UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

February 10, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 16. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2)[eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON MARCH 10, 2014 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY FEBRUARY 24, 2014, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY MARCH 3, 2014. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 17 THROUGH 38. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON FEBRUARY 18, 2014, AT 2:30 P.M.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 13-35606-A-13 HERMAN/BRENDA HODGES — OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE
JPJ-1 — 1-23-14 [20]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained in part and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The objection pertaining to the valuation of the collateral of Sun Trust Bank will be overruled because the debtor has successfully valued that collateral.

However, the debtor has taken an impermissible $500 deduction from current monthly income on Form 22. This amount is contributed to the support of an adult daughter who resides on the East Coast, is a college graduate, and is neither elderly, disabled or chronically ill.

With this deduction eliminated, the debtor must pay no less than $44,427 to Class 7 unsecured creditors. Because the plan will pay these creditors only $15,122.92, it does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

2. 12-41715-A-13 LESLIE CREED — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
HLG-5 — 1-3-14 [103]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be granted and the objection will be overruled on the condition the plan is further modified to eliminate the request for an additional $750 in debtor's attorney's fees. This is without prejudice to counsel requesting additional fees by making a motion for approval of such fees in a manner consistent with Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1(c). As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

3. 13-34418-A-13 FELIPE OLIVARES AND SALLY SANDOVAL OLIVARES
MG-1 VS. AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.
MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
12-20-13 [16]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The debtor has filed a valuation motion that accompanies a proposed chapter 13 plan. The valuation motion addresses the value of a 2009 Chevrolet Aveo that secures Americredit's Class 2 claim. While the debtor has opined that the vehicle has a value of $2,300 based on the vehicle's model year, 99,000 miles, and good condition, no specific information is given in the motion regarding equipment and accessories.

Americredit counters that the value of the vehicle is $6,850 based on a retail evaluation by the NADA Official Used Car Guide.

To the extent the objection urges the court to reject the debtor's opinion of value because the debtor's opinion is not admissible, the court instead rejects the objection. As the owner of the vehicle, the debtor is entitled to express an opinion as to the vehicle's value. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Any opinion of value by the owner must be expressed without giving a reason for the valuation. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08). Indeed, unless the owner also qualifies as an expert, it is improper for the owner to give a detailed recitation of the basis for the opinion. Only an expert qualified under Fed. R. Evid. 702 may rely on and testify as to facts "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 703. "For example, the average debtor-homeowner who testifies in opposition to a motion for relief from the § 362 automatic stay, should be limited to giving his opinion as to the value of his home, but should not be allowed to testify concerning what others have told him concerning the value of his or comparable properties unless, the debtor truly qualifies as an expert under Rule 702 such as being a real estate broker, etc." Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08).

The creditor has come forward with evidence that the replacement value of the vehicle, based on its retail value as reported by the NADA, is $6,850. The vehicle must be valued at its replacement value. In the chapter 13 context, the replacement value of personal property used by a debtor for personal, household or family purposes is "the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined." See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).

The retail value suggested by the creditor appears to approximate replacement value given the debtor's concession that the vehicle is in good condition and mileage. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) asks for "the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the property at the time value is determined."

Accordingly, the valuation motion must be denied.

And, because the valuation motion has not been granted, at this point, the debtor is unable to "strip down" Americredit's secured claim to $2,300, the plan cannot be confirmed because it either violates 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) because it will not pay Americredit's secured claim in full, or, it will pay what Americredit has demanded, the plan payments to be made by the trustee will not be sufficient to pay all dividends required by the plan. In the event of the latter, the plan is not feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).

4. 13-34418-A-13 MG-2 — FELIPE OLIVARES AND SALLY SANDOVAL OLIVARES — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 12-20-13 [23]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan is not feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) because the monthly plan payment of $1,378.92 is less than the $1,585 in dividends and expenses the plan requires the trustee to pay each month.

5. 13-34418-A-13 MG-2 — FELIPE OLIVARES AND SALLY SANDOVAL OLIVARES — COUNTER MOTION TO DISMISS CASE 1-27-14 [34]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

6. 13-35625-A-13 JPJ-1 — MICHAEL REED — OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE 1-23-14 [15]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The debtor failed to appear at the meeting of creditors. Appearance is mandatory. See 11 U.S.C. § 343. To attempt to confirm a plan while failing to appear and be questioned by the trustee and any creditors who appear, the debtor is also failing to cooperate with the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3). Under these circumstances, attempting to confirm a plan is the epitome of bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). The failure to appear also is cause for the dismissal of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6).

Nonetheless, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

7. 13-33027-A-13 GLENN ARMSTRONG — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
RTD-1 — 1-27-14 [55]
SCHOOLS FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION VS.

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the creditor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the other creditors, the debtor, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the movant to repossess its collateral, to dispose of it pursuant to applicable law, and to use the proceeds from its disposition to satisfy its claim. No other relief is awarded.

Since the case was filed in October 2013, the debtor has made no contract installment payments to the movant and only one of the adequate protection payments required by 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)(C). Further, the debtor has proposed two plans but the court has denied confirmation of both of them. The debtor has not proposed a third plan.

Given the failure to adequately protect the movant's claim and the failure to confirm a plan despite reasonable time and opportunity to do so, there is cause to terminate the automatic stay.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived. Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

8. 11-43931-A-13 JEREMIAH/MELISSA SELLERS
RWH-2

MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
1-6-14 [77]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

First, the debtor has failed to make $2,006.19 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Second, due to the debtor's defaults under the previously confirmed plans, the trustee was unable to make all post-petition payments required to be paid to the holder of a Class 1 home mortgage.

Even though 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) prevents the proposed plan from modifying a claim secured only by the debtor's home, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) & (b)(5) permit the plan to provide for the cure of any defaults on such a claim while ongoing installment payments are maintained. The cure of defaults is not limited to the cure of pre-petition defaults. See In re Bellinger, 179 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995). The proposed plan, however, does not provide for a cure of the post-petition arrears on the Class 1 claim. By failing to provide for a cure, the debtor is, in effect, impermissibly modifying a home loan. Also, the failure to cure the default means that the Class 1 secured claim will not be paid in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).

9. 13-35935-A-13 JODY MARQUEZ
LHL-1
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC VS.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
1-27-14 [19]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the creditor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the other creditors, the debtor, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). The movant completed a nonjudicial foreclosure sale before the bankruptcy case was filed. Under California law, once a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has occurred, the trustor has no right of redemption. Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App.4th 822, 831 (1994). In this case, therefore, the debtor has no right to ignore the foreclosure. If the foreclosure sale was not in accord with state law, this should be asserted as a defense to an unlawful detainer proceeding in state

court. The purchaser's right to possession after a foreclosure sale is based on the fact that the property has been "duly sold" by foreclosure proceedings. Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1161a. Therefore, it is necessary that the plaintiff prove that each of the statutory procedures has been complied with as a condition for seeking possession of the property. See Miller & Starr, California Real Estate 2d, §§ 18.140 and 18.144 (1989). Alternatively, the debtor should press an independent claim for relief in state court to challenge the foreclosure. The automatic stay is a respite from creditor action while the debtor attempts to reorganize.

The foregoing is cause to terminate the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the movant to obtain possession of the subject property.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived. Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

10.	14-20453-A-13 PGM-1	ANTONIO TORRES AND VIRGINIA NORIEGA	MOTION TO EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY 1-27-14 [14]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. A prior case was dismissed within one year of the filing of the current case. The prior case was dismissed two weeks before the filing of the most recent case at the IRS's request because the debtor had failed to pay post petition tax liabilities exceeding $42,000.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30th day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30th day after the filing of the petition. The motion will be adjudicated before the 30-day period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, it appears that the debtor was able to maintain plan payments in the first case only by not paying post-petition tax liabilities. This motion does not establish that the debtor will be any more successful in this case.

A comparison of Schedules I and J filed by the debtor in both cases shows that the debtor's financial position now is more precarious. For instance, in the first case, the debtor's net business income was $6,400. In the current case it is $6,333.67. After four years, there has been no improvement, even a slight decline.

And, while net business income is approximately the same, as noted below, the obligations the debtor must pay in full have increased substantially. Further, in the first case, gross business income was $16,000. In this case it is $27,500. So, to make approximately the same net business income, the debtor's expenses have increased by nearly 60%. This means that any disruption in business income will have an even more dramatic effect in this case.

Examination of Schedule I in the current case indicates that Mr. Torres has overstated his monthly income. The only income listed for him is the income from his trucking business of $6,333.67. Yet, the subtotal on the second page of Schedule I indicates his monthly income is $7,533.67. Similarly, the employment income for Mrs. Noreiga is $2,158.32, yet the subtotal showing her total income is stated at $2,758.32. Unless Schedule I has failed to list some additional sources of income, the total net income for both should be $1,800 less. And, because Schedule J show total net income of just $2,005.11 and because the plan requires a monthly payment of $2,005, the absence of the $1,800 in income will make any plan infeasible.

If Schedule I simply neglects to list other sources of income, there still is a problem. Taking Schedules I and J in both cases at face value, and after taking account of the fact that in the first case the debtors' mortgages were paid through the plan but in this case they will be paid directly by the debtors, the debtors will have $4,713.54 of net income in this case ($2,005.11 plus the mortgage expense of $2,708.43) and they had $4,900 of net income in their first case. Inasmuch as the first case was not successful with slightly higher net income, it is difficult to believe this case will have a better chance of success. The fact that the debtors' priority tax debt has increased from just $2400 in the first case to more than $90,000 in this case, only deepens the court's skepticism that the debtors have the ability to reorganize.

The court cannot conclude that this case is more apt to succeed.

11. 13-29062-A-13 NAZILA EDALATI
MET-2
VS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

OBJECTION TO CLAIM
12-23-13 [36]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be overruled.

The IRS has filed a proof of claim for, among other thing, priority unsecured taxes totaling $188,768.51 for taxes due in 2011 and 2012. These taxes are based on the debtor's filed income taxes for the years in question. The debtor asserts that this amount should be reduced to $84,556.83 based on amended returns recently filed with the IRS.

However, as noted in the response to the objection, there is no declaration from the debtor authenticating the amended returns or attesting to the relevant facts that warranted the filing of the amended returns. Further, the IRS has not yet accepted the amended returns and until accepted, the fact that an amended return was filed has little probative value. See Badaracco v. Comm'r, 464 U.S. 386, 393 (1984).

12. 13-29062-A-13 NAZILA EDALATI
MET-3
VS. FRANCHISE TAX BOARD

OBJECTION TO CLAIM
12-26-13 [42]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be overruled.

The FTB has filed a proof of claim for, among other thing, a secured tax totaling $30,215.43 and a priority unsecured claim totaling $35,144.03 for taxes due in 2011 and 2012. These taxes are based on the debtor's filed income taxes for the years in question.

As to the secured claim, the debtor asserts that the FTB's tax liens are junior to the IRS's tax liens because they were recorded later in time. The debtor further asserts that because the IRS's liens consume all equity the debtor has in real property, the FTB claim is in fact an unsecured claim.

This objection will be overruled. First, there is no evidence of the value of the different real properties owned by the debtor. Hence, it cannot be ascertained from this record whether there is equity to support the FTB's position even if it is junior to the IRS's lien. Second, if the claim is not secured, the objection fails to establish that the taxes would be nonpriority or priority unsecured debt.

As to the priority claim, the debtor asserts that, based on amended returns recently filed with the FTB, the debtor is owed a refund for 2011 and 2012 and owes no taxes for these years.

However, as noted in the response to the objection, there is no declaration from the debtor authenticating the amended returns or attesting to the relevant facts that warranted the filing of the amended returns. Further, the IRS has not yet accepted the amended returns and until accepted, the fact that an amended return was filed has little probative value. See Badaracco v. Comm'r,

464 U.S. 386, 393 (1984).

13. 13-29062-A-13 NAZILA EDALATI — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN
MET-1 — 12-22-13 [31]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan is not feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) because the monthly plan payment of $1,371 during the first 12 months of the plan is less than the $2,953.19 in dividends and expenses the plan requires the trustee to pay each month.

14. 13-35584-A-13 SHIRLEY MATTHEWS — OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE
JPJ-1 — 1-23-14 [16]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The debtor failed to appear at the meeting of creditors. Appearance is mandatory. See 11 U.S.C. § 343. To attempt to confirm a plan while failing to appear and be questioned by the trustee and any creditors who appear, the debtor is also failing to cooperate with the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3). Under these circumstances, attempting to confirm a plan is the epitome of bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). The failure to appear also is cause for the dismissal of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6).

Nonetheless, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

15. 13-35784-A-13 CHARLES MCNEIL ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 1-21-14 [25]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will be dismissed.

The debtor was given permission to pay the filing fee in installments pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b). The installment in the amount of $70 due on January 16 was not paid. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(2).

16. 13-33385-A-13 SHERRIE CUNNINGHAM ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 1-21-14 [72]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will be dismissed.

The debtor was given permission to pay the filing fee in installments pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b). The installment in the amount of $70 due on January 14 was not paid. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(2).

THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

17. 13-35606-A-13 HERMAN/BRENDA HODGES — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
DPR-1
VS. SUN TRUST BANK — 1-12-14 [15]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of $400,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Sun Trust Bank. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately $618,750 as of the petition date. Therefore, Sun Trust Bank's other claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.

3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of $400,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

18. 11-44107-A-13 ARCHIMEDES/JAMICE ALIMAGNO — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
JT-3 — 1-10-14 [53]
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of $278,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately $461,037.18 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's

principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of $278,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

19. 10-29108-A-13 ANTONY MOHSENZADEGAN — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
SAC-2 — 12-26-13 [82]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the condition that the plan is further modified to require payments for 46 months, to provide for total payments of $4,400 through December 2013, and to require a lump sum payment of $2,100 on or before February 25, 2014. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

20. 13-35312-A-13 JOYCE SPRINGER — MOTION TO AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN
SBT-1
VS. PALISADES COLLECTION, LLC — 1-7-14 [16]

Final Ruling: This motion to avoid a judicial lien has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). The subject real property has a value of $505,000 as of the date of the petition. The unavoidable liens total $602,816.24. The debtor has an available exemption of $1. The respondent holds a judicial lien created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment in the chain of title of the subject real property. After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is no equity to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of this judicial lien impairs the debtor's exemption of the real property and its fixing is avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

21. 13-35312-A-13 JOYCE SPRINGER — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
SBT-2
VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. — 1-7-14 [22]

Final Ruling: The motion has been resolved by stipulation.

22. 13-35613-A-13 ALVIN CATLIN — OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO DISMISS CASE
JPJ-1 — 1-23-14 [23]

Final Ruling: The objection and counter motion will be dismissed because they are moot. The case was dismissed on January 23, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

23. 13-35613-A-13 ALVIN CATLIN
PPR-1
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON VS.

OBJECTION TO
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
1-23-14 [19]

Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed because it is moot. The case was dismissed on January 23, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

24. 11-34816-A-13 CHARLES/ROSEMARY MCMASTER
RWR-1
PACIFIC SERVICE CREDIT UNION VS.

MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
1-9-14 [46]

Final Ruling: This motion for relief from the automatic stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor and the trustee to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the movant to repossess and to obtain possession of its personal property security, and to dispose of it in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law. The movant is secured by a vehicle. The debtor has confirmed a plan that provides for payment of the movant's secured claim. However, in breach of that plan, the debtor has voluntarily surrendered the vehicle to the movant.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived. Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

25. 13-36119-A-13 AMADOR/STEPHANIE FRAIRE
SMR-1
TAN FAMILY TRUST VS.

MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
1-9-14 [13]

Final Ruling: This motion for relief from the automatic stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor and the trustee to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the movant to retake possession of the real property leased or rented to the debtor. No other relief is awarded.

The plan makes no provision for the assumption of a lease, and no separation motion has been filed to assume. Further, the debtor has failed to pay the rent required by the lease/rental agreement, both before and after filing this case. The post-petition rent default is $2,990. This is cause for termination of the automatic stay.

Because the movant has not established that it holds an over-secured claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

26. 13-28021-A-13 BRUNO/GRACIA AMATO — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN 1-6-14 [53]
EJS-3

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

27. 10-23022-A-13 RAYMOND/ESTHER ESCALANTE — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN 12-26-13 [93]
WW-8

Final Ruling: The hearing on the objection has been continued ton May 12, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

28. 10-23022-A-13 RAYMOND/ESTHER ESCALANTE — OBJECTION TO CLAIM AND TO NOTICE OF MORTGAGE PAYMENT CHANGE 12-26-13 [98]
WW-9
VS. THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON

Final Ruling: The hearing on the objection has been continued ton April 21, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

29. 10-21944-A-13 KATHLEEN SEYBOLD — MOTION TO APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY (FEES $2,240, EXP. $96.85) 1-6-14 [83]
TBH-2

Final Ruling: This compensation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(a)(6). The failure of the trustee, the debtor, the United States Trustee, the creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion seeks approval of $2,240 in fees and $96.85 in costs. The foregoing represents reasonable compensation for actual, necessary, and beneficial

services rendered to the debtor. This compensation when added to previously awarded fees is consistent with the fees estimated in the plan. The motion will be granted. Any retainer may be drawn upon and the balance of the approved compensation is to be paid through the plan in a manner consistent with the plan and Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1, if applicable.

30. 13-32148-A-13 ANTHONY/DEANNA LOGAN — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 12-31-13 [31]
CLH-1

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

The motion does not comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(e)(3) because when it was filed it was not accompanied by a separate proof/certificate of service. Appending a proof of service to one of the supporting documents (assuming such was done) does not satisfy the local rule. The proof/certificate of service must be a separate document so that it will be docketed on the electronic record. This permits anyone examining the docket to determine if service has been accomplished without examining every document filed in support of the matter on calendar. Given the absence of the required proof/certificate of service, the moving party has failed to establish that the motion was served on all necessary parties in interest.

31. 13-34549-A-13 SHAWN NELSON — ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 1-21-14 [39]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be discharged because it is moot. The case was dismissed on January 22.

32. 12-35071-A-13 TIMOTHY BOGGS — MOTION TO SELL 1-7-14 [55]
WW-5

Final Ruling: This motion to sell property has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion to sell real property will be granted on the condition that the sale proceeds are used to pay all liens of record in full in a manner consistent with the plan. If the proceeds are not sufficient to pay liens of record in full (including liens ostensibly "stripped off"), no sale may be completed without the consent of each lienholder not being paid in full.

33. 13-32983-A-13 HENA NOA — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 12-30-13 [29]
SL-2

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the

notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

34. 13-32983-A-13 HENA NOA — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
SL-3
VS. AMERICAN RIVER VILLAGE OWNERS ASSOC. — 12-30-13 [34]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of $89,917 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Select Portfolio Servicing, LLC. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately $95,012 as of the petition date. Therefore, American River Village Owners Association's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes

provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of $89,917. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

35. 11-42688-A-13 BRIAN/KELLY WOOD — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
JT-2
VS. PNC BANK, N.A. — 1-10-14 [38]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of $470,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Citimortgage, Inc. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately $662,523 as of the petition date. Therefore, PNC Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11

U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of $470,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

36. 13-31090-A-13 CATHRYN BURNETT — OBJECTION TO CLAIM
JRH-4
VS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE — 12-27-13 [55]

Final Ruling: The objecting party has voluntarily dismissed the objection.

37. 13-33091-A-13 CURTIS/TINA LANDS — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN
JLK-2
12-31-13 [29]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(3) and (b)(1) require that when the debtor files and serves a motion to confirm a chapter 13 plan, the motion to confirm it must be set for hearing on 42 days of notice to all creditors, the chapter 13 trustee, and the U.S. Trustee. If any of these parties in interest wish to object to the confirmation of the plan, they must file and serve a written objection at least 14 days prior to the hearing. See Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1)(B). The debtor's notice of the hearing on the motion to confirm the plan must advise all parties in interest of the deadline for filing written objections. See Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(d)(3).

This procedure complies with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(b), which requires a minimum of 28 days of notice of the deadline for objections to confirmation as well as the hearing on confirmation of the plan. Because Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) requires that written opposition be filed 14 days prior to the hearing but Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b) requires 28 days of notice of the deadline for filing opposition, the debtor must give 42 days of notice of the hearing.

Here, the debtor gave only 41 days of notice of the hearing. Therefore, parties in interest received only 27 days notice of the deadline for filing and serving written opposition to the motion. Notice was insufficient.

38. 13-33496-A-13 PATRICK FAGUNDES — ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
1-21-14 [47]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be discharged and the case will remain pending.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the $70 installment when due on January 16. However, after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent installment was paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.