

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
Eastern District of California

**Honorable Ronald H. Sargis**  
**Chief Bankruptcy Judge**  
**Sacramento, California**

September 3, 2020 at 10:00 a.m.

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1. [20-20175-E-11](#)     **HERBERT MILLER**     **MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM**  
[VVF-1](#)     **Judson Henry**     **AUTOMATIC STAY AND/OR MOTION**  
                             **FOR ADEQUATE PROTECTION**  
                             **7-31-20 [116]**
- AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE**  
**CORPORATION VS.**

**THIS MOTION WILL BE HEARD ON THE COURT'S 10:30 CALENDAR  
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER MATTERS  
IN THE MILLER CASE ON THAT CALENDAR**

**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, creditors holding the twenty largest unsecured claims, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on July 31, 2020. By the court's calculation, 34 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). The defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered.

**The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is **xxxxx**.**

American Honda Finance Corporation (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2017 Honda Accord, VIN ending in 1353 (“Vehicle”). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Lauren Johnson to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by Herbert Edward Miller (“Debtor”). In the alternative, Movant requests an order for adequate protection payments.

Movant argues Debtor has not made 2.53 post-petition payments, with a total of \$1,424.20 in post-petition payments past due. Declaration, Dckt. 118.

## **DEBTOR’S OPPOSITION**

Debtor filed an Opposition on August 20, 2020 indicating his intention to cure the default in the near future as Debtor’s counsel and Movant’s counsel have been in communication to address the means by which it requires Debtor to tender such payment. Dckt. 135.

## **DISCUSSION**

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$19,185.64 (Declaration, Dckt. 118), while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$16,064.00 as stated in Schedules A/B and D filed by Debtor.

### **11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1): Grant Relief for Cause**

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. *See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.)*, 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because “cause” is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); *In re Silverling*, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), *aff’d sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling)*, No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. *See In re J E Livestock, Inc.*, 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan)*, 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); *Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis)*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

### **11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)**

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property’s value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

### Adequate Protection Payments

Movant requests in the alternative that if the court does not terminate the stay, that the court order adequate protection payments. Debtor filed a response asserting that he is in communications with Movant to cure the present default.

At the hearing, **XXXXXXX**

### Request for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from the automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests, that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

~~The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:~~

~~Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.~~

~~The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by American Honda Finance Corporation (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing;~~

~~**IT IS ORDERED** the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2017 Honda Accord (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.~~

~~**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is waived for cause.~~

~~No other or additional relief is granted.~~

2. [20-20175-E-11](#)     **HERBERT MILLER**     **MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM**  
[AP-1](#)     **Judson Henry**     **AUTOMATIC STAY**  
7-21-20 [[98](#)]

**WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND  
SOCIETY, FSB VS.**

**THIS MOTION WILL BE HEARD ON THE COURT'S 10:30 CALENDAR  
IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER MATTERS  
IN THE MILLER CASE ON THAT CALENDAR**

**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, and creditors on July 21, 2020. By the court's calculation, 44 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). The defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered.

**The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is denied without prejudice.**

Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 11155 Shadow Ct., Auburn, California ("Property"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of William R. Jarrell to introduce evidence as a basis for Movant's contention that Herbert Edward Miller ("Debtor") does not have an ownership interest in or a right to maintain possession of the Property.

**Review of Minimum Pleading Requirements for a Motion**

The Supreme Court requires that the motion itself state with particularity the grounds upon

which the relief is requested. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9013. The Rule does not allow the motion to merely be a direction to the court to “read every document in the file and glean from that what the grounds should be for the motion.” That “state with particularity” requirement is not unique to the Bankruptcy Rules and is also found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b).

Consistent with this court’s repeated interpretation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9013, the bankruptcy court in *In re Weatherford*, applied the general pleading requirements enunciated by the United States Supreme Court to the pleading with particularity requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 9013. *See* 434 B.R. 644, 646 (N.D. Ala. 2010) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)). The *Twombly* pleading standards were restated by the Supreme Court in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal* to apply to all civil actions in considering whether a plaintiff had met the minimum basic pleading requirements in federal court. *See* 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9013 incorporates the “state with particularity” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b), which is also incorporated into adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7007. Interestingly, in adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of Bankruptcy Procedure, the Supreme Court endorsed a stricter, state-with-particularity-the-grounds-upon-which-the-relief-is-based standard for motions rather than the “short and plain statement” standard for a complaint.

Law and motion practice in bankruptcy court demonstrates why such particularity is required in motions. Many of the substantive legal proceedings are conducted in the bankruptcy court through the law and motion process. These include sales of real and personal property, valuation of a creditor’s secured claim, determination of a debtor’s exemptions, confirmation of a plan, objection to a claim (which is a contested matter similar to a motion), abandonment of property from the estate, relief from the automatic stay, motions to avoid liens, objections to plans in Chapter 13 cases (akin to a motion), use of cash collateral, and secured and unsecured borrowing.

The court in *Weatherford* considered the impact to other parties in a bankruptcy case and to the court, holding,

The Court cannot adequately prepare for the docket when a motion simply states conclusions with no supporting factual allegations. The respondents to such motions cannot adequately prepare for the hearing when there are no factual allegations supporting the relief sought. Bankruptcy is a national practice and creditors sometimes do not have the time or economic incentive to be represented at each and every docket to defend against entirely deficient pleadings. Likewise, debtors should not have to defend against facially baseless or conclusory claims.

434 B.R. at 649–50; *see also In re White*, 409 B.R. 491, 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2009) (holding that a proper motion must contain factual allegations concerning requirements of the relief sought, not conclusory allegations or mechanical recitations of the elements).

The courts of appeals agree. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an objection filed by a party to the form of a proposed order as being a motion. *St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Continental Casualty Co.*, 684 F.2d 691, 693 (10th Cir. 1982). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow a party to use a memorandum to fulfill the pleading with particularity requirement in a motion, stating:

Rule 7(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all applications to the court for orders shall be by motion, which unless made during a hearing or trial, “shall be made in writing, [and] *shall state with particularity the grounds therefor*, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.” The standard for “particularity” has been determined to mean “reasonable specification.”

*Martinez v. Trainor*, 556 F.2d 818, 819–20 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing 2-A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 7.05 (3d ed. 1975)).

Not stating with particularity the grounds in a motion can be used as a tool to abuse other parties to a proceeding, hiding from those parties grounds upon which a motion is based in densely drafted points and authorities—buried between extensive citations, quotations, legal arguments, and factual arguments. Noncompliance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9013 may be a further abusive practice in an attempt to circumvent Bankruptcy Rule 9011 by floating baseless contentions to mislead other parties and the court. By hiding possible grounds in citations, quotations, legal arguments, and factual arguments, a movant bent on mischief could contend that what the court and other parties took to be claims or factual contentions in the points and authorities were “mere academic postulations” not intended to be representations to the court concerning any actual claims and contentions in the specific motion or an assertion that evidentiary support exists for such “postulations.”

### **Grounds Stated in Motion**

Movant has not provided any grounds, merely unsupported conclusions of law. The insufficient statement made by Movant is :

- A. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), cause exists to terminate the automatic stay because: As of the petition date, Debtor had no right to continued occupancy of the premises as Movant acquired title to the premises by foreclosure sale pre-petition.

That “ground” is merely a conclusion of law by Movant. Presumably, Movant believed that the court would make those conclusions, but the “grounds” cannot merely state the anticipated conclusions.

Movant is reminded that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these [Local Bankruptcy] Rules . . . may be grounds for imposition of any and all sanctions authorized by statute or rule within the inherent power of the Court, including without limitation, **dismissal of any action**, entry of default, finding of contempt, imposition of monetary sanctions or attorneys’ fees and costs, and other lesser sanctions.” LOCAL BANKR. R. 1001-1(g) (emphasis added).

The Motion states that grounds are found in:

- A. The Notice of Motion;
- B. Memorandum of Points and Authorities;
- C. Declaration in Support of Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay;
- D. Exhibits to Declaration in Support of Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay;
- D. Any pleadings of which the court takes judicial notice; and
- E. Whatever else is presented prior to or at the hearing.

The court generally declines an opportunity to do associate attorney work and assemble motions for parties. It may be that Movant believes that the Points and Authorities is “really” the motion and should be substituted by the court for the Motion. That belief fails for multiple reasons. One is that under Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(d)(4), a motion and a memorandum of points and authorities are separate documents, even though they may be filed as one document when not exceeding six pages. *See* Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-(d)(4). The court has not waived that Local Rule for Movant.

The Motion is denied without prejudice.

### **Opposition of Debtor**

While not determinative of the outcome for this motion, the court has taken the time to review Debtor’s Opposition. Dckt. 130. The Debtor denies and disputes the perceived allegations that Movant has acquired title to the Property and seeks to have an adjudication of the perfection, validity, and determination of Movant’s rights. Such is well beyond a “simple motion for relief.” As stated by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in *Hamilton v. Hernandez*, No. CC-04-1434-MaTK, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005), relief from stay proceedings are summary proceedings which address issues arising only under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d). *Hamilton*, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 at \*8-\*9 (citing *Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson)*, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court does not determine underlying issues of ownership, contractual rights of parties, or issue declaratory relief.

If such a bona fide dispute exists, and Movant were to present a colorable claim of ownership, then such would have to be litigated in the appropriate court - whether the bankruptcy court in an adversary proceeding (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001), the district court if there was a non-bankruptcy federal law issue, or the state court (quite possibly in connection with an unlawful detainer proceeding).

The Debtor also asserts that since Movant does not even allege that the Property is not necessary for an effective reorganization, the Motion must fail. Such is not required, as the Motion does state that relief is sought for cause pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Pursuant to that section, there is no requirement for a determination that the Property is not necessary for an effective reorganization, that being require only if relief is sought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).<sup>FN. 1</sup>

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FN. 1. Since the Debtor raised the question of an effective reorganization, the court notes that Debtor commenced this bankruptcy case as a “small business debtor.” Petition, ¶ 13; Dckt. 1. This bankruptcy case was filed on January 13, 2020. No proposed plan has been filed in this case by Debtor in the past eight months. The Monthly Operating Report for July 2020 (timely filed August 14, 2020; Dckt. 124) states that in the first seven months of the case, the total cash receipts by the Debtor in Possession has been \$30,407, while the expenses have been (\$30,884) [of which \$20,715 are identified as “Personal Expenses”], with there only being cash of \$666 remaining after seven months of bankruptcy operation.  
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To the extent that Debtor seeks to have the litigation of a disputed ownership of the Property as part of a confirmed plan, the court has allowed such. However, where a debtor seeks to use the automatic stay in lieu of a preliminary injunction from a district court or state court judge, for which a bond would be required, this court has required an adequate protection payment be made - whether to the



# FINAL RULINGS

4. [16-24907-E-7](#)      MARY AIKEN      MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM  
[RAS-1](#)              Seth Hanson      AUTOMATIC STAY  
8-6-20 [86]
- DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST  
COMPANY VS.

**Final Ruling:** No appearance at the September 3, 2020 hearing is required.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor’s Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on August 6, 2020. By the court’s calculation, 28 days’ notice was provided. 28 days’ notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party’s failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties’ pleadings.

**The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.**

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, solely as Trustee for HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust Mortgage loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-14 (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to Mary Terlaje Aiken’s (“Debtor”) real property commonly known as 23104 Cottage Hill Drive, Grass Valley, California (“Property”). Movant has provided the Declaration of Vanessa Giorgiani to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

Movant argues Debtor has not made 19 post-petition payments, with a total of \$41,296.34 in post-petition payments past due. Declaration, Dckt. 88.

Trustee has no opposition to the relief requested. Trustee's August 24, 2020 Docket Entry Statement.

## DISCUSSION

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$542,838.09 (Declaration, Dckt. 88), while the value of the Property is determined to be \$410,099.00, as stated in Schedules A/B and D filed by Debtor.

### 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1): Grant Relief for Cause

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. *See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.)*, 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because "cause" is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); *In re Silverling*, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), *aff'd sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling)*, No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. *See In re J E Livestock, Inc.*, 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan)*, 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); *Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis)*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

### 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property's value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[4][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (stating that Chapter 13 debtors are rehabilitated, not reorganized). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Property for either Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See Ramco Indus. v. Preuss (In re Preuss)*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

## **Request for Attorneys' Fees**

In the Motion, Movant requests that it be allowed attorneys' fees. The Motion alleges contractual grounds for such fees, in that under the loan documents Movant is entitled to its costs and expenses in enforcing its interest to the extent not prohibited by applicable law. Specifically, Page 3 Section 7(E) of the Note states:

If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediately in full as described above, the Note Holder will have the right to be paid back by me for all of its costs and expenses in enforcing this Note, whether or not a lawsuit is brought, to the extent not prohibited by Applicable Law. Those expenses include, for example, reasonable attorneys' fees.

Exhibit 1, Dckt. 90, at p. 6.

Movant is seeking \$1,231 in attorney's fees as a result of the fees incurred in the filing of this motion. Part of those fees include a \$181 filing fee while the remaining balance can be attributed to the amount incurred by Movant's attorneys in drafting this Motion.

Usually, a claim for attorney's fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion unless the substantive law requires those fees to be proved at trial as an element of damages. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(2)(A); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7054, 9014.

Seeing as Movant presents all the information needed to determine reasonableness of fees, and the court being experienced with the type of work needed for this type of motion, the court finds the fees are reasonable.

## **Request for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement**

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from the automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, solely as Trustee for HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust Mortgage loan Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-14 ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of

counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed that is recorded against the real property commonly known as 23104 Cottage Hill Drive, Grass Valley, California, (“Property”) to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale to obtain possession of the Property.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is waived for cause.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Movant is awarded \$1,231 in attorney’s fees relating to this Motion.

No other or additional relief is granted.

**CAB WEST, LLC VS.**

**Final Ruling:** No appearance at the September 3, 2020 hearing is required.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor’s Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on July 28, 2020. By the court’s calculation, 37 days’ notice was provided. 28 days’ notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party’s failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties’ pleadings.

**The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.**

CAB WEST, LLC (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2019 Ford F150, VIN ending in 8101 (“Vehicle”). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Jacklyn Larson to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by Jeffrey Brian Larsen and Catherine Shelly Larsen (“Debtor”). Debtor is the lessee of the Vehicle.

Movant provides evidence that there are 3 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$1,341.42. Declaration, Dckt. 11.

**DISCUSSION**

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$29,099.05 (Declaration, Dckt. 11). No value is provided by either party for the Vehicle.

According to Movant, Debtor surrendered the Vehicle on June 30, 2020. *Id.*

## 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1): Grant Relief for Cause

Whether there is cause under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) to grant relief from the automatic stay is a matter within the discretion of a bankruptcy court and is decided on a case-by-case basis. *See J E Livestock, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re J E Livestock, Inc.)*, 375 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. 137, 140 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003)) (explaining that granting relief is determined on a case-by-case basis because “cause” is not further defined in the Bankruptcy Code); *In re Silverling*, 179 B.R. 909 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1995), *aff’d sub nom. Silverling v. United States (In re Silverling)*, No. CIV. S-95-470 WBS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4332 (E.D. Cal. 1996). While granting relief for cause includes a lack of adequate protection, there are other grounds. *See In re J E Livestock, Inc.*, 375 B.R. at 897 (quoting *In re Busch*, 294 B.R. at 140). The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *W. Equities, Inc. v. Harlan (In re Harlan)*, 783 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986); *Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis)*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in post-petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

## Request for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from the automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests, that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by CAB WEST, LLC (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement,

loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2019 Ford F150 (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.