

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**

Eastern District of California

**Honorable Ronald H. Sargis**

Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Modesto, California

**February 14, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.**

1. [19-90003-E-7](#)  
[RLE-1](#)

**NATHAN DAMIGO**  
**Pro Se**

**MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM  
AUTOMATIC STAY AND/OR MOTION  
TO HOLD NON-DISCHARGEABILITY  
ACTION IN ABEYANCE  
1-30-19 [\[12\]](#)**

**JOHN DOE VS.**

**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

**Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. If there is opposition presented, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2)(C).**

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(2) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor (*pro se*), Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on January 30, 2019. By the court's calculation, 15 days' notice was provided. 14 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay was properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Debtor, creditors, the Chapter 7 Trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offer opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing, unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. At the hearing, -----

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<b>The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.</b>
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February 14, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.

- Page 1 of 9-

Elizabeth Sines, Seth Wispelwey, Marissa Blair, Tyler Magill, April Muniz, Hannah Pearce, Marcus Martin, Natalie Romero, John Doe and Chelsea Alvarado (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay to allow *Elizabeth Sines, et al. v. Jason Kessler, et al.*, Case No. 3:17-CV-00072 (“Federal Court Litigation”) to be concluded.<sup>FN.1.</sup> Movant has provided the Declaration of Alan Levine, counsel of record in the Federal Court Litigation, to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by Nathan Benjamin Damigo (“Debtor”).

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FN.1. Several (slightly) varying case names appear in the documents filed as Exhibits A-E. They appear as follows:

Case No. 3:17-CV-72

Case 3:17-cv-00072-NKM-JCH

Civil Action No. 3:17-cv-00072-NKM

Case No. 3:17-CV-00072

Exhibit D is an Order and Memorandum Opinion issued by the court in the Federal Court litigation. That document states “Case No. 3:17-CV-00072.” Exhibit D, Dckt. 16 at p. 123.

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The Levine Declaration states that the parties in the Federal Court Litigation have engaged in extensive discovery for over a year, having served multiple requests for production and interrogatories and engaged in numerous meet and confers. Dckt. 15, ¶¶ 7-8. The parties expect to begin depositions in coming weeks. *Id.*, ¶ 12.

The Declaration states further the court on the Federal Court Litigation has issued pre-trial scheduling orders, setting the following deadlines:

1. Complete Fact Discovery: April 17, 2019
2. Initial Expert Reports: March 11, 2019
3. Rebuttal Expert Reports: April 9, 2019
4. Dispositive Motions: April 24, 2019
5. Trial: July 8 through August 2, 2019

*Id.*, ¶ 13.

The Motion states relief should be granted for the limited purpose of allowing the federal court to determine Debtor’s liability and liquidate Movant’s claims against Debtor.

Movant also requests the court issue an order holding in abeyance an Adversary Proceeding filed by Movant against Debtor. The Adversary Proceeding seeks a determination that Movant's claims against Debtor are non-dischargeable. See Complaint, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 19-09006, Dckt. 1, January 30, 2019.

## DISCUSSION

The court may grant relief from stay for cause when it is necessary to allow litigation in a nonbankruptcy court. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[3][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds. 16th ed.). The moving party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that relief from the automatic stay is warranted, however. *LaPierre v. Advanced Med. Spa Inc. (In re Advanced Med. Spa Inc.)*, No. EC-16-1087, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2205, at \*8–9 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 23, 2016). To determine “whether cause exists to allow litigation to proceed in another forum, ‘the bankruptcy court must balance the potential hardship that will be incurred by the party seeking relief if the stay is not lifted against the potential prejudice to the debtor and the bankruptcy estate.’” *Id.* at \*9 (quoting *Green v. Brotman Med. Ctr., Inc. (In re Brotman Med. Ctr., Inc.)*, No. CC-08-1056-DKMo, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 4692, at \*6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2008)) (citing *In re Aleris Int’l, Inc.*, 456 B.R. 35, 47 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011)). The basis for such relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) when there is pending litigation in another forum is predicated on factors of judicial economy, including whether the suit involves multiple parties or is ready for trial. *See Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.)*, 912 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990); *Packerland Packing Co. v. Griffith Brokerage Co. (In re Kemble)*, 776 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1985); *Santa Clara Cty. Fair Ass’n v. Sanders (In re Santa Clara Cty. Fair Ass’n)*, 180 B.R. 564 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995); *Truebro, Inc. v. Plumberex Specialty Prods., Inc. (In re Plumberex Specialty Prods., Inc.)*, 311 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004).

The court finds that the nature of the Federal Court Litigation warrants relief from stay for cause. In the Federal Court Litigation there are numerous parties involved who have already engaged in extensive discovery and prepared for trial currently scheduled to commence July 2019. Judicial economy dictates that the federal court ruling be allowed to continue after the considerable time and resources put into the matter already.

The court shall issue an order modifying the automatic stay as it applies to Debtor to allow Movant to continue the Federal Court Litigation. The automatic stay is not modified with respect to enforcement of the judgment against Debtor, Gary Farrar (“the Chapter 7 Trustee”), or property of the bankruptcy estate. Any judgment obtained shall be submitted to this court for the proper treatment of any claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code.

Additionally, the court shall issue and order holding *Sines, et al., v. Damigo*, Adversary Proceeding No. No. 19-09006, is stayed until **XXXXXXX** to allow the parties to determine liability for and liquidate the underlying claims of the non-dischargeability action.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by Elizabeth Sines, Seth Wispelwey, Marissa Blair, Tyler Magill, April Munoz, Hannah Pearce, Marcus Martin, Natalie Romero, John Doe and Chelsea Alvarado (“Movant’s”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are modified as applicable to Nathan Benjamin Damigo (“Debtor”) to allow Elizabeth Sines, Seth Wispelwey, Marissa Blair, Tyler Magill, April Munoz, Hannah Pearce, Marcus Martin, Natalie Romero, John Doe and Chelsea Alvarado, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors to proceed with litigation in *Elizabeth Sines, et al. v. Jason Kessler, et al.*, Case No. 3:17-CV-00072.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the automatic stay is not modified with respect to enforcement of any judgment against Debtor, Gary Farrar (“the Chapter 7 Trustee”), or property of the bankruptcy estate. Any judgment obtained by Movant shall be submitted to this court for the proper treatment of any claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that *Sines, et al., v. Damigo*, Adversary Proceeding No. No. 19-09006, is stayed until **XXXXX** to allow the parties to determine liability for and liquidate the underlying claims of the non-dischargeability action.

The court shall issue a separate order continuing the Status Conference in Adversary Proceeding 19-09006, to **XXXX**

No other or additional relief is granted.

2. [18-90892-E-7](#)  
[CAS-1](#)

ILOUSH ABDISHOU  
Patrick Greenwell

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM  
AUTOMATIC STAY  
1-7-19 [\[17\]](#)

BMW BANK OF NORTH AMERICA  
VS.

**Final Ruling:** No appearance at the February 14, 2019 hearing is required.  
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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor’s Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on January 7, 2019. By the court’s calculation, 38 days’ notice was provided. 28 days’ notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party’s failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties’ pleadings.

<b>The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.</b>
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BMW Bank of North America (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2015 BMW 3 Series Sedan 4D 320i, VIN ending in 9895 (“Vehicle”). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Pamela Weems to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by Iloush F. Abdishou (“Debtor”).

The Weems Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made 1 post-petition payments, with a total of \$643.67 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are slightly less than 3 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$1,874.68.

Movant has also provided a copy of the Kelley Blue Book Valuation Report for the Vehicle. The Report has been properly authenticated and is accepted as a market report or commercial publication generally relied on by the public or by persons in the automobile sale business. FED. R. EVID. 803(17).

Debtor has not listed the Vehicle as an asset on Schedule A/B, or Movant as a creditor holding secured claim on Schedule D. However, Debtor has listed Movant on Schedule E/F as having an unsecured claim based on “Deficiency on auto loan.” Schedule E/F, Dckt. 1 at p. 2.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$23,477.10, as stated in the Weems Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$15,740.00, as stated on the Kelley Blue Book Valuation Report.

## DISCUSSION

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. *See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.)*, 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because “cause” is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); *In re Silverling*, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), *aff’d sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling)*, No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. *See In re J E Livestock, Inc.*, 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan)*, 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); *Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis)*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments that have come due and Debtor’s treatment of the claim as unsecured (evincing intent to surrender the Vehicle). 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property’s value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective rehabilitation. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[4][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (stating that Chapter 13 debtors are rehabilitated, not reorganized). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See Ramco Indus. v. Preuss (In re Preuss)*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

## **Request for Attorneys' Fees**

In the Motion, almost as if an afterthought, Movant requests that it be allowed attorneys' fees. The Motion does not allege any contractual or statutory grounds for such fees.<sup>FN.1.</sup> No dollar amount is requested for such fees. No evidence is provided of Movant having incurred any attorneys' fees or having any obligation to pay attorneys' fees. Based on the pleadings, the court would either: (1) have to award attorneys' fees based on grounds made out of whole cloth, or (2) research all of the documents and California statutes and draft for Movant grounds for attorneys' fees, and then make up a number for the amount of such fees out of whole cloth. The court is not inclined to do either.

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FN.1. The Motion does state attorney's fees should be awarded "pursuant to applicable provisions of the prevailing contractual agreement." The plain language of the request implies there are multiple contractual agreements, and attorney's fees should be granted pursuant to the "prevailing" one.

No provision of any contract is stated as providing contractual grounds for fees.

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If grounds had been shown and evidence provided, the court could have easily made such determination and granted fees (assuming there is a contractual or statutory basis). If an amount of such fees had been included in the motion and prayer, the court and all parties in interest would fairly have been put on notice of the upper limit of such amounts, and the court could have taken the non-opposition and non-response as defaults.

While the court could consider the award of attorneys' fees as a post-judgment motion (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052, 9014), the otherwise unnecessary cost and expense of Movant having to file a motion for an award of attorneys' fees for the unopposed Motion in which it made reference to wanting attorneys' fees would well exceed any attorneys' fees that the court would award for a motion such as this. Movant's strategic decision not to provide the court with grounds for and evidence of attorneys' fees has rendered it useless to proceed with a post-judgment motion that would cost more in unawarded (as in unnecessary and unreasonable fees) attorneys' fees.

## **Request for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement**

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from the automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court because there is no equity in the Vehicle and the Vehicle continues to depreciate in value. The Motion also notes that the Vehicle was repossessed before the filing of the bankruptcy case.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

## Request for Prospective Injunctive Relief

Movant makes an **additional request stated in the prayer**, for which no grounds are clearly stated in the Motion. Movant's further relief requested in the prayer is that this court make this order, **as opposed to every other order issued by the court**, binding and effective despite any conversion of this case to another chapter of the Code. Though stated in the prayer, no grounds are stated in the Motion for grounds for such relief from the stay. The Motion presumes that conversion of the bankruptcy case will be reimposed if this case were converted to one under another Chapter.

As stated above, Movant's Motion does not state any grounds for such relief. Movant does not allege that notwithstanding an order granting relief from the automatic stay, a stealth stay continues in existence, waiting to spring to life and render prior orders of this court granting relief from the stay invalid and rendering all acts taken by parties in reliance on that order void.

No points and authorities is provided in support of the Motion. This is not unusual for a relatively simple (in a legal authorities sense) motion for relief from stay as the one before the court. Other than referencing the court to the legal basis (11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) or (4)) and then pleading adequate grounds thereunder, it is not necessary for a movant to provide a copy of the statute quotations from well known cases. However, if a movant is seeking relief from a possible future stay, which may arise upon conversion, the legal points and authorities for such heretofore unknown nascent stay is necessary.

As noted by another bankruptcy judge, such request (unsupported by any grounds or legal authority) for relief of a future stay in the same bankruptcy case:

[A] request for an order stating that the court's termination of the automatic stay will be binding despite conversion of the case to another chapter unless a specific exception is provided by the Bankruptcy Code is a common, albeit silly, request in a stay relief motion and does not require an adversary proceeding. Settled bankruptcy law recognizes that the order remains effective in such circumstances. Hence, the proposed provision is merely declarative of existing law and is not appropriate to include in a stay relief order.

Indeed, requests for including in orders provisions that are declarative of existing law are not innocuous. First, the mere fact that counsel finds it necessary to ask for such a ruling fosters the misimpression that the law is other than it is. Moreover, one who routinely makes such unnecessary requests may eventually have to deal with an opponent who uses the fact of one's pattern of making such requests as that lawyer's concession that the law is not as it is.

*In re Van Ness*, 399 B.R. 897, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing *Aloyan v. Campos (In re Campos)*, 128 B.R. 790, 791–92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); *In re Greetis*, 98 B.R. 509, 513 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)).

As noted in the 2009 ruling quoted above, the “silly” request for unnecessary relief may well be ultimately deemed an admission by BMW Bank of North America and its counsel that all orders granting relief from the automatic stay are immediately terminated as to any relief granted BMW Bank of North



America and other creditors represented by counsel, and upon conversion, any action taken by such creditor is a *per se* violation of the automatic stay.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by BMW Bank of North America (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2015 BMW 3 Series Sedan 4D 320i (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.