

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

JAMKE (“Movant”) seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 2307 Gilbert Road, Ceres, California (the “Property”). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Ken Elving to introduce evidence as a basis for Movant’s contention that Herbert Solano (“Debtor”) do not have an ownership interest in or a right to maintain possession of the Property. Movant presents evidence that it is the owner of the Property. Movant asserts it purchased the Property at a pre-petition Trustee’s Sale on January 4, 2016. Based on the evidence presented, Debtor would be at best tenant at sufferance.

Movant has provided a properly authenticated copy of the recorded Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale to substantiate its claim of ownership. Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

Movant has presented a colorable claim for title to and possession of this real property. As stated by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in *Hamilton v. Hernandez*, No. CC-04-1434-MaTK, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Aug. 1, 2005), relief from stay proceedings are summary proceedings which address issues arising only under 11 U.S.C. Section 362(d). *Hamilton*, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3427 at *8-*9 (citing *Johnson v. Righetti (In re Johnson)*, 756 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court does not determine underlying issues of ownership, contractual rights of parties, or issue declaratory relief as part of a motion for relief from the automatic stay Contested Matter (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow JAMKE, and its agents, representatives and successors, to exercise its rights to obtain possession and control of the real property commonly known as 2307 Gilbert Road, Ceres, California, including unlawful detainer or other appropriate judicial proceedings and remedies to obtain possession thereof.

Implicit in the Motion is the request for relief for

“an Order that is binding and effective in any bankruptcy case commenced by or against any debtor who claims any interest in the Property for a period of 180 days from the hearing of this Motion without further notice. Movant seeks an order that is binding in any other bankruptcy case purporting to affect the Property filed not later than 2 years after the date of entry of such order, except that a debtor in a subsequent case may move for relief from the order based upon a changed circumstance or for good cause shown, after notice and hearing.”

The first part of the request appears to be some sort of injunction in which the Movant fails to cite any authority. The latter part appears to be a request pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4).

At face value, the Motion itself does not clearly state with particularity with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9013. FN.1.

FN.1. Consistent with this court’s repeated interpretation of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9013, the bankruptcy court in *In re Weatherford*, 434 B.R. 644 (N.D. Ala. 2010), applied the general pleading requirements enunciated by the *United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to the pleading with particularity requirement of Bankruptcy Rule 9013. The *Twombly* pleading standards were restated by the Supreme Court in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), to apply to all civil actions in considering whether a plaintiff had met the minimum basic pleading requirements in federal court.

In discussing the minimum pleading requirement for a complaint (which only requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)(2), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” is required. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678-679. Further, a pleading which offers mere “labels and conclusions” of a “formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. *Id.* A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, if accepted as true, “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Id.* It need not be probable that the plaintiff (or movant) will prevail, but there are sufficient grounds that a plausible claim has been pled.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9013 incorporates the state-with-particularity requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b), which is also incorporated into adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7007. Interestingly, in adopting the Federal Rules and Civil Procedure and Bankruptcy Procedure, the Supreme Court stated a stricter, state-with-particularity-the-grounds-upon-which-the-relief-is-based standard for motions rather than the “short and plain statement” standard for a complaint.

Law-and-motion practice in bankruptcy court demonstrates why such particularity is required in motions. Many of the substantive legal proceedings are conducted in the bankruptcy court through the law-and-motion process. These include, sales of real and personal property, valuation of a creditor’s secured claim, determination of a debtor’s exemptions, confirmation of a plan, objection to a claim (which is a contested matter similar to a motion), abandonment of property from the estate, relief from stay (such as in this case to allow a creditor to remove a significant asset from the bankruptcy estate), motions to avoid liens, objections to plans in Chapter 13 cases (akin to a motion), use of cash collateral, and secured and unsecured borrowing.

Not pleading with particularity the grounds in the motion can be used as a tool to abuse the other parties to the proceeding, hiding from those parties the grounds upon which the motion is based in densely drafted points and authorities – buried between extensive citations, quotations, legal arguments and factual arguments. Noncompliance with Bankruptcy Rule 9013 may be a further abusive practice in an attempt to circumvent the provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 9011 to try and float baseless contentions in an effort to mislead the other parties and the court. By hiding the possible grounds in the citations, quotations, legal arguments, and factual arguments, a movant bent on mischief could contend that what the court and other parties took to be claims or factual contentions in the points and authorities were “mere academic postulations” not intended to be representations to the court concerning the actual claims and contentions in the specific motion or an assertion that evidentiary support exists for such “postulations.”

However, where the Motion may come up short, read with the Points and Authorities (though a separate pleading and not actually the Motion) there is clarification and specification of certain serious

events and conduct of debtors in a series of bankruptcy cases concerning the Property at issue. Specifically, the Points and Authorities provides the following:

- I. This is the fourth bankruptcy petition filed by a debtor claiming interest in the Property. Prior persons and cases concerning this Property are:
 - A. Liliana Hernandez
 1. Filed on January 8, 2016
 2. Case No. 16-90012
 3. Dismissed for failure to file documents
 - B. Maricela Rios
 1. Filed on May 3, 2016
 2. Case No. 16-90390
 3. Dismissed for failure to file documents
 - C. Jesus Miranda
 1. Filed on June 14, 2016
 2. Case No. 16-90521
 3. Dismissed for failure to file documents

It is in these details that the proper grounds are stated for relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). Given the egregious and repeated filings connected with the Property and the indication of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud Movant from exercising its rights.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) allows the court to grant relief from stay where the court finds that the petition was filed as part of a scheme to delay, hinder or defraud creditors that involved either (I) transfer of all or part ownership or interest in the property without consent of secured creditors or court approval or (ii) multiple bankruptcy cases affecting the property. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds. 16th ed.).

The court finds that proper grounds exist for issuing an order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(4). Movant has provided sufficient evidence concerning a series of bankruptcy cases being filed with respect to the subject property. The unauthorized transfers of interests in the subject property to beneficiaries who then filed several bankruptcies were a deliberate attempt as a stay to any foreclosure. The court finds that the filing of the present petition works as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud Movant with respect to the Property by both the transfer of an interest in the property and the filing of multiple bankruptcy cases.

The court shall issue a minute order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow JAMKE, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the property. The court also grants relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § (d)(4).

The moving party has alleged adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3).

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by the creditor having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow JAMKE, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 2307 Gilbert Road, Ceres, California, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that relief is granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) with this order granting relief from the stay, if recorded in compliance with applicable State laws governing notices of interests or liens in real property, shall be binding in any other case under this title purporting to affect such real property filed not later than 2 years after the date of the entry of such order by the court, except as ordered by the court in any subsequent case filed during that period.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.

TD AUTO FINANCE, LLC VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the August 4, 2016 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on June 13, 2016. By the court's calculation, 52 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

James Alvin Freeman and Uen Freeman ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on May 20, 2016. TD Auto Finance LLC ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2009 Mercedes Bens CLS500, VIN ending in 0466 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Tiffanie Daniels to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Declaration also provides evidence that there are 8 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$5,403.68.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$32,506.39, as stated in the Daniels

RULING

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the

automatic stay since the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow TD Auto Finance LLC, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has not stated adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted. (This additional relief merely being stated in the prayer.)

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by TD Auto Finance LLC (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2009 Mercedes Bens CLS500 (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived.

No other or additional relief is granted.

3. [16-90368-E-7](#) **JOSE GARCIA**
JCW-1

**MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
6-23-16 [13]**

U.S. BANK, N.A. VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the August 4, 2016 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor (*pro se*), Chapter 7 Trustee, and Melvin Harrell on June 23, 2016. By the court's calculation, 42 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee, successor in interest to Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee, successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National Association, as Trustee for Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-6("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 31449 Ocean View Drive, Running Springs Area, California (the "Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Crystal M. Massey to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

The Motion asserts that the Debtor has filed multiple bankruptcies as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors and has transferred partial interest in the Property without permission as a means to further delay the Movant from exercising its rights.

11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) allows the court to grant relief from stay where the court finds that the petition was filed as part of a scheme to delay, hinder or defraud creditors that involved either (I) transfer of all or part ownership or interest in the property without consent of secured creditors or court approval or (ii) multiple bankruptcy cases affecting the property. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds. 16th ed.).

Certain patterns and conduct that have been characterized as bad faith include the presence of recent transfers of assets, inability of filing debtors to reorganize, and unnecessary delays due to serial filings. *Id.* The Court takes notice of a pattern regarding the Property that involves several recent transfers of assets and serial filings.

On January 22, 2004, Melvin Harrell, entered into an agreement with Movant for \$147,250.00, secured by a Note on the Property.

On July 18, 2011, Melvin Harrell transferred all interest to Ana Patricia Rivera as Co-Trustee of the Ocean View Drive Trust, as to an undivided 25% interest and to Melvin Harrell a Married Man as to an undivided 75% interest as tenants in common without knowledge or consent of the Movant.

On August 19, 2011, Melvin Harrell transferred an alleged interest in the Property to Russell Eugene Reshaw, an unmarried man (100%) without the knowledge or consent of Movant.

On May 29, 2014, Melvin Harrell transferred a fractionated interest to Manuel Lara (1/16%) without the knowledge or consent of the Movant.

On March 5, 2015, Melvin Harrell transferred a fractionated interest to Elizabeth Darline Givens (1/16%) without knowledge or consent of Movant.

On November 9, 2015, Melvin Harrell transferred a fractionated interest to Tony Martinez Jr. (1/16%) without knowledge or consent of Movant.

On March 3, 2016, Melvin Harrell transferred a fractionated interest to Eduardo Tovar (1/16%) without knowledge or consent of Movant.

On May 11, 2015, Melvin Harrell transferred a fractionated interest to Jose Aurleio Garcia (1/16%) without knowledge or consent of Movant.

On April 18, 2016, Jose Aurelio Garcia (“Debtor”) filed the instant bankruptcy case.

Following these fractionalized transfers, each of the transferors have filed at least one bankruptcy case in the past 12 years since the execution of the Note and Deed of Trust. All of these cases have been dismissed.

The court finds that proper grounds exist for issuing an order pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4). Movant has provided sufficient evidence concerning a series of bankruptcy cases being filed with respect to the subject property. The unauthorized transfers of interests in the subject property to beneficiaries who then filed several bankruptcies were a deliberate attempt as a stay to any foreclosure. The court finds that the filing of the present petition works as part of a scheme to delay, hinder, or defraud Movant with respect to the Property by both the transfer of an interest in the property and the filing of multiple bankruptcy cases.

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights,

and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property. The court also grants relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(4).

The moving party has alleged adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3) and this part of the requested relief is granted.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by U.S. Bank National Association (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are immediately vacated to allow U.S. Bank National Association, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed which is recorded against the property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 31449 Ocean View Drive, Running Springs Area, California.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that relief is granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) with this order granting relief from the stay, if recorded in compliance with applicable State laws governing notices of interests or liens in real property, shall be binding in any other case under this title purporting to affect such real property filed not later than 2 years after the date of the entry of such order by the court, except as ordered by the court in any subsequent case filed during that period.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.

4. [16-90083-E-7](#) VALLEY DISTRIBUTORS,
CSA-1 INC.

MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
6-28-16 [[158](#)]

K. HOVNANIAN COMMUNITIES,
INC. VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the August 4, 2016 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and parties requesting special notice on June 24, 2016. By the court's calculation, 41 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

K. Hovnanian Communities, Inc. f/k/a K. Hovnanian Forecast Homes, Inc. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay for the sole purpose of permitting the Movant to prosecute its claims against the Debtor in state court action in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, State of California, Badal, et al v. K. Hovnanian Forecast Homes, Inc, et al.

Movant seeks relief from the automatic stay to may proceed only against the available insurance assets of Valley Distributors, Inc. ("Debtor") in the claim related to construction industry standards and involves tort and contract claims.. Recovery will be limited to available insurance coverage, if any. The moving party has provided the Declaration of Corinna Arbiter to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases its claim.

A party may seek relief from stay when the party needs to obtain a judgment against the debtor in name only in order to recover from the debtor's insurer. *IBM v. Fernstrom Storage & Van Co. (In re Fernstrom Storage & Van Co.)*, 938 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1991). When the court is reasonably confident that the policy proceeds will be sufficient to satisfy the creditor's claims paid under the policy, the court should grant relief from the stay to permit an action. Because the policy proceeds will be available only to the creditors with claims covered by the policy, there is no depletion of assets that would otherwise be available

to general, unsecured claims, and there is no reason to delay the creditor seeking to recover under the policy. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07[3][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds. 16th ed.)

Given that the movant would not seek to enforce any judgements against the debtor and will proceed against the debtor only to the extent its claims can be satisfied from the debtor's insurance proceeds, the court concludes that cause exists for the granting of relief from the automatic stay.

The court shall issue a minute order terminating and vacating the automatic stay, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), to allow the movant to prosecute the claims against the debtor, but not enforce any judgments against the debtor or the estate other than against available insurance coverage, if any.

Movant has pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by the K. Hovnanian Communities, Inc. f/k/a K. Hovnanian Forecast Homes, Inc. having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow K. Hovnanian Communities, Inc. f/k/a K. Hovnanian Forecast Homes, Inc., its agents, representatives, and successors to allow the movant to prosecute the claims against the debtor, but not enforce any judgments against the debtor or the estate other than against available insurance coverage, if any.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is waived for cause shown by Movant.

No other or additional relief is granted.

5. [16-90495-E-7](#) **CHRISTOPHER HILL**
APN-1

**MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
AUTOMATIC STAY
6-16-16 [11]**

CAB WEST, LLC VS.

Final Ruling: No appearance at the August 4, 2016 hearing is required.

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion - No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on June 16, 2016. By the court's calculation, 49 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties are entered. Upon review of the record there are no disputed material factual issues and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay is granted.

Christopher Joseph Hill ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on June 7, 2016. CAB West, LLC ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2015 Ford Fusion, VIN ending in 6020 (the "Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Gabrielle Bowen to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

The Declaration provides evidence that there are 4 pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$1,319.96.

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$9,643.95, as stated in the Bowen Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$19,500.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor.

RULING

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent

in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay since the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985).

Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Vehicle is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow CAB West, LLC, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the 14-day stay of enforcement required under Rule 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by CAB West, LLC (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2015 Ford Fusion (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the fourteen (14) day stay of enforcement provided in Rule 4001(a)(3), Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, is not waived.

No other or additional relief is granted.