## UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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4 In re: 5 MAY CHI-MAY LAING, Case No. 05-28649-C-7 Docket Control No. RJH-1

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Debtor.

Richard Hanf, chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee"), has objected to a claim of exemption filed by May Chi-May Laing (the "Debtor"). The claim of exemption relates to the Debtor's interest in an annuity contract issued by Kemper Investors Life Insurance Company, certificate no. KI11034481, described in the Debtor's C-Schedule in part as "ANNUITY: scudder destinations," and valued in the B-Schedule at \$41,038.40 (hereinafter, the "Annuity")

For the reasons set forth below, the court will overrule the objection.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Debtor filed her chapter 7 petition on July 15, 2005. In her C-Schedule filed with the chapter 7 petition, the Debtor claims as exempt the entire aggregate value of the Annuity, \$41,038.40, and identifies California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") section 703.140, subsections(b)(5) (exempting \$19,006.00) and (b)(10)(E) (exempting \$22,032.40), as the law providing for the claimed exemption.

On November 28, 2005, the Trustee filed an objection, bearing Docket Control No. RJH-1 (the "Objection"), to the Debtor's claim of exemption as to the Annuity. The Objection was noticed under Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The Objection was timely under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b), the Meeting of Creditors having been concluded on October 25, 2005.1

On December 6, 2005, the Debtor filed timely opposition to the Objection, which was supported by a declaration executed by the Debtor. Without objection, the Debtor also submitted as exhibits a copy of the Annuity contract and related documentation. By not filing a statement of disputed factual issues as set forth in Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii), the Debtor consented to resolution of disputed material factual issues pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e), as made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9017.

On December 22, 2005, the Trustee filed a timely reply to the Debtors' opposition, and the record closed at that time pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(iii). The

<sup>1.</sup> In her opposition to the Objection, the Debtor argued that the Objection was late-filed. While Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(b) provides for a 30-day period for filing objections, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a) provides that when the last day to file is a legal holiday, the period for objection runs until the end of the following day not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Here, the thirtieth day after October 25, 2005 was November 24, 2005, the Thanksgiving holiday. The Trustee electronically transmitted the Objection to the Clerk on November 25, 2005. Pursuant to General Order 04-01, ¶ 9, the Objection was deemed filed on November 28, 2005, the next business day for the court. The court was closed on Friday, November 25, 2005, a California state holiday, as described in Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(a), and therefore the filing on November 28 (the next Monday) was timely.

<sup>2.</sup> On December 23, 2005, the Debtor also filed a "Reply to Trustee's Response to Debtor's Response to Trustee's Objection to Claimed Exemption." Although the Trustee did not object to the filing of this document, the court does did not consider the document necessary to resolution of this matter.

Trustee submitted no declaration or documentary evidence to support the Objection. The court heard oral argument on January 3, 2006.

## II. ANALYSIS

This court has jurisdiction over the Objection pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1334 and 157(b)(1). The Objection is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. section (b)(2)(B). The Objection was brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b).

The objecting party, in this case the Trustee, bears the burden of proving that a claimed exemption is improper. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(c). Because a claimed exemption is presumptively valid, the objecting party must produce evidence to rebut the presumptively valid exemption, whereupon the burden of production shifts to the debtor to demonstrate that the exemption is proper. The burden of persuasion remains with the objecting party. In reCarter, 182 F.3d. 1027, 1029-30 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999).

In this case, the Trustee does not object to the Debtor's exemption claim of \$19,006.00 in the Annuity under CCP section 703.140(b)(5), which provides for the exemption of value up to \$925.00, plus up to \$17,425.00 in value not exempted under section 703.140(b)(1), in any property. Instead, the Trustee objects to the Debtor's exemption claim of \$22,032.40 under CCP section 703.140(b)(10)(E) (hereinafter, "Subsection-E"), which provides for the exemption, to the extent reasonably necessary for support, of a "payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service."

The Trustee does not argue that payments under the Annuity

are not reasonably necessary for support, but that payments under the Annuity are not made on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service. The Debtor argues that on the contrary, the Annuity contract is designed to provide payments to the Debtor on account of her disability, death, or age, as circumstances may dictate. The Debtor also argues that the Trustee has not submitted evidence sufficient to overturn the Debtor's exemption claim under Subsection-E.

Two decisions of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit ("BAP") are helpful in this matter. In In re Rawlinson, 209 B.R. 501 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997), the BAP ruled that a debtor's individual retirement account qualified as a "similar plan" under Subsection-E and thus, like employer-settled plans, are subject to exemption under that provision. In Rawlinson, the BAP dismissed the claim that a debtor's control over the distribution of funds in an individual retirement account was relevant to the issue of exemption under Subsection-E. The BAP noted that the concept of control is applicable to a determination of whether an asset is part of the bankruptcy estate, but not to exemption (just as other assets, such as personal residences, may be exempted without reference to the debtor's control). 209 B.R. at 507. Instead:

As long as the right to receive a payment . . . can be triggered by one or more of the five listed events, and is therefore exemptible, the fact that payments can also be triggered by some additional factor . . . cannot destroy exemptibility.

<u>Id</u>., quoting <u>In re Carmichael</u>, 100 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1996) (interpreting analogous provision in 11 U.S.C. section 522).

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In <u>In re Metz</u>, 225 B.R. 173 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998), the BAP reviewed a Bankruptcy Court's decision overruling a trustee's objection and denying reconsideration, where a debtor had claimed as exempt the value of her interest in her ex-husband's company retirement plan, which was awarded to her in a marital dissolution proceeding. Although in <u>Metz</u> the BAP affirmed the Bankruptcy Court on other grounds, it discussed in detail the debtor's ability to exempt the value of the interest under Subsection-E. 225 B.R. at 178-79. Although the trustee had argued that the debtor's "excessive control over the trust corpus" disqualified it from exemption, it found that "[t]he dispositive inquiry under the California statute is whether the plan was designed and used for retirement purposes." <u>Id</u>, quoting <u>Schwartzman v. Wilshinsky</u>, 50 Cal. App. 4th 619, 628 (1996).

The Trustee argues that the Debtor's ability under the Annuity to withdraw funds after six years without penalty (there are penalties for withdrawals before six years) disqualifies the Annuity from exemption under Subsection-E. However, under Rawlinson and Metz, the control that the Debtor holds over funds in the Annuity will not dictate whether exemption under Subsection-E is available. Instead, the court is to look to whether the Annuity is designed and used for the purposes set forth in Subsection-E: on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service. Under Metz, where the contract is designed and used for retirement purposes specifically, Subsection-E is applicable.

Here, a primary feature of the Annuity is the so-called Guaranteed Retirement Income Benefit ("GRIB"). <u>See</u> Debtor's

Opposition Exh. A, at 4 (stating GRIB feature). A review of the Annuity Option Table (Exh. C, after marked p. 9), clearly indicates that the Annuity is designed to provide installment payments to the Debtor over a period of years ranging from five to thirty or more years, the bulk of which the Debtor, who is currently fifty-one years old, would be retired from her occupation (she is self-employed). According to the information submitted by the Debtor with the Annuity, the issuer of the Annuity views the early withdrawal feature as important to the annuitant's use of funds should they be needed before retirement, as where a disability occurs. See Exh. C, at marked page 4. In addition, the Annuity includes a death-benefit provision (Exh. B, at marked p. 6), and the Debtor has designated certain beneficiaries under the Annuity (Exh. B, at "Certificate Schedule").

Based on the record in this matter and the features of the Annuity described above, the court finds that the Annuity is designed for retirement purposes, and pays benefits based on the Debtor's age and, under certain circumstances, her disability or death. The court therefore will overrule the Objection to the Debtor's claim of exemption under Subsection-E.

## III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court will overrule the Objection. The court will issue an order consistent with this memorandum.

Dated: January 13, 2006

/s/

ROBERT S. BARDWIL United States Bankruptcy Judge