

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

May 27, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 16. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON JUNE 23, 2014 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY JUNE 9, 2014, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY JUNE 16, 2014. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 17 THROUGH 37. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON JUNE 2, 2014, AT 2:30 P.M.

May 27, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 11-44107-A-13 ARCHIMEDES/JAMICE MOTION TO
CYB-1 ALIMAGNO INCUR DEBT
5-9-14 [60]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion to incur a purchase money loan to purchase a vehicle will be granted. The motion establishes a need for the vehicle and it does not appear that repayment of the loan will unduly jeopardize the debtor's performance of the plan.

2. 10-51430-A-13 AARON HASTINGS MOTION TO
AEH-101328 MODIFY PLAN
9-19-13 [218]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be granted provided the plan is further modified as directed below.

The plan confirmed by the court was filed on January 11, 2012. It was confirmed on March 21, 2012. That plan required the debtor to make payments to the trustee for 36 months. For the first 13 months of the case, those payments were \$250 (a total of \$3,250) and for the last 23 months the payments were to be \$688 a month (a total of \$15,824).

There are two categories of allowed claims in this case. A&S Jewelry has an allowed total claim of \$42,500. Of this amount, \$22,500 was allowed as secured with the balance allowed as a nonpriority unsecured claim. Prior to confirmation, the debtor paid directly to this creditor \$11,000. Therefore, from the 36-month stream of payments to the trustee, A&S was to receive \$11,500. Accordingly, the plan required a monthly payment of \$319.45 (this provision is in the order confirming the plan). No interest accrued on the claim.

All of the other allowed claims were nonpriority unsecured claims which totaled \$85,784.59. The plan assumed that these claims would total slightly less, \$85,484.59. The plan required that filed and allowed unsecured claims receive no less than a 7% dividend, or a total aggregate dividend of \$6,004.92. When confirming the plan, the court concluded that in a chapter 7 liquidation, unsecured creditors would receive nothing.

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While these dividends were to be paid over a 36-month plan duration, at section 2.03 the plan made provision for a 6-month extension: "If necessary to complete this plan, Debtor may make monthly payments for up to 6 months beyond the commitment period, but in no event shall monthly payments continue for more than 60 months."

On April 1, 2013, the trustee moved to dismiss the case (JPJ-3). This motion pointed out that the debtor had failed to make a monthly plan payment of \$688 in July 2012. The trustee also asserted that based on allowed claims, it would take 54 months to pay the dividends required by the plan, well in excess of the 36-month duration or even the extended 42-month duration permitted by section 2.03 of the confirmed plan.

The debtor cured the missed plan payment prior to the hearing on May 13, 2013 and the trustee's assertion that it would take 54 months to complete the plan was rejected by the court. The trustee had assumed in his calculations that A&S would be paid a total of \$22,500 on its secured claim through the plan. As indicated above, it was to be only \$11,500 through the plan; the other \$11,000 had previously been paid by the debtor directly to A&S. The dismissal motion was denied.

Next, the debtor made two attempts to modify the plan. The first attempt on July 12, 2013 was unsuccessful for non-substantive reasons, including the failure to use the court's most recent required chapter 13 plan form. The proposed plan sought to reduce the final 6 monthly plan payments from \$688 to \$468. This change would reduce the dividend payable on nonpriority unsecured claims from 7% to 5.6%.

On September 18, 2013, the debtor renewed his effort to confirm a modified plan and reduce the last six monthly plan payments. The reason offered for the reduction was an increase in the debtor's living expenses.

At the hearing on October 28, 2013, the trustee informed the court that the modification was unnecessary inasmuch as the debtor had to pay only approximately \$300 to complete the plan. The amount necessary to complete the plan, was less than the proposed amended monthly payment. Therefore, the court denied the motion as unnecessary. No plan modification was necessary even if the debtor's income had been reduced.

However, this was a mistake. What the court was not told by the trustee was that the trustee had assumed that approximately \$1,500 in the trustee's account for this case was not available for distribution to all unsecured creditors. If it was available for distribution to all unsecured creditors, an additional \$300 was all that was necessary to complete the plan. However, the \$1,500 represented uncashed dividend payments to unsecured creditor Denise Praizler. The funds were not available for distribution to all unsecured creditors.

While the amended plan was pending a confirmation hearing, the debtor reduced his monthly plan payment to the trustee to \$468 in accordance with the amended plan. And, even though the court did not approve the modification, this did not appear to be a problem inasmuch as the trustee had indicated at the confirmation hearing that the debtor had only \$300 more to pay to complete the confirmed plan.

By January 2014, the trustee apparently discovered that more than \$300 was necessary to complete the confirmed plan. So, he noticed the debtor's default under the confirmed plan. The default was due to the debtor's reduction in his

monthly plan payment from \$688 to \$468 and his failure to make a payment in December 2013. After the notice of default was served, the debtor paid \$468 for the December 2013 payment.

However, because the debtor failed to timely set a hearing on the trustee notice of default in accordance with Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(g), the case was dismissed on February 18, 2014. Within 10 days, the dismissal spurred the debtor to move to vacate the dismissal and ask the court to reconsider its refusal to modify the plan.

Because of the confusion created when the trustee informed the court and the debtor that less than \$300 was necessary to complete the confirmed plan, the court vacated the dismissal at a hearing on March 24 and it set a further hearing to consider confirming the debtor's modified plan and trustee's dismissal motion.

The modification is timely given that it is being made in the 41st month of the 42-month extended term of the confirmed plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a). And, given the increase in the debtor's reasonable living expenses, a reduction in the plan payment is warranted. Therefore, the modified plan will be confirmed provided two changes are made.

First, as the trustee notes, the plan does accurately provide for the payments made through the 41 months of the confirmed plan. A total of \$17,774 has been paid by the debtor to the trustee.

Second, while the debtor's net income may have been reduced warranting a reduction in the plan payment, this does not necessarily require a reduction in the dividend to unsecured creditors. As noted by the trustee, the amounts paid thus far permit the trustee to pay a 6.53% dividend to unsecured creditors. This means that it will take only one additional plan payment (43 monthly payments) of \$468 to pay a 7% dividend to unsecured creditors. So, while there may be cause to reduce the plan, the plan can be extended by one month and preserve the original dividend.

3. 10-51430-A-13 AARON HASTINGS TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO
JPJ-4 DISMISS
1-8-14 [267]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied for the reasons explained in the ruling of the debtor's motion to confirm a modified plan, AEH-101328. That ruling is incorporated by reference.

4. 10-51430-A-13 AARON HASTINGS OBJECTION TO
TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS CASE
2-5-14 [271]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be sustained for the reasons explained in the ruling of the debtor's motion to confirm a modified plan, AEH-101328. That ruling is incorporated by reference.

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the case will be dismissed.

First, the debtor is not eligible for chapter 13 relief. According to Schedule D, the debtor owes secured claims in excess of \$1,360,000 in noncontingent, liquidated secured debt. This exceeds the \$1,149,525 maximum permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

Second, 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) prohibits an individual from being a debtor under any chapter unless that individual received a credit counseling briefing from an approved non-profit budget and credit counseling agency during the 180-day period immediately preceding the filing of the petition. In this case, the debtor has not filed a certificate evidencing that briefing was completed during the 180-day period prior to the filing of the petition. Hence, the debtor was not eligible for bankruptcy relief when this petition was filed.

Third, if requested by the U.S. Trustee or the chapter 13 trustee, a debtor must produce evidence of a social security number or a written statement that such documentation does not exist. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4002(b)(1)(B). In this case, the debtor has breached the foregoing duty by failing to provide evidence of the debtor's social security number. This is cause for dismissal.

Fourth, Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(b)(6) provides: "Documents Required by Trustee. The debtor shall provide to the trustee, not later than the fourteen (14) days after the filing of the petition, Form EDC 3-088, *Domestic Support Obligation Checklist*, or other written notice of the name and address of each person to whom the debtor owes a domestic support obligation together with the name and address of the relevant state child support enforcement agency (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 464 & 466), Form EDC 3-086, *Class 1 Checklist*, for each Class 1 claim, and Form EDC 3-087, *Authorization to Release Information to Trustee Regarding Secured Claims Being Paid By The Trustee*." Because the plan includes long-term, impaired secured claims, the debtor was required to provide the trustee with a Class 1 checklist. The debtor failed to do so.

Fifth, the debtor owes a domestic support obligation. Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(b)(6) provides:

"The debtor shall provide to the trustee, not later than the fourteen (14) days after the filing of the petition, Form EDC 3-088, *Domestic Support Obligation Checklist*, or other written notice of the name and address of each person to whom the debtor owes a domestic support obligation together with the name and

address of the relevant state child support enforcement agency (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 464 & 466), Form EDC 3-086, *Class 1 Checklist*, for each Class 1 claim, and Form EDC 3-087, *Authorization to Release Information to Trustee Regarding Secured Claims Being Paid By The Trustee.*"

The debtor failed to deliver to the trustee the Domestic Support Obligation Checklist. This checklist is designed to assist the trustee in giving the notices required by 11 U.S.C. § 1302(d).

The trustee must provide a written notice both to the holder of a claim for a domestic support obligation and to the state child support enforcement agency. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(d)(1)(A) & (B). The state child support enforcement agency is the agency established under sections 464 and 466 of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 664 & 666. Section 1302(d)(1)(C) requires a third, post-discharge notice to both the claim holder and the state child support enforcement agency.

The trustee's notice to the claimant must: (a) advise the holder that he or she is owed a domestic support obligation; (b) advise the holder of the right to use the services of the state child support enforcement agency for assistance in collecting such claim; and (c) include the address and telephone number of the state child support enforcement agency.

The trustee's notice to the State child support enforcement agency required by section 1302(d)(1)(B) must: (a) advise the agency of such claim; and (b) advise the agency of the name, address and telephone number of the holder of such claim.

By failing to provide the checklist to the trustee, the debtor has disregarded the rule that it be provided, has breached the duty to cooperate with the trustee imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4). This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(1).

Sixth, in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-1(c) the debtor has failed to provide the trustee with employer payment advices for the 60-day period preceding the filing of the petition. The withholding of this financial information from the trustee is a breach of the duties imposed upon the debtor by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4) and the attempt to confirm a plan while withholding this relevant financial information is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

Seventh, 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(B) & (C) requires the court to dismiss a petition if an individual chapter 7 or 13 debtor fails to provide to the case trustee a copy of the debtor's federal income tax return for the most recent tax year ending before the filing of the petition. This return must be produced seven days prior to the date first set for the meeting of creditors. The failure to provide the return to the trustee justifies dismissal and denial of confirmation. In addition to the requirement of section 521(e)(2) that the petition be dismissed, an uncodified provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 found at section 1228(a) of BAPCPA provides that in chapter 11 and 13 cases the court shall not confirm a plan of an individual debtor unless requested tax documents have been turned over. This has not been done.

Eighth, the debtor failed to utilize the court's mandatory form plan as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(a) (effective on and after May 1, 2012, in all cases regardless when filed).

by the confirmed plan, and if the debtor fails to rebut the trustee's evidence, the case shall be dismissed at the hearing.

(3) Alternatively, the debtor may acknowledge that the plan payment(s) has(have) not been made and, within thirty (30) days of the mailing of the notice of default, either (A) make the delinquent plan payment(s) and all subsequent plan payments that have fallen due, or (B) file a modified plan and a motion to confirm the modified plan. If the debtor's financial condition has materially changed, amended Schedules I and J shall be filed and served with the motion to modify the chapter 13 plan.

(4) If the debtor fails to set a hearing on the trustee's notice, or cure the default by payment, or file a proposed modified chapter 13 plan and motion, or perform the modified chapter 13 plan pending its approval, or obtain approval of the modified chapter 13 plan, all within the time constraints set out above, the case shall be dismissed without a hearing on the trustee's application.

Thus, a debtor receiving a Notice of Default has three alternatives: (1) Cure the default within 30 days of the notice of default; (2) within 30 days of the notice of default, file a motion to confirm a modified plan and a modified plan in order to cure/suspend the default stated in the notice of default; or (3) contest the notice of default by setting a hearing within 28 days of the notice of default on 14 days of notice to the trustee.

In this case, the debtor exercised the second alternative - on March 7 the debtor proposed a modified plan to resolve the plan default. That modified plan and the motion to confirm it were filed timely under the local rule. However, the court denied the motion and the debtor failed to obtain an extension of time to confirm a plan or to otherwise cure the default under the confirmed plan. As a result, the trustee sought and obtained the dismissal of the case.

This motion fails to explain what excusable neglect resulted in the dismissal of the motion to confirm the modified plan or to obtain an extension of time before the original time period to confirm a modified plan expired.

8. 14-23355-A-13 FRANK LILLY OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
5-7-14 [38]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained in part and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The objections relating to the failure to file a certificate of credit

counseling, provide proof of a social security number, and to value the collateral of Chase will be overruled. These deficiencies have been cured.

However, the debtor has not successfully valued the collateral of SAFE (Toyota Motor Credit), a Prius. As a result, the debtor will not be able to "strip down" this secured claim by the application of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). As a result, the treatment accorded SAFE's secured claim does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) because it will not be paid in full. Or, if the plan will pay what the creditor has demanded, the plan payments to be made to the trustee will not be sufficient to pay all dividends required by the plan. In the event of the latter, the plan is not feasible as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).

Further, the interest rate the plan proposes to pay on account of SAFE's secured claim, 3%, does not pass muster under Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004). In Till the Supreme Court held that the appropriate interest rate on impaired secured claims must be determined by a "formula approach." This approach requires the court to take the national prime rate in order to reflect the financial market's estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate it for the loan's opportunity costs, inflation, and a slight risk of default. The bankruptcy court may be required to adjust this rate for a greater risk of default posed by a bankruptcy debtor. This adjustment depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the security, and the plan's feasibility and duration. Cf. Farm Credit Bank v. Fowler (In re Fowler), 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Camino Real Landscape Main. Contrs., Inc., 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987).

In this case, the claim is under-secured, the creditor has not received payment since December 2013, and the debtor has filed a prior unsuccessful chapter 13 case which was dismissed without payment of the creditor. In this circumstance, a 3% interest rate, which is .25% less than the current prime rate, is insufficient.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

9. 14-23355-A-13 FRANK LILLY OBJECTION TO
MBJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
SAFE CREDIT UNION VS. 5-7-14 [30]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained to the extent and for the reasons explained in

the ruling on the trustee's objection to confirmation, JPJ-1. That ruling is incorporated by reference.

10. 14-23355-A-13 FRANK LILLY MOTION TO
MAC-3 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. TOYOTA FINANCIAL SERVICES 4-13-14 [24]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The debtor has filed a valuation motion that accompanies a proposed chapter 13 plan. The valuation motion addresses the value of a 2011 Toyota Prius that secures SAFE Credit Union's Class 2 claim. It is the successor of Toyota Motor Credit. While the debtor has opined that the vehicle has a value of \$13,136, no specific information is given in the motion regarding the vehicle's condition, mileage, equipment and accessories.

SAFE counters that the value of the vehicle is \$22,062 based on a retail evaluation by the Kelley Blue Book.

To the extent the objection urges the court to reject the debtor's opinion of value because the debtor's opinion is not admissible, the court instead rejects the objection. As the owner of the vehicle, the debtor is entitled to express an opinion as to the vehicle's value. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Any opinion of value by the owner, however, must be expressed without giving a reason for the valuation " Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, Vol. II, § 701.2, p. 784-85 (2012-13). Indeed, unless the owner also qualifies as an expert, it is improper for the owner to give a detailed recitation of the basis for the opinion. Only an expert qualified under Fed. R. Evid. 702 may rely on and testify as to facts "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 703. "For example, the average debtor-homeowner who testifies in opposition to a motion for relief from the § 362 automatic stay, should be limited to giving his opinion as to the value of his home, but should not be allowed to testify concerning what others have told him concerning the value of his or comparable properties unless, the debtor truly qualifies as an expert under Rule 702 such as being a real estate broker, etc." Id.

The creditor has come forward with evidence that the replacement value of the vehicle, based on its retail value as reported by the Kelley Blue Book, is \$22,062. This valuation, however, presumes the condition of the vehicle is excellent. See <http://www.kbb.com> (indicating that retail "value assumes the vehicle has received the cosmetic and/or mechanical reconditioning needed to qualify it as 'Excellent'" and that "this is not a transaction value; it is representative of a dealer's asking price and the starting point for negotiation").

The vehicle must be valued at its replacement value. In the chapter 13 context, the replacement value of personal property used by a debtor for personal, household or family purposes is "the price a retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering the age and condition of the

will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

12. 14-23461-A-13 BERNADETTE ROLFS OBJECTION TO
JHW-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC VS. 5-2-14 [16]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be overruled.

According to the objecting creditor's proof of claim, it is owed \$10,806.34 and it is secured by a Ford vehicle. The debtor concedes that the creditor is over-secured, the vehicle having a value of \$13,975. The creditor has come forward with no evidence of a different value. The plan proposes to maintain the contract installment payment due to the creditor and the contract rate of interest, 1.9% will be maintained. This means the claim will be paid in full in approximately the first 20 months of the plan.

The creditor asserts that is entitled to a higher rate of interest under Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 124 S.Ct. 1951 (2004). In Till the Supreme Court held that the appropriate interest rate on impaired secured claims must be determined by a "formula approach." This approach requires the court to take the national prime rate in order to reflect the financial market's estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate it for the loan's opportunity costs, inflation, and a slight risk of default. The bankruptcy court may be required to adjust this rate for a greater risk of default posed by a bankruptcy debtor. This adjustment depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the security, and the plan's feasibility and duration. Cf. Farm Credit Bank v. Fowler (In re Fowler), 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Camino Real Landscape Main. Contrs., Inc., 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987).

The only change to the contractual relationship between the debtor and the creditor is that the trustee will be paying the creditor. The court does not regard this as a material impairment of the claim. Because the claim is unimpaired, the creditor cannot complain about its treatment. It is being paid as it bargained to be paid.

To the extent the court is incorrect in this conclusion, the 1.9% interest rate passes muster under Till for several reasons. First, the creditor is over-secured. Second, its claim will be paid in full within 20 months. Third, the plan reduces the risk of default by requiring the trustee to pay the claim rather than the debtor. And, fourth, the claim was not in default when the case was filed, suggesting the debtor is a good credit risk. In this circumstance, 1.9% represents an appropriate rate of interest even though it is a discount of 1.35% of the current prime rate.

13. 14-23468-A-13 ROBERT/RHONDA WELCH
JPJ-1

OBJECTION TO
CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
5-7-14 [18]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because this hearing on an objection to the confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan and a motion to dismiss the case was set pursuant to the procedure required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-1(c)(4), the debtor was not required to file a written response. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the objection. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The plan misclassifies the County of Sacramento's claim as a priority claim. It is a secured claim for delinquent property taxes. The difference is material because 11 U.S.C. §§ 511(a) and 1325(a)(5)(B) combine to require that secured tax claims at the rate required by applicable nonbankruptcy law, while 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) does not require that any interest be paid on account of priority claims. The interest due on delinquent California real property taxes is set by statute. For each installment of real property taxes not timely paid, a 10% penalty is assessed. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 2617, 2618, 2705. In addition, a "redemption" penalty of 1 1/2% per month is added to the tax bill. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(a). For purposes of a claim in a bankruptcy case, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 4103(b) provides that "the assessment of penalties . . . constitutes the assessment of interest."

Because the plan proposed by the debtor, does not provide interest on account of a secured tax claim, it is not confirmable. Nevertheless, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

14. 14-24982-A-13 THOMAS/DELYSE GANNAWAY
MRL-1
VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
5-12-14 [10]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on

the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$550,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by BSI Financial Services. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$600,900 as of the petition date. Therefore, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and

heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$550,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

15. 14-22885-A-13 MARK/LISA THARALDSEN MOTION TO
CK-2 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. GATEWAY ONE LENDING AND FINANCE 4-24-14 [14]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The motion seeks to value the collateral of the respondent. That collateral is a motor vehicle. The respondent financed the debtor's purchase of the vehicle 569 days prior to the bankruptcy. The purpose of the valuation is to "strip down" the respondent's secured claim to the value of the vehicle as permitted by 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

This is sometimes permitted by section 506(a). However, the respondent's claim is subject to the "hanging" paragraph following 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9). The hanging paragraph states that "section 506 shall not apply to a claim described in [section 1325(a)(5)] if the creditor has a purchase money security interest," the secured debt was incurred within 910 days of the filing of the petition, and the collateral is a motor vehicle acquired for the personal use of the debtor. Here, the creditor financed the purchase of a vehicle by the debtor for the debtor's personal use 569 days prior to the bankruptcy. Hence, the debtor is precluded from stripping down the claim.

Because the debtor must pay the present value of the amount due when the petition was filed, there is no reason to value the vehicle.

16. 14-22790-A-13 AMANDA SHRINER MOTION TO
CAH-2 CONFIRM PLAN
4-11-14 [19]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

The debtor has failed to commence making plan payments and has not paid approximately \$343 to the trustee as required by the proposed plan. This has

resulted in delay that is prejudicial to creditors and suggests that the plan is not feasible. This is cause to deny confirmation of the plan and for dismissal of the case. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c)(1) & (c)(4), 1325(a)(6).

THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

17. 14-23503-A-13 BRYANT/JOANNA ADAMS MOTION TO
DPR-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. 4-29-14 [15]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$195,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$302,199 as of the petition date. Therefore, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P.

defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The valuation motion pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) will be granted. The motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration. The debtor is the owner of the subject property. In the debtor's opinion, the subject property had a value of \$11,050 as of the date the petition was filed and the effective date of the plan. Given the absence of contrary evidence, the debtor's opinion of value is conclusive. See Enewally v. Washington Mutual Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, \$11,050 of the respondent's claim is an allowed secured claim. When the respondent is paid \$11,050 and subject to the completion of the plan, its secured claim shall be satisfied in full and the collateral free of the respondent's lien. Provided a timely proof of claim is filed, the remainder of its claim is allowed as a general unsecured claim unless previously paid by the trustee as a secured claim.

20. 14-22513-A-13 JONATHAN SHELEY
JME-1
VS. PNC BANK

MOTION TO
VALUE COLLATERAL
4-22-14 [21]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$241,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Green Tree Servicing Company. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$364,375 as of the petition date. Therefore, PNC Bank's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing

the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$241,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

21. 14-22513-A-13 JONATHAN SHELEY OBJECTION TO
JPJ-2 EXEMPTIONS
5-2-14 [29]

Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed without prejudice.

The notice of hearing informs potential respondents that written opposition must be filed and served within 14 days prior to the hearing if they wish to oppose the motion. Because less than 28 days of notice of the hearing was given [25 days' notice was given to the debtor], Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2) specifies that written opposition is unnecessary. Instead, potential respondents may appear at the hearing and orally contest the motion. If

necessary, the court may thereafter require the submission of written evidence and briefs. By erroneously informing potential respondents that written opposition was required and was a condition to contesting the motion, the moving party may have deterred a respondent from appearing. Therefore, notice was materially deficient.

22. 10-20018-A-13 YOLANDA/ARTEMIO CABATIC MOTION TO
PGM-3 MODIFY PLAN
4-16-14 [49]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

23. 13-33621-A-13 ALLEN MEDINA MOTION TO
RAS-2 CONFIRM PLAN
3-29-14 [48]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

24. 14-23338-A-13 MARK/TEENA MANCUSO ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
5-6-14 [23]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be discharged and the case will remain pending.

The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the \$70 installment when due on May 1. However, after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent installment was paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.

25. 09-47542-A-13 ARMANDO/MIRIAM RAMIREZ MOTION TO
SDB-7 MODIFY PLAN
4-18-14 [102]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

26. 09-47542-A-13 ARMANDO/MIRIAM RAMIREZ MOTION TO
SDB-8 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. 4-22-14 [109]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$282,500 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by BAC home Loan Servicing LP. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$395,000 as of the petition date. Therefore, Bank of America, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$282,500. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

27. 13-34650-A-13 HOLLY BELLAMY
LBG-1

MOTION TO
CONFIRM PLAN
4-1-14 [31]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(c)(3) & (d)(1) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court

will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

28. 14-22555-A-13 MELANIO/ELLEN VALDELLON OBJECTION TO
SJS-2 CLAIM
VS. THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 4-24-14 [26]

Final Ruling: The objection will be dismissed without prejudice.

The notice of hearing informs the claimant that written opposition must be filed and served 14 days prior to the hearing if the claimant wishes to oppose the objection to the proof of claim. Because less than 44 days of notice of the hearing was given, Local Bankruptcy Rule 3007-1(b)(2) specifies that written opposition is unnecessary. Instead, the claimant may appear at the hearing and orally contest the objection. If necessary, the court may thereafter require the submission of written evidence and briefs. By erroneously informing the claimant that written opposition was required and was a condition to contesting the objection, the objecting party may have deterred the claimant from appearing. Therefore, notice was materially deficient.

29. 14-23355-A-13 FRANK LILLY MOTION TO
MAC-2 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. CHASE HOME LOANS, CHASE BANK, N.A. 4-13-14 [20]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$180,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Chase Home Loans. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$209,455.12 as of the petition date. Therefore, Chase Bank, N.A.'s claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840

(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$180,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

30. 11-35662-A-13 PETER/JILL LASSEN MOTION TO
THS-9 MODIFY PLAN
4-17-14 [146]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the conditions that the plan is further modified in the confirmation order to provide the same interest rate on secured claims as required by the confirmed plan and that the plan provide for payment in full of the FTB priority claim without reducing the dividend payable on any other class of claims. If the latter requires an increased plan payment, the order also shall specify that increased payment. As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

31. 13-29062-A-13 NAZILA EDALATI MOTION TO
MET-4 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 4-6-14 [67]
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on May 6.

32. 13-29062-A-13 NAZILA EDALATI MOTION TO
MET-5 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 4-6-14 [72]
FRANCHISE TAX BOARD

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on May 6.

33. 13-29062-A-13 NAZILA EDALATI MOTION TO
MET-6 CONFIRM PLAN
4-6-14 [77]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed on May 6.

34. 10-49474-A-13 NECIA SILVA MOTION TO
DBJ-3 MODIFY PLAN
4-9-14 [29]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The motion will be granted on the condition that the plan is further modified in the confirmation order to correct the total amount paid into the plan through May 2014 (not May 2013). As further modified, the plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

35. 14-22885-A-13 MARK/LISA THARALDSEN MOTION TO
CK-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE 4-25-14 [24]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice

required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$130,000 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by USDA Rural Development. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$137,254 as of the petition date. Therefore, Wells Fargo Home Mortgage's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security

interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$130,000. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

36. 13-35888-A-13 ROSA NARANJO MOTION TO
CAH-2 SELL
4-22-14 [41]

Final Ruling: This motion to sell property has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion to sell real property will be granted on the condition that the sale proceeds are used to pay all liens of record in full in a manner consistent with the plan. If the proceeds are not sufficient to pay liens of record in full (including liens ostensibly "stripped off"), no sale may be completed without the consent of each lienholder not being paid in full.

37. 14-22889-A-13 SUE GALVEZ MOTION TO
GW-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. SCHOOLS FINANCIAL CREDIT UNION 4-23-14 [17]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed without prejudice.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(h) requires that service of contested matters and adversary proceedings on insured depository institutions be accomplished by certified mailed addressed to an officer of the institution unless the institution has previously appeared in the case through an attorney. A review of the docket reveals that the respondent has not previously appeared through an attorney. And, a credit union is an insured depository institution as

defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.

Second, a motion is a contested matter and it must be served like a summons and a complaint. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014 incorporating by reference Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004. Service of the motion did not comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(3) and 9014(b). The motion must be served to the attention of an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service of process for the respondent creditor. According to the certificate of service, this motion was simply sent to the corporation. Cf. ECMC v. Repp (In re Repp), 307 B.R. 144 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (service in accordance with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(b) does not satisfy the service requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)). Service, then, is deficient.