

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

September 2, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 15. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON SEPTEMBER 22, 2014 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY SEPTEMBER 8, 2014, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY SEPTEMBER 15, 2014. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON ITEMS 16 THROUGH 26 IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR. INSTEAD, THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON SEPTEMBER 8, 2014, AT 2:30 P.M.

September 2, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 13-31708-A-13 TERRY/TAMARA AMENDED MOTION FOR
SJS-1 MOTSCHENBACHER ORDER CONFIRMING ABSENCE OF
AUTOMATIC STAY
8-19-14 [30]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be denied.

There is a confirmed plan in this case. The plan provides, consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b), that all property of the estate reverted in the debtor when the plan was confirmed.

As to the secured claims of Bank of America and Sacramento Credit Union, the plan provided that these claims in Class 3. They would be satisfied by the surrender of the debtor's real property in Folsom, California. The plan also specified: "Upon confirmation, all bankruptcy stays are modified to allow a Class 3 secured claim holder to exercise its rights against its collateral."

This motion seeks a "comfort order" declaring that the property has been reverted in the debtor and that all bankruptcy stays have been terminated so as to permit the Class 3 secured creditors to take their collateral.

The court does not issue any order in the absence of bona fide dispute. Here there is no dispute because the plan already provides the relief requested.

2. 14-26819-A-13 WILLIAM WAY OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
8-14-14 [19]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

4. 14-26541-A-13 RAMONA WILLIAMS OBJECTION TO
MDE-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON VS. 7-17-14 [15]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be sustained to the extent and for the reasons stated in the ruling on the trustee's objection (JPJ-1).

5. 14-27048-A-13 LINDA VANPELT OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
8-14-14 [21]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained in part and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

First, if requested by the U.S. Trustee or the chapter 13 trustee, a debtor must produce evidence of a social security number or a written statement that such documentation does not exist. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4002(b)(1)(B). In this case, the debtor has breached the foregoing duty by failing to provide evidence of the debtor's social security number. This is cause for dismissal.

Second, Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(b)(6) provides: "Documents Required by Trustee. The debtor shall provide to the trustee, not later than the fourteen (14) days after the filing of the petition, Form EDC 3-088, *Domestic Support Obligation Checklist*, or other written notice of the name and address of each person to whom the debtor owes a domestic support obligation together with the name and address of the relevant state child support enforcement agency (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 464 & 466), Form EDC 3-086, *Class 1 Checklist*, for each Class 1 claim, and Form EDC 3-087, *Authorization to Release Information to Trustee Regarding Secured Claims Being Paid By The Trustee*." Because the plan includes a class 1 claim, the debtor was required to provide the trustee with a Class 1 checklist. The debtor failed to do so.

Third, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-1(c) the debtor has failed to provide the trustee with employer payment advices for the 60-day period preceding the filing of the petition. The withholding of this financial information from the trustee is a breach of the

confirmation. In addition to the requirement of section 521(e)(2) that the petition be dismissed, an uncodified provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 found at section 1228(a) of BAPCPA provides that in chapter 11 and 13 cases the court shall not confirm a plan of an individual debtor unless requested tax documents have been turned over. This has not been done.

Third, the debtor has failed to give the trustee additional financial records relating to the debtor's income. This is a breach of the duties imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4). To attempt to confirm a plan while withholding relevant financial information from the trustee is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

7. 14-27157-A-13 JOHN LIEBELT MOTION TO
RPH-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. INDYMAC BANK F.S.B. 8-15-14 [19]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$350,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Ocwen Loan Servicing. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$382,212 as of the petition date. Therefore, Indymac Bank F.S.B.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$350,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

8. 14-26173-A-13 HILLIARY WALTON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
8-15-14 [22]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will be dismissed.

The debtor was given permission to pay the filing fee in installments pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b). The installment in the amount of \$77 due on August 11 was not paid. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (2).

9. 14-27973-A-13 FAUSTINO CUIEL MOTION FOR
SNM-1 RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY
OXBOW INVESTMENTS, INC. VS. 8-11-14 [17]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the creditor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f) (2). Consequently, the other creditors, the debtor, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

Prior to the filing of the petition, the movant successfully prosecuted an unlawful detainer action in state court and was awarded possession of the subject property.

Given the filing of the unlawful detainer judgment and the notice to quit that necessarily preceded it, the debtor's right to possession has terminated and there is cause to terminate the automatic stay. In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Smith, 105 B.R. 50, 53 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989). The debtor no longer has an interest in the subject property which can be considered either property of the estate or an interest deserving of protection by section 362(a). This is cause to terminate the automatic stay.

The 14-day stay of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(a) (3) is ordered waived.

10. 13-26081-A-13 ELAINE WEBB MOTION TO
PGM-2 INSTRUCT TRUSTEE TO DISBURSE FUNDS
7-30-14 [32]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied.

stated in the plan, will be paid. See section 2.04 of the proposed plan.

The objection to the proposed interest rate of 4.25% also is overruled.

The Supreme Court decided in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004), that the appropriate interest rate is determined by the "formula approach." This approach requires the court to take the national prime rate in order to reflect the financial market's estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate it for the loan's opportunity costs, inflation, and a slight risk of default. The bankruptcy court is required to adjust this rate for a greater risk of default posed by a bankruptcy debtor. This upward adjustment depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the security, and the plan's feasibility and duration. Cf. Farm Credit Bank v. Fowler (In re Fowler), 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Camino Real Landscape Main. Contrs., Inc., 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987).

To set the appropriate rate, the court is required to conduct an "objective inquiry" into the appropriate rate. However, the debtor's bankruptcy statements and schedules may be culled for the evidence to support an interest rate.

The prime rate currently is 3.25% as reported by BankRate.com. As surveyed by the Supreme Court in Till, courts using the formula approach typically have adjusted the interest rate 1% to 3%. The debtor's proposed rate of 4.25% gives a 1% upward adjustment. This increase, combined with the fact that the movant is secured rather than unsecured, is secured by real estate not personal property, and given the financial feasibility of the plan (as evidenced by Schedules I and J), satisfies section 1325(a)(B)(ii). Absent some showing by the objecting creditor that 4.25% is not adequate, the court concludes that it is adequate for purposes of section 1325(a)(5)(ii).

"Moreover, starting from a concededly low estimate and adjusting upward places the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors, who are likely to have readier access to any information absent from the debtor's filing. . . ." The creditor here has not satisfied this burden.

14. 14-25389-A-13 FRANK NAVARRETTE MOTION TO
PGM-1 CONFIRM PLAN
7-17-14 [20]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objections will be sustained in part.

First, the plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) because nonpriority, unsecured creditors would receive \$18,821.39 in a chapter 7 liquidation as of the effective date of the plan. This plan will pay nothing to unsecured creditors.

Second, the plan misclassifies a priority support claim as a secured claim. It belongs in Class 5 not Class 4 as a claim entitled to priority by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). Further, this priority claim exceeds \$85,000. At the dividend rate proposed, \$600 a month, the claim would not be paid in full during the five year duration of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).

However, the objection by the priority claimant that the plan cannot be confirmed because it does not provide for interest on her priority claim will be overruled. Nothing in section 1322(a)(2) requires interest be paid on priority claims paid over time through a chapter 13 plan be paid with interest. This is contrasted to secured claims which must be paid in full "as of the effective date" of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a)(2) & 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

If the objecting creditor is entitled to interest it is because her claim is made nondischargeable by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), not because it is entitled to priority treatment by 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).

Post-petition interest on a nondischargeable also is nondischargeable. See Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Pardee (In re Pardee), 218 B.R. 916, 925 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.1998), *affirmed*, 193 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999). This is consistent with Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964). In Bruning, the Supreme Court determined that post-petition interest on a nondischargeable tax debt was itself nondischargeable under the former Bankruptcy Act. See also Ward v. Board of Equalization of Cal. (In re Artisan Woodworkers), 204 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2000).

Unfortunately for the claimant, under the Bankruptcy Code, unsecured creditors are not entitled to include unmatured, or post-petition, interest as part of their claims in the bankruptcy proceeding and cannot collect such interest from the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Pardee and the Supreme Court in Bruning held that even though post-petition interest on a nondischargeable claim could not be paid by the bankruptcy estate, it survived bankruptcy and could be recovered personally from the debtor after the bankruptcy proceeding was complete. See Bruning, 376 U.S. at 361; Pardee, 218 B.R. at 921-22. In the words of the Supreme Court, post-petition interest on a nondischargeable debt must also be nondischargeable because it is "an integral part of a continuing debt." Bruning, 376 U.S. at 360.

The clear weight of authority supports the conclusion that Bruning remains good law under the Bankruptcy Code. See e.g., Leeper v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 49 F.3d 98, 105 (3rd Cir. 1995).

Hence, the interest accruing on the objecting creditor's claim may be nondischargeable, but the plan cannot provide for it. It will be collected from the debtor at the conclusion of the case.

Third, the plan fails to cure an arrearage on a home mortgage. Consequently, the plan does not satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) which requires secured claims be paid in full.

15. 14-25389-A-13 FRANK NAVARRETTE COUNTER MOTION TO
PGM-1 DISMISS CASE
8-13-14 [31]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to

confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

16. 14-27019-A-13 MICHAEL PETERSON OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
8-14-14 [13]

Final Ruling: At the request of the parties, the hearing is continued to September 22, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

17. 14-24623-A-13 ROBERT/TANYA JOHNSON MOTION TO
MRL-1 DISMISS CASE
8-4-14 [21]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

Because this case has not been converted from another chapter, and because no party in interest has asserted that there was fraud or bad faith in connection with the filing, prosecution, or dismissal of the case, the debtor has the right to dismiss the case. No hearing was necessary. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b).

18. 14-25734-A-13 WILLIAM AKIYAMA OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
7-15-14 [24]

Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed because it is moot. The case was dismissed on August 15.

19. 14-25734-A-13 WILLIAM AKIYAMA OBJECTION TO
JPJ-2 EXEMPTIONS
7-15-14 [27]

Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed because it is moot. The case was dismissed on August 15.

20. 10-45636-A-13 REYNALDO/RHODORA RICARDO MOTION TO
RKW-3 MODIFY PLAN
7-24-14 [48]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

21. 14-23355-A-13 FRANK LILLY
MAC-4

MOTION TO
CONFIRM PLAN
7-21-14 [52]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

22. 14-25257-A-13 DARRELL/BARBARA NEAL
SJS-3
VS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

OBJECTION TO
CLAIM
7-18-14 [32]

Final Ruling: This objection to the proof of claim of the Internal Revenue Service has been set for hearing on at least 44 days' notice to the claimant as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(c)(1)(ii). The failure of the claimant to file written opposition at least 14 calendar days prior to the hearing is considered as consent to the sustaining of the objection. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the claimant's default is entered and the objection will be resolved without oral argument.

The IRS filed a timely proof of claim. It demands payment of a secured claim of \$1,504.52, an unsecured priority claim of \$16,781.15, and an unsecured nonpriority claim of \$5,815.94. This objection concerns only a portion of the priority claim, the \$6,230.71 demanded for income taxes due for tax year 2013. According to the proof of claim, the debtor failed to file a return for 2013 and so the amount demanded is an estimate.

The objection asserts that this portion of the claim should be reduced to \$1,195 plus pre-petition interest. This is the amount due according to the debtor's tardy 2013 income tax return. Reduced to this sum, the total priority claim is \$11,745.44 plus pre-petition interest on \$1,195.

Given that income taxes are self-assessed and given that the IRS has raised no issue concerning the late filed return, the objection will be sustained.

23. 14-27158-A-13 VENIAMIN/LYUDMILA
OAG-1 SHISHKOVSKIY
VS. CHASE HOME FINANCE, L.L.C.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
7-29-14 [20]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered

as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$230,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$259,538.67 as of the petition date. Therefore, Chase Home Finance, LLC's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobby, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court

will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$230,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

24. 14-26172-A-13 MANUAL/DONNA VALDIVIA OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
7-29-14 [21]

Final Ruling: The objecting party has voluntarily dismissed the objection and the related dismissal motion.

25. 14-24982-A-13 THOMAS/DELYSE GANNAWAY MOTION TO
MRL-2 AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN
VS. GREATER CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL SERVICES 7-29-14 [24]

Final Ruling: This motion to avoid a judicial lien has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). The subject real property has a value of \$550,000 as of the date of the petition. The unavoidable liens total \$600,900. The debtor has an available exemption of \$1. The respondent holds a judicial lien created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment in the chain of title of the subject real property. After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is no equity to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of this judicial lien impairs the debtor's exemption of the real property and its fixing is avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$375,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by America's Servicing Company. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$613,319 as of the petition date. Therefore, BSI Mortgage, aka BSI Financial Services, Inc. & Servis One, Inc.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary

proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$375,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).