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| 3 | UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT | |
| 4 | EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA | |
| 5 | SACRAMENTO DIVISION | |
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| 8 | In re: |) |
| 9 | JAMES/ESTRELLA KINCAID, |) Case No. 05-21390-B-7 |
| 10 | |) Docket Control No. DNL-13 |
| 11 | Debtors. |) Date: November 7, 2006 |
| 12 | |) Time: 9:30 a.m. |
| 13 | On or after the calendar set forth above, the court issued the following ruling. The official record of the ruling is appended to the minutes of the hearing. | |
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| 15 | Because the ruling constitutes a "reasoned explanation" of the court's decision under the E-Government Act of 2002 (the "Act"), a copy of the ruling is hereby posted on the court's Internet site, www.caeb.uscourts.gov, in a text-searchable format, as required by the Act. However, this posting does not constitute the official record, which is always the ruling appended to the minutes of the hearing. | |
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| 19 | DISPOSITION AFTER ORAL ARGUMENT | |
| 20 | Neither the respondent within the time for opposition nor the | |
| 21 | movant within the time for reply has filed a separate statement | |
| 22 | identifying each disputed material factual issue relating to the | |
| 23 | motion. Accordingly, both movant and respondent have consented to the | |
| 24 | resolution of the motion and all disputed material factual issues | |
| 25 | pursuant to FRCivP 43(e). LBR 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) and (iii). | |
| 26 | The estate owns real property located at 2253 Penryn Rd., Penryn, | |
| 27 | California (APNs 032-230-030 and 032-230-029). The trustee seeks to | |

28 sell the estate's interest in the property to Jeff Voracek for

\$160,000, to be paid from a \$10,000 non-refundable deposit already paid to the Chapter 7 trustee and \$150,000 to be paid from a cashier's check or transfer of immediately available funds within 30 days of the entry of an order authorizing the sale.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1), the motion is granted and the trustee is authorized to sell the property to Jeff and Tracy Oracek, or an overbidder approved by the court at the hearing. The proceeds of sale shall be administered as set forth in the motion.

The qualification and bidding procedures set forth in the notice of hearing are approved. The initial bid shall be in the amount of \$161,000, with subsequent bids in minimum \$1,000.00 increments.

No request for a finding of good faith has been made under 11 U.S.C. \S 363(m) and the court makes no such finding.

The court notes that the debtors have filed opposition to this motion on the grounds that the court does not have jurisdiction to render a decision on this motion. The debtors argue that this court is deprived of jurisdiction over this matter because the debtors filed a notice of appeal with the district court. That notice appeals this court's April 7, 2006, order denying the debtors' Motion for Full Retroactive Disqualification of Judge and the Recusal of Judge to Hear Instant Matter and all Subsequent Hearings, Etc. (Dkt. No. 524) In their opposition to his motion, the debtors assert that because they appealed that prior order, that this court no longer has jurisdiction to render a decision on any matter related to their case.

That assertion is incorrect. The debtors rely on the general rule that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of its jurisdiction over a case. Although the debtors have cited this

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general rule as the holding in the only bankruptcy case they cite, In re Marino, 234 B.R. 767 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999), they fail to recognize the full extent of that holding. In particular, they fail to recognize the applicability of the holding to situations in which a party has filed a notice of appeal from a court's order in an ongoing case. The Marino court stated the general rule for which the debtors have cited its opinion, but went further to hold that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction "over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Id. at 769 (emphasis added). The court went on to state that "while an appeal of an order is pending, the trial court retains jurisdiction to implement or enforce the order Courts thus distinguish between actions to enforce the judgment, which are permissible, and actions to expand upon or alter the judgment, which are prohibited." Id. at 770; see <u>also</u> <u>In re Padilla</u>, 222 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Absent a stay or supersedeas, the trial court also retains jurisdiction to implement or enforce the judgment or order but may not alter or expand upon the judgment."). "This principle serves to 'ensure the integrity of the appellate process.'. . . This is true because in implementing an appealed order, the court does not disrupt the appellate process so long as its decision remains intact for the appellate court to review." Marino, 234 B.R. at 769-70 (quoting In re Hagel, 184 B.R. 793, 798 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995)).

The holdings in <u>Marino</u> and <u>Padilla</u> are not contradicted by the other cases that debtors have cited for the general rule on which they rely. Both <u>Lewis v. Alexander</u>, 987 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1993) and Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1970), involve facts and

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procedural postures that are distinguishable from this case. Each of those cases raised the general rule asserted by the debtors in the context of appeals taken from the final judgments of trial courts in civil and criminal matters.

Here, the debtors appealed from the denial of a motion in their case that did not constitute a final judgment in or disposition of their bankruptcy case. The circumstances under which a bankruptcy court may retain jurisdiction while an appeal from one of its orders is pending as described in Marino and Padilla exist here. Since the debtors filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 2006, the court has proceeded to administer their case pursuant to and consistent with its denial of the debtors' motion for disqualification and recusal. Rendering a decision on the trustee's instant motion to sell real property belonging to the estate does not alter or expand upon that judgment. Therefore, the debtors' argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to render a judgment on this motion is not supported by law, and their objection is overruled.

Finally, the court notes that the debtors misquote the third case they cite, <u>United States v. Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143</u>, 971 F.2d 974 (3rd Cir. 1992). The court in that case stated that "[t]he filing of a notice of appeal does <u>not</u> divest the district court of jurisdiction to <u>entertain</u> a Rule 60(b) motion [relating to the order or judgment on appeal]." <u>Id.</u> at 988 (initial emphasis added). As such, the court in that case identified an exception to the general rule upon which the debtors rely here. The case is inapposite, as there is no Rule 60 motion currently before the court.

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