

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

Eastern District of California

Honorable Michael S. McManus
Bankruptcy Judge
Sacramento, California

March 3, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

THIS CALENDAR IS DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. THEREFORE, TO FIND ALL MOTIONS AND OBJECTIONS SET FOR HEARING IN A PARTICULAR CASE, YOU MAY HAVE TO LOOK IN BOTH PARTS OF THE CALENDAR. WITHIN EACH PART, CASES ARE ARRANGED BY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE CASE NUMBER.

THE COURT FIRST WILL HEAR ITEMS 1 THROUGH 9. A TENTATIVE RULING FOLLOWS EACH OF THESE ITEMS. THE COURT MAY AMEND OR CHANGE A TENTATIVE RULING BASED ON THE PARTIES' ORAL ARGUMENT. IF ALL PARTIES AGREE TO A TENTATIVE RULING, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPEAR FOR ARGUMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS INCUMBENT ON EACH PARTY TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ALL OTHER PARTIES WILL ACCEPT A RULING AND FOREGO ORAL ARGUMENT. IF A PARTY APPEARS, THE HEARING WILL PROCEED WHETHER OR NOT ALL PARTIES ARE PRESENT. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE COURT WILL ANNOUNCE ITS DISPOSITION OF THE ITEM AND IT MAY DIRECT THAT THE TENTATIVE RULING, AS ORIGINALLY WRITTEN OR AS AMENDED BY THE COURT, BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES OF THE HEARING AS THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

IF A MOTION OR AN OBJECTION IS SET FOR HEARING PURSUANT TO LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3015-1(c), (d) [eff. May 1, 2012], GENERAL ORDER 05-03, ¶ 3(c), LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 3007-1(c)(2) [eff. through April 30, 2012], OR LOCAL BANKRUPTCY RULE 9014-1(f)(2), RESPONDENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION TO THE RELIEF REQUESTED. RESPONDENTS MAY APPEAR AT THE HEARING AND RAISE OPPOSITION ORALLY. IF THAT OPPOSITION RAISES A POTENTIALLY MERITORIOUS DEFENSE OR ISSUE, THE COURT WILL GIVE THE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE WRITTEN OPPOSITION AND SET A FINAL HEARING UNLESS THERE IS NO NEED TO DEVELOP THE WRITTEN RECORD FURTHER. IF THE COURT SETS A FINAL HEARING, UNLESS THE PARTIES REQUEST A DIFFERENT SCHEDULE THAT IS APPROVED BY THE COURT, THE FINAL HEARING WILL TAKE PLACE ON MARCH 31, 2014 AT 1:30 P.M. OPPOSITION MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY MARCH 17, 2014, AND ANY REPLY MUST BE FILED AND SERVED BY MARCH 24, 2014. THE MOVING/OBJECTING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE DATE AND TIME OF THE CONTINUED HEARING DATE AND OF THESE DEADLINES.

THERE WILL BE NO HEARING ON THE ITEMS IN THE SECOND PART OF THE CALENDAR, ITEMS 10 THROUGH 23. INSTEAD, EACH OF THESE ITEMS HAS BEEN DISPOSED OF AS INDICATED IN THE FINAL RULING BELOW. THAT RULING WILL BE APPENDED TO THE MINUTES. THIS FINAL RULING MAY OR MAY NOT BE A FINAL ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS; IF IT IS, IT INCLUDES THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. IF ALL PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO A CONTINUANCE OR HAVE RESOLVED THE MATTER BY STIPULATION, THEY MUST ADVISE THE COURTROOM DEPUTY CLERK PRIOR TO HEARING IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT VACATE THE FINAL RULING IN FAVOR OF THE CONTINUANCE OR THE STIPULATED DISPOSITION.

IF THE COURT CONCLUDES THAT FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014(d) REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, UNLESS OTHERWISE ORDERED, IT WILL BE SET ON MARCH 10, 2014, AT 2:30 P.M.

March 3, 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

Matters to be Called for Argument

1. 13-36124-A-13 FRANCISCO AGREDANO MOTION TO
CAH-4 ESQUIVIAS AND ROSA GUZMAN CONFIRM PLAN
1-21-14 [31]

- Telephone Appearance
 Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be denied and the objection will be sustained.

In violation of 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-1(c) the debtor has failed to provide the trustee with employer payment advices for the 60-day period preceding the filing of the petition. The withholding of this financial information from the trustee is a breach of the duties imposed upon the debtor by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(3) & (a)(4) and the attempt to confirm a plan while withholding this relevant financial information is bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).

2. 13-36124-A-13 FRANCISCO AGREDANO COUNTER MOTION TO
CAH-4 ESQUIVIAS AND ROSA GUZMAN DISMISS CASE
2-6-14 [43]

- Telephone Appearance
 Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be conditionally denied.

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the prejudice to creditors will be substantial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

3. 13-34650-A-13 HOLLY BELLAMY OBJECTION TO
JPJ-1 CONFIRMATION OF PLAN AND MOTION TO
DISMISS CASE
12-23-13 [19]

- Telephone Appearance
 Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The objection will be sustained and the motion to dismiss the case will be conditionally denied.

The plan does not comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) because unsecured creditors would receive at least \$46,542.90 in a chapter 7 liquidation as of the effective date of the plan. This dividend may increase because the debtor has failed to schedule an interest in a motor vehicle. Because the plan will pay only \$18,269.82 to unsecured creditors, it does not comply with section 1325(a)(4).

Because the plan proposed by the debtor is not confirmable, the debtor will be given a further opportunity to confirm a plan. But, if the debtor is unable to confirm a plan within a reasonable period of time, the court concludes that the

prejudice to creditors will be prejudicial and that there will then be cause for dismissal. If the debtor has not confirmed a plan within 75 days, the case will be dismissed on the trustee's ex parte application.

4. 14-21055-A-13 MARK/JENNIFER GALISATUS MOTION TO
DMD-1 EXTEND AUTOMATIC STAY
2-14-14 [16]
- Telephone Appearance
 - Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion will be granted in part.

This is the second chapter 13 case filed by the debtor. A prior case was dismissed within one year of the most recent petition.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) provides that if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending within the preceding one-year period but was dismissed, the automatic stay with respect to a debt, property securing such debt, or any lease terminates on the 30th day after the filing of the new case.

Section 362(c)(3)(B) allows a debtor to file a motion requesting the continuation of the stay. A review of the docket reveals that the debtor has filed this motion to extend the automatic stay before the 30th day after the filing of the petition. The motion will be adjudicated before the 30-day period expires.

In order to extend the automatic stay, the party seeking the relief must demonstrate that the filing of the new case was in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. For example, in In re Whitaker, 341 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006), the court held: "[T]he chief means of rebutting the presumption of bad faith requires the movant to establish 'a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor . . . or any other reason to conclude' that the instant case will be successful. If the instant case is one under chapter 7, a discharge must now be permissible. If it is a case under chapters 11 or 13, there must be some substantial change."

Here, it appears that the debtor was unable to maintain plan payments in the first case due to the amount of the tax claims. Now that the size of the tax debt is known, the debtor has scaled back expenses to free up additional funds to pay that debt. This is a sufficient change in circumstances rebut the presumption of bad faith.

property of the debtors. Put differently, the IRS may still enforce its claim against the former community property of the spouses. See Ordlock v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2008). Because the objection fails to establish that the plan is funded by something other than former community property, the claim cannot be disallowed.

7. 13-35262-A-13 ADAM TREMOUREUX AND DONA MOTION TO
ADR-1 LEVY-TREMOUREUX VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. DIAMONDS RESORT INTERNATIONAL 12-23-13 [15]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The motion will be granted and the objection will be overruled.

The debtor seeks to value a vacation timeshare at \$12,000. The creditor secured by that timeshare objects, maintaining that it has a value of \$28,332.

First, the motion is accompanied by the debtor's declaration which includes a lay opinion of the timeshare's value. Contrary to the assertion in the objection, the debtor's opinion is admissible and it is admissible even though it does not include detail as to the reasons for the debtor's opinion.

As the owner of the timeshare, the debtor is entitled to express an opinion as to the vehicle's value. See Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

Any opinion of value by the owner must be expressed without giving a reason for the valuation. Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08). Indeed, unless the owner also qualifies as an expert, it is improper for the owner to give a detailed recitation of the basis for the opinion. Only an expert qualified under Fed. R. Evid. 702 may rely on and testify as to facts "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject. . . ." Fed. R. Evid. 703. "For example, the average debtor-homeowner who testifies in opposition to a motion for relief from the § 362 automatic stay, should be limited to giving his opinion as to the value of his home, but should not be allowed to testify concerning what others have told him concerning the value of his or comparable properties unless, the debtor truly qualifies as an expert under Rule 702 such as being a real estate broker, etc." Barry Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 701.2, p. 1278-79 (2007-08).

Second, the contrary evidence offered by the creditor, a hearsay statement repeating the hearsay statements of an Internet site that allegedly records resales of timeshares, is not admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 801. And, while Fed. R. Evid. 803(17) excepts from the hearsay rule market compilations generally used and relied upon by the public, no foundation was laid establishing that the values reported by this Internet site meet this criteria. This problem remains despite a continuance to give the respondent time to cure the evidentiary problem.

Third, the assertion that a timeshare is a luxury item that the debtor's plan may not pay because it is not necessary to an effective reorganization might be relevant to confirmation of the plan but it has no bearing on the value of the timeshare.

8. 08-39270-A-13 STEFAN/GINA HADL
LC-4

MOTION TO
INCUR DEBT
2-14-14 [89]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: Because less than 28 days' notice of the hearing was given by the debtor, this motion is deemed brought pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(2). Consequently, the creditors, the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, and any other parties in interest were not required to file a written response or opposition to the motion. If any of these potential respondents appear at the hearing and offers opposition to the motion, the court will set a briefing schedule and a final hearing unless there is no need to develop the record further. If no opposition is offered at the hearing, the court will take up the merits of the motion. Below is the court's tentative ruling, rendered on the assumption that there will be no opposition to the motion. Obviously, if there is opposition, the court may reconsider this tentative ruling.

The motion to incur a purchase money loan in order to purchase a new home will be granted. The motion establishes a need for the home and it does not appear that repayment of the loan will unduly jeopardize the debtor's performance of the plan given that the debtor's performance of the plan is complete or nearly complete.

9. 14-20086-A-13 DANETTE PALLADINO

ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
2-10-14 [20]

- Telephone Appearance
- Trustee Agrees with Ruling

Tentative Ruling: The case will be dismissed.

The debtor was given permission to pay the filing fee in installments pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b). The installment in the amount of \$70 due on February 5 was not paid. This is cause for dismissal. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(2).

THE FINAL RULINGS BEGIN HERE

10. 10-39100-A-13 SERGEV NEMOLYAEV AND MOTION TO
PGM-8 IRINA SHULGINA APPROVE LOAN MODIFICATION
1-30-14 [143]

Final Ruling: This motion to modify a home loan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(b) and 9014-1(f)(1), and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(b). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The debtor is authorized but not required to enter into the proposed modification. To the extent the modification is inconsistent with the confirmed plan, the debtor shall continue to perform the plan as confirmed until it is modified.

11. 14-20818-A-13 SCOTT/FRANCES KILGORE MOTION TO
MS-1 VALUE COLLATERAL
VS. SAFE CREDIT UNION 1-30-14 [8]

Final Ruling: This valuation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted.

The debtor seeks to value the debtor's residence at a fair market value of \$194,285 as of the date the petition was filed. It is encumbered by a first deed of trust held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. The first deed of trust secures a loan with a balance of approximately \$218,852.55 as of the petition date. Therefore, Safe Credit Union's claim secured by a junior deed of trust is completely under-collateralized. No portion of this claim will be allowed as a secured claim. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).

Any assertion that the respondent's claim cannot be modified because it is secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence is disposed of by In re Zimmer, 313 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2002) and In re Lam, 211 B.R. 36 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997). See also In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000); McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 611-13 (3rd Cir. 2000); and Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).

Because the claim is completely under-secured, no interest need be paid on the claim except to the extent otherwise required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). If the secured claim is \$0, because the value of the respondent's collateral is \$0, no interest need be paid pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

Any argument that the plan, by valuing the respondent's security and providing the above treatment, violates In re Hobdy, 130 B.R. 318 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991), will be overruled. The plan is not an objection to the respondent's proof of claim pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007 and 11 U.S.C. § 502. The plan makes provision for the treatment of the claim and all other claims, and a separate valuation motion has been filed and served as permitted by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). The plan was served by the trustee on all creditors, and the motion to value collateral was served by the debtor with a notice that the collateral for the respondent's claim would be valued. That motion is supported by a declaration of the debtor as to the value of the real property. There is nothing about the process for considering the valuation motion which amounts to a denial of due process.

To the extent the respondent objects to valuation of its collateral in a contested matter rather than an adversary proceeding, the objection is overruled. Valuations pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3012 are contested matters and do not require the filing of an adversary proceeding. Further, even if considered in the nature of a claim objection, an adversary proceeding is not required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3007. It is only when such a motion or objection is joined with a request to determine the extent, validity or priority of a security interest, or a request to avoid a lien that an adversary proceeding is required. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(2). The court is not determining the validity of a claim or avoiding a lien or security interest. The respondent's deed of trust will remain of record until the plan is completed. This is required by 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I). Once the plan is completed, if the respondent will not reconvey its deed of trust, the court will entertain an adversary proceeding. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(I).

In the meantime, the court is merely valuing the respondent's collateral. Rule 3012 specifies that this is done by motion. Rule 3012 motions can be filed and heard any time during the case. It is particularly appropriate that such motions be heard in connection with the confirmation of a plan. The value of collateral will set the upper bounds of the amount of the secured claim. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Knowing the amount and character of claims is vital to assessing the feasibility of a plan, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6), and determining whether the treatment accorded to secured claims complies with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).

To the extent the creditor objects to the debtor's opinion of value, that objection is also overruled, particularly in light of its failure to file any contrary evidence of value. According to the debtor, the residence has a fair market value of \$194,285. Evidence in the form of the debtor's declaration supports the valuation motion. The debtor may testify regarding the value of property owned by the debtor. Fed. R. Evid. 701; So. Central Livestock Dealers, Inc., v. Security State Bank, 614 F.2d 1056, 1061 (5th Cir. 1980).

12. 14-20818-A-13 SCOTT/FRANCES KILGORE MOTION TO
MS-2 AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN
VS. CACH, L.L.C. 1-30-14 [12]

Final Ruling: This motion to avoid a judicial lien has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the

trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). The subject real property has a value of \$194,285 as of the date of the petition. The unavoidable liens total \$218,852.55. The debtor has an available exemption of \$1. The respondent holds a judicial lien created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment in the chain of title of the subject real property. After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is no equity to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of this judicial lien impairs the debtor's exemption of the real property and its fixing is avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

13. 14-20818-A-13 SCOTT/FRANCES KILGORE MOTION TO
MS-3 AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 1-30-14 [14]

Final Ruling: This motion to avoid a judicial lien has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). The subject real property has a value of \$194,285 as of the date of the petition. The unavoidable liens total \$218,852.55. The debtor has an available exemption of \$1. The respondent holds a judicial lien created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment in the chain of title of the subject real property. After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is no equity to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of this judicial lien impairs the debtor's exemption of the real property and its fixing is avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

14. 14-20818-A-13 SCOTT/FRANCES KILGORE MOTION TO
MS-4 AVOID JUDICIAL LIEN
VS. SACRAMENTO CREDIT UNION 1-30-14 [20]

Final Ruling: This motion to avoid a judicial lien has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the trustee and the respondent creditor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the trustee and the respondent creditor are entered

and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A). The subject real property has a value of \$194,285 as of the date of the petition. The unavoidable liens total \$218,852.55. The debtor has an available exemption of \$1. The respondent holds a judicial lien created by the recordation of an abstract of judgment in the chain of title of the subject real property. After application of the arithmetical formula required by 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A), there is no equity to support the judicial lien. Therefore, the fixing of this judicial lien impairs the debtor's exemption of the real property and its fixing is avoided subject to 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(B).

15. 13-35028-A-13 GARRY BERNARDS OBJECTION TO
JPJ-2 EXEMPTIONS
1-29-14 [30]

Final Ruling: The court finds that a hearing will not be helpful to its consideration and resolution of this matter. Accordingly, it is removed from calendar for resolution without oral argument.

The objection will be dismissed as moot because the debtor has amended his exemptions and the amendment, at facially, resolves the trustee's objection. To the extent it does not, the trustee may interpose that objection, and any others he may have to the amended exemptions.

16. 13-33731-A-13 ARBERZINE FISHER MOTION TO
JPJ-2 CONVERT OR DISMISS CASE
1-30-14 [51]

Final Ruling: The motion will be dismissed as moot. The case was dismissed at the request of the debtor on February 20, 2014.

17. 13-35935-A-13 JODY MARQUEZ OBJECTION TO
JPJ-2 EXEMPTIONS
2-6-14 [29]

Final Ruling: This objection to the debtor's exemptions has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the debtor's default is entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained.

The trustee objects to all of the debtor's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(b) exemptions claimed on Schedule C. The trustee argues that because the debtor is married and because the debtor's spouse has not joined in the chapter 13 petition, the debtor must file his spouse's waiver of right to claim exemptions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(a)(2). This was not done.

A debtor's exemptions are determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 314 (1991); see also In re Chappell, 373

B.R. 73, 77 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "critical date for determining exemption rights is the petition date"). Thus, the court applies the facts and law existing on the date the case was commenced to determine the nature and extent of the debtor's exemptions.

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) permits the states to opt out of the federal exemption statutory scheme set forth in section 522(d). In enacting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.130, the State of California opted out of the federal exemption scheme relegating a debtor to whatever exemptions are provided under state law. Thus, substantive issues regarding the allowance or disallowance of a claimed exemption are governed by state law in California.

California state law gives debtors filing for bankruptcy the right to choose (1) a set of state law exemptions similar but not identical to the Bankruptcy Code exemptions; or (2) California's regular non-bankruptcy exemptions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 703.130, 703.140. In the case of a married debtor, if either spouse files for bankruptcy individually, California's regular non-bankruptcy exemptions apply unless, while the bankruptcy case is pending, both spouses waive in writing the right to claim the regular non-bankruptcy state exemptions in any bankruptcy proceeding filed by the other spouse. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(a)(2).

Here, the debtor is asserting the exemptions of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(b), which require a spousal waiver. That waiver was not filed. Therefore, the objection will be sustained. This is without prejudice to the right of the debtor to claim amended exemptions.

18. 12-33539-A-13 DAVID/LORETTA WELCH MOTION TO
EJS-3 MODIFY PLAN
1-21-14 [37]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

19. 13-25246-A-13 CORNELIUS/GLENDA MOTION TO
NUU-5 WESTBROOK MODIFY PLAN
1-23-14 [65]

Final Ruling: This motion to confirm a modified plan proposed after confirmation of a plan has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rules 3015-1(d)(2) and 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 3015(g). The failure of the trustee, the U.S. Trustee, creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53

(9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the debtor, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the respondents' defaults are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion will be granted. The modified plan complies with 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a) & (b), 1323(c), 1325(a), and 1329.

20. 10-33562-A-13 LAKISCHA FULLARD MOTION TO
PGM-4 APPROVE COMPENSATION OF DEBTOR'S
ATTORNEY (FEES \$1,380)
1-25-14 [104]

Final Ruling: This compensation motion has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) and Fed. R. Bankr. R. 2002(a)(6). The failure of the trustee, the debtor, the United States Trustee, the creditors, and any other party in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the above-mentioned parties in interest are entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The motion seeks approval of \$1,380 in fees. The foregoing represents reasonable compensation for actual, necessary, and beneficial services rendered to the debtor. This compensation was for services related to attempting to obtain a home loan modification and modifying the plan. The motion will be granted. Any retainer may be drawn upon and the balance of the approved compensation is to be paid directly by the debtors and not through the plan provided the debtors and their counsel sign and file a statement that they agree to this method of payment. Otherwise, payment shall be through the plan and if that is not feasible, the debtors shall modify the plan.

21. 13-34282-A-13 KAMIYAR MALEKY ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
2-10-14 [34]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be dismissed because it is moot. The case was dismissed on February 20.

22. 13-35585-A-13 ROBERT CORONADO OBJECTION TO
JPJ-2 EXEMPTIONS
2-6-14 [31]

Final Ruling: This objection to the debtor's exemptions has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the debtor to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered as consent to the granting of the motion. Cf. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the objecting party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. See Boone v. Burk (In re Eliapo), 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the debtor's default is entered and the matter will be resolved without oral argument.

The objection will be sustained.

The trustee objects to all of the debtor's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(b) exemptions claimed on Schedule C. The trustee argues that because the debtor is married and because the debtor's spouse has not joined in the chapter 13 petition, the debtor must file his spouse's waiver of right to claim exemptions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(a)(2). This was not done.

A debtor's exemptions are determined as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 314 (1991); see also In re Chappell, 373 B.R. 73, 77 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "critical date for determining exemption rights is the petition date"). Thus, the court applies the facts and law existing on the date the case was commenced to determine the nature and extent of the debtor's exemptions.

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) permits the states to opt out of the federal exemption statutory scheme set forth in section 522(d). In enacting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.130, the State of California opted out of the federal exemption scheme relegating a debtor to whatever exemptions are provided under state law. Thus, substantive issues regarding the allowance or disallowance of a claimed exemption are governed by state law in California.

California state law gives debtors filing for bankruptcy the right to choose (1) a set of state law exemptions similar but not identical to the Bankruptcy Code exemptions; or (2) California's regular non-bankruptcy exemptions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 703.130, 703.140. In the case of a married debtor, if either spouse files for bankruptcy individually, California's regular non-bankruptcy exemptions apply unless, while the bankruptcy case is pending, both spouses waive in writing the right to claim the regular non-bankruptcy state exemptions in any bankruptcy proceeding filed by the other spouse. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(a)(2).

Here, the debtor is asserting the exemptions of Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.140(b), which require a spousal waiver. That waiver was not filed. Therefore, the objection will be sustained. This is without prejudice to the right of the debtor to claim amended exemptions.

23. 13-34296-A-13 CHRISTY NAVARRO

ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE
2-10-14 [44]

Final Ruling: The order to show cause will be dismissed and the case will remain pending. The court granted the debtor permission to pay the filing fee in installments. The debtor failed to pay the \$70 installment when due on February 5. However, after the issuance of the order to show cause, the delinquent installment was paid. No prejudice was caused by the late payment.