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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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5 In re:

ASHWANI MAYER and POOJA VERMA,

ASHWANI MAYER and POOJA VERMA,

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

Debtor(s).

Plaintiff(s),

Defendant(s).

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Case No. 15-25582-B-13

Adversary No. 15-2154

DC No. SBM-1

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Introduction

Plaintiffs Aswani Mayer and Pooja Verma are debtors in the underlying chapter 13 case. This adversary proceeding involves an offset by defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., against plaintiffs' checking account identified in Schedule B and claimed as exempt in Schedule C. Defendant offset \$3,482.74 from that checking account to satisfy plaintiffs' related VISA account. Defendant refunded the offset funds several weeks after the chapter 13 petition was filed and before it was served with the summons and complaint in this adversary proceeding.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant violated the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and defendant is liable for damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Plaintiffs also allege that defendant's offset is an avoidable preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).

The court concludes that defendant did not violate the automatic stay, either by its initial offset against the plaintiffs' checking account or by its post-petition retention of the offset funds. The court also concludes there is no avoidable preference because the offset funds have been refunded. Therefore, because there is no genuine issue of material fact and because defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment will be granted for defendant on all claims for relief alleged in the amended complaint.

15 Jurisdiction and Venue

Federal subject-matter jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1334. This matter is a core proceeding that a bankruptcy judge may hear and determine. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (G) and (0). To the extent it may ever be determined to be a matter that a bankruptcy judge may not hear and determine without consent, the parties nevertheless consent to such determination by a bankruptcy judge. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

Background

The amended complaint alleges four causes of action: (1) declaration of relief based on the premise of a purported continuing stay violation; (2) violation of the automatic stay

under § 362(a); (3) damages under § 362(k)(1); and (4) preference avoidance under § 547(b). Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims for relief alleged in the amended complaint. Plaintiffs have opposed defendant's motion and defendant has replied to plaintiffs' opposition. The court has taken judicial notice of its docket in this adversary proceeding and of the dockets in two related cases filed in this court, nos. 15-25582 and 15-21850.

The court held a hearing on the defendant's motion on November 4, 2015. Proper notice of the hearing was given. Appearances were noted on the record. The court continued that hearing to November 18, 2015, and then to November 25, 2015. This order disposes of the defendant's motion and renders the continued hearing on November 25, 2015, unnecessary.

Statement of Facts

Plaintiffs are debtors in the underlying chapter 13 case, case no. 15-25582. Plaintiffs filed their chapter 13 petition on July 13, 2015, at 4:48:12 p.m.

Plaintiffs maintained a pre-petition checking account with defendant. The last four numbers of that checking account are "2012." Plaintiffs list that checking account on Schedule B with a balance of \$4,700. They also claim it as exempt under Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 703.140(b)(5) on Schedule C.

At 4:04 p.m. on July 13, 2015, defendant offset plaintiffs' checking account ending in "2012" in the amount of \$3,482.74.

That offset resulted in a payment to plaintiffs' related VISA account. Defendant had no record of notice of the plaintiffs'

bankruptcy case prior to its offset.

Plaintiff Mayer received a letter confirming defendant's offset on July 14, 2014, following an in-person visit to defendant. After receiving that letter, plaintiffs, their attorney, and the attorney's staff spent several hours attempting to contact defendant by telephone to no avail. At some point after July 14, 2015, plaintiffs' attorney called another attorney who represents defendant (but not in this matter). There is no evidence the two actually spoke about the offset, reversal of the offset, or that they even spoke at all. Plaintiffs' attorney sent defendant a "cease and desist" letter on July 17, 2015, which defendant received on July 23, 2015.

After consulting with its counsel and without any request from the plaintiffs or their attorney, and also without any notice of this adversary proceeding, defendant refunded the offset funds to plaintiffs on August 7, 2015. Plaintiffs served defendant with the summons and complaint in this adversary proceeding the following day on August 8, 2015.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if documents, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and declarations, if any, show that there is "no genuine issue of fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

The initial burden of showing the absence of a material factual issue is on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330; DeHorney v. Bank of America N.T.& S.A., 879 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1989). When the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may discharge that burden by demonstrating there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once that burden is met, the opposing party must come forward with specific facts, and not allegations, to show a genuine factual issue remains for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25. Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

Discussion

The Initial Offset Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay.

The first issue is whether defendant's offset violated the automatic stay of § 362(a). It did not. Defendant's offset of \$3,482.74 from plaintiffs' checking account did not violate the automatic stay because plaintiffs had not yet filed their chapter 13 petition, which means the automatic stay was not yet in effect, when the offset occurred.

The offset at issue occurred on July 13, 2015, at 4:04 p.m. The court's docket reflects that the plaintiffs filed their chapter 13 petition on July 13, 2015, at 4:48:12 p.m. Section 362(a) states that except as provided in subsection (b) of that

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section, "a petition filed under section 301 ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities[.]" Thus, the automatic stay was not triggered until the petition was filed which was 44 minutes after the offset from plaintiff's checking account occurred. Consequently, it would not be possible for defendant to have received notice of the plaintiffs' bankruptcy filing before the offset took place, much less violate the automatic stay which was not even in effect when the offset occurred. Therefore, summary judgment on this aspect of plaintiffs' § 362(a) claim will be granted for the defendant.

<u>Defendant's Post-Petition Retention of the Offset Funds Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay.</u>

Plaintiffs also allege that defendant violated the automatic stay by retaining the offset funds after it learned of the plaintiffs' bankruptcy filing. Defendant did not know of plaintiffs' bankruptcy filing until it received plaintiffs' "cease and desist" letter on July 23, 2015. Defendant unilaterally reversed the offset and refunded the offset funds to plaintiffs on August 7, 2015. For the reasons explained below, the court concludes that defendant's post-petition retention of the offset funds did not violate the automatic stay.

Inasmuch as defendant's offset from plaintiffs' checking account occurred pre-petition, the offset funds were not property of the estate under § 541(a). Defendant's retention of those

Not only was the stay triggered after the offset occurred, but the clerk did not enter the bankruptcy in the public record until July 14, 2015, at 7:43 a.m., which is the earliest time at which defendant could have had notice of plaintiffs' bankruptcy and, thus, notice of the automatic stay.

funds, therefore, was not possession or control over property of the estate or from the estate. In fact, the offset funds would become property of the estate when returned to the estate on August 7, 2015, or otherwise recovered as a preference under § 547(b). But even if the offset funds were property of the estate, defendant's post-petition retention of those funds would not violate the automatic stay.

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The court initially rejects defendant's suggestion that Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995), imposed an obligation on the plaintiffs to demand that defendant return the offset funds. Defendant has it backwards. The automatic stay imposes an affirmative duty on the creditor to discontinue actions in violation of the stay. Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. <u>Leetien</u>, 309 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, when property of the estate is held in violation of the automatic stay, the onus is on the creditor to turn over the property and not for the debtor to chase the creditor and force correction of the continuing violation. Emp't Dev. Dep't v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1996). Strumpf also authorizes a bank's temporary administrative freeze in order to permit a bank to effectuate setoff rights. Since the offset in this case occurred pre-petition, defendant no longer had setoff (or offset) rights to effectuate when it held plaintiffs' funds after it learned of plaintiffs' bankruptcy. Strumpf, therefore, is of no assistance to the defendant.

Nevertheless, in <u>In re Mwangi</u>, 764 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit upheld a bank's post-petition retention of funds in a deposit account the debtors claimed as exempt.

Although the court recognized those funds were property of the estate from the petition date until the debtors' claim of exemption was resolved or the exemption objection period expired, the court concluded that the bank did not violate the automatic stay by holding those funds pending direction from the trustee. Id. at 1177.

In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the case before it from Taxel, supra. The court noted that whereas Taxel involved an unconditional turnover obligation under \$ 542(a), because of the unique nature of a deposit account and the relationship between the bank and its customers, the bank's turnover obligation in the case before it was governed instead by \$ 542(b). Id. That meant the bank's turnover obligation was not unconditional and, in fact, was subject to direction from the trustee pending resolution of the exemption or expiration of the exemption objection period. Id. In other words, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the bank could hold the debtors' funds - as property of the estate - pending direction from the party entitled to those funds which, in the case before it, was the trustee.

In this case, the offset funds were taken from the plaintiffs' checking account ending in "2012." Plaintiffs claimed that account and the funds in it as exempt in Schedule C filed with the petition. Plaintiffs' claim of exemption to that account was not resolved before the offset funds were returned to plaintiffs on August 7, 2015. And based on a § 341 meeting that was first set for August 20, 2015, the exemption objection period would not have expired until September 19, 2015. See Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 4003(b)(1).

Plaintiffs also provided defendant with no direction regarding disposition of the offset funds prior to August 7, 2015, when defendant took it upon itself to return the offset funds to the plaintiffs after consulting with its counsel. In fact, the only direction defendant received from plaintiffs regarding disposition of the offset funds came on August 8, 2015, when defendant was served in this adversary proceeding. By that time, however, the offset funds had already been returned.

In sum, in the absence of direction from the plaintiffs regarding disposition of the offset funds which plaintiffs claimed as exempt, defendant's post-petition retention of those funds would not violate the automatic stay even if those funds remained property of the estate after defendant's offset.

Therefore, summary judgment on this aspect of plaintiffs' claim alleged under § 362(a) is warranted and will be granted.

Return of the Offset Funds Negates any Avoidable Preference.

Finally, there is no dispute that defendant refunded the offset funds on August 7, 2015. Funds that were offset within the 90 days before the petition was filed having been returned to the plaintiffs, there is nothing for the plaintiffs to avoid and recover as a preference under § 547(b). Therefore, summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim alleging a preferential transfer under § 547(b) will also be granted.

 $^{^2\}mathrm{Since}$ this is a chapter 13 case, direction regarding the disposition of the offset funds would come from the plaintiffs who, as chapter 13 debtors, have the right to use property of the estate exclusive of the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1303.

Conclusion

There is no genuine issue of material fact on any of the claims for relief alleged in the amended complaint and defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will grant summary judgment for the defendant on all claims for relief alleged in the amended complaint.

A separate judgment for the defendant shall enter.

Dated: November 23, 2015.

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK OF COURT SERVICE LIST The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the attached document, via the BNC, to the following parties: Peter G. Macaluso 7230 South Land Park Drive #127 Sacramento CA 95831 Steven B. Mains 267 Locust Ave. Suite A San Rafael CA 94901