

Eastern District of California

Sacramento, California

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The Aguilar Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made nine post-petition payments, with a total of \$4,975.13 in post-petition payments past due.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$5,367.76, as stated in the Aguilar Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$5,220.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor.

DISCUSSION

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. *See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.)*, 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because “cause” is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); *In re Silverling*, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), *aff’d sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling)*, No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. *See In re J E Livestock, Inc.*, 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan)*, 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); *Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis)*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property’s value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See Ramco Indus. v. Preuss (In re Preuss)*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

In the Motion, Movant also moves for relief from the fourteen-day stay imposed by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) and for the order of the court to be binding and effective upon any conversion of this bankruptcy case. Movant filed an Amendment to the Motion on March 6, 2017, removing those two requests. Accordingly, the court does not rule on them.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by Americredit Financial Services, Inc. dba GM Financial (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2011 Mistubishi Outlander, VIN ending in 4800 (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

No other or additional relief is granted.

2. [15-28690-E-7](#) LISA SLEDGE
JCW-1 Chad Johnson

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION
VS.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
3-1-17 [88]

Final Ruling: No appearance at the April 6, 2017 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, and Chapter 7 Trustee on March 1, 2017. By the court's calculation, 36 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.

Lisa Sledge ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on November 9, 2015. Freedom Mortgage Corporation ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 3833 Clay Bank Road, Fairfield, California ("Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Maria McDevitt to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The McDevitt Declaration states that there are fifteen post-petition defaults in the payments on the obligation secured by the Property, with a total of \$44,440.35 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are six pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$18,018.00. Movant further asserts that the Property has a value of \$495,000.00 based on Debtor's statement of value on the Schedules, and that after allowance for Movant's secured claim and costs of sale, there would be only \$2,052.38 in recoverable equity for Debtor or the bankruptcy estate. Testimony as to the amount of the secured claim is stated in the McDevitt Declaration. Dckt. 92.

The Motion requests the court grant relief from the automatic stay for cause, expressly citing only to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Motion, 2:23–34; Dckt. 88.

DISCUSSION

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$453,347.62 (including \$453,347.62 secured by Movant’s first deed of trust), as stated in the McDevitt Declaration. The value of the Property is determined to be \$495,000.00, as stated in Schedules A and D.

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. *See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.)*, 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because “cause” is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); *In re Silverling*, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), *aff’d sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling)*, No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. *See In re J E Livestock, Inc.*, 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan)*, 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); *Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis)*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Movant’s contention that mere lack of equity is “cause,” as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) is without merit. Lack of equity is one of the two necessary elements for relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). The fact that a debtor has no equity in the estate is not sufficient standing alone to grant relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). *Pistole v. Mellor (In re Mellor)*, 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984); *United Sav. Ass’n v. Suter (In re Suter)*, 10 B.R. 471, 472 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1981). Moving party has not adequately pleaded or provided an evidentiary basis for granting relief for “cause.”

In this Chapter 7 case, the Trustee has not opposed the Motion. The court notes that the Trustee reports that Debtor did not appear at the Chapter 7 First Meeting of Creditors. March 4, 2017 Trustee’s Docket Entry Report. There is pending the Chapter 7 Trustee’s motion to dismiss this case. Dckt. 95.

Cause exists to terminate the automatic stay. The Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss the case is consistent with not opposing this Motion.

In the prayer to the Motion, Movant drops in a request for the court to also waive the fourteen-day stay of enforcement as imposed by the United States Supreme Court in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3). However, the Motion does not state what grounds exist for this court to find cause to set aside the fourteen-day stay imposed by the Supreme Court in enacting Rule 4001(a)(3).

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Freedom Mortgage Corporation (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow Freedom Mortgage Corporation, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 3833 Clay Bank Road, Fairfield, California.

No other or additional relief is granted.