UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

September 19, 2016 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 14. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2)[eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE OCTOBER 17, 2016 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY OCTOBER 3, 2016, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY OCTOBER 11, 2016. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON ITEMS 15 THROUGH 30 IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR. INSTEAD, THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2016, AT 2:30 P.M.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 16-24200-A-13 LESLIE LEWIS — ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 9-2-16 [34]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will remain pending but the court will modify the terms of its order permitting the debtor to pay the filing fee in installments.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the $76 installment when due on August 29. While the delinquent installment was paid on September 7, the fact remains the court was required to issue an order to show cause to compel the payment. Therefore, as a sanction for the late payment, the court will modify its prior order allowing installment payments to provide that if a future installment is not received by its due date, the case will be dismissed without further notice or hearing.

2. 16-22206-A-13 JACQUELINE/ROBERT COONEY — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 5-27-16 [32]
HDR-2

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection sustained.

First, the debtor has failed to make $20 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Second, in order to pay the dividends required by the plan at the rate proposed by it will take 78 months which exceeds the maximum 5-year duration permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) as well as the proposed 5-year duration of the plan.

Third, counsel for the debtor has opted to receive fees pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1 rather than by making a motion in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §§ 329, 330 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 2016, 2017. However, the rights and responsibilities agreement executed and filed indicates that counsel will receive a $4,000 fee with $1,850 paid before the case was filed and $2,150 to be paid through the proposed plans. The plan, on the other hand, indicates counsel was paid nothing before the case was filed and will be paid $1,800 through the plan. Therefore, the provision in the proposed plan requiring the trustee to pay the fees contradicts the agreement with the debtor.

3. 16-22206-A-13 JACQUELINE/ROBERT COONEY — COUNTER MOTION TO DISMISS CASE 6-27-16 [49]
HDR-2

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be

given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

4. 12-23807-A-13 DOUGLAS CREECH — MOTION TO SET ASIDE DISMISSAL 9-2-16 [68]
JGD-4

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be granted.

This case was dismissed on August 10, 2016. Through May 26, 2016, the debtor failed to make plan payments totaling $4,051.70. This prompted the trustee to issue a notice of default pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g). It noted this default and also demanded the additional $2,024 due on May 26, a total amount of $6,075.70.

This notice of default procedure, as authorized by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g), provides:

(1) If the debtor fails to make a payment pursuant to a confirmed plan, including a direct payment to a creditor, the trustee may mail to the debtor and the debtor's attorney written notice of the default.

(2) If the debtor believes that the default noticed by the trustee does not exist, the debtor shall set a hearing within twenty-eight (28) days of the mailing of the notice of default and give at least fourteen (14) days' notice of the hearing to the trustee pursuant to LBR 9014-1(f)(2). At the hearing, if the trustee demonstrates that the debtor has failed to make a payment required by the confirmed plan, and if the debtor fails to rebut the trustee's evidence, the case shall be dismissed at the hearing.

(3) Alternatively, the debtor may acknowledge that the plan payment(s) has(have) not been made and, within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the notice of default, either (A) make the delinquent plan payment(s) and all subsequent plan payments that have fallen due, or (B) file a modified plan and a motion to confirm the modified plan. If the debtor's financial condition has materially changed, amended Schedules I and J shall be filed and served with the motion to modify the chapter 13 plan.

(4) If the debtor fails to set a hearing on the trustee's notice, or cure the default by payment, or file a proposed modified chapter 13 plan and motion, or perform the modified chapter 13 plan pending its approval, or obtain approval of the modified chapter 13 plan, all within the time constraints set out above, the case shall be dismissed without a hearing on the trustee's application.

Thus, a debtor receiving a Notice of Default has three alternatives. (1) Cure the default within 30 days of the notice of default as well as paying the additional payment that would come due during the 30-day period to cure the default. (2) Within 30 days of the notice of default, file a motion to confirm a modified plan and a modified plan in order to cure/suspend the default stated in the notice of default. (3) Contest the notice of default by setting a hearing within 28 days of the notice of default on 14 days of notice to the

trustee.

The debtor moved to modify the plan in order to cure the default. However, because the debtor failed to serve the IRS correctly, the motion to modify the plan was dismissed. While the debtor promptly reset and reserved the motion, the debtor neglected to extend the deadline under the Notice of Default and the case was dismissed before the reset motion could be considered.

The motion to vacate the dismissal was filed approximately three weeks after the dismissal. The court will grant the motion but in the future, counsel should not assume that refiling the motion and setting it for hearing after the deadline set in the Notice of Default will avert dismissal or will be cause to vacate the dismissal.

5. 16-25609-A-13 ENRIQUE BERTRAN AND CHRISTINA HELMAN
SJS-1 MOTION TO EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
8-30-16 [8]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

The debtors filed a prior chapter 7 case on March 31, 2016, Case No. 16-22060. They received a discharge on July 18.

On August 25, 2016, the debtors filed this case and they move pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) to extend the automatic stay beyond the 30th day after the filing of the second case.

Section 362(c)(3) is not applicable to this case.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30th day after the filing of the new case.

The previous case filed by the debtors was not dismissed. Hence, when their second case was filed the automatic stay came to life and will remain viable unless otherwise ordered by the court or it expires pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) or (c)(2).

6. 16-25916-A-13 MICHELLE CAMPAU
RJ-1
VS. SANTANDER CONSUMER USA

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
9-5-16 [11]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of $6,900 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $6,900 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid $6,900 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

7. 16-25623-A-13 JOHN ANDRADE
SLH-1

MOTION TO
EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
8-31-16 [8]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. A prior case was dismissed within one year of the most recent petition because the debtor failed to file a proposed plan, schedules and statements.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30th day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30th day after the filing of the petition. The motion will be adjudicated before the 30-day period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, the debtor was unrepresented in the first case and was unable to file a proposed plan, schedules and statements which resulted in the dismissal of the first case. The debtor now is represented by counsel and has filed all required documents. This is a sufficient change in circumstances rebut the presumption of bad faith.

8. 16-22928-A-13 NICOLE DOW — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN
ELG-2 — 8-2-16 [40]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection sustained.

First, the plan is not feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) because the plan has inconsistent provisions regarding monthly plan payments. It requires two payments of $1,928 and 58 monthly payments of $2,264 as well as one payment of $1,928 and 59 monthly payments of $2,264. Which is it?

Second, the plan fails to provide at section 2.07 for a dividend to be on account of allowed administrative expenses, including the debtor's attorney's fees. Unless counsel is working for nothing, this means that the plan does not provide for payment in full of priority claims as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). Also see 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a).

9. 14-25346-A-13 GERALDINE WHITNEY — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
LRR-3 — 7-28-16 [56]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection sustained.

The plan fails to provide for the treatment previously ordered by the court on the claim of Armando Garcia. The court modified the automatic stay to permit this creditor to liquidate his claim in a nonbankruptcy forum and then, if he was owed money, to satisfy it from the Uninsured Employers Benefit Trust Fund. The plan does not require this treatment and instead lumps the claim in with other Class 7 claims.

10. 12-28147-A-13 JUAN/LETICIA LUJAN — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
PGM-3 — 7-14-16 [87]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection sustained.

The plan has not been proposed in good faith as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) because the debtor seeks to reduce the monthly plan payment from $3,101 to $150. There is no evidence of a change in circumstances warranting such a change other than the modification of a home loan. With that modification the debtor will pay the home loan directly rather than the plan. After deducting the mortgage payment, as modified, from the debtor's income as reported in the last filed Schedule I, the debtor should have monthly net income of $1,079.76 to contribute to the plan yet the debtor proposes a payment of only $150. There is no justification for such a reduction.

11. 16-24670-A-13 JORGE/LAURA ORELLANA — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
MET-1 — 9-1-16 [15]
VS. SAFE CREDIT UNION

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of $16,598 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $16,598 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid $16,598 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a

secured claim.

12. 16-24074-A-13 FRANCISCO ESQUIVIAS AND ROSA GUZMAN — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. AMERICREDIT FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. — 8-8-16 [34]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied.

Based in part on the fact that the subject vehicle has been in three accidents in the past year, the debtor asserts it has a value of $14,000 which is substantially less than the retail value of $21,775 reported by commonly used market guide. However, the contract with the respondent required the debtor to insure the vehicle and the debtor has not explained why the vehicle has not been repaired with the available insurance. Until this issue is addressed and proof of insurance is produced, the motion will be denied.

13. 16-21184-A-13 LATARUS JAMES — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN
JLK-2 — 7-28-16 [29]

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection sustained.

First, in order to pay the dividends required by the plan at the rate proposed by it will take 77 months which exceeds the maximum 5-year duration permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) as well as the proposed 5-year duration of the plan.

Second, the debtor has failed to make $11,200 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Third, even though 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) prevents the proposed plan from modifying a claim secured only by the debtor's home, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) & (b)(5) permit the plan to provide for the cure of any defaults on such a claim while ongoing installment payments are maintained. The cure of defaults is not limited to the cure of pre-petition defaults. See In re Bellinger, 179 B.R. 220 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995). The proposed plan, however, does not provide for a cure of the post-petition arrears owed to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage on its Class 1 home loan. By failing to provide for a cure, the debtor is, in effect, impermissibly modifying a home loan. Also, the failure to cure the default means that the Class 1 secured claim will not be paid in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).

14. 15-28096-A-13 LA KEISHA MATLOCK — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
RL-1 — 8-30-16 [69]
FEI GUAN VS.

- ☐ Telephone Appearance
- ☐ Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the trustee, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule

9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the debtor, the creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Cause exists to permit the movant to take the appropriate action and to commence and prosecute those proceedings necessary to take possession of residential real property rented to the debtor. The debtor has defaulted in the payment of rent and the movant wishes to serve a notice to quit and, if the debtor fails to quit, file, serve and prosecute an unlawful detainer action.

Inasmuch as the plan makes no provision for a claim by the movant and because the alleged default occurred after the bankruptcy case was filed, cause exists to permit the parties to proceed in state court to determine whether there has been a default and whether cause exists to evict the debtor.

The parties shall bear their own fees and costs. The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived.

FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

15. 15-28204-A-13 REGINA PAGE — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
JHW-1 — 8-18-16 [42]
MERCEDES-BENZ FIN'L SVCS. USA, L.L.C. VS.

Final Ruling: This motion for relief from the automatic stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor and the trustee to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to permit the movant to repossess and to obtain possession of its personal property security, a Smart car, and to dispose of it in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law. The movant is secured by a vehicle. The debtor has proposed a plan that does not provide for the payment of this claim. Further, the debtor has not paid the claim under the terms of the contract with the movant. Because the debtor has not paid the movant's claim, and will not pay it in connection with the chapter 13 case, there is cause to terminate the automatic stay.

Because the movant has not established that the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of its claim, the court awards no fees and costs. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a)(3) will be waived.

16. 12-23807-A-13 DOUGLAS CREECH — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
JGD-3 — 8-10-16 [64]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the trustee, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on condition the dismissal of the case is vacated. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

17. 16-20819-A-13 MELANIE HAMPTON-BANFORD — MOTION TO CONVERT OR TO DISMISS CASE
JPJ-2 — 8-18-16 [59]

Final Ruling: This motion to dismiss the case or to convert it to one under

chapter 7 has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the the debtor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted and the case converted to one under chapter 7.

In a case filed in February, the debtor has failed to confirm a plan. No steps have been taken since July when the court denied the debtor's motion to confirm a plan. This is cause for dismissal or conversion to chapter 7, whichever is in the interests of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1).

Because the schedules and the chapter 13 trustee's investigation into the value of the debtor's home indicate there is substantial nonexempt and unencumbered equity in assets, the court concludes that conversion rather than dismissal is in the best interests of creditors.

18. 16-22722-A-13 ROBERT/STACY TURNER — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 8-8-16 [25]
PGM-1

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

19. 13-22333-A-13 KENNETH BEYER AND ANGELA DAVIS — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL 8-16-16 [45]
MCN-3
VS. CHASE BANK

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of $200,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Bank of America. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately $$246,275 as of the petition date. Therefore, Chase Bank's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining

whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of $200,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

20. 14-24138-A-13 REY ACOSTA — MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN 8-10-16 [36]
SDB-2

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the debtor, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the trustee, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

21. 16-25252-A-13 RODNEY ABBOTT — MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 8-15-16 [10]
RMW-1
BASSAM DAHDULI VS.

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on August 29. As a result, both the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and the codebtor stay of 11 U.S.C. § 1301 have expired as a matter of law. There are no bankruptcy stays to modify or terminate.

22. 15-26561-A-13 CATHERINE DEFAZIO — MOTION TO DISMISS CASE 8-31-16 [53]
MEV-3

Final Ruling: The motion will be granted and the case dismissed. Inasmuch as this case was commenced under chapter 13 and has not been previously converted to another chapter, the chapter 13 debtor may dismiss the case as a matter of right. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b). No hearing is necessary.

23. 16-21764-A-13 STANLEY BERMAN — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 8-8-16 [49]
SPB-2

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on August 25.

24. 16-24364-A-13 RITA KAKALIA
PGM-1
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
8-18-16 [20]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of $261,522 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Bank of New York Mellon. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately $312,691 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is $0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is $0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an

adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of $261,522. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

25. 16-24364-A-13 RITA KAKALIA — MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
PGM-2
VS. KINECTA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION — 8-18-16 [25]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of $2,500 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $2,500 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid $2,500 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

26. 15-20671-A-13 BRYAN SCHULTZ
EWV-99

MOTION TO MODIFY PLAN
8-22-16 [41]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice. Insufficient notice of the hearing on the motion has been given to parties in interest.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(d)(2) provides:

"If the debtor, trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim modifies the chapter 13 plan after confirmation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1329, the plan proponent shall file and serve the modified chapter 13 plan together with a motion to confirm it. Notice of the motion shall comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3015(g), which requires twenty-one (21) days' of notice of the time fixed for filing objections, as well as LBR 9014-1(f)(1). LBR 9014-1(f)(1) requires twenty-eight (28) days' notice of the hearing and notice that opposition must be filed fourteen (14) days prior to the hearing. In order to comply with both Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3015(g) and LBR 9014-1(f)(1), parties-in-interest shall be served at least thirty-five (35) days prior to the hearing."

The debtor gave only 28 days' notice of the hearing.

27. 16-24074-A-13 FRANCISCO ESQUIVIAS AND ROSA GUZMAN
VS. GOLDEN 1 CREDIT UNION

MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL
8-8-16 [29]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of $1,500 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, $1,500 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid $1,500 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

28. 11-37078-A-13 TERESA ARMENDARIZ
PGM-2

MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL
8-18-16 [60]

Final Ruling: This motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(a)(6). The

failure of the trustee, the United States Trustee, the creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on condition that the debtor pays $620 to the trustee on or before September 26.

The case was dismissed on August 9 when the debtor failed to make the final payment of $620 due under the terms of her plan. She fell behind after believing she had made the last payment. After the case was dismissed the debtor moved promptly to vacate the dismissal and tendered the remaining payment. This is sufficient grounds to vacate the dismissal provided the $620 is first paid to the trustee.

29. 15-28581-A-13 BARBARA WHITSON — MOTION TO APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY
GW-1 — 8-19-16 [23]

Final Ruling: This compensation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(a)(6). The failure of the trustee, the debtor, the United States Trustee, the creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The motion seeks approval of $6,900 in fees and $310 in costs for services related to the filing and prosecution of this case. Counsel has opted out of the compensation scheme permitted by Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1. The foregoing represents reasonable compensation for actual, necessary, and beneficial services rendered to the debtor. Any retainer may be drawn upon and the balance of the approved compensation is to be paid through the plan in a manner consistent with the plan.

30. 16-21185-A-13 AMANDA/JEREMY MALMSTROM — MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN
JLK-3 — 7-28-16 [37]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf.

Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.