### UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

### Honorable Christopher M. Klein

Bankruptcy Judge Sacramento, California

April 2, 2019 at 2:00 p.m.

#### **Notice**

The court has reorganized the cases, placing all of the Final Rulings in the second part of these Posted Rulings, with the Final Rulings beginning with Item 10.

1. 19-21404-C-13 RANDLE HODGE MOTION TO EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
BLG-1 Chad Johnson 3-11-19 [10]

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. If there is opposition presented, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2)(C).

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(2) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on March 11, 2019. 14 days' notice is required. That requirement was met.

## The Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay is granted.

Randle Hodge ("Debtor") seeks to have the provisions of the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) extended beyond thirty days in this case. This is Debtor's second bankruptcy petition

pending in the past year. Debtor's prior bankruptcy case (No. 18-26647) was dismissed on January 29, 2019, pursuant to Debtor's voluntary Motion to Dismiss *See* Order, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 18-26647, Dckt. 33. Therefore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A), the provisions of the automatic stay end as to Debtor thirty days after filing of the petition.

Here, Debtor states that the instant case was filed in good faith and explains that the previous case was voluntarily dismissed. The court notes that Debtor's Motion to Dismiss the prior proceeding (No. 18-26647, Dckt. 12) states that Debtor had not made "arrangements or agreements with any creditor." However, Debtor's Declaration in support of this Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay states that the mortgage creditor "NACA ... advised [him] to voluntarily dismiss [his] case due to an opportunity to refinance [his] mortgage." Dckt. 12. The court also notes that Debtor was pro se in his prior proceeding and is represented in the current proceeding.

Upon motion of a party in interest and after notice and hearing, the court may order the provisions extended beyond thirty days if the filing of the subsequent petition was filed in good faith. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). As this court has noted in other cases, Congress expressly provides in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) that the automatic stay **terminates as to Debtor**, and nothing more. In 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), Congress expressly provides that the automatic stay **never goes into effect in the bankruptcy case** when the conditions of that section are met. Congress clearly knows the difference between a debtor, the bankruptcy estate (for which there are separate express provisions under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) to protect property of the bankruptcy estate) and the bankruptcy case. While terminated as to Debtor, the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) is limited to the automatic stay as to only Debtor. The subsequently filed case is presumed to be filed in bad faith if one or more of Debtor's cases was pending within the year preceding filing of the instant case. *Id.* § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(I). The presumption of bad faith may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. *Id.* § 362(c)(3)(C).

In determining if good faith exists, the court considers the totality of the circumstances. *In re Elliot-Cook*, 357 B.R. 811, 814 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006); *see also* Laura B. Bartell, *Staying the Serial Filer - Interpreting the New Exploding Stay Provisions of § 362(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code*, 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 201, 209–10 (2008). An important indicator of good faith is a realistic prospect of success in the second case, contrary to the failure of the first case. *See, e.g., In re Jackola*, No. 11-01278, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2443, at \*6 (Bankr. D. Haw. June 22, 2011) (citing *In re Elliott-Cook*, 357 B.R. 811, 815–16 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006)). Courts consider many factors—including those used to determine good faith under § 1307(c) and 1325(a)—but the two basic issues to determine good faith under § 362(c)(3) are:

- A. Why was the previous plan filed?
- B. What has changed so that the present plan is likely to succeed?

*In re Elliot-Cook*, 357 B.R. at 814–15.

Debtor has sufficiently demonstrated the case was filed in good faith/rebutted the presumption of bad faith under the facts of this case and the prior case for the court to extend the automatic stay.

The Motion is granted, and the automatic stay is extended for all purposes and parties, unless terminated by operation of law or further order of this court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay filed by Randle Hodge ("Debtor") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is granted, and the automatic stay is extended pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) for all purposes and parties, unless terminated by operation of law or further order of this court.

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 19, 2019. 35 days' notice is required. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(9); LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(d)(1). That requirement was met.

The Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(1), 9014-1(f)(1), and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(b). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Opposition having been filed, the court will address the merits of the motion at the hearing. If it appears at the hearing that disputed material factual issues remain to be resolved, a later evidentiary hearing will be set. LOCAL BANKR. R. 9014-1(g).

# The Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan is granted.

Stephanie Big-Eagle ("Debtor") seeks confirmation of the Amended Plan because Debtor has Amended her Schedules I and J (reducing income). Dckt. 33 (Declaration). The Amended Plan proposes one payment of \$641.00 and fifty-nine payments of \$416.00 and 0% distribution to general unsecured creditors. Dckt. 32 (Amended Plan). 11 U.S.C. § 1323 permits a debtor to amend a plan any time before confirmation.

#### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S RESPONSE**

David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") filed a Response on March 11, 2019. Dckt. 42. The Trustee notes that the Debtor has made two payments of \$641.00 and does not oppose the confirmation of the Plan so long as it provides for two monthly payments of \$641.00 instead of one.

At the hearing----.

The Amended Plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323, and 1325(a) and is confirmed.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Confirm the Amended Chapter 13 Plan filed by Stephanie Big-Eagle ("Debtor") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is granted, and Debtor's Amended Chapter 13 Plan filed on February 19, 2019, is confirmed. Debtor's Counsel shall prepare an appropriate order confirming the Chapter 13 Plan, transmit the proposed order to David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") for approval as to form, and if so approved, the Chapter 13 Trustee will submit the proposed order to the court.

3. <u>14-31437</u>-C-13 DJD-1 GARY DUERNER Pro Se MOTION TO CONFIRM TERMINATION OR ABSENCE OF STAY 2-28-19 [191]

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor (*pro se*), Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 28, 2019. 28 days' notice is required. That requirement was met.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). The defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered.

# The Motion to Confirm Termination or Absence of Stay granted.

Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, as servicer for Banc of America Funding Corporation 2007-C U.S. Bank National Association ("Movant") moves the court for an order confirming that the automatic stay is not in effect in this case as to Creditor pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(j). Movant seeks confirmation from the court that no automatic stay in effect on 3527 Buckskin Court, Rocklin, California ("Property") is not in effect pursuant to Gary D. Duerner's ("Debtor") Plan.

The grounds stated with particularity in the Motion are:

- A. Debtor confirmed a Modified Chapter 13 Plan on September 1, 2018. Order Confirming, Dckt. 183.
- B. The claim of Movant, is provided for payment as a Class 4 Claim. Plan, Dckt. 170.
- C. The terms for treatment of the Class 4 Claim of Movant, include the following (emphasis added), Plan ¶ 3.10, *Id.*,:

"Class 4 claims mature after the completion of this plan, are not in default, and are not modified by this plan. These claims shall be paid by Debtor or a third person whether or not the plan is confirmed. [...] **Upon confirmation** 

of the plan, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and the co-debtor stay of 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) are [....] modified to allow the holder of a Class 4 secured claim to exercise its rights against its collateral and any nondebtor in the event of a default under applicable law or contract."

Based on the above, Movant requests relief from the court as follows: "1. For an Order stating that no automatic stay applies to the Property; 2. For an Order modifying the automatic stay to protect the interest of Movant, as the Court deems proper. . . ." Motion, Dckt. 44 at 2:20.5–22.5.

#### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S RESPONSE**

David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") filed a Response on March 19, 2019. Dckt. 197. The Chapter 13 Trustee states that Movant, is listed in Class 4 of the Plan provides for the stay to be modified upon confirmation for the creditor to exercise its rights upon default.

### **DEBTOR'S RESPONSE:**

Debtor filed an opposition stating that he is not in default under the terms of the loan. Dckt. 195.

### **DISCUSSION**

Movant contends that Class 4 of the Plan confirmed on September 1, 2018, states that "Upon Confirmation of the plan, all bankruptcy stays are modified to allow the holder of a Class 4 secured claim to exercise its rights against its collateral and any nondebtor in the event of a default under applicable law or contract." See Dckt. 7.

Movant's contention is that the above plan provision results in the following: "there is no automatic stay in effect on the Property. . . ." Motion, Dckt. 191. However, under the plain language of the Class 4 treatment, the automatic stay has only been Modified, not terminated, by operation of that provision. The modification is for the limited purpose, "to allow the holder of a Class 4 secured claim to exercise its rights against its collateral and any nondebtor in the event of a default under applicable law or contract." The automatic stay exists, but it is modified. (The court does not endeavor to determine if there are other provisions of the Plan that might affect the automatic stay, leaving such to Movant in later motion(s) if necessary.)

There is no allegation of there being a default and in fact the Debtor contends there has been no default. However, the modification of the automatic stay is not dependent upon a default. The stay is modified by confirmation of the Plan, and the modification is for the limited purpose of the holder of a Class 4 Claim asserting its rights against its collateral.

The court recognizes that creditors may need an order specifying the continuing effect and modification of an automatic say when state recording and filing law come into play, as well as for title insurance purposes.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has recognized the basic "discretion is the better part of valor" principle when it comes to the automatic stay. Seeking a separate order clearly specifying the scope of the relief granted in the Plan is not inappropriate.

The court grants the Motion, granting relief that under the terms of the confirmed Modified Chapter 13 Plan, Dckt. 183, in this bankruptcy case stating that the bankruptcy stays are modified to allow Movant, and its agents and successors, as] the holder of a Class 4 secured claim to exercise its rights against its collateral and any nondebtor in the event of a default under applicable law or contract.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Confirm Absence of the Automatic Stay filed by Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, as servicer for Banc of America Funding Corporation 2007-C U.S. Bank National Association ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the relief is granted pursuant to the Motion, the court confirming that "[u]pon confirmation of the plan, the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and the co-debtor stay of 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a) are [....] modified to allow the holder of a Class 4 secured claim to exercise its rights against its collateral and any nondebtor in the event of a default under applicable law or contract..." Confirmed Modified Chapter 13 Plan, Dckt. 170; Order Confirming, Dckt. 183.

4. <u>18-26242</u>-C-13 PGM-2 WAYNE ROSEMOND Peter Macaluso MOTION TO CONFIRM PLAN 2-24-19 [56]

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 24, 2019. 35 days' notice is required. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(9); LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(d)(1). That requirement was met.

The Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(1), 9014-1(f)(1), and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(b). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Opposition having been filed, the court will address the merits of the motion at the hearing. If it appears at the hearing that disputed material factual issues remain to be resolved, a later evidentiary hearing will be set. LOCAL BANKR. R. 9014-1(g).

### The Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan is denied.

Wayne Rosemond ("Debtor") seeks confirmation of the Amended Plan to address the Chapter 13 Trustee's oppositions to his previous Plan including the inability to timely organize a sale of real property and filing his 2016 federal tax return. Dckt. 58 (Declaration). The Amended Plan proposes payments for months 2 through 19 of \$2,600.00 and a one-time lump sum payment of \$80,000.00 on or before July 25, 2019. Dckt. 59 (Amended Plan). 11 U.S.C. § 1323 permits a debtor to amend a plan any time before confirmation.

### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OPPOSITION**

David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") filed an Opposition on March 5, 2019. Dckt. 61. The Trustee's Opposition is based on the following:

- A. The Chapter 13 Trustee asserts that Debtor is \$2,600.00 delinquent in plan payments, which represents one month of the \$2,600.00 plan payments for months 2 through 19 of the Plan. Delinquency indicates that the Plan is not feasible and is reason to deny confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).
- B. A review of Debtor's Plan shows that it relies on a Motion to Sell for which no Motion to Sell or Motion to Employ Realtor has been filed. The Plan is not feasible without the sale because the Plan

relies on a one-time lump sum payment of \$80,000.00 on or before July 25, 2019 funded by this proposed sale. The Trustee also notes he made this same opposition in connection with the previous proposed Plan.

### **DEBTOR'S RESPONSE:**

On March 25, 2019, Debtor's counsel filed a response stating that he will discuss the Trustee's oppositions with his client, the Debtor, on March 29, 2019. Dckt. 68.

### **RULING:**

At the hearing -----.

The Amended Plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323, and 1325(a) and is not confirmed.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Confirm the Amended Chapter 13 Plan filed by Wayne Rosemond ("Debtor") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that the Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan is denied, and the proposed Chapter 13 Plan is not confirmed.

5. <u>18-27544</u>-C-13 BLG-3 AMY LOAFEA Chad Johnson MOTION TO VALUE COLLATERAL OF ECOMMISSION FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC 2-15-19 [37]

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, Creditor, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 15, 2019. 28 days' notice is required. That requirement was met.

The Motion to Value Collateral and Secured Claim has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). The defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered.

The Motion to Value Collateral and Secured Claim of eCommission Financial Services, Inc. ("Creditor") is \$6,162.10, and Creditor's secured claim is determined to have a value of \$6,162.10.

The Motion filed by Amy Loafea ("Debtor") to value the secured claim of eCommission Financial Services, Inc. ("Creditor") is accompanied by Debtor's declaration. Debtor is the owner of commissions earned from two pre-petition real estate deals totaling \$10,240.77 ("Property"). Debtor seeks to value the Property at a replacement value of \$10,240.77 as of the petition filing date. As the owner, Debtor's opinion of value is evidence of the asset's value. *See* FED. R. EVID. 701; *see also Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally)*, 368 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004).

Debtor provides the UCC 1 that was filed with the California Secretary of State on November 15, 2016 (Dckt. 40, Exhibit C), but does not provide the underlying documents relating to the security interest. The court notes that the filed UCC 1 states that it attaches to "All present and future Accounts of the Debtor." Dckt. 40, Exhibit C. Without the underlying agreement the court has insufficient information to determine whether the Debtor has sufficiently stated the property securing the interest, assuming an underlying document exists.

### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE RESPONSE:**

The Chapter 13 Trustee filed a response on March 19, 2019. Dckt. 51. The Trustee does not oppose the Debtor's Motion but flags for the court that the Creditor has not filed a proof of claim and is provided for in Class 2B of the proposed plan.

#### **RULING:**

The court notes that Debtor has not provided evidence of the actual security agreement and merely filed with the court a recorded UCC lien. The court requires additional evidence and/or testimony from the Debtor regarding that actual security agreement with the Creditor before it can rule on the requested relief.

At the hearing----.

Therefore, Creditor's claim secured by a lien against the Property is under-collateralized. Creditor's secured claim is determined to be in the amount of \$6,162.10, the value of the collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The valuation motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) is granted.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Value Collateral and Secured Claim filed by Amy Loafea ("Debtor") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) is granted, and the claim of eCommission Financial Services, Inc. ("Creditor") secured by an asset described as commissions earned from two pre-petition real estate deals totaling \$10,240.77 ("Property") is determined to be a secured claim in the amount of \$6,162.10, and the balance of the claim is a general unsecured claim to be paid through the confirmed bankruptcy plan. The value of the Property is \$6,162.10 and is encumbered by a lien securing a claim that exceeds the value of the asset.

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtors, Debtors' Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 15, 2019. 35 days' notice is required. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(5) & 3015(h) (requiring twenty-one days' notice); LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(d)(2) (requiring fourteen days' notice for written opposition). That requirement was met.

The Motion to Confirm the Modified Plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2), 9014-1(f)(1), and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3015(g). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Opposition having been filed, the court will address the merits of the motion at the hearing. If it appears at the hearing that disputed material factual issues remain to be resolved, a later evidentiary hearing will be set. LOCAL BANKR. R. 9014-1(g).

### The Motion to Confirm the Modified Plan is denied.

Michael Russell and Renee Russell ("Debtors") seek confirmation of the Modified Plan because their financial and legal circumstances have changed. Dckt. 29 (Declaration). The Modified Plan proposes 36 monthly payments of \$847.00 with no less than a 23.76% dividend to the general unsecured creditors. Dckt. 31 (Modified Plan). 11 U.S.C. § 1329 permits a debtor to modify a plan after confirmation.

### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OPPOSITION**

David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") filed an Opposition on March 18, 2019. Dckt. 37. The Trustee's opposition is based on the following:

- A. The Debtors' Motion does not state with particularity the reason for the modification, but merely states, without particularity that their circumstances have changed.
- B. The Chapter 13 Trustee asserts that Debtor is \$2,332.00 delinquent in plan payments, which represents over two of the \$847.00 plan payment. Delinquency indicates that the Plan is not feasible and is reason to deny confirmation. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).

C. The Debtors Schedules I and J filed with their Motion are marked both Amended and Supplemental and has insufficiently addressed the changes in expenses (increase in food and housekeeping from \$125 to \$750, increase in medical and dental from \$50 to \$200, and an increase in transportation from \$100 to \$350).

### **RULING:**

At the hearing ----.

The Modified Plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325(a), and 1329 and is not confirmed.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Confirm the Modified Chapter 13 Plan filed by Michael Russell and Renee Russell ("Debtors") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that Motion to Confirm the Modified Plan is denied, and the proposed Chapter 13 Plan is not confirmed.

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7. <u>19-21449</u>-C-13 JOHN JKM-1 Jin Ki

JOHN WILSON
Jin Kim

MOTION TO EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY 3-18-19 [10]

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**No Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. If there is opposition presented, the court will consider the opposition and whether further hearing is proper pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2)(C).

Local Rule 9014-1(f)(2) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on March 18, 2019. 14 days' notice is required. That requirement was met.

# The Motion to Impose the Automatic Stay is xxxx.

John Wilson ("Debtor") seeks to have the provisions of the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) extended beyond thirty days in this case. However, contrary to Debtor's Motion, this is Debtor's third, not second, bankruptcy petition pending in the past year. Debtor's prior bankruptcy cases (No. 18-24431) and (18-20287) were dismissed on February 21, 2019 and on July 12, 2018 respectively, after Debtor not make all required plan payments. *See* Order, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 18-24431, Dckt. 36; Order, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 18-20287, Dckt. 21. Therefore, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(I), the provisions of the automatic stay did not go into effect upon Debtor filing the instant case.

Here, Debtor states that the instant case was filed in good faith and explains that the previous case was dismissed because Debtor incurred unanticipated vehicle expenses and missed work due to an illness. Dckt. 12. The Debtor states that he has employer approved overtime, adjusted his withholdings, and has family members who have offered to help him make all required Plan payments.

#### APPLICABLE LAW

When stay has not gone into effect pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4), a party in interest may

request within 30 days of filing that the stay take effect as to any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may impose), after notice and a hearing, only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B).

For purposes of subparagraph (B), a case is presumptively filed not in good faith as to all creditors if:

- (I) 2 or more previous cases under this title in which the individual was a debtor were pending within the 1-year period;
- (II) a previous case under this title in which the individual was a debtor was dismissed within the time period stated in this paragraph after the debtor failed to file or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court without substantial excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be substantial excuse unless the dismissal was caused by the negligence of the debtor's attorney), failed to provide adequate protection as ordered by the court, or failed to perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court; or
- (III) there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous case under this title, or any other reason to conclude that the later case will not be concluded, if a case under chapter 7, with a discharge, and if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that will be fully performed; . . .

### 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(D).

In determining if good faith exists, the court considers the totality of the circumstances. *In re Elliot-Cook*, 357 B.R. 811, 814 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006); *see also* Laura B. Bartell, *Staying the Serial Filer - Interpreting the New Exploding Stay Provisions of § 362(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code*, 82 Am. Bankr. L.J. 201, 209–10 (2008). An important indicator of good faith is a realistic prospect of success in the second case, contrary to the failure of the first case. *See, e.g., In re Jackola*, No. 11-01278, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2443, at \*6 (Bankr. D. Haw. June 22, 2011) (citing *In re Elliott-Cook*, 357 B.R. 811, 815–16 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006)). Courts consider many factors—including those used to determine good faith under § 1307(c) and 1325(a)—but the two basic issues to determine good faith under § 362(c)(3) are:

- A. Why was the previous plan filed?
- B. What has changed so that the present plan is likely to succeed?

*In re Elliot-Cook*, 357 B.R. at 814–15.

### **DISCUSSION**

Debtor's prior cases were dismissed after Debtor did not make required Plan payments. *See* Order, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 18-24431, Dckt. 36; Order, Bankr. E.D. Cal. No. 18-20287, Dckt. 21.

Debtor has sufficiently rebutted the presumption of bad faith under the facts of this case and the prior cases for the court to impose the automatic stay.

The Motion is granted, and the automatic stay is imposed for all purposes and parties, unless terminated by operation of law or further order of this court.
The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.
The Motion to Impose the Automatic Stay filed by John Wilson ("Debtor") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is granted, and the automatic stay is imposed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(B) for all purposes and parties, unless terminated by operation of law or further order of this court.

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 24, 2019. 35 days' notice is required. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(9); LOCAL BANKR. R. 3015-1(d)(1). That requirement was met.

The Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(1), 9014-1(f)(1), and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(b). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Opposition having been filed, the court will address the merits of the motion at the hearing. If it appears at the hearing that disputed material factual issues remain to be resolved, a later evidentiary hearing will be set. LOCAL BANKR. R. 9014-1(g).

### The Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan is denied.

Roque Delarosa ("Debtor") seeks confirmation of the Amended Plan. Dckt. 50 (Declaration). The Amended Plan proposes 60 payments of \$1,670.00 and a 100% dividend to the general unsecured creditors. Dckt. 51 (Amended Plan). 11 U.S.C. § 1323 permits a debtor to amend a plan any time before confirmation.

#### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE'S OPPOSITION**

David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") filed an Opposition on March 5, 2019. Dckt. 55. The Chapter 13 Trustee asserts that Debtor is \$1,670.00 delinquent in plan payments, which represents one plan payment. Delinquency indicates that the Plan is not feasible and is reason to deny confirmation. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).

#### **DEBTOR'S RESPONSE:**

Debtor's counsel responded on March 25, 2019 that Debtor will be current by the hearing.

### **RULING:**

### At the hearing ----.

Absent evidence that the Debtor has made all required Plan payments, the Amended Plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323, and 1325(a) and is not confirmed.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Confirm the Amended Chapter 13 Plan filed by Roque Delarosa ("Debtor") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that the Motion to Confirm the Amended Plan is denied, and the proposed Chapter 13 Plan is not confirmed.

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**Tentative Ruling:** Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—Hearing Required.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 22, 2019. 35 days' notice is required. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2) (requiring twenty-one days' notice); LOCAL BANKR. R. 9014-1(f)(1)(B) (requiring fourteen days' notice for written opposition). That requirement was met.

The Motion to Sell Property has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). The defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered.

# The Motion to Sell Property is xxxxx.

The Bankruptcy Code permits Betty Walker, the Debtor, ("Movant") to sell property of the estate or under the confirmed plan after a noticed hearing. 11 U.S.C. §§ 363 and 1303. Here, Movant proposes to sell the real property commonly known as 747 Tuolumne Street, Vallejo, California ("Property").

The proposed purchaser of the Property is JP Enterprise Group, Inc., and the terms of the sale are:

A. Purchase price to be \$345,000.00.

### **CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE RESPONSE:**

On March 18, 2019 the Chapter 13 Trustee filed a response. Dckt. 130. The Trustee states that he does not oppose the proposed sale of the Property to be sold subject to the liens held by Umpqua Bankfor the first deed of trust and Solano County Tax Collector for property taxes. The Trustee notes, as the does the court, that the Motion did not include an estimated settlement statement.

### **DISCUSSION**

At the time of the hearing, the court announced the proposed sale and requested that all other persons interested in submitting overbids present them in open court. At the hearing, the following overbids were presented in open court: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.

Based on the evidence before the court, the court determines that the proposed sale is in the best interest of the Estate because the sale will pay in full all liens encumbering the property and will generate a proceeds for the for the estate.

The court notes that it appears a commission will be paid to the broker the motion does not explicitly states the commission percentage.

### At the hearing----.

Movant has estimated that a #### percent broker's commission from the sale of the Property will equal approximately \$xxxx.xx. As part of the sale in the best interest of the Estate, the court permits Movant to pay the broker a #### percent commission.

### Request for Waiver of Fourteen-Day Stay of Enforcement

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004(h) stays an order granting a motion to sell for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court but does not provide specific ground.

However, the stay is intended to provide the Debtor or the in habitants of the property time to move out of the property in an orderly fashion. Provided that Movant is the actual resident of the property the court will waive the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004(h), and this part of the requested relief is granted.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion to Sell Property filed by Betty Walker, the Debtor, ("Movant") having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that Betty Walker, the Debtor, is authorized to sell pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) to JP Enterprise Group, Inc. or nominee ("Buyer"), the Property commonly known as 747 Tuolumne Street, Vallejo, California ("Property"), on the following terms:

- A. The Property shall be sold to Buyer for \$345,000.00, on the terms and conditions set forth in the Purchase Agreement, Exhibit A, Dckt.126, and as further provided in this Order.
- B. The sale proceeds shall first be applied to closing costs, real estate

commissions, prorated real property taxes and assessments, liens, other customary and contractual costs and expenses incurred to effectuate the sale.

- C. The Debtor is authorized to execute any and all documents reasonably necessary to effectuate the sale.
- D. The Debtor is authorized to pay a real estate broker's commission in an amount equal to xx percent of the actual purchase price upon consummation of the sale. The xx percent commission shall be paid to broker, Gerri Kalk.
- E. No proceeds of the sale, including any commissions, fees, or other amounts, shall be paid directly or indirectly to the Chapter 13 Debtor. Within fourteen days of the close of escrow, the Chapter 13 Debtor shall provide the Chapter 13 Trustee with a copy of the Escrow Closing Statement. Any monies not disbursed to creditors holding claims secured by the property being sold or paying the fees and costs as allowed by this order, shall be disbursed to the Chapter 13 Trustee directly from escrow.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 6004(h) is waived for cause.

# FINAL RULINGS

10. <u>15-26192</u>-C-13 MRL-4

KRISTIE ALLENSWORTH Mikalah Liviakis MOTION FOR COMPENSATION FOR MIKALAH RAYMOND LIVIAKIS, DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY 2-24-19 [64]

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**Final Ruling:** No appearance at the April 2, 2019 hearing is required.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Sufficient Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 13 Trustee, creditors, parties requesting special notice, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 24, 2019. 35 days' notice is required. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(6) (requiring twenty-one days' notice when requested fees exceed \$1,000.00); LOCAL BANKR. R. 9014-1(f)(1)(B) (requiring fourteen days' notice for written opposition). That requirement was met.

The Motion for Allowance of Professional Fees has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

# The Motion for Allowance of Professional Fees is granted.

Mikalah Liviakis, the Attorney ("Applicant") for Kristie Allensworth, the Chapter 13 Debtor ("Client"), makes a Request for the Additional Allowance of Fees and Expenses in this case.

Fees are requested for the perio June 21, 2016 through February 24, 2019. Applicant requests fees in the amount of \$2,025.00 and costs in the amount of \$0.00.

The Trustee filed a statement of Non-Opposition to the request. Dkct. 70

#### APPLICABLE LAW

### **Statutory Basis For Professional Fees**

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3),

In determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to an examiner, trustee under chapter 11, or professional person, the court shall consider the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors, including—

- (A) the time spent on such services;
- (B) the rates charged for such services;
- (C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the completion of, a case under this title;
- (D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed;
- (E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and
- (F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.

Further, the court shall not allow compensation for,

- (i) unnecessary duplication of services; or
- (ii) services that were not—
  - (I) reasonably likely to benefit the debtor's estate;
  - (II) necessary to the administration of the case.

11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A). An attorney must "demonstrate only that the services were reasonably likely to benefit the estate at the time rendered," not that the services resulted in actual, compensable, material benefits to the estate. *Ferrette & Slatter v. United States Tr. (In re Garcia)*, 335 B.R. 717, 724 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (citing *Roberts, Sheridan & Kotel, P.C. v. Bergen Brunswig Drug Co. (In re Mednet)*, 251 B.R. 103, 108 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000)). The court may award interim fees for professionals pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 331, which award is subject to final review and allowance pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330.

#### **Reasonable Fees**

A bankruptcy court determines whether requested fees are reasonable by examining the circumstances of the attorney's services, the manner in which services were performed, and the results of the services, by asking:

- A. Were the services authorized?
- B. Were the services necessary or beneficial to the administration of the estate at the time they were rendered?

- C. Are the services documented adequately?
- D. Are the required fees reasonable given the factors in 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)?
- E. Did the attorney exercise reasonable billing judgment?

*In re Garcia*, 335 B.R. at 724 (citing *In re Mednet*, 251 B.R. at 108; *Leichty v. Neary (In re Strand)*, 375 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2004)).

## Reasonable Billing Judgment

Even if the court finds that the services billed by an attorney are "actual," meaning that the fee application reflects time entries properly charged for services, the attorney must still demonstrate that the work performed was necessary and reasonable. *Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.* (*In re Puget Sound Plywood*), 924 F.2d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 1991). An attorney must exercise good billing judgment with regard to the services provided because the court's authorization to employ an attorney to work in a bankruptcy case does not give that attorney "free reign to run up a [fees and expenses] tab without considering the maximum probable recovery," as opposed to a possible recovery. *Id.*; *see also Brosio v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.* (*In re Brosio*), 505 B.R. 903, 913 n.7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) ("Billing judgment is mandatory."). According to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, prior to working on a legal matter, the attorney is obligated to consider:

- (a) Is the burden of the probable cost of legal services disproportionately large in relation to the size of the estate and maximum probable recovery?
- (b) To what extent will the estate suffer if the services are not rendered?
- (c) To what extent may the estate benefit if the services are rendered and what is the likelihood of the disputed issues being resolved successfully?

In re Puget Sound Plywood, 924 F.2d at 958-59 (citing In re Wildman, 72 B.R. 700, 707 (N.D. Ill. 1987)).

A review of the application shows that Applicant's services for the Estate include approximately five and a half hours of work including preparing the fee application and preparing motions to incur debt for the purpose of allowing Debtor to sign two separate academic loans for Debtor's son to attend college. The court finds the services were beneficial to Client and the Estate and were reasonable.

### "No-Look" Fees

In this District, the Local Rules provide consumer counsel in Chapter 13 cases with an election for the allowance of fees in connection with the services required in obtaining confirmation of a plan and the services related thereto through the debtor obtaining a discharge. Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1 provides, in pertinent part,

(a) Compensation. Compensation paid to attorneys for the representation of chapter 13 debtors shall be determined according to Subpart (c) of this Local Bankruptcy Rule, unless a party-in-interest objects or the attorney opts out of Subpart (c). The failure of an attorney to file an executed copy of Form EDC 3-096, Rights and Responsibilities of Chapter 13 Debtors and Their Attorneys, shall signify that the

attorney has opted out of Subpart (c). When there is an objection or when an attorney opts out, compensation shall be determined in accordance with 11 U.S.C. §§ 329 and 330, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002, 2016, and 2017, and any other applicable authority."

. . .

- (c) Fixed Fees Approved in Connection with Plan Confirmation. The Court will, as part of the chapter 13 plan confirmation process, approve fees of attorneys representing chapter 13 debtors provided they comply with the requirements to this Subpart.
- (1) The maximum fee that may be charged is \$4,000.00 in nonbusiness cases, and \$6,000.00 in business cases.
- (2) The attorney for the chapter 13 debtor must file an executed copy of Form EDC 3-096, Rights and Responsibilities of Chapter 13 Debtors and Their Attorneys.
- (3) If the fee under this Subpart is not sufficient to fully and fairly compensate counsel for the legal services rendered in the case, the attorney may apply for additional fees. The fee permitted under this Subpart, however, is not a retainer that, once exhausted, automatically justifies a motion for additional fees. Generally, this fee will fairly compensate the debtor's attorney for all preconfirmation services and most postconfirmation services, such as reviewing the notice of filed claims, objecting to untimely claims, and modifying the plan to conform it to the claims filed. Only in instances where substantial and unanticipated post-confirmation work is necessary should counsel request additional compensation. Form EDC 3-095, Application and Declaration RE: Additional Fees and Expenses in Chapter 13 Cases, may be used when seeking additional fees. The necessity for a hearing on the application shall be governed by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(a)(6).

The Order Confirming the Chapter 13 Plan expressly provides that Applicant is allowed \$4,000.00 in attorneys' fees, the maximum set fee amount under Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1 at the time of confirmation. Dckt. 73. Applicant prepared the order confirming the Plan.

### **Lodestar Analysis**

If Applicant believes that there has been substantial and unanticipated legal services that have been provided, then such additional fees may be requested as provided in Local Bankruptcy Rule 2016-1(c)(3). The attorney may file a fee application, and the court will consider the fees to be awarded pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 329, 330, and 331. For bankruptcy cases in the Ninth Circuit, "the primary method" to determine whether a fee is reasonable is by using the lodestar analysis. *Marguiles Law Firm, APLC v. Placide (In re Placide)*, 459 B.R. 64, 73 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (citing *Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons (In re Yermakov)*, 718 F.2d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1983)). The lodestar analysis involves "multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate." *Id.* (citing *In re Yermakov*, 718 F.2d at 1471). "This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services." *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). A compensation award based on the lodestar is a presumptively reasonable fee. *In re Manoa Fin. Co.*, 853 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1988).

In rare or exceptional instances, if the court determines that the lodestar figure is unreasonably low or high, it may adjust the figure upward or downward based on certain factors. *Miller v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 827 F.2d 617, 620 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the court has considerable discretion in

determining the reasonableness of a professional's fees. *Gates v. Duekmejian*, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992). It is appropriate for the court to have this discretion "in view of the [court's] superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters." *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 437. Both the Ninth Circuit and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel have stated that departure from the lodestar analysis can be appropriate. *See In re Placide*, 459 B.R. at 73 (citing *Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. (In re Puget Sound Plywood)*, 924 F.2d 955, 960, 961 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the lodestar analysis is not mandated in all cases, thus allowing a court to employ alternative approaches when appropriate); *Digesti & Peck v. Kitchen Factors, Inc.* (*In re Kitchen Factors, Inc.*), 143 B.R. 560, 562 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) (stating that lodestar analysis is the primary method, but it is not the exclusive method)).

# FEES AND COSTS & EXPENSES REQUESTED

### **Fees**

Applicant provides a task billing analysis and supporting evidence for the services provided, which are described in the following main categories.

<u>Case Administration:</u> Applicant spent 4.2 hours in this category. Applicant prepared two motions to incur debt.

Fee Applications: Applicant spent 1.2 hours in this category.

The fees requested are computed by Applicant by multiplying the time expended providing the services multiplied by an hourly billing rate. The persons providing the services, the time for which compensation is requested, and the hourly rates are:

Names of Professionals and Experience	Time	<b>Hourly Rate</b>	Total Fees Computed Based on Time and Hourly Rate
Mikalah Liviakis	5.4	\$375.00	\$2,025.00
<b>Total Fees for Period of Application</b>			\$2,025.00

The unique facts surrounding the case, including two motions to incur debt, raise substantial and unanticipated work for the benefit of the Estate, Debtor, and parties in interest. The court finds that the hourly rates are reasonable and that Applicant effectively used appropriate rates for the services provided. The request for additional fees in the amount of \$2,025.00 is approved pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 and authorized to be paid by David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") from the available funds of the Plan in a manner consistent with the order of distribution in a Chapter 13 case under the confirmed Plan.

Applicant is allowed, and the Chapter 13 Trustee is authorized to pay, the following amounts as compensation to this professional in this case:

Fees \$2,025.00

pursuant to this Application as final fees pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 in this case.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Allowance of Fees and Expenses filed by Mikalah Liviakis ("Applicant"), Attorney having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that Mikalah Liviakis is allowed the following fees and expenses as a professional of the Estate:

Mikalah Liviakis, Professional Employed by Kristie Allensworth ("Debtor")

Fees in the amount of \$2,025.00

as the final allowance of fees and expenses pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 330 as counsel for Debtor.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that David Cusick ("the Chapter 13 Trustee") is authorized to pay the fees allowed by this Order from the available Plan Funds in a manner consistent with the order of distribution under the confirmed Plan.

11. <u>19-20002</u>-C-13 CHAREL/ALMA WINSTON <u>19-2002</u> David Barrett MOTION TO DISMISS ADVERSARY PROCEEDING 2-21-19 [9]

AF-1

WINSTON ET AL V. NGUYEN ET AL ADVERSARY PROCEEDING DISMISSED: 03/04/19

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No appearance at the April 2, 2019 hearing necessary. The above-referenced adversary proceeding was dismissed pursuant to court order on March 4, 2019. Dckt. 16.

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