UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus Bankruptcy Judge Sacramento, California

March 21, 2016 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 4. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF <u>ALL</u> PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2)[eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE APRIL 25, 2016 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY APRIL 11, 2016, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY APRIL 18, 2016. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON ITEMS 5 THROUGH 18 IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR. INSTEAD, THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON MARCH 28, 2016, AT 2:30 P.M.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 15-29553-A-13 DEAN/SHELYA WILLIAMS SS-2

MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 1-8-16 [18]

- □ Telephone Appearance
- □ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The feasibility of the plan depends upon the debtor qualifying for and obtaining a reverse mortgage. While the trustee no longer objects to the ability of the debtor to obtain such a mortgage, the proposed plan fails to specify how much of the mortgage will be contributed to the plan. The debtor has not carried the burden of proving feasibility. See 11 U.S.C. \$ 1325(a)(6).

Also, the plan fails to provide for dividends on account of the Class 2 secured claim of Sacramento County. The plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(5)(B).

2. 16-21359-A-13 ERIC/ADINA HENDERSON DBL-1

MOTION TO
EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
3-7-16 [9]

- □ Telephone Appearance
- □ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtors. A prior case was dismissed within one year of the filing of the current case. It was dismissed approximately 11 months after that case (15-20290) was filed. In that case a plan was confirmed in June 2015, the debtors made plan payments for the four month preconfirmation period, then after confirmation of the plan failed to make a payment for August 2015 and thereafter. This default prompted the chapter 13 trustee to move for dismissal. Despite being given 30 days to cure the default or modify the plan, the default was never addressed and the case ultimately was dismissed in December 2015.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt,

property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30^{th} day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the $30^{\rm th}$ day after the filing of the petition. The motion must be adjudicated before the $30{\rm -day}$ period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in <u>In re Whitaker</u>, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, it appears that the debtor was unable to maintain plan payments in the first case. This motion does not establish that the debtor will be any more successful in this case. The motion states only that the debtors "are unable to determine if [they] were properly advised as to our rights and responsibilities to the Court. . . which may have contributed to [their] unknowing and unintentional failure to fulfill our duties. . . "

In the context of the prior case, this explains nothing. The debtors confirmed a plan, made payments pursuant to it, both before and after it was confirmed, then stopped making payments. They were notified of the default then given an opportunity to cure the default and did not. This motion does nothing to explain this default and the court cannot conclude that this case is more apt to succeed.

3. 15-28462-A-13 MARK JOCOY PGM-2

MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 2-3-16 [38]

- □ Telephone Appearance
- □ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the chapter 13 trustee's objections will be sustained.

First, the debtor has failed to make \$3,685 of payments as required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Second, even though 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) prevents the proposed plan from modifying a claim secured only by the debtor's home, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) & (b)(5) permit the plan to provide for the cure of any defaults on such a claim while ongoing installment payments are maintained. The cure of defaults is not limited to the cure of pre-petition defaults. See In re Bellinger, 179 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995). The proposed plan, however, does not provide for a cure of the post-petition arrears owed on a Class 1 home loan that arose because the debtor has not made timely plan payments. By failing to provide for a cure, the debtor is, in effect, impermissibly modifying a home loan.

Also, the failure to cure the default means that the Class 1 secured claim will not be paid in full as required by 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(5)(B).

Third, to pay the dividends required by the plan at the rate proposed by it will take 125 months which exceeds the maximum 5-year duration permitted by 11 U.S.C. \S 1322(d). This problem arises because the debtor has understated the IRS's priority tax claim by more than \$48,000. Priority tax claims must be paid in full. See 11 U.S.C. \S 1322(a)(2).

Fourth, the plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) because it neither pays unsecured creditors in full nor pays them all of the debtor's projected disposable income. The plan will pay unsecured creditors nothing even though Form 22 shows that the debtor will have \$38,124 over the next five years.

The chapter 7 trustee's objection, which was incorrectly filed and noticed as a separate matter, will be sustained in part and overruled in part as an objection to the debtor's motion.

The failure to pay a claim as ordered by another court and then filing a bankruptcy petition to deal with that claim is not evidence of bad faith. This objection will be overruled.

However, the debtor has failed to fully and accurately provide all information required by the petition, schedules, and statements. As noted by the chapter 7 trustee, the debtor has not listed the tangible assets of a proprietorship business. If that business is conducted through a closely held entity, the debtor's interest in the entity has not been disclosed in the schedules. This nondisclosure is a breach of the duty imposed by 11 U.S.C. \S 521(a)(1) to truthfully list all required financial information in the bankruptcy documents. To attempt to confirm a plan while withholding relevant financial information from the trustee is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(3).

4. 15-26984-A-13 KASSI MARTINEZ FF-2 MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 2-5-16 [45]

- □ Telephone Appearance
- □ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan fails to provide at section 2.07 for a dividend to be on account of allowed administrative expenses, including the debtor's attorney's fees. Unless counsel is working for nothing, this means that the plan does not provide for payment in full of priority claims as required by 11 U.S.C. \S 1322(a)(2). Also see 11 U.S.C. \S 503(b), 507(a).

THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

5. 15-28808-A-13 BRIAN/CARMEN CARROLL PGM-2

MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 2-8-16 [32]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. $\S\S$ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

6. 15-29111-A-13 ERWIN/MARY ANN SANTOS PGM-1
VS. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
2-17-16 [31]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$300,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by U.S. Bank. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$492,092.94 as of the petition date. Therefore, The Bank of New York Mellon's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by $\underline{\text{In re Zimmer}}$, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and $\underline{\text{In re Lam}}$, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also $\underline{\text{In re Bartee}}$, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); $\underline{\text{In re Tanner}}$, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); $\underline{\text{McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald)}}$, 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and $\underline{\text{Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann)}}$, 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If

the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \$ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates $\underline{\text{In re Hobdy}}$, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9^{th} Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (5) (B) (I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (5) (B) (I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. \S 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$300,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

7. 11-43822-A-13 DONALD/DIANE BARNES OBJECTION TO JPJ-4 CLAIM VS. RABOBANK, N.A. 2-3-16 [111]

Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Rabobank has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as

consent to the sustaining of the objection. <u>Cf. Ghazali v. Moran</u>, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. <u>See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo)</u>, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim was February 8, 2012. The proof of claim was filed on May 25, 2012. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

8. 12-31122-A-13 WILLIE JOHNSON AND MARY PGM-6 KNIGHT-JOHNSON

MOTION TO
APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION
2-19-16 [98]

Final Ruling: This motion to modify a home loan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

9. 14-31822-A-7 JOHN DYNOWSKI WW-1

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 3-7-16 [28]

Final Ruling: The court continues the hearing to April 25, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. so that the motion can be considered with a related motion for relief from the automatic stay filed by PennyMac Holdings. Counsel for the debtor shall serve this motion and notice of the continuance on the trustee, PennyMac, and counsel for PennyMac no later than March 24. Any opposition to this motion shall be filed and served no later than April 11. Any reply to opposition shall be filed and served no later than April 18.

10. 15-28574-A-13 JOHN DYNOWSKI WW-1

MOTION FOR ORDERS, TO DETERMINE ACTIONS TAKEN AND FOR SANCTIONS 3-2-16 [38]

Final Ruling: The court continues the hearing to April 25, 2016 at 10:00 a.m. so that the motion can be considered with a related by case by the same debtor in which a related motion for relief from the automatic stay filed by PennyMac Holdings. Counsel for the debtor shall serve this motion and notice of the

continuance on the trustee, PennyMac, and counsel for PennyMac no later than March 24. Any opposition to this motion shall be filed and served no later than April 11. Any reply to opposition shall be filed and served no later than April 18.

11. 14-24342-A-13 MARK/DAWN THOMSEN MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN 2-15-16 [36]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the condition that the plan is further modified in the confirmation order to account for all payments made by the debtor under the terms of the prior plan, a total of \$180,768 through February 2016, to require a plan payment of \$24,790.40 in March 2016, to require a monthly plan payment of \$3,000 beginning in April 2016, and to clarify that Ocwen's secured claim will be paid in Class 1 through month 22 and thereafter the refinance from Americash will be paid as a Class 4 claim beginning in month 23. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

12. 14-24342-A-13 MARK/DAWN THOMSEN MOTION TO REFINANCE 1-25-16 [28]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion to incur a loan in order to refinance an existing home loan will be granted on condition that the debtor's motion to confirm a modified plan, MMM-2, also is granted. The motion establishes that the new loan will like enhance the ability of the debtor to complete the plan.

13. 16-20556-A-13 JOSEPH/LISA TARANGO MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL VS. CHASE HOME EQUITY LOAN SERVICING 2-19-16 [12]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$528,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Bayview Loans Servicing. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$601,864 as of the petition date.

Therefore, Chase Home Equity Loan Servicing's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by $\underline{\text{In re Zimmer}}$, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and $\underline{\text{In re Lam}}$, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also $\underline{\text{In re Bartee}}$, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); $\underline{\text{In re Tanner}}$, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); $\underline{\text{McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald)}}$, 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and $\underline{\text{Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann)}}$, 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates <u>In re Hobdy</u>, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that

objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$528,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

14. 10-52961-A-13 ALBERT/BETTY BOZZO OBJECTION TO JPJ-1 CLAIM
VS. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION/MOHELA 2-3-16 [112]

Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of Dept. of Education/MOHELA has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained. The last date to file a timely proof of claim was February 7, 2012. The proof of claim was filed on October 22, 2012. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \$ 502(b)(9) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(c), the claim is disallowed because it is untimely. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Edelman, 237 B.R. 146, 153 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1989); Zidell, Inc. V. Forsch (In re Coastal Alaska), 920 F.2d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1990).

15. 15-29871-A-13 KEITH/KATHY BOWLES OBJECTION TO JPJ-1 EXEMPTIONS 2-19-16 [20]

Final Ruling: This objection to the debtor's exemptions has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the debtor's default is entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained. Equipment and rifles used in Civil War reenactments are not household furnishings, appliances, or apparel. Therefore, the exemption claimed under Cal. Civ. Pro. Code \S 704.020 is disallowed. That exemption applies only to furnishings, appliances, and apparel.

16. 15-29587-A-13 MICHAEL/CYNTHIA ORTIZ MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL VS. ALLY FINANCIAL 2-17-16 [34]

Final Ruling: The debtor voluntarily dismissed the motion. While opposition was filed to the motion, the dismissal was filed prior to the opposition.

14-23791-A-13 IGOR ZHILOVSKIY MET-2 VS. RBS CITIZENS, N.A.

17.

MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL 2-20-16 [29]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$600,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Ocwen Loan Servicing. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$644,606 as of the petition date. Therefore, RBS Citizen's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. \$ 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. \$ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates <u>In re Hobdy</u>, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an

adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. \S 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. \S 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$600,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

18. 15-27896-A-13 EILEEN NOVOA FF-3

MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 2-2-16 [24]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the condition that the plan is further modified in the confirmation order to account for all prior payments made by the debtor under the terms of the prior plan, a total of 3,989.09, and to provide for a plan payment of 70 beginning March 2016. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.