncontradicted evidence that Debtor knew or should have known that the Armona Property was not her homestead and should not have been exempted. Debtor will have her chance to be heard, but the court is inclined to DENY this motion.

4. [26-10810](#)-B-7 **IN RE: MARK GALAVIZ**
[JCW-1](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
3-25-2026 [\[13\]](#)

FINANCIAL SERVICES VEHICLE TRUST/MV
MARK ZIMMERMAN/ATTY. FOR DBT.
JENNIFER WONG/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in
conformance with the ruling below.

Financial Services Vehicle Trust ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) with respect to a 2023 BMW 5 Series 540i Sedan (VIN: WBA53BJ01PWY09812) ("Vehicle"). Doc. #13.

This motion relates to an executory contract or lease of personal property. The time prescribed in 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) for the lease to be assumed by the chapter 7 trustee has not expired and, pursuant to § 365 (p)(1), the leased property is still property of the estate and protected by the automatic stay under § 362(a).

Mark A. Galaviz ("Debtor") nor the Trustee filed opposition, and Movant repossessed the Vehicle on February 5, 2026. Since there is no opposition from either the Debtor or the Trustee and the court is unaware if Debtor exercised his option to assume the lease under § 365(p)(2), this motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay for the following reason. Debtor has made no payments since the filing of the petition and apparently has made no payments since approximately December 18, 2025. Docs. #15, #17.

Accordingly, the motion will be GRANTED pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because the Vehicle was repossessed on February 5, 2026.

5. [15-10422](#)-B-7 **IN RE: JACK/VALERIE MOORE**

MOTION TO AVOID LIEN OF PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, INC.
3-11-2026 [\[54\]](#)

VALERIE MOORE/MV
GORDON DAYTON/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Denied without prejudice.

ORDER: The court will issue an order.

On March 11, 2026, Jack and Valerie Moore ("Debtors") filed the instant *Motion to Avoid Lien of Portfolio Recovery Associates, Inc.* Doc. #54. This motion will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to comply with the Local Rules of Practice ("LBR").

LBR 9004-2(c)(1) requires that motions, notices, objections, responses, replies, declarations, affidavits, other documentary evidence, exhibits, memoranda of points and authorities, other supporting documents, proofs of service, and related pleadings shall be filed as separate documents. In this instance, Debtors improperly combined the notice, the motion, the exhibits, and the Co-Debtor's Declaration into a single document.

LBR 9004-2(a)(6), (b)(5), (b)(6), (e)(3), LBR 9014-1(c), and (e)(3) are the rules about Docket Control Numbers ("DCN"). These rules require a DCN to be in the caption page on all documents filed in every matter with the court and each new motion requires a new DCN. The DCN shall consist of not more than three letters, which may be the

initials of the attorney for the moving party (e.g., first, middle, and last name) or the first three initials of the law firm for the moving party, and the number that is one number higher than the number of motions previously filed by said attorney or law firm in connection with that specific bankruptcy case. Each separate matter must have a unique DCN linking it to all other related pleadings. In this instance, the motion had no DCN whatsoever.

LBR 9014-1(d)(3)(B)(iii) requires the movant to notify respondents that they can determine (a) whether the matter has been resolved without oral argument; (b) whether the court has issued a tentative ruling that can be viewed by checking the pre-hearing dispositions on the court's website at <http://www.caeb.uscourts.gov> after 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing; and (c) parties appearing telephonically must view the pre-hearing dispositions prior to the hearing. Here, the notice, which was improperly combined with the motion as a single document, does not contain the required language directing respondents to the pre-hearing dispositions on the court's website, nor does it state that parties appearing telephonically are required to view the pre-hearing dispositions prior to appearing at the hearing. Doc. #54.

For the above reason(s), this motion will be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

6. [26-11024](#)-B-7 **IN RE: VALERIA TORRES AND ALBERTO SOSA**
[RSS-1](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
4-1-2026 [[23](#)]

SEASIDE AT LAGUNA HEIGHTS LLC/MV
RICHARD SONTAG/ATTY. FOR MV.

TENTATIVE RULING: This matter will be called and proceed as scheduled because Debtors are *pro se*. The court intends to DENY this motion.

DISPOSITION: Denied as moot.

ORDER: The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions. The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order after hearing.

Seaside at Laguna Heights ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1), (d)(2) and (d)(3) with respect to 94 Seaspray East, Laguna Niguel, California 92677 ("Property"). Doc. #23. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

Written opposition was not required and may be presented at the hearing. In the absence of opposition, this motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was filed and served pursuant to Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(2) and will proceed as scheduled. Unless opposition is presented at the hearing, the court intends to enter the respondents' defaults and grant the motion. If opposition is presented at the hearing, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(2). The court will issue an order if a further hearing is necessary.

Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A), if the debtor has had a bankruptcy case pending within the preceding one-year period that was dismissed, then the automatic stay under subsection (a) shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the latter case is filed. Debtors had one case pending within the preceding one-year period that was dismissed: Case No. 25-42047-B-7, Northern District of California. That case was filed on October 30, 2025, and was dismissed on November 11, 2025, for failure to file information. This case was filed on March 10, 2026. Doc. #1. The automatic stay expired on April 9, 2026.

Pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(A), the Property is no longer property of the estate and the automatic stay under § 362(a) has already terminated by operation of law. Therefore, the grounds for this motion are MOOT and it is DENIED.

The court notes that the motion appears to invoke § 363(d)(4) by requesting "[t]he Order be binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against Debtors, so that no further automatic stay shall arise in the case as to the Property without further notice" and "[t]hat the Order be binding and effective in any Bankruptcy case commenced by or against any debtors who claim any interest in the Property without further notice."

To the extent that the motion seeks relief under § 362(d)(4), it is DENIED. Even if the motion was not moot because the stay had already terminated, Movant has failed to provide sufficient evidentiary support to satisfy the requirements of § 362(d)(4).

7. [26-10445](#)-B-7 **IN RE: JAVIER CASADO-RAMOS**
[AP-1](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
3-20-2026 [[13](#)]

NATIONS DIRECT MORTGAGE, LLC/MV
TIMOTHY SPRINGER/ATTY. FOR DBT.
WENDY LOCKE/ATTY. FOR MV.
RESPONSIVE PLEADING

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in
conformance with the ruling below.

Nations Direct Mortgage, LLC ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to a 625 W. Morris Avenue, Fresno, California ("Property"). Doc. #13. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

Javier Casado-Ramos ("Debtor") filed non-opposition on March 30, 2027. Doc. #21. No other party in interest timely filed written opposition. Debtor's Statement of Intention indicated that the Property would be surrendered. This motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtor has failed to make at least ten (10) complete pre- and post-petition payments. The Movant has produced evidence that Debtor is delinquent at least \$39,102.86 and the entire balance of \$529,130.15 is due. Docs. ##17-18.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Property and the Property is not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. The property is valued at \$515,000.00 and Debtor owes \$529,130.15. Docs. ##17-18.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because Debtor has failed to make at least ten (10) payments, both pre- and post-petition to Movant.

8. [25-22557](#)-B-7 **IN RE: KENNETH/JENNIFER KOCH**
[FW-1](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
3-20-2026 [[50](#)]

COMPEER FINANCIAL, FLCA/MV
JAMES BEIRNE/ATTY. FOR DBT.
FANNY WAN/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Compeer Financial, FLCA ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to 18575 McCourtney Road, Grass Valley, California ("Property"). Doc. #50. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

Kenneth Ryan Koch and Jennifer Patricia Koch ("Debtors") did not oppose. On March 30, 2026, Chapter 7 Trustee Ethan J. Birnberg filed non-opposition. Docket Generally. No other party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtors have failed to make at least twelve (12) complete pre- and post-petition payments. The Movant has produced evidence that Debtors are delinquent at least \$201,317.80 and the amount of \$2,350,796.30 is due to Movant. Said amount does not include the \$700,000.00 owed to the second lien holder. Docs. #52, #53, #55.

The court also finds that the Debtors do not have any equity in the Property and that the Property is not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtors are in chapter 7. The property is valued at \$2,360,000.00 and Debtors owe \$3,050,796.30 (which includes the \$700,000.00 owed to the second lien holder). Docs. #52, #53, #55.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because Debtors have failed to make at least twelve (12) payments, both pre- and post-petition to Movant.

9. [20-23267](#)-B-7 **IN RE: SHON/JILL TREANOR**

MOTION TO SUBMIT DIRECT EVIDENCE OF FRAUD
3-23-2026 [[519](#)]

SHON TREANOR/MV
SHON TREANOR/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Continued to May 19, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

ORDER: The court will prepare the order.

On April 17, 2026, Jill Treanor, Co-Debtor in the above-styled case, submitted a handwritten document requesting that this matter be continued due to the recent death of her father. While not presented as a formal motion, the court finds this request well-taken. Accordingly, this matter is hereby CONTINUED to May 19, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

10. [20-23267](#)-B-7 **IN RE: SHON/JILL TREANOR**

MOTION TO RECEIVE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF MY HOME
2-2-2026 [[514](#)]

JILL TREANOR/MV

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Continued to May 19, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

ORDER: The court will prepare the order.

On April 17, 2026, Jill Treanor, Co-Debtor in the above-styled case, submitted a handwritten document requesting that this matter be continued due to the recent death of her father. While not presented as a formal motion, the court finds this request well-taken. Accordingly, this matter is hereby CONTINUED to May 19, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

11. [24-24267](#)-B-7 **IN RE: RIKI TROWE**
[DNL-14](#)

CONTINUED MOTION FOR BAD FAITH DETERMINATION
10-20-2025 [[193](#)]

NIKKI FARRIS/MV
OMERO BANUELOS/ATTY. FOR DBT.
J. CUNNINGHAM/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Dropped from the calendar.

ORDER: The court will prepare the order.

On March 31, 2026, the court entered an order granting this motion.
Doc. #312. Accordingly, this matter will be DROPPED from the calendar.

12. [24-24267](#)-B-7 **IN RE: RIKI TROWE**
[DNL-15](#)

CONTINUED MOTION FOR EXAMINATION
10-27-2025 [[203](#)]

OMERO BANUELOS/ATTY. FOR DBT.
J. CUNNINGHAM/ATTY. FOR MV.

NO RULING.

13. [24-24267](#)-B-7 **IN RE: RIKI TROWE**
[DNL-18](#)

MOTION TO COMPROMISE CONTROVERSY/APPROVE SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT WITH EMILY TROWE
3-23-2026 [[300](#)]

NIKKI FARRIS/MV
OMERO BANUELOS/ATTY. FOR DBT.
J. CUNNINGHAM/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The moving party will prepare the order in accordance
with the ruling below.

Nikki B. Farris ("Trustee"), Chapter 7 Trustee in the above-styled case, moves for an order approving the settlement agreement ("the Agreement") between the estate and Emily Trowe ("Emily"). Doc. #300.

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

Riki Trowe ("Debtor") filed this case as a Chapter 13 on September 24, 2024, and converted to Chapter 7 on December 6, 2024. Docs. #1, #36. During the course of the Chapter 7 case, Trustee filed several adversary proceedings, including *Farris v. Marron et al.*, 25-02135 ("the AP"). One of the defendants in the AP is Emily, against whom Trustee seeks to avoid and recover a number of pre-petition and post-petition allegedly fraudulent transfers totaling an estimated \$224,710.00. Doc. #302 (Exhibit A - Settlement Agreement).

Under the terms of the Agreement between Trustee and Emily, Trustee will waive any and all claims of the estate against Emily in exchange for a payment of \$7,000.00. Doc. #302.

The court notes that a copy of the settlement agreement has not been filed in this case. The motion will only be granted if Trustee separately files the settlement agreement and docket it as a stipulation.

As representative of the chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, Trustee has the authority to settle claims of Debtor subject to court approval. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a). On a motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or settlement. Rule 9019. Approval of a compromise must be based upon considerations of fairness and equity. *In re A & C Props.*, 784 F.2d 1377, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). The court must consider and balance four factors: (1) the probability of success in the litigation; (2) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in the matter of collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience, and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the creditors with a proper deference to their reasonable views. *In re Woodson*, 839 F.2d 610, 620 (9th Cir. 1988).

It appears from the moving papers that the Trustee has considered the *A & C Props.* and *Woodson* factors, which weigh in favor of approving the settlement agreement as follows:

1. Probability of success in litigation: Trustee asserts that this factor is neutral, as there is a high likelihood that the Trustee will prevail at trial of the underlying cause of intentional fraudulent transfer. However, litigation would cause the estate to incur litigation expenses, and it is unlikely that litigation would result in a judgment in excess of \$7,000.00 that Emily could actually pay.
2. Collection: Trustee asserts that there is a serious doubt as to whether Emily can pay any judgment in excess of \$7,000.00. This factor favors settlement.
3. Complexity of litigation: The Trustee notes that litigation would require time and expense that is otherwise wholly avoidable by the compromise. The law favors compromise and not litigation for its own sake. *In re Blair*, 538 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1976).
4. Paramount interests of creditors: This factor supports compromise. It is the Trustee's opinion that the Agreement would increase the funds available to creditors from \$641,000.00 to \$648,000.00, which is in the best interests of creditors.

The *A & C Props.* and *Woodson* factors appear to weigh in favor of approving the settlement. Therefore, the settlement appears to be a fair, equitable, and reasonable exercise of Trustee's business judgment. The court may give weight to the opinions of the trustee,

the parties, and their attorneys. *In re Blair*, 538 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1976). Furthermore, the law favors compromise and not litigation for its own sake. *Id.*

Accordingly, this motion will be GRANTED. The settlement between the estate and Emily Trowe will be approved.

This ruling is not authorizing the payment of any fees or costs associated with the settlement. Additionally, Trustee shall attach a copy of the settlement agreement as an exhibit to the proposed order and shall separately file the settlement agreement and docket it as a stipulation.

14. [24-24267](#)-B-7 **IN RE: RIKI TROWE**
[DNL-19](#)

MOTION FOR WAIVER OF DISCHARGE
3-23-2026 [\[305\]](#)

NIKKI FARRIS/MV
OMERO BANUELOS/ATTY. FOR DBT.
J. CUNNINGHAM/ATTY. FOR MV.

TENTATIVE RULING: This matter will proceed as scheduled.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions. Order preparation determined at the hearing.

This matter was originally heard before Judge Frederick E. Clement and was later reassigned to the undersigned judge.

Nikki B. Farris ("Trustee") moves for an order approving the discharge waiver provided in a written stipulation ("the Stipulation") executed by the following parties:

1. Riki Trowe ("Debtor");
2. Trustee,
3. Colutions, LLC ("Colutions");
4. Ventura Seed Company, LLC ("VS"); and
5. their respective counsel.

(collectively "the Parties"). Doc. #305. The court notes that the Stipulation was filed as an exhibit to this motion and it has not been separately filed and docketed as a stipulation.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in

interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987).

No party in interest timely filed written opposition. Nevertheless, this matter will be called and proceed as scheduled for the reasons outlined below.

Debtor filed this case as a Chapter 13 case on September 24, 2024, and later voluntarily converted the case to Chapter 7 on December 6, 2024. Docs. #1, #36.

In the course of this case, three adversary proceedings ("the Discharge APs") were filed by Trustee, Colutions, and VSC seeking denial of Debtor's discharge. See AP 25-02136, 25-02036, and 25-02037. The complaints allege conduct on the part of Debtor which, if proven, would result in denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3), (a)(4)(A), (a)(6)(A), and (a)(7). *Id.*

Subject to court approval, the Parties have entered into the Stipulation, which provides for: (a) the Debtor's irrevocable and unconditional waiver of discharge; and (b) dismissal without prejudice of the Discharge AP's, with the parties bearing their own attorney fees and cost. Doc. #308 (Exhibit A - the Agreement). The Trustee opines that approving the Stipulation is in the best interests of the estate because: (a) the Parties will avoid incurring additional attorney fees and litigation costs and (b) the Stipulation will resolve the discharge dispute while still allowing the estate to pursue other pending matters connected with this case and this Debtor. Doc. #307 (Trustee's Declaration).

Debtor has previously submitted a declaration in support of a prior motion [DCN DNL-16] to approve the proposed waiver. Doc. #269. That earlier motion was denied by Judge Clement because Debtor did not appear at the hearing conducted on February 2, 2026. Doc. #277. The moving papers indicate that, during a subsequent hearing on related matters, Debtor's counsel advised that Debtor still wished to proceed with the waiver, and the parties agreed that this motion would be refiled and set for hearing on April 23, 2026, before the undersigned. Doc. #305. Debtor is expected to participate in this hearing and be available for examination to confirm that the waiver is knowing and voluntary. *Id.*

No party in interest has opposed this motion, and the defaults of non-responding parties are entered. The court is inclined to GRANT this motion. However, because of the significance of waiving the right to discharge, a hearing in this matter will proceed as scheduled so that

the Debtor can be examined as to whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary. But if Debtor does is not present at the hearing, the court is nevertheless inclined to GRANT the motion in light of Debtor's earlier declaration.

Any proposed order shall attach the Stipulation as an exhibit. Movant shall also separately file the Stipulation and docket it as a stipulation.

15. [24-22469](#)-B-7 **IN RE: JENNIFER RODRIGUE**
[CRG-8](#)

CONTINUED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE
AUTOMATIC STAY
4-8-2025 [[282](#)]

JENNIFER RODRIGUE/MV
CARL GUSTAFSON/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Continued to June 30, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

ORDER: The court will issue the order.

On April 3, 2026, Debtor submitted a unilateral status report advising that Debtor's counsel "is undergoing a medical procedure that cannot be rescheduled at the time currently set for the status conference." Doc. #333. Debtor requested a continuance to another date in the near future. *Id.* Accordingly, this matter is hereby CONTINUED to June 30, 2026, at 1:30 p.m.

16. [26-10271](#)-B-7 **IN RE: PEDRO/MARY YBARRA**
[PFT-1](#)

OPPOSITION RE: TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
APPEAR AT SEC. 341(A) MEETING OF CREDITORS
3-2-2026 [[23](#)]

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Conditionally denied.

ORDER: The court will issue the order.

Chapter 7 trustee Peter L. Fear ("Trustee") seeks dismissal of this case for the debtor's failure to appear and testify at the § 341(a) meeting of creditors held on March 2, 2026. Doc. #23.

Pedro V. Ybarra, Jr. and Mary I. Ybarra ("Debtors") timely opposed. Doc. #28. Debtors aver that their failure to appear was due to a miscommunication with their petition prepare as to the date of the Meeting of Creditors. Debtors did not indicate if they would be present at the continued Meeting of Creditors.

This motion to dismiss will be CONDITIONALLY DENIED.

Debtors shall attend the meeting of creditors rescheduled for May 14, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. See, Doc. #22. If Debtors fail to appear and testify at the rescheduled meeting, Trustee may file a declaration with a proposed order and the case may be dismissed without a further hearing.

The times prescribed in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017(e)(1) and 4004(a) for the Chapter 7 Trustee and U.S. Trustee to object to Debtors' discharge or file motions for abuse, other than presumed abuse under § 707, are extended to 60 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors.

17. [23-12178](#)-B-7 **IN RE: JOHN/CYNTHIA MENDOZA**
[JES-2](#)

MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR JAMES SALVEN, ACCOUNTANT(S)
3-17-2026 [\[47\]](#)

JAMES SALVEN/MV
BENNY BARCO/ATTY. FOR DBT.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing in this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order that conforms with the opinion below.

James Salven ("Applicant" or "Salven") seeks approval of a final allowance of compensation under 11 U.S.C. §§ 330 of the Bankruptcy Code for professional services rendered and reimbursement for expenses incurred as accountant for Irma Edmonds, Trustee in the above-styled case ("Trustee"). Doc. #47. The debtors are John and Cynthia Mendoza ("Debtors").

Applicant was employed to perform services under § 327 of the Code pursuant to an order of this court dated February 9, 2026. Doc. #46. This is Applicant's first and final request for compensation.

Applicant seeks **\$2,200.00** in fees based on 9.7 billable hours from January 30, 2026, through March 16, 2026. Doc. #51. Based on the moving papers, it appears that Salven was the only employee of Applicant to work on this case, and he billed at a rate of \$280.00 per hour. *Id.* Applicant seeks an award of **\$251.41** for copies, postage,

using the Lacerte Tax program to prepare Debtor's tax returns, and expenses in preparing and filing the employment and fee applications. *Id.*

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1)(A) and (B) permit approval of "reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by . . . [a] professional person, or attorney" and "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses." In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to a professional person, the court shall consider the nature, extent, and value of such services, considering all relevant factors, including those enumerated in subsections (a)(3)(A) through (E). § 330(a)(3). Previous interim compensation awards under 11 U.S.C. § 331, if any, are subject to final review under § 330.

Applicant's services here included, without limitation, accounting work on behalf of the estate, including preparation and filing of state and federal tax returns for the estate and determining the property basis for estate property and the escrow account. Doc. #48. The court finds the services and expenses reasonable, actual, and necessary. The Trustee has reviewed the Application and finds the requested fees and expenses to be reasonable. Doc. #51.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). Thus, pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B), the failure of any party in interest (including but not limited to creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other properly-served party in interest) to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing may be deemed a waiver of any such opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). When there is no opposition to a motion, the defaults of all parties in interest who failed to timely respond will be entered, and, in the absence of any opposition, the movant's factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amounts of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary when an unopposed movant has made a prima facie case for the requested relief. *See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).

No party in interest has responded, and the defaults of all such parties are entered.

This Application is GRANTED. The court will approve on a final basis under 11 U.S.C. §330 compensation in the amount of **\$2,200.00** in fees and **\$251.41** in expenses. The court grants the Application for a total award of **\$2,451.41** as an administrative expense of the estate and an order authorizing and directing the DIP to pay such to Applicant from the first available estate funds.

18. [26-10880](#)-B-7 **IN RE: KAWAL PREET SINGH**
[HRH-3](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
4-2-2026 [[35](#)]

CROSSROADS EQUIPMENT LEASE AND FINANCE, LLC/MV
JERRY LOWE/ATTY. FOR DBT.
RAFFI KHATCHADOURIAN/ATTY. FOR MV.

TENTATIVE RULING: This matter will proceed as scheduled.

DISPOSITION: The court intends to grant the motion for relief on the grounds stated in the motion.

ORDER: The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions. The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order after hearing.

Crossroads Equipment Lease and Finance, LLC ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to a 2024 Peterbilt Model 579 truck (VIN 1XPBD49XXRD 610223) (the "0223 Truck") and a 2024 Peterbilt Model 579 truck (VIN 1XPBD49XIRD6L0224) (the "0224 Truck") (collectively, the "Trucks") Doc. #35. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

As an informative matter, the certificates of service filed in connection with this motion used an older version of the court's *Official Certificate of Service* form (EDC Form 7-005, Rev. 10/30/2024) instead of the most updated version of the form (EDC Form 7-005, Rev. 6/3/2025). Doc. #41. The correct form can be accessed on the court's website.

Written opposition was not required and may be presented at the hearing. In the absence of opposition, this motion will be GRANTED. Movant recovered the 0224 Truck pre-petition and the 0223 Truck is currently in a repair shop. Debtor's Statement of Intention indicates that the 0223 Truck will be surrendered. Doc. #1.

This motion was filed and served pursuant to Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(2) and will proceed as scheduled. Unless opposition is presented at the hearing, the court intends to enter the respondents' defaults and grant the motion. If opposition is presented at the hearing, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(2). The court will issue an order if a further hearing is necessary.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary

relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtor has missed five (5) pre-petition payments totaling \$39,219.90. Docs. #37, #38, #40. Movant recovered possession of the 0224 Truck pre-petition. *Id.* Since the 0224 Truck has been recovered, the only issue is disposition of the collateral.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Trucks and the Trucks are not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. Movant values the Trucks at \$130,000.00 and the amount owed to Movant is \$273,367.15, which includes late fees, repossession fees and insufficient fund fees. Docs. #37, #38, #40.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded. According to the Debtor's Statement of Intention, the 0223 Truck will be surrendered.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because the Debtor has failed to make at least five (5) pre-petition payments and the Trucks are depreciating assets.

19. [26-10880](#)-B-7 **IN RE: KAWAL PREET SINGH**
[HRH-4](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
4-2-2026 [[28](#)]

LEE FINANCIAL SERVICES/MV
JERRY LOWE/ATTY. FOR DBT.
RAFFI KHATCHADOURIAN/ATTY. FOR MV.

TENTATIVE RULING: This matter will proceed as scheduled.

DISPOSITION: The court intends to grant the motion for relief on the grounds stated in the motion.

ORDER: The minutes of the hearing will be the court's findings and conclusions. The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order after hearing.

Lee Financial Services ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to a 2022 Freightliner Cascadia tractor truck (VIN 3AKJHHDR9NSNBI080), a 2021 International Model 625 tractor truck (VIN 3HSDZAPR1MN471466) and a 2020 Freightliner Cascadia tractor truck (VIN 3AKJHHDR6LSLK2856) (collectively the "Trucks") Doc. #28. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

As an informative matter, the certificates of service filed in connection with this motion used an older version of the court's *Official Certificate of Service* form (EDC Form 7-005, Rev. 10/30/2024) instead of the most updated version of the form (EDC Form 7-005, Rev. 6/3/2025). Doc. #34. The correct form can be accessed on the court's website.

Written opposition was not required and may be presented at the hearing. In the absence of opposition, this motion will be GRANTED. Debtor's Statement of Intention indicates that the Trucks will be surrendered. Doc. #1.

This motion was filed and served pursuant to Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(2) and will proceed as scheduled. Unless opposition is presented at the hearing, the court intends to enter the respondents' defaults and grant the motion. If opposition is presented at the hearing, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(2). The court will issue an order if a further hearing is necessary.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtor has missed two (2) pre-petition payments totaling \$16,472.02. Docs. #30, #32, #33.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Trucks and that the Trucks are not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. Movant values the Trucks at \$120,000.00 and expenses. Docs. #30, #32, #33.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded. According to the Debtor's Statement of Intention, the Trucks will be surrendered.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because the Debtor has failed to make at least two (2) pre-petition payments and the Trucks are depreciating assets.

20. [26-10386](#)-B-7 **IN RE: CORELIA EVERS**
[DWE-1](#)

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
3-25-2026 [\[17\]](#)

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION/MV
BRIAN HADDIX/ATTY. FOR DBT.
DANE EXNOWSKI/ATTY. FOR MV.

FINAL RULING: There will be no hearing on this matter.

DISPOSITION: Granted.

ORDER: The Moving Party shall submit a proposed order in conformance with the ruling below.

Freedom Mortgage Corporation ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) with respect to 3807 Kansas Ave, Riverbank, California 95367 ("Property"). Doc. #17. Movant also requests waiver of the 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4). *Id.*

Debtor filed non-opposition on April 16, 2026. Doc. #24. No other party in interest timely filed written opposition. This motion will be GRANTED.

This motion was set for hearing on 28 days' notice as required by Local Rule of Practice ("LBR") 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the creditors, the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, or any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(B) may be deemed a waiver of any opposition to the granting of the motion. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See *Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. Upon default, factual allegations will be taken as true (except those relating to amount of damages). *Televideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). Constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff make a *prima facie* showing that they are entitled to the relief sought, which the movant has done here.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) allows the court to grant relief from the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection. "Because there is no clear definition of what constitutes 'cause,' discretionary relief from the stay must be determined on a case-by-case basis." *In re Mac Donald*, 755 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1985).

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) allows the court to grant relief from the stay if the debtor does not have an equity in such property and such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.

After review of the included evidence, the court finds that "cause" exists to lift the stay because Debtor has failed to make at least ten (10) complete pre- and post-petition payments. The Movant has produced evidence that Debtor is delinquent at least \$8,249.20 and the entire balance of \$392,127.84 is due. Docs. #17, #21, #22. Said amount does not include the \$28,018.00 owed to the second lien holder.

The court also finds that the Debtor does not have any equity in the Property and the Property is not necessary to an effective reorganization because Debtor is in chapter 7. The property is valued at \$450,200.00 and Debtor owes \$420,145.84. Said amount does include the \$28,018.00 owed to the second lien holder. Docs. #17, #21, #22.

Accordingly, the motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(d)(1) and (d)(2) to permit the Movant to dispose of its collateral pursuant to applicable law and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(4) will be ordered waived because Debtors have failed to make at least 10 payments, both pre- and post-petition to Movant.