

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

Honorable Fredrick E. Clement
Fresno Federal Courthouse
2500 Tulare Street, 5th Floor
Courtroom 11, Department A
Fresno, California

PRE-HEARING DISPOSITIONS

DAY: WEDNESDAY
DATE: MARCH 22, 2017
CALENDAR: 10:00 A.M. CHAPTER 7 ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS

GENERAL DESIGNATIONS

Each pre-hearing disposition is prefaced by the words "Final Ruling," "Tentative Ruling" or "No Tentative Ruling." Except as indicated below, matters designated "Final Ruling" will not be called and counsel need not appear at the hearing on such matters. Matters designated "Tentative Ruling" or "No Tentative Ruling" will be called.

ORAL ARGUMENT

For matters that are called, the court may determine in its discretion whether the resolution of such matter requires oral argument. See *Morrow v. Topping*, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971); accord LBR 9014-1(h). When the court has published a tentative ruling for a matter that is called, the court shall not accept oral argument from any attorney appearing on such matter who is unfamiliar with such tentative ruling or its grounds.

COURT'S ERRORS IN FINAL RULINGS

If a party believes that a final ruling contains an error that would, if reflected in the order or judgment, warrant a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), as incorporated by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 9024, then the party affected by such error shall, not later than 4:00 p.m. (PST) on the day before the hearing, inform the following persons by telephone that they wish the matter either to be called or dropped from calendar, as appropriate, notwithstanding the court's ruling: (1) all other parties directly affected by the motion; and (2) Kathy Torres, Judicial Assistant to the Honorable Fredrick E. Clement, at (559) 499-5860. Absent such a timely request, a matter designated "Final Ruling" will not be called.

1. [11-17165](#)-A-7 OAKHURST LODGE, INC., A CONTINUED MOTION TO VACATE
AJM-1 CALIFORNIA CORPORATION DISMISSAL OF CASE
FIRST-CITIZENS BANK & TRUST 12-28-16 [[258](#)]
COMPANY/MV
PETER FEAR/Atty. for dbt.
AARON MALO/Atty. for mv.
DISMISSED

Tentative Ruling

Motion: Motion to Vacate Order Dismissing Case and Appoint Chapter 7 trustee

Notice: LBR 9014-1(f)(1); written opposition required

Disposition: First-Citizen's Bank & Trust's motion: granted in part, denied in part; Oakhurst Lodge, Inc.'s counter-motion: granted.

Order: Civil minute order

First-Citizens Bank & Trust ("FCB"), a creditor in this case and a defendant in a related adversary proceeding, moves to vacate the order dismissing this case, Order, June 1, 2013, ECF # 220, and to appoint a Chapter 7 trustee. FCB argues that the language of Rule 60(b)(6), i.e., "any other reason that justifies relief," allows this court to vacate the dismissal order to allow the court to enforce a written stay settlement of \$850,000 negotiated between FCB and OLI (which OLI now disavows) and to administer that asset for the benefit of creditors. Oakhurst Lodge Inc. ("OLI") supports vacating the dismissal order but also wants the court to vacate its order converting the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. Order, January 10, 2013, ECF # 174. The court deems OLI's opposition a counter-motion for relief. No creditor or other party in interest has opposed the motion.

At the initial hearing on the motion the court issued its tentative ruling granting both the motion to vacate the dismissal and the counter-motion to vacate the conversion of the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. In response to the court's intended ruling, FCB requested the opportunity to submit additional briefing, which it has done. Having considered that briefing and taking judicial notice of the records of the California Secretary of State showing that OLI is suspended, the court is not persuaded.

LAW

Rule 60(b) allows this court to vacate an order "for any other reason that justifies relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. Such a motion must be presented within a reasonable time. *Id.* Rule 60(b)(6) requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances. *United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.*, 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

This case started as a Chapter 11. A plan was confirmed. OLI alleges FCB violated the stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and the plan by foreclosing its only income earning asset, a hotel. The case then was converted to Chapter 7 and later was dismissed.

Timeliness

Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must be sought within a reasonable time. The use of the word reasonable indicates that the trial court has wide discretion on the issue.

The motion and the countermotion are timely, though barely so. The order dismissing the case was entered three and one-half years ago and the order converting the case four years ago. While at the outer edges of reasonableness, the court notes that in 2015, the debtor filed an adversary proceeding against First-Citizens Bank & Trust and others for stay violations that occurred between July and December 2012. With the assistance of a court appointed mediator, approximately seven months ago the parties negotiated a settlement of the adversary proceeding for \$850,000. OLI has disavowed the settlement, and FCB wishes to enforce it. Among the issues to be solved is whether the compromise complies with Rule 9019 and whether the settlement works a material modification of the plan, requiring treatment under 11 U.S.C. § 1127. Because the events giving rise to the motion, e.g. the settlement and OLI's refusal to consummate it, occurred less than one year ago, the court finds the motion timely.

Order Dismissing

Extraordinary circumstances that justify Rule 60(b) relief are the existence of an asset, i.e. a cause of action or settlement, that needs to be administered for the benefit of creditors. This court believes that the foreclosure of OLI's hotel precluded the debtor from performing its plan, that the plan binds, and that the proceeds of the adversary proceeding need to be paid to creditors consistent with the terms of the plan, Civil minutes, January 27, 2016, ECF 3 107, or of such modification as may be necessary. 11 U.S.C. § 1127. OLI has refused to proceed with the settlement, apparently because it believed that the settlements did not need to be paid to creditors. Status Report, July 12, 2016, ECF # 207 (Oakhurst Lodge settled the case "under the belief the bankruptcy was closed and without any Trustee in place, any funds received would be net to the Oakhurst Lodge, Inc., and not subject to the debt of the plan."). While ordinarily the court would leave enforcement of the plan to impacted creditors, given the convoluted history of this case, the lack of notice to the creditors of the existence of funds from which payment can be made, and the suggestion that the debtor may not voluntarily comply with the terms of the confirm plan, the court finds the existence of extraordinary circumstances to vacate the dismissal order.

FCB's Supplemental Opposition

FCB offers four arguments in opposition to the counter-motion to vacate the conversion order.

OLI's Lack of Standing Based on the Suspension of Its Corporate Status

FCB argues that OLI's suspended status precludes it from seeking the protection of the bankruptcy courts. Supplemental Opposition, Certificate of Status (Exh. A), February 22, 2017, ECF # 271. That suspension was initiated by the Franchise Tax Board. *Id.*

Suspended corporations may not bring a civil action. *Boyle v. Lakeview Creamery Co.*, 9 Cal.2d 16, 18 (1937); *Ocean Park Bath House*

and Amusement Co. v. Pacific Auto Park Co., 37 Cal.App.2d 158, 159 (1940). But any argument that the prohibition extends to filing bankruptcy is foreclosed by *In re Feature Homes, Inc.*, 116 B.R. 731 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990) (Chapter 11). As a result, that argument fails.

OLI's Failure to Remedy Past Failures

FCB argues that OLI has not remedied any of the failures that lead to conversion: (1) failure to file post-confirmation operating reports, and (2) failure to pay quarterly U.S. Trustee fees.

Section 1112(b) governs conversion or dismissal post-confirmation. *In re Greenfield Drive Storage Park*, 207 B.R. 913, 916-917 (9th Cir. BAP 1997). Section 1112(b) provides that the court "shall" dismiss or convert a case if (1) cause exists; (2) notwithstanding a finding of cause, creditors would not be better served by the appointment of a trustee or examiner; and (3) there is an absence of "unusual circumstances". In such case, the court shall make a determination as to whether creditors are better served by conversion or dismissal. Neither a trustee, nor an examiner, may be appointed post-confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a), (c). "Unusual circumstances" requires a finding of (1) unusual circumstances "establishing that converting or dismissing the case is not in the best interests of creditors and the estate; (2) there is a reasonably likelihood of timely plan confirmation; and (3) the grounds for dismissal or conversion are explained by "reasonable justification" and will be cured within "a reasonable time."

Here, the unusual circumstances are FCB's stay violation (foreclosure of the hotel that disrupted business operations) and pending \$850,000 settlement of that act. Creditors would be better served by prosecution of the adversary proceeding and/or enforcement of the settlement, which will almost certainly require payment to creditors under the terms of the confirmed or a modified plan. The court finds that the reasonable justification is FCB's unilateral act and that the delinquencies, operating reports, and UST's fees, will be cured shortly after return of the hotel and/or enforcement of the settlement.

Appointment of a Chapter 7 trustee is appropriate

FCB contends that OLI's president, Steven Marshall, has demonstrated that he is not an "adequate fiduciary" for the purposes of implementing the plan and, therefore, a Chapter 7 trustee must be appointed. First, as set forth below, a Chapter 7 trustee has abandoned the in rem stay violation rights and lacks standing to enforce the in personam stay violation rights held by the debtor. As a consequence, the trustee would be ineffective in administering this cause of action. Second, the terms of the plan bind. And the plan provides that the debtor will act as its own disbursing agent and discloses that Steven Marshall will remain the president of OLI. Plan §§ 7.01, 7.02. If the parties are of the mind that factual grounds and a legal basis, e.g. plan provision or statute, exist for removal and replacement of Mr. Marshall, the parties may make such motions as are appropriate.

OLI's Motion is Defective on Its Face

The court agrees that OLI's showing in support of its counter-motion to vacate the conversion order is weak. But the court finds sufficient basis to grant this motion.

Order Converting Case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7

The more difficult question is whether to allow a Chapter 7 trustee to administer the case or to also vacate the order converting the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.

The court finds that Chapter 7 is likely an ineffective remedy and, thus, finds the extraordinary circumstances required to also vacate the conversion order.

The first reason that Chapter 7 is not an adequate remedy to address the problem is the conflict between the nature of a confirmed plan, which compels distribution as specified in the plan, and 11 U.S.C. § 726, which ordinarily controls distribution in Chapter 7. In this court's view, the plan binds, even though the case was converted and even though the case was later dismissed. *In re Laing*, 31 F.3d 1050, 1051 (10th Cir. 1994). As one commentator notes, "Most courts hold a confirmed plan is res judicata as to debtor and creditor rights under the plan, even where the Chapter 11 case is not consummated and is subsequently converted to another Chapter. [*In re Laing* (10th Cir. 1994) 31 F3d 1050, 1051 (conversion to Chapter 7); but see *Matter of Silver Mill Frozen Foods, Inc.* (BC WD MI 1982) 23 BR 179, 183—where plan provided for conversion upon default, creditors not limited to plan provisions but were entitled to all Chapter 7 rights and protections]." March, Ahart & Shapiro, *California Practice Guide: Bankruptcy*, §§ 5:1962, 5:2294 (Rutter Group 2016). In contrast, a Chapter 7 trustee must make distribution under 11 U.S.C. § 726. Allowing the case to remain in Chapter 7 puts the trustee in the awkward position of choosing between a distribution scheme mandated by the plan and a scheme mandated by the code.

Second, this court questions whether a Chapter 7 trustee has the power to administer this asset. *In re Adair*, 253 B.R. 85, 91 (9th Cir. BAP 2000) (deliberate and informed decision to abandon an asset a basis to deny reopening). As set forth in this court's ruling on First-Citizens Bank & Trust and Total Lender Solutions' motion to dismiss, AJM-4 and NLG-5, it appears that the trustee, but not the debtor, has relinquished its rights to pursue FCB's stay violation.

"In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the stay arises on the filing of a petition. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 103(a). The stay has two distinct parts: (1) an in personam component, which protects the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (6)-(7); and (2) an in rem component, which protects property of the estate, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)-(5).." Civil minutes * 6, January 27, 2016, ECF # 107. In this case, both the estate and OLI's rights under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) were impinged.

The bankruptcy code defines the duration of the stay. "Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), (f), and (h) of this section--(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate;(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until the earliest of--(A) the time the case is

closed; (B) the time the case is dismissed; or (C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied." 11 U.S.C. § 362(c).

As to the estate

The estate's rights were injured. Notwithstanding confirmation, the hotel that was the subject of the foreclosure remained property of the estate. That is true because the plan specifically provided that property remain in the estate until such date as discharge was entered (which never occurred). The plan provided: "Revesting of Assets. Subject to the provisions of the Plan and the Confirmation Order, the property of the Estate shall not vest in the Reorganized Debtor until discharge is entered. As of the Discharge Date, all such property shall be free and clear of all Claims, Liens and Equity Interest, except as otherwise provided in the Plan or the Confirmation Order. From and after the Discharge Date, the Reorganized Debtor shall be free of any restriction imposed by the Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, other than the obligations set forth in this Plan." Plan § 15.01, November 9, 2011, ECF # 79. After plan confirmation but before conversion to Chapter 7, FCB foreclosed its liens against the hotel. Doing so violated 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), which precludes creditors from "acts to obtain possession of property of the estate. . . .or to exercise control over property of the estate." While OLI originally held these rights, when the case converted to Chapter 7, the trustee Robert Hawkins succeeded to the rights of the debtor in possession to estate property, including the (wrongfully foreclosed) hotel. 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (trustee is the estate representative). But soon thereafter, the trustee abandoned any interest he had in the hotel. Notice of Intent to Abandon, February 14, 2013, ECF # 182. When the trustee did so, it lost its rights to administer the hotel as an asset of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 554(a).

But the trustee's abandonment was limited to the 60 unit hotel, fixtures and equipment. *Id.* Because the trustee held no other rights with respect to the hotel foreclosure, the trustee did not, and could not, abandon any other stay violation rights. As a consequence, insofar as the hotel (which was estate property) is concerned, the estate appears to have lost its right to administer the asset, and the Chapter 7 trustee would not now have standing to recover it.

As to the debtor

The debtor in possession, OLI, was also injured by the foreclosure. The stay arose on the date OLI filed its petition, June 22, 2011, and lifted when the Chapter 7 trustee forced dismissal of the case, June 1, 2013. 11 U.S.C. 362(c)(2).

Between those dates, FCB foreclosed OLI's hotel. Foreclosure of the hotel that remained part of the estate, Plan § 15.01, November 9, 2011, ECF # 79, and formed the basis of the debtor's plan of reorganization plan violated not only the estate's rights but also the debtor's right to be left alone during the bankruptcy process. Title 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (6). Those subsections provide, "[A] petition filed under section 301of this titleoperates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of--(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the

debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title. . . (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title." These rights are separate and apart from the estate's rights and protect the debtor's right to be free of collection efforts.

These rights belong exclusively to the debtor in possession and not to the estate. Stay violations for collection activities are not property of the estate because they occur postpetition. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (2). And none of the provisions of § 541(a) that capture property acquired by the debtor after the petition or by the estate are implicated here. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)-(7); *In re Neidorf*, 534 B.R. 369 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to include in the estate the debtor's right to a post-petition mortgage settlement that did not arise until years after her Chapter 7 was filed). Moreover, conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 did not alter the date of the commencement of the case, allowing the trustee to augment the estate with these rights. 11 U.S.C. 348(a). The simple point is that the Chapter 7 trustee never held these rights and they have always belonged to OLI.

More importantly, OLI took the necessary affirmative steps to preserve these rights to itself. The confirmed plan provided, "Preservation of Claims and Rights. Except as expressly set forth herein, nothing in this Plan shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the powers of the Debtor as a debtor in possession under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy rules [sic] or the Local Rules and the Debtor and the Reorganized Debtor as applicable shall retain after the Confirmation Date and after the Effective Date all powers granted by the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Rules and Local Rules Except as otherwise provided in the Plan or the Confirmation Order, the Debtor and the Reorganized Debtor reserve any and all of their Claims and rights against any and all third parties, whether such Claims arose before, on or after the Petition Date, the Confirmation Date, the Effective Date and/or the Distribution Date. (emphasis added)." Plan § 7.03, November 9, 2011, ECF # 79. And it is these rights, that have never belonged to the Chapter 7 trustee, that OLI now properly asserts.

CIVIL MINUTE ORDER

The court shall issue a civil minute order that conforms substantially to the following form:

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated in the civil minutes for the hearing.

First-Citizens Bank & Trust's motion to vacate order dismissing the case and Oakhurst Lodge's countermotion to vacate the order converting the case from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 have been presented to the court.

Having considered the pleadings and documents filed in support of the motions,

IT IS ORDERED that the order dismissing the case, Order, June 1, 2013, ECF # 220, is vacated;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the order converting the case from Chapter

11 to Chapter 7, Order, January 10, 2013, ECF # 174, is vacated;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Oakhurst Lodge, Inc.'s Chapter 11 case is reinstated.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a continued status conference is scheduled for May 10, 2017, at 1:30 p.m.; counsel for the debtor and a representative of Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. shall attend in person; and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that not later than April 5, 2017, Oakhurst Lodge Inc. shall file and serve on the U.S. Trustee, all creditors and all parties in interest a notice of continued status conference. That notice shall specify the date, time and place of the continued status conference and shall include in Courier 11 bold font the following verbiage:

"In June 2011, Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. You were identified as a creditor or other interested party. In November 2011, Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. proposed a plan of reorganization. That plan provided for payment of Oakhurst Lodge, Inc.'s debts over time from the monies generated by continued operations of Oakhurst Lodge, a 60 unit motel located at 40302 Highway 41, Oakhurst, California.

In February 2012, First-Citizens Bank & Trust foreclosed on the motel. Foreclosure of the motel precluded Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. from making the payments promised by the plan of reorganization.

Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. brought a lawsuit against First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company and others. Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. V. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company, No. 15-1017 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015). Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. contends that First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company's foreclosure was unlawful. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company denies that it acted unlawfully. But it has offered to settle the lawsuit by allowing First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company to keep the hotel but pay damages of \$850,000.00. Acceptance of the settlement would effectively put Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. out of business and the settlement funds would not be enough to pay all or even most creditors the monies promised them under the plan.

On May 10, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. in Department A, Courtroom 11, Fifth Floor, United States Courthouse, 2500 Tulare Street, Fresno, California, the court has scheduled a status conference to discuss, among other things, whether Oakhurst Lodge, Inc. should (1) accept the settlement offered by First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company or (2) should continue the lawsuit to recover the motel. Your rights under the plan or otherwise may be affected.

You are invited to appear, either personally or by telephone (telephone appearances arranged by CourtCall by calling 866-582-6878) and to make your views on these and other matters pertinent to this case known."

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Certificate of Service described in the preceding paragraph shall be supported by a current copy of the ECF master address list, accessible through PACER, which shall be attached to the certificate of service to indicate that notice has been transmitted to all creditors and parties in interest. The copy of the master address list should indicate a date near in time to the date of service of the notice. In addition, governmental creditors must be

noticed at the address provided on the Roster of Governmental Agencies, Form EDC 2-785, so the master address list and schedule of creditors must be completed using the correct addresses shown on such roster. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(j), 5003(e); LBR 2002-1.

2. [11-17165](#)-A-7 OAKHURST LODGE, INC., A CONTINUED STATUS CONFERENCE RE:
[15-1017](#) CALIFORNIA CORPORATION AMENDED COMPLAINT
OAKHURST LODGE, INC. V. 4-6-16 [[151](#)]
FIRST-CITIZENS BANK & TRUST
DONNA STANDARD/Atty. for pl.

Tentative Ruling

Assuming the court adopts its tentative ruling in the motion to vacate, AJM-1/AJM-2, the court will continue the status conference May 10, 2017, at 1:30 p.m.

3. [15-14365](#)-A-7 APRIL ADAMS STATUS CONFERENCE RE: COMPLAINT
[17-1005](#) 1-25-17 [[1](#)]
SALVEN V. DIMER ET AL
RUSSELL REYNOLDS/Atty. for pl.

Final Ruling

The status conference is continued to May 24, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. to allow the plaintiff to prove up the default of defendants Ray DIMER and Tambac Left. In the event that neither a judgment, nor a dismissal, is in the file, not later than 14 days prior to the continued status conference the plaintiff shall file a status report.

4. [15-10966](#)-A-7 RODNEY HARON PRETRIAL CONFERENCE RE:
[15-1122](#) COMPLAINT
HAWKINS V. NEVADA PROPERTY 1
LLC 10-18-15 [[1](#)]
GABRIEL WADDELL/Atty. for pl.
NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

Final Ruling

The pretrial conference is continued to May 10, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. In the event that the adversary proceeding has not been dismissed, not later than 14 days prior to the continued pretrial conference the parties will file a joint status report.

5. [15-10966](#)-A-7 RODNEY HARON PRETRIAL CONFERENCE RE:
 [15-1126](#) COMPLAINT
 HAWKINS V. VENETIAN CASINO
 RESORT, LLC 10-18-15 [[1](#)]
 GABRIEL WADDELL/Atty. for pl.
 NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

Final Ruling

This matter is continued to April 12, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. to allow the plaintiff to file a dismissal of the adversary proceeding. Stipulation, March 9, 2017, ECF # 105. In the event that a dismissal has not been filed, not later than 7 days prior to the continued hearing the parties will file a joint status report.

6. [15-10966](#)-A-7 RODNEY HARON CONTINUED PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
 [16-1015](#) RE: COMPLAINT
 HARVEYS TAHOE MANAGEMENT
 COMPANY, INC. ET AL V. HARON 2-1-16 [[1](#)]
 LANCE SELFRIDGE/Atty. for pl.
 ORDER CONTINUING TO 5/24/17,
 ECF NO. 34

Final Ruling

The pre-trial conference has been continued to May 24, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., pursuant to order, ECF #34.

7. [16-11674](#)-A-7 JEFF/MICKI PRINS CONTINUED STATUS CONFERENCE RE:
 [16-1094](#) COMPLAINT
 MANFREDO V. PRINS 9-27-16 [[1](#)]
 HILTON RYDER/Atty. for pl.

No tentative ruling.

8. [16-11674](#)-A-7 JEFF/MICKI PRINS CONTINUED STATUS CONFERENCE RE:
 [16-1095](#) COMPLAINT
 MANFREDO V. BALAKIAN ET AL 9-27-16 [[1](#)]
 HILTON RYDER/Atty. for pl.

No tentative ruling.

9. [15-13184](#)-A-7 DEBBY RENNA
[17-1006](#)
U.S. TRUSTEE V. RENNA
ROBIN TUBESING/Atty. for pl.

STATUS CONFERENCE RE: COMPLAINT
1-25-17 [[1](#)]

Final Ruling

The status conference is continued to May 24, 2017, at 10:00 a.m. If a judgment is not in the file, not later than 14 days prior to the continued status conference, the plaintiff shall file a status report.