1 2 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SACRAMENTO DIVISION 6 7 8 9 Case No. 03-32180-A-11In re 10 JOMED INC., and JOMED USA, Jointly Administered with INC., Case No. 03-32183-A-1111 Docket Control No. MTW-2 Reorganized Debtors. 12 Date: April 25, 2005 13 Time: 9:00 14 On April 25, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. the court considered the motion of motion of Richard A. Johnson and Michael J. Sorna for 15 relief from a permanent injunction and/or abstention. The text of the final ruling appended to minutes of the hearing follows. This final ruling constitutes a "reasoned explanation" for the 16 court's decision and accordingly is posted to the court's 17 Internet site, www.caeb.uscourts.gov, in a text-searchable format as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. The official record 18 of this ruling remains the minutes of the hearing. 19 FINAL RULING 20 The motion will be denied for the reasons discussed below. 21 22 I. The Relief Requested 23 The movants, Richard A. Johnson and Michael J. Sorna, seek relief from an injunction and/or for the court to abstain from 24 25 resolving the debtors' objections to their proofs of claim. 26 Instead, they seek to liquidate their claims in the Texas 27 district court where their civil action was originally filed

against Jomed Inc. as well as Jomed N.V.

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Prior to the filing of these chapter 11 cases, the movants commenced litigation against Jomed Inc. and its Dutch parent company, Jomed N.V., in Texas. That litigation remains pending in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The movants asserted claims for breach of employment contracts with Jomed N.V.

This litigation was automatically stayed as against Jomed Inc. when its chapter 11 petition was filed. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). While the automatic stay expired (see 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)) when the chapter 11 plan was confirmed on July 29, 2004 and became effective on August 11, 2004, the litigation continues to be stayed according to the terms of the confirmed chapter 11 plan, jointly proposed by Jomed Inc. and Jomed USA. The confirmed plan provides for an injunction against the commencement or continuation of proceedings to liquidate or enforce any claim against Jomed Inc. other than in connection with the bankruptcy claims allowance process. That process is well underway.

As to the movants' claims and the objections to them, the court has set a discovery deadline and expects to set a trial for the late summer or early fall of this year. Because this court has three recalled judges available for trial assignments, there is no likelihood of delay.

Delaying the resolution of the movants' claims is a concern to all creditors. Under the confirmed chapter 11 plans, the liquidated assets of Jomed Inc. and Jomed USA will be distributed to creditors and to interest holders once all objections to claims have been determined. The motion attempts to derail the claims allowance process in this court and in favor of a return to the Texas district court. This motion is made on several grounds, none of which is convincing or compelling.

II. Background

Jomed Inc. and Jomed USA are the wholly-owned subsidiaries of Jomed N.V., a Swedish corporation, currently in a Dutch insolvency proceeding. On January 13, 2004, the Dutch curators of Jomed N.V. filed a petition to commence an ancillary proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 304. Section 304 permits an ancillary proceeding to be opened in the United States in aid of a foreign insolvency proceeding.

Just as the movants filed their claims in these chapter 11 cases, they filed them against Jomed N.V. in its foreign insolvency proceeding. Just as Jomed Inc. has disputed the claims, so have the curators. Unlike the automatic stay enjoyed by Jomed Inc., the Dutch insolvency proceeding did not stay the movants from continuing with their suit in Texas against Jomed N.V.

Hence, the reason for the ancillary proceeding. In an ancillary proceeding, the foreign representative of the foreign debtor may ask, among other things, that creditors in the United States be enjoined from commencing or continuing judicial proceedings against it in the United States. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1). Jomed N.V.'s curators asked this court to enjoin the movants from continuing their suit in Texas district court. The curators also wanted to compel the movants to litigate the

dispute concerning their claim in the Dutch insolvency proceeding or in this court.

The movants countered by asking this court to not stay the Texas action. Instead, they asked that they be permitted to resolve both Jomed N.V.'s and Jomed Inc.'s objections regarding their claims before the Texas district court. To this end they also sought relief from the automatic stay in the chapter 11 case. In the ancillary proceeding they asked that injunctive relief be limited to enjoining the movants from enforcing any judgment received from the Texas court other than by presenting claims for payment in the chapter 11 case and the Dutch insolvency proceeding.

Jomed Inc., as distinct from Jomed N.V., wanted its objection to movants' claims litigated in this court and so it opposed the motion for relief from the automatic stay. And, while Jomed Inc. did not oppose Jomed N.V.'s objections to the movants' claims being resolved by this court, it made clear that if the Texas district court was permitted to resolve Jomed N.V.'s objections to the claims, Jomed Inc. still wanted its objections resolved by this court.

In its February 19, 2004 Memorandum Opinion, the court concluded that cause did not then exist to modify the stay to permit the Texas litigation to continue against Jomed Inc. It also preliminarily enjoined the movants from proceeding against Jomed N.V. pending a determination as to whether permanent relief should be granted in the ancillary proceeding.

In denying relief from the automatic stay, the court stated that "[s]hould the court in the Netherlands permit Johnson and

Sorna to pursue their claims in Texas, or should this court not grant the petition under section 304, the court will reconsider this denial."

The ancillary petition was later granted. Then, for the reasons given in its July 29, 2004 Memorandum Opinion (filed in the ancillary proceeding), the court "enjoined [the movants] from commencing or continuing any action against Jomed N.V., its property, or its curators other than by presenting their claims to the court with jurisdiction over Jomed N.V.'s insolvency proceeding."

However, if the respondents received leave from the Dutch court to proceed with their litigation in Texas or some other court, including this court, they would be permitted do so without further order from this court. In no event, however, were the movants to enforce any judgment against Jomed N.V. other than by presenting a claim to the court in the Netherlands.

At this point, then, the movants were left defending their claim against Jomed Inc. in this court and defending their claim against Jomed N.V. in the Netherlands. While the claim objections of Jomed Inc. have been proceeding in this court, the Dutch court punted.

When the movants and the curators returned to the Dutch court, it informed them that even though the movants had submitted to its jurisdiction by filing claims in the Netherlands, it was without jurisdiction to resolve the curators' objections to those claims. If further ruled that it was also without jurisdiction to dictate which court in the United States should resolve the curators' objections.

Consequently, this court and the Dutch court had left the parties in limbo. This court had enjoined the Texas litigation from moving forward, and despite the fact that Johnson and Sorna had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Dutch court by filing claims, that court had declined to resolve the curators' objection to those claims. Hence, if the curators' objections were to be adjudicated, this court had to modify its previous injunction.

The movants then sought leave to activate the dormant Texas litigation with the proviso that any judgment in their favor not be enforced against the U.S. assets of Jomed N.V. Any judgment would be satisfied to the extent allowed by the Dutch court administering Jomed N.V.'s insolvency proceeding. The curators, on the other hand, wanted their objections resolved by this court in connection with resolution of Jomed Inc.'s similar objections.

For the reasons given in its February 17, 2005 Memorandum Opinion (filed in the ancillary proceeding), this court agreed with the movants and it modified the injunctive relief granted in the ancillary proceeding to permit them to liquidate their claims against Jomed N.V. in Texas. In granting this relief, however, the court explained that it was not prepared to permit the Texas court to resolve Jomed Inc.'s objections to the movants' claims. It held:

This court is in a position to promptly adjudicate the objections raised by [Jomed Inc.] to Johnson's and Sorna's chapter 11 claims. Given the procedural posture of those objections, and given the absence of a right to a jury trial in the chapter 11 cases, these objections are likely to be resolved long before the

Texas litigation goes to trial. This holds out the prospect of the only real efficiencies likely to be achieved.

III. Discussion

Given its decision to permit the Texas court to resolve

Jomed N.V.'s curators' objections to the movants' claims, this

court is willing to reconsider its decision to not let the Texas

court resolve Jomed Inc.'s objections to the movants' claims.

That reconsideration, however, does not counsel in favor of

abstention or modification of the plan's injunction.

The motion sets forth supposed "stipulations" in which the movants attempt to demonstrate that Jomed Inc. and Jomed N.V. agreed that the claims and objections should be tried in one forum. These stipulations, based on quotes from the prior documents of Jomed Inc., are unhelpful and unpersuasive. The quotes are edited and are not presented in their full and proper context.

Α.

Their proper context implicates the ancillary proceeding and the lengthy history recited above. While Jomed Inc. was in favor of adjudicating all objections and all claims in this court, counsel for Jomed Inc. always made clear that if this court declined to resolve the objections to the claims filed against Jomed N.V., Jomed Inc. was prepared to litigate independently its objections to the claims in this court.

The movants allege that Jomed Inc. and Jomed N.V. entered into a joint defense agreement in order to defend themselves against the movants' claims in a single lawsuit.

В.

In its opposition to the motion, Jomed Inc. persuasively responds that this agreement generally covers the chapter 11 cases of Jomed Inc., Jomed N.V.'s Dutch insolvency proceeding and the ancillary proceeding, and the adversary proceedings related to the ancillary proceeding. It was not entered into in anticipation of a single proceeding involving the movants.

Rather, it contemplates a multiplicity of proceedings.

The movants utilize a "balance of the hardships" test to argue that it would not be prejudicial, or add expense, to require Jomed Inc. to litigate in the Texas district court. In fact, they believe that one lawsuit instead of two will conserve resources.

С.

The balance of hardships test invoked by the movants is not the standard for modification of a permanent injunction like the one in the confirmed chapter 11 plan. Instead, modification of a permanent injunction requires a significant change of law or facts, neither of which has occurred in this case.

If it were the standard, the court is unconvinced that the movants should prevail.

First, the only potential witnesses identified by the parties as residents of Texas are the movants. At least two potential witnesses, who are former Jomed Inc. employees, reside in the Sacramento area. All other potential witnesses appear to be from other states and foreign countries. These witnesses cannot be compelled to attend trial in either Texas or Sacramento. Their depositions can be used in either forum.

Jomed Inc. notes that the movants' assertion that three foreign witnesses would appear voluntarily for trial in Texas is inadmissable hearsay. The court agrees. If the hearsay is ignored, the court concludes that if these witnesses would voluntarily appear in Texas, they are just as likely to appear in California.

Second, Jomed Inc.'s assets have been liquidated. They will not be sufficient to pay all claims in full. Resolving objections in one centralized forum has the best hope of conserving those assets.

The movants contend that Jomed Inc. has sufficient funds available from its insurance carrier to defend against their claim in the Texas action. In its opposition, however, Jomed Inc. reports that the extent of insurance coverage for the movants' claims cannot be ascertained until the results of the litigation are known. While Jomed Inc. is seeking reimbursement of legal expenses expended to defend against the movants' claims, the insurer has been slow to respond to such reimbursement requests. Therefore, Jomed Inc. maintains that the burden of defense costs remains very much at issue.

Third, allowing Jomed Inc.'s objections to be resolved in Texas is likely to delay the payment of claims and the consummation of its plan. As noted above, payment of claims must await the completion of the claims allowance process. In Texas the movants will seek a jury trial. In connection with the objections to the claims in the chapter 11 case, there is no jury trial right.

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An objection to a proof of claim does not entitle the claimant to a jury trial. Resolution of an objection is a matter within the core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(B), (C). By filing a proof of claim, the claimant submits to this equitable jurisdiction and waives any right to a jury trial in connection with any claim objection.

See Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44, 111 S.Ct. 330, 331 (1990); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329 86 S.Ct. 467, 472 (1966); Benedor Corp. v. Conejo Enterprises, Inc. (In re Conejo Enterprises, Inc.), 96 F.3d 346, 354, n.6 (9th Cir. 1996).

Fourth, the court does not believe there is a likely risk of inconsistent fact finding. To the extent this court determines issues that also arise in the Texas litigation, application of issue preclusion will likely prevent relitigation of those issues in Texas. Unlike claim preclusion, which applies only as between the original parties, issue preclusion may be applied in later litigation with others. Section 29 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides: "A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party . . . is also precluded from doing so with another person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate the issue."

D.

When the court indicated in its February 19, 2004 Memorandum Opinion that it would reconsider its denial of the motion for relief from the automatic stay, it had not then confirmed Jomed

Inc.'s plan of reorganization. That plan, as noted above, contained an injunction barring all creditors of Jomed Inc. and Jomed USA from commencing or continuing any proceedings to liquidate or enforce any claim against Jomed Inc. other than in connection with the bankruptcy claims allowance process.

Absent modification of the confirmed plan (see 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b)), modification of that injunction in the plan is problematic and modification of the plan is unlikely.

First, modification of the plan pursuant to section 1127(b) is unlikely given the plan's substantial consummation and the requirement that the plan proponent or the reorganized debtor propose any modification. The movants were not the plan proponent, they are not the reorganized debtor, and because distributions have commenced under the plan, it has been substantially consummated. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101((2)(C).

Second, the authority cited for the contrary position generally relates to abstention and relief from the automatic stay. In re Brotby, 303 B.R. 177, 199 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) comes the closest to helping the movants. Brotby, however, is distinguishable on some key points. In Brotby, a creditor appealed the order confirming a chapter 11 plan contending, among other things, that the plan impermissibly enjoined him from collecting a nondischargeable debt while the debtor performed the plan. The appellate panel concluded:

. . . the bankruptcy court failed to make the necessary specific findings of fact to support imposition of the injunction in this case. The bankruptcy court did not address why the inclusion of the collection injunction against [the creditor] in Debtor's Plan was "necessary for the success of the plan." [Citation omitted.] Perhaps since Debtor is

funding his plan in large part from his earnings, if [the creditor] were allowed to pursue collection of its claim "outside" the Plan, Debtor's ability to complete the Plan and to reorganize may be jeopardized and the rights of creditors adversely impacted. If those circumstances in fact exist, delaying [the creditor's] collection efforts may be reasonably necessary to the success of Debtor's Plan. But the record at this point does not include such findings.

On this record, it is also unclear whether the bankruptcy court engaged in any balancing of the relative hardships resulting from the imposition of the collection injunction, or whether it agreed that the scope and duration of the collection injunction was properly limited in the Plan so as to not unfairly prejudice the creditor . . . [S]uch findings are the necessary foundation to the bankruptcy court's use of its equitable powers under § 105(a).

While the bankruptcy court correctly interpreted § 1141(d)(2), absent appropriate factual findings to support the use of the collection injunction in this case, the matter must be remanded to the bankruptcy court. [Citations omitted.]

In re Brotby, 303 B.R. at 191.

In this case, the movants did not appeal the confirmation order. Consequently, they are bound by the terms of the plan, including the injunction. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a). This is not unfair. The movants have been represented throughout this case by able counsel. Not only did the movants vote for confirmation, they were members of the creditors' committee. It is exceedingly unlikely, given these facts, that the injunction went unnoticed.

In addition to abstention, the movants cite a variety of statutes and argue they permit the court to ignore the plan and the injunction in it. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) gives the court the power to "issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title." Under 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b), the court may "direct the debtor . . . to perform any other act . . . that is necessary for the

consummation of the plan." Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) provides that in the interest of comity and justice, a district court may abstain from hearing a proceeding arising under title 11.

None of these sections gives the court authority to modify a final injunction provided in a debtor's confirmed plan.

However, and more to the point, even if invested with such authority, the case before the court does not justify such relief whether it be based on an abstention doctrine or these statutes.

In short, the movants have not persuaded the court that it should abstain from the determination of their claims or that relief from the injunction in the plan should be granted. The issue of whether the movants should be free to litigate in some other forum has been presented to this court on several occasions. In each instance, the court has already carefully considered the appropriate place to litigate claims. The court finds no cause to now reconsider (assuming it can reconsider).

IV. Conclusion

This court has been in, and remains in, the best position to adjudicate promptly the objections raised by Jomed Inc. to the movants' claims. Given the procedural posture of those objections, and given the absence of a right to a jury trial in the chapter 11 cases, these objections are likely to be resolved with less expense and long before the Texas litigation goes to trial.

The court, as well as the reorganized debtors, have a responsibility to all creditors of Jomed Inc. to adjudicate claim

disputes in a timely and efficient manner, thereby conserving assets of an insolvent debtor for the maximum benefit of all creditors. This responsibility may impose some constraints on some creditors that would not otherwise be imposed outside of the bankruptcy context. Considering this responsibility and the needs of all creditors, the burden imposed on the movants is not unfair.

A separate order will be entered denying the motion.