

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus  
Bankruptcy Judge  
Sacramento, California

June 9, 2015 at 1:30 p.m.

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THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 18. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON JULY 6, 2015 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY JUNE 22, 2015, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY JUNE 29, 2015. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON ITEMS 19 THROUGH 34 IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR. INSTEAD, THESE ITEMS HAVE BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON JUNE 15, 2015, AT 2:30 P.M.

June 9, 2015 at 1:30 p.m.

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**Matters to be Called for Argument**

1. 14-31800-A-13 DONNA PALMER MOTION TO  
NBC-3 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-29-15 [42]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objections will be sustained in part.

To the extent Wells Fargo Bank complains that the plan impermissibly strips down its secured claim in contravention of the "hanging paragraph" which follows 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9), the objection will be overruled. The proposed plan specifies the claim will not be reduced based on the value of the vehicle securing the claims. And, while the plan may understate the amount of the claim, and fail to acknowledge that the creditor has a purchase money security interest, the proof of claim, not the plan, determines the amount and characteristics of the claim. See Proposed plan § 2.04.

The remaining objections will be sustained.

First, the plan fails to account for all payments made by the debtor under the terms of the prior plan. These total \$1,563.82, not \$1,232.69 as stated in the plan.

Second, a debtor wishing to retain a creditor's collateral must propose a plan that provides for the secured creditor's retention of its lien and the payment of the present value of its secured claim. That payment must be in an equal monthly installment that is sufficient to adequately protect the creditor's interest in its collateral over the duration of the plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii). Here, when interest on the claim is included at 6.25% (see below, the proposed installment of \$181.02 will not be sufficient to retire the claim over 60 months.

Third, the plan provides no interest on the claim of Wells Fargo. That claim is secured by a vehicle. The failure to include interest means that the plan does not comply with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Further, given that the vehicle is worth no more than the secured claim, the interest rate must be 6.25%, a 3% adjustment over the current prime rate.

The Supreme Court decided in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004), that the appropriate interest rate is determined by the "formula approach." This approach requires the court to take the national prime rate in order to reflect the financial market's estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate it for the loan's opportunity costs, inflation, and a slight risk of default. The bankruptcy court is required to adjust this rate for a greater risk of default posed by a bankruptcy debtor. This upward adjustment depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the security, and the plan's feasibility and duration. Cf. Farm Credit Bank v. Fowler (In re Fowler), 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1990); In re Camino Real Landscape Main. Contrs., Inc., 818 F.2d 1503 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987).

To set the appropriate rate, the court is required to conduct an "objective inquiry" into the appropriate rate. However, the debtor's bankruptcy

statements and schedules may be culled for the evidence to support an interest rate.

The prime rate as reported by the Wall Street Journal is currently 3.25%. As surveyed by the Supreme Court in Till, courts using the formula approach typically have adjusted the interest rate 1% to 3%. An adjustment at the higher end of the spectrum is warranted given the lack of equity in the vehicle and its age.

2. 12-25202-A-13 RICHARD/JEANETTE ABBOTT MOTION TO  
JDP-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. BANCO POPULAR NORTH AMERICA 5-15-15 [44]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$257,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Seterus. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$352,022.70 as of the petition date. Therefore, Banco Popular North America's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate

valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$257,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

3. 11-36003-A-13 ANDREW/JULIE SCHWEITZER MOTION TO  
EGS-1 APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION  
4-24-15 [82]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. From the additional evidence it is clear the modification is to the financial advantage of the debtor and will not jeopardize the performance of the plan. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. A prior case chapter 13 case was dismissed within one year of this chapter 13 case.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30<sup>th</sup> day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30<sup>th</sup> day after the filing of the petition. The motion will be adjudicated before the 30-day period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, it appears that the debtor was unable to maintain her plan payments in the first case. That was a joint case filed with her now estranged spouse. He failed to pay bills including the chapter 13 plan payment and then failed to disclose these facts to the debtor. The spouses are now separated and a divorce is pending. The debtor's employment has remained stable albeit with an increase in pay and reduction in monthly expenses. This is a sufficient change in circumstances rebut the presumption of bad faith.

5. 13-25125-A-13 PATRICIA STANTON MOTION TO  
JPJ-1 MODIFY PLAN  
5-4-15 [23]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be conditionally granted. Provided the future monthly plan payments are reduced to \$225, the motion will be granted. The order shall also require the debtor to provide to the trustee all payments advices from her employer at the end of each calendar quarter beginning June 30.

6. 12-35128-A-13 ERWIN/MARY ANN SANTOS MOTION TO  
PGM-1 DISALLOW ATTORNEY FEES  
5-12-15 [117]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be granted in part.

The debtor's original counsel opted to be compensated pursuant to the court's voluntary chapter 13 fee compensation scheme that is now part of Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1. Counsel's fees therefore were limited to \$4,000 of which counsel received \$1,472.45 directly from the debtor before the case was filed. The remaining \$2,527.55 was to be paid through the chapter 13 plan. To date, all but \$280.83 of the \$2,527.55 has been disbursed to counsel.

This motion seeks two things: to replace the debtor's counsel with Peter Macaluso and to redirect the remaining \$280.83 to him.

As to the first request, the debtor does not need the permission of the court to discharge their former attorney or to hire Mr. Macaluso.

As to the second request, the court determines that the previously approved compensation of original counsel is improvident in light of a subsequent development - the law firm representing the debtor disbanded and it is no longer representing the debtor. Because the flat fee previously awarded was for the debtor's representation throughout this case, that fee has not been earned. To the extent not already paid, it is now reconsidered and disallowed.

However, it is not to be paid to Mr. Macaluso. To the extent he wishes to be paid by the estate, he shall file a fee application. When approved it may be paid by the estate through the plan.

7. 15-21236-A-13 ALAN/JENNY ALFORD MOTION TO  
WW-2 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-22-15 [29]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan's feasibility depends on the debtor successfully prosecuting a motion

to value the collateral of Washington Mutual in order to strip down or strip off its secured claim from its collateral. While motion was filed, served, and granted the debtor failed to lodge a proposed order granting the motion as instructed by the court. Absent a successful motion (i.e., one in which an order has been entered that grants the motion) the debtor cannot establish that the plan will pay secured claims in full as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) or that the plan is feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(j) provides: "If a proposed plan will reduce or eliminate a secured claim based on the value of its collateral or the avoidability of a lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), the debtor must file, serve, and set for hearing a valuation motion and/or a lien avoidance motion. The hearing must be concluded before or in conjunction with the confirmation of the plan. If a motion is not filed, or it is unsuccessful, the Court may deny confirmation of the plan."

8. 15-22136-A-13 PETER WALSH MOTION TO  
CONFIRM PLAN  
4-15-15 [27]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

First, the debtor failed to appear at the meeting of creditors. Appearance is mandatory. See 11 U.S.C. § 343. To attempt to confirm a plan while failing to appear and be questioned by the trustee and any creditors who appear, the debtor is also failing to cooperate with the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3). Under these circumstances, attempting to confirm a plan is the epitome of bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). The failure to appear also is cause for the dismissal of the case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(6).

Second, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-1(c) the debtor has failed to provide the trustee with employer payment advices for the 60-day period preceding the filing of the petition. The withholding of this financial information from the trustee is a breach of the duties imposed upon the debtor by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4) and the attempt to confirm a plan while withholding this relevant financial information is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

Third, 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(B) & (C) requires the court to dismiss a petition if an individual chapter 7 or 13 debtor fails to provide to the case trustee a copy of the debtor's federal income tax return for the most recent tax year ending before the filing of the petition. This return must be produced seven days prior to the date first set for the meeting of creditors. The failure to provide the return to the trustee justifies dismissal and denial of confirmation. In addition to the requirement of section 521(e)(2) that the petition be dismissed, an uncodified provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 found at section 1228(a) of BAPCPA provides that in chapter 11 and 13 cases the court shall not confirm a plan of an individual debtor unless requested tax documents have been turned over. This has not been done.

Fourth, the plan contains two different page ones, each with differing plan payment requirements.

Fifth, if requested by the U.S. Trustee or the chapter 13 trustee, a debtor must produce evidence of a social security number or a written statement that such documentation does not exist. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4002(b)(1)(B). In this case, the debtor has breached the foregoing duty by failing to provide evidence of the debtor's social security number. This is cause for dismissal.

Sixth, the debtor has failed to fully and accurately provide all information required by the petition, schedules, and statements. Specifically, the debtor did not use the current forms for Schedules I and J and Form 22. Further, Schedules A and D omit reference to encumbered real property in which the debtor has an interest. These nondisclosures are a breach of the duty imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) to truthfully list all required financial information in the bankruptcy documents. To attempt to confirm a plan while withholding relevant financial information from the trustee is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

Seventh, the plan fails to provide a dividend for a secured claim classified in Class 2A. The plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).

9. 15-22136-A-13 PETER WALSH COUNTER MOTION TO  
DISMISS CASE  
4-15-15 [27]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be granted and the case will be dismissed for the same reasons the court has denied confirmation of the proposed plan. That ruling is incorporated by reference.

10. 10-46437-A-13 LILLIE BRACY MOTION TO  
CA-2 MODIFY PLAN  
4-26-15 [57]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The plan makes no provision for payments by the debtor to the trustee to fund the plan. Therefore, it neither complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1), which requires the debtor to submit sufficient income to fund the plan, nor is the plan feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) because the plan requires dividends be paid to creditor but makes no provision for payments to fund those dividends.

11. 15-23837-A-13 MIGUEL ROCHA MOTION FOR  
SNM-1 RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY  
WICKMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. 5-22-15 [11]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be dismissed because it is moot. The case was dismissed on May 29. As a result, the automatic stay has expired as a matter of law. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1) & (c)(2).

And, while the movant also asks for permission to take possession of the subject property for the next 180 days should the debtor file another petition, this relief also is unnecessary. The debtor filed Case No. 15-22992 on April 14, 2015. It was dismissed on May 1, 2015 due to the debtor's failure to file schedules. The debtor then filed this case on May 11 which also was dismissed on May 29 because the debtor failed to file schedules. Hence, if the debtor files a third case for a one year period after May 1, 2015 there will be no automatic stay by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4).

12. 10-38544-A-13 ROBERT/PAULA GREEN  
GG-4

MOTION TO  
APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTORS'  
ATTORNEY  
4-22-15 [126]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

Counsel opted into the voluntary chapter 13 fee guidelines which at the time authorized a \$3,500 flat fee for consumer cases like this one. Those guidelines provided:

"If . . . the initial [\$3,500] fee is not sufficient to fully compensate counsel for the legal services rendered in the case, the attorney may apply for additional fees. The court will not approve, however, additional compensation in cases in which no plan is confirmed, or for work necessary to confirm the initial plan. Further, counsel should not view the fee permitted by these Guidelines as a retainer that, once exhausted, automatically justifies a fee motion. This fee is sufficient to fairly compensate counsel for all preconfirmation services and most post-confirmation services such as reviewing the notice of filed claims, objecting to untimely claims, and modifying the plan to conform it to the claims filed. Only in instances where substantial and unanticipated post-confirmation work is necessary should counsel request additional compensation. The form application attached hereto may be used by the attorney when seeking additional fees. The necessity for a hearing on the application shall be governed by Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(6)."

A review of the fee application reveals that counsel has billed 19.1 hours of work at \$300 for work done prior to the September 14, 2011 confirmation of the initial plan. This is \$5,730. Because counsel agreed, at a minimum, to accept \$3,500 for all preconfirmation work, the court will disallow at least \$2,230 of the requested additional compensation.

But, the problems run deeper.

Counsel has been paid \$3,500 for fees and \$274 for costs. This application asks for an additional \$13,495 in fees and costs, which means counsel's total compensation is a whopping \$16,995 in fees and \$274 in costs.

A review of the contemporaneous time records filed with the motion reveals they are inadequate because they fail to adequately describe the work done by counsel. For instance, a total of 4.95 hours has been billed for legal research with no description of the issues researched. Similarly, there are numerous time entries for phone calls, letters, emails, and facsimile

transmissions with no indication of topics discussed. Given these vague entries, counsel cannot prove his efforts were necessary, reasonable or beneficial.

Finally, as noted in the trustee's objection, counsel's post confirmation work in the case certainly was not to the benefit of creditors. The trustee discovered that the debtor's income had increased \$8,500 a month after confirmation of the plan. The trustee then filed a motion to increase the debtor's plan payment and the dividend payable to unsecured creditors. The debtor proposed a competing plan that basically sought to keep the additional income for the debtor. The court however confirmed a modified plan that increased the dividend to unsecured creditors from nothing to 40% despite the debtor's attempts to thwart the trustee.

13. 15-21246-A-13 GAYE PERKINS MOTION TO  
AFL-1 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-21-15 [17]
- Telephone Appearance
  - Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The debtor has failed to make \$715.08 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

14. 15-21246-A-13 GAYE PERKINS COUNTER MOTION TO  
AFL-1 DISMISS CASE  
4-25-15 [25]
- Telephone Appearance
  - Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

15. 12-22549-A-13 RICHARD/LYNNDA LOPEZ MOTION TO  
TJW-1 SELL  
5-19-15 [27]
- Telephone Appearance
  - Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing

schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion to sell real property will be granted on the condition that the sale proceeds are used to pay all liens of record in full in a manner consistent with the plan. If the proceeds are not sufficient to pay liens of record in full (including liens ostensibly "stripped off"), no sale may be completed without the consent of each lienholder not being paid in full.

16. 15-20681-A-13 VALERIE SMITH MOTION TO  
JME-1 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-3-15 [25]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

First, the debtor has failed to make \$409.02 of payments required by the plan. This has resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

Second, the plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) because it neither pays unsecured creditors in full nor pays them all of the debtor's projected disposable income. The plan will pay unsecured creditors approximately \$12,180.18 but Form 22 shows that the debtor will have \$12,900 of projected disposable income over the next five years. The problem become even more significant if one uses the debtor's monthly gross income as reported on Schedule I, \$7,659.86, and substitutes it for the debtor's average current monthly income of \$7,068.14 as reported on Form 22. Given that Schedule I admits the higher income and does not indicate at line 13 that the debtor anticipates a decrease in income within the next year, this change in income is substantial that is known and virtually certain at this point in time. In this circumstance, Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S.Ct 2464 (2010) permits the trustee to rebut the presumption that the amount of projected disposable income is as stated in Form 22. The debtor has come forward with no evidence that the change is not substantial or likely to continue. Unsupported comments by counsel are not evidence, particularly in the face of the sworn statement by the debtor. See line 1, Schedule I.

17. 14-32191-A-13 ANNY RECINOS MOTION TO  
RSC-2 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-28-15 [46]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

First, the plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) because it neither pays unsecured creditors in full nor pays them all of the debtor's projected disposable income. The plan will pay unsecured creditors \$3,737.83 but Form 22

shows that the debtor will have \$172,549.20 over the next five years.

Second, the plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) because unsecured creditors would receive \$6,177.09 in a chapter 7 liquidation as of the effective date of the plan. This plan will pay only \$5,737.83 to unsecured creditors.

18. 15-24191-A-13 ANDREW KROGH AND CINDY MOTION TO  
RJ-1 DOUGAN VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. SIERRA GOLD MORTGAGE, INC. 5-26-15 [10]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

**Tentative Ruling:** Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$170,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Bank of America. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$203,497 as of the petition date. Therefore, Sierra Gold Mortgage's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all

creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$170,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

**FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE**

19. 14-31902-A-13 ROY/CHERIS WHITAKER MOTION TO  
RMW-4 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-24-15 [87]

**Final Ruling:** The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on April 21.

20. 14-31902-A-13 ROY/CHERIS WHITAKER MOTION TO  
RMW-5 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. ALLY FINANCIAL 4-24-15 [83]

**Final Ruling:** The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on April 21.

21. 10-36328-A-13 DONNIE HALEY MOTION TO  
SDB-4 MODIFY PLAN  
4-30-15 [72]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

22. 10-20130-A-13 RICHARD/PATRICIA MOTION TO  
JSO-6 CLEVINGER EXCUSE DEBTOR FROM COMPLETING THE  
1328 AND 522 CERTIFICATE  
5-7-15 [83]

**Final Ruling:** This motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

One of the debtors died after the case was filed and before the plan was completed. Prior to his death, the debtors completed their plan payments and the both filed certifications of completion of a post-petition course on personal financial management. However, the deceased debtor is unable able to

file the remaining documents required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 5009-1. Nonetheless, it appears from the electronic record that the deceased debtor has not received a prior discharge with the time periods specified in 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f), the deceased debtor had no outstanding domestic support obligations, and the deceased debtor did not owe obligations of the type described in 11 U.S.C. § 522(q). Therefore a discharge shall be issued at such time as the clerk is in a position to enter the discharge of the surviving debtor.

23. 15-22149-A-13 MATTHEW MCKEE MOTION TO  
BSJ-2 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-15-15 [22]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

24. 15-22356-A-13 KIM SCHMIDT MOTION TO  
AFL-2 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. GOLDEN 1 CREDIT UNION 5-11-15 [25]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$22,043 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$22,043 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$22,043 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

25. 15-22356-A-13 KIM SCHMIDT MOTION TO  
AFL-3 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. RC WILLEY HOME FURNISHINGS, INC. 5-12-15 [30]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$240 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$240 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$240 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

26. 13-27668-A-13 VINCENT MUNSON MOTION TO  
NSV-2 APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTOR'S  
ATTORNEY  
5-15-15 [47]

**Final Ruling:** The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

First, the motion was noticed for hearing pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)1) which requires a minimum of 28 days of notice. When this notice is given, anyone wishing to oppose the motion must file a written objection 14 days prior to the hearing. In this instance, the movant gave only 25 days notice of the hearing, reducing by three days the amount of time to file opposition. Notice is deficient.

Second, a review of the certificate of service reveals that the debtor was not served with the motion.

27. 15-21670-A-13 DENISE MEDINA OBJECTION TO  
DSH-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN  
DAVID PERRY VS. 4-8-15 [15]

**Final Ruling:** The objection will be dismissed without prejudice.

First, the objection pertains to the original plan proposed by the debtor. Because the debtor has filed a modified plan that will be considered by the court at a hearing on July 13, the objection is moot. To the extent the creditor believes his objection has vitality, it should be interposed in timely written opposition to the motion to confirm the modified plan.

Second, this objection was not set for hearing by the deadline set by the court. The creditor received notice of the plan in the Notice of the Commencement of the Case. That notice instructed all creditors to file written objections to the confirmation of the original plan by April 9 and to set a hearing on any objection on April 27. This objection was filed timely but not set for hearing until June 9. Further, the notice of the hearing instructed the debtor, pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) to file a written response to the objection 14 days prior to the hearing. However, Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4) specifies that the hearing shall be noticed for hearing pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2) which does not require the debtor to file a written response.

To add to the confusion, the first page of the objection indicates that it has been filed on behalf of the debtor, not the creditor.

28. 11-38979-A-13 EUGENE/MONICA STEELE MOTION TO  
SDB-3 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. UNITED GUARANTY RESIDENTIAL INSURANCE 5-6-15 [45]  
COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$175,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by JPMorgan Chase. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$321,164.12 as of the petition date. Therefore, United Guaranty Residential Insurance Company's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991),

will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$175,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

29. 15-22083-A-13 DANNY CLARKE MOTION TO  
PLC-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 5-14-15 [26]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter

will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$250,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Seterus, Inc. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$273,000 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobby, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such

motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$250,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).

30. 13-26685-A-13 KATHLEEN STEFFENS MOTION TO  
JPJ-1 MODIFY PLAN  
5-4-15 [54]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

31. 15-20786-A-13 ADELAI DA PAYURAN MOTION TO  
PJM-3 CONFIRM PLAN  
4-20-15 [51]

**Final Ruling:** The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. The trustee has voluntarily dismissed his objection. Accordingly, the motion is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

32. 15-20786-A-13 ADELAI DA PAYURAN COUNTER MOTION TO  
PJM-3 DISMISS CASE  
5-20-15 [56]

**Final Ruling:** The trustee has voluntarily dismissed the counter motion.

33. 14-31994-A-13 TAMARA TOGIAI MOTION TO  
SJS-1 MODIFY PLAN  
4-24-15 [22]

**Final Ruling:** This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after

confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

34. 15-22395-A-13 TINA KAUTZMAN MOTION TO  
HLG-1 VALUE COLLATERAL  
VS. WELLS FARGO 5-5-15 [17]

**Final Ruling:** This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$246,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Ocwen Loan Servicing. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$271,393 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes

provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$246,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1980).