

**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**

Eastern District of California

**Honorable Ronald H. Sargis**

Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Modesto, California

**February 23, 2017, at 10:00 a.m.**

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1. [17-90005](#)-E-7      **KEITH/MELISSA CHHIENG**      **MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM**  
**EAT-1**      **Pro Se**      **AUTOMATIC STAY**  
                **1-26-17 [15]**  
  
**U.S. BANK NATIONAL**  
**ASSOCIATION VS.**

**Final Ruling:** No appearance at the February 23, 2017 hearing is required.

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor (*pro se*), Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on January 26, 2017. By the court's calculation, 28 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

<p><b>The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.</b></p>
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Keith Chhieng and Melissa Chhieng ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on January 4, 2017. U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QO2 ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to the real property commonly known as 808 Fallen Leaf Lane, Modesto, California ("Property"). Movant has provided the Declaration of Mary Gracia to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation secured by the Property.

**February 23, 2017, at 10:00 a.m.**

The Gracia Declaration states that there are ten pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$12,735.39.

## **DISCUSSION**

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the total debt secured by this property is determined to be \$203,549.93 (including \$203,549.93 secured by Movant's first deed of trust), as stated in the Gracia Declaration. The value of the Property is determined to be \$185,000.00, as stated in Schedules A and D.

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay, including defaults in pre-petition payments that have come due. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property's value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Property for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Property, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale to obtain possession of the Property.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests, for no particular reason, that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court. With no grounds for such relief specified, the court will not grant additional relief merely stated in the prayer.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

## REQUEST FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Movant makes an **additional request stated in the prayer**, for which no grounds are clearly stated in the Motion. Movant's further relief requested in the prayer is that this court make this order, **as opposed to every other order issued by the court**, binding and effective despite any conversion of this case to another chapter of the Code. Though stated in the prayer, no grounds are stated in the Motion for grounds for such relief from the stay. The Motion presumes that conversion of the bankruptcy case will be reimposed if this case were converted to one under another Chapter.

As stated above, Movant's Motion does not state any grounds for such relief. Movant does not allege that notwithstanding an order granting relief from the automatic stay, a stealth stay continues in existence, waiting to spring to life and render prior orders of this court granting relief from the stay invalid and rendering all acts taken by parties in reliance on that order void.

No points and authorities is provided in support of the Motion. This is not unusual for a relatively simple (in a legal authorities sense) motion for relief from stay as the one before the court. Other than referencing the court to the legal basis (11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) or (4)) and then pleading adequate grounds thereunder, it is not necessary for a movant to provide a copy of the statute quotations from well known cases. However, if a movant is seeking relief from a possible future stay, which may arise upon conversion, the legal points and authorities for such heretofore unknown nascent stay is necessary.

As noted by another bankruptcy judge, such (unsupported by any grounds or legal authority) for relief of a future stay in the same bankruptcy case:

[A] request for an order stating that the court's termination of the automatic stay will be binding despite conversion of the case to another chapter unless a specific exception is provided by the Bankruptcy Code is a common, albeit silly, request in a stay relief motion and does not require an adversary proceeding. Settled bankruptcy law recognizes that the order remains effective in such circumstances. Hence, the proposed provision is merely declarative of existing law and is not appropriate to include in a stay relief order.

Indeed, requests for including in orders provisions that are declarative of existing law are not innocuous. First, the mere fact that counsel finds it necessary to ask for such a ruling fosters the misimpression that the law is other than it is. Moreover, one who routinely makes such unnecessary requests may eventually have to deal with an opponent who uses the fact of one's pattern of making such requests as that lawyer's concession that the law is not as it is.

*In re Van Ness*, 399 B.R. 897, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing *Aloyan v. Campos (In re Campos)*, 128 B.R. 790, 791–92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); *In re Greetis*, 98 B.R. 509, 513 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)).

As noted in the 2009 ruling quoted above, the “silly” request for unnecessary relief may well be ultimately deemed an admission by U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee for Residential Accredited Loans, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QO2 and its counsel that all orders granting relief from the automatic stay are immediately terminated as to any relief granted U.S. Bank

National Association, As Trustee for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QO2 and other creditors represented by counsel, and upon conversion, any action taken by such creditor is a *per se* violation of the automatic stay. FN.1.

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FN.1. The requesting of relief from which no legal basis exists raises serious questions for the court and issues for counsel and Movant. If Movant (whichever attorney it uses) or counsel for Movant in this case continue in requesting such improper relief the court will, at a minimum, order an evidentiary hearing to be conducted, with counsel and senior management of the movant appearing, in person with no telephonic appearances permitted, to present the court with their best case for such “silly relief.” If such relief is not warranted and the certifications made pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 have been breached, both counsel and the client can expect appropriate sanctions issued, with a sufficient number of zeros after the dollar sign for a billion dollar creditor to correct its conduct in all federal courts across the nation.

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No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue an order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QO2 (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** that the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow U.S. Bank National Association, As Trustee for Residential Accredit Loans, Inc., Mortgage Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2006-QO2, its agents, representatives, and successors, and trustee under the trust deed, and any other beneficiary or trustee, and their respective agents and successors under any trust deed that is recorded against the Property to secure an obligation to exercise any and all rights arising under the promissory note, trust deed, and applicable nonbankruptcy law to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and for the purchaser at any such sale to obtain possession of the real property commonly known as 808 Fallen Leaf Lane, Modesto, California.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is not waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.

2. [16-91133-E-7](#) **BARRY/SHANA PETERSON** **MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM**

**MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL  
SERVICES USA LLC VS.**

**Tentative Ruling:** The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). The failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least 14 days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(ii) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995).

Oral argument may be presented by the parties at the scheduled hearing, where the parties shall address the issues identified in this tentative ruling and such other issues as are necessary and appropriate to the court's resolution of the matter.

**Below is the court's tentative ruling.**

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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Not Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on February 9, 2017. By the court's calculation, 14 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has not been properly set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

**The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is denied without prejudice.**

Barry Peterson and Shana Peterson ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on December 23, 2016. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2014 Mercedes Benz M2PV144, VIN ending in 2070 ("Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Elizabeth Lugo to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by the Debtor.

## **IMPROPER NOTICE PROVIDED**

Movant filed this Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay on February 9, 2017, using the procedure provided in Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). That Rule and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a) require at least twenty-eight days' notice to be provided for the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay.

The Notice of Hearing instructs the Chapter 7 Trustee and Debtor:

“PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to Local Rules 9014-1(d)(3) and 9014-1(1)(1), opposition, if any, to the granting of the motion shall be in writing and must be filed with the clerk of this Court and served on Movant's counsel at the address listed in the upper left hand corner of the first page of this document, and the Chapter 7 Trustee, Michael D. McGranahan, P.O. Box 5018, Modesto, CA 95352, not less than fourteen (14) days prior to the above-stated hearing date.”

Notice, p. 2:6-10; Dckt. 13. This is an accurate statement of the requirements under Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1) for opposition, if any, to a motion noticed under that procedure. Unfortunately, Movant did not give at least 28 days notice, but only 14 days. Read literally, any opposition would have to have been filed before the motion was received by the Debtor and Trustee. It appears that in preparing the notice Movant mistakenly used the 14-day notice provisions of Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014(f)(2) in picking the hearing date, but then erroneously used a Rule (f)(1) notice form.

Generally, the court denies without prejudice such improperly noticed motions to avoid any confusion as to the rights of the parties. The court notes that the attorneys preparing the motion appear regularly in this court and this is not a common (if it ever previously occurred) problem with them. It appears to just have been human error.

On the Statement of Intention filed by Debtor, no provision is made for this claim or Debtor's retention of the vehicle which secures the claim. Dckt. 1 at 50-51. As discussed below, by Movant's calculations (using a NADA retail sale valuation), the claim is undersecured by (\$5,000). Even using Debtor's value from Schedule B, the claim is undersecured by (\$3,000).

The Chapter 7 Trustee has filed a Report of No Distribution in this Chapter 7 case, demonstrating that the Trustee has found no assets of value to administer. February 7, 2017 Docket Entry Report. This includes the Trustee's review of the vehicle securing Movant's claim. This indicates that the Trustee sees no value in the vehicle for the estate, and no reason to oppose the Motion.

On Schedule C, Debtor does not claim an exemption in this vehicle. Dckt. 1 at 19-21.

Though the court could deny the motion without prejudice and have counsel refile the motion, or issue a modest monetary sanction, neither are necessary – this notice period glitch is just simple human error for which no corrective “opportunity” is warranted to make this a “teachable moment.” Requiring a new motion may well be contrary to the desires of Debtor and Trustee, which may be to get the vehicle out of their hands (and any potential liability) as soon as possible.

The court waives the defect in service and shortens time for notice to 14-days. **Opposition presented orally at the hearing, if any, was considered by the court.**

### **CONSIDERATION OF MOTION**

The Lugo Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made one post-petition payment, with a total of \$1,182.94 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there are three pre-petition payments in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$4,191.98.

Movant has also provided a copy of the NADA Valuation Report for the Vehicle. The Report has been properly authenticated and is accepted as a market report or commercial publication generally relied on by the public or by persons in the automobile sale business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(17).

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$39,801.26, as stated in the Lugo Declaration, while the value of the Vehicle is determined to be \$38,000.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor, which is more than the retail value of \$33,825.00 stated in the NADA Valuation Report.

### **Granting of Relief**

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay because the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

A debtor has no equity in property when the liens against the property exceed the property's value. *Stewart v. Gurley*, 745 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984). Once a movant under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) establishes that a debtor or estate has no equity in property, it is the burden of the debtor or trustee to establish that the collateral at issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2); *United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1988). Based upon the evidence submitted, the court determines that there is no equity in the Vehicle for either the Debtor or the Estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2). This being a Chapter 7 case, the Property is *per se* not necessary for an effective reorganization. *See In re Preuss*, 15 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981).

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests, for no particular reason, that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court. With no grounds for such relief specified, the court will not grant additional relief merely stated in the prayer.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

## REQUEST FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Movant makes an **additional request stated in the prayer**, for which no grounds are clearly stated in the Motion. Movant's further relief requested in the prayer is that this court make this order, **as opposed to every other order issued by the court**, binding and effective despite any conversion of this case to another chapter of the Code. Though stated in the prayer, no grounds are stated in the Motion for grounds for such relief from the stay. The Motion presumes that conversion of the bankruptcy case will be reimposed if this case were converted to one under another Chapter.

As stated above, Movant's Motion does not state any grounds for such relief. Movant does not allege that notwithstanding an order granting relief from the automatic stay, a stealth stay continues in existence, waiting to spring to life and render prior orders of this court granting relief from the stay invalid and rendering all acts taken by parties in reliance on that order void.

As noted by another bankruptcy judge, such (unsupported by any grounds or legal authority) for relief of a future stay in the same bankruptcy case:

[A] request for an order stating that the court's termination of the automatic stay will be binding despite conversion of the case to another chapter unless a specific exception is provided by the Bankruptcy Code is a common, albeit silly, request in a stay relief motion and does not require an adversary proceeding. Settled bankruptcy law recognizes that the order remains effective in such circumstances. Hence, the proposed provision is merely declarative of existing law and is not appropriate to include in a stay relief order.

Indeed, requests for including in orders provisions that are declarative of existing law are not innocuous. First, the mere fact that counsel finds it necessary to ask for such a ruling fosters the misimpression that the law is other than it is. Moreover, one who routinely makes such unnecessary requests may eventually have to deal with an opponent who uses the fact of one's pattern of making such requests as that lawyer's concession that the law is not as it is.

*In re Van Ness*, 399 B.R. 897, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing *Aloyan v. Campos (In re Campos)*, 128 B.R. 790, 791–92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); *In re Greetis*, 98 B.R. 509, 513 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)).

As noted in the 2009 ruling quoted above, the “silly” request for unnecessary relief may well be ultimately deemed an admission by Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC and its counsel that all orders granting relief from the automatic stay are immediately terminated as to any relief granted Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC and other creditors represented by counsel, and upon conversion, any action taken by such creditor is a *per se* violation of the automatic stay. FN.1.

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FN.1. While counsel and Movant may have received the benefit of the doubt and given relief from the mistake as to notice, continued requests for relief which is not warranted will not be treated similarly. If Movant (whichever attorney it uses) or counsel for Movant in this case continue in requesting such improper relief the court will, at a minimum, order an evidentiary hearing to be conducted, with counsel and senior management of the movant appearing, in person with no telephonic appearances permitted, to present the court with their best case for such “silly relief.” If such relief is not warranted and the certifications made pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 have been breached, both counsel and the client can expect appropriate sanctions issued, with a sufficient number of zeros after the dollar sign for a billion dollar creditor to correct its conduct in all federal courts across the nation.

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No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay filed by Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA LLC (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2014 Mercedes Benz M2PV144, VIN ending in 2070 (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is not waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.

3. [16-91087](#)-E-7      **MILTON/LINDA BETTINCOURT**      **MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM**  
**WFM-1**      **Seth Hanson**      **AUTOMATIC STAY**  
1-19-17 [[12](#)]

**BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. VS.**

**Final Ruling:** No appearance at the February 23, 2017 hearing is required.  
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Local Rule 9014-1(f)(1) Motion—No Opposition Filed.

Correct Notice Provided. The Proof of Service states that the Motion and supporting pleadings were served on Debtor, Debtor's Attorney, Chapter 7 Trustee, and Office of the United States Trustee on January 19, 2017. By the court's calculation, 35 days' notice was provided. 28 days' notice is required.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay has been set for hearing on the notice required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1). Failure of the respondent and other parties in interest to file written opposition at least fourteen days prior to the hearing as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 9014-1(f)(1)(B) is considered to be the equivalent of a statement of nonopposition. *Cf. Ghazali v. Moran*, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a court ruling based upon a local rule construing a party's failure to file opposition as consent to grant a motion). Further, because the court will not materially alter the relief requested by the moving party, an actual hearing is unnecessary. *See Law Offices of David A. Boone v. Derham-Burk (In re Eliapo)*, 468 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the defaults of the non-responding parties and other parties in interest are entered. Upon review of the record, there are no disputed material factual issues, and the matter will be resolved without oral argument. The court will issue its ruling from the parties' pleadings.

**The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay is granted.**

Milton Bettincourt and Linda Bettincourt ("Debtor") commenced this bankruptcy case on December 5, 2016. Bank of America, N.A. ("Movant") seeks relief from the automatic stay with respect to an asset identified as a 2013 Baystar 3012, VIN ending in 5641 ("Vehicle"). The moving party has provided the Declaration of Christopher Hackney to introduce evidence to authenticate the documents upon which it bases the claim and the obligation owed by Debtor.

The Hackney Declaration provides testimony that Debtor has not made four post-petition payments, with a total of \$2,679.48 in post-petition payments past due. The Declaration also provides evidence that there is one pre-petition payment in default, with a pre-petition arrearage of \$669.87.

Movant has also provided a copy of the NADA Valuation Report for the Vehicle. The Report has been properly authenticated and is accepted as a market report or commercial publication generally relied on by the public or by persons in the automobile sale business. Fed. R. Evid. 803(17).

From the evidence provided to the court, and only for purposes of this Motion for Relief, the debt secured by this asset is determined to be \$92,871.92, as stated in the Hackney Declaration, while the value

of the Vehicle is determined to be \$84,472.00, as stated in Schedules B and D filed by Debtor, which is slightly higher than the \$81,350.00 value listed in the NADA Valuation Report.

## DISCUSSION

The court maintains the right to grant relief from stay for cause when a debtor has not been diligent in carrying out his or her duties in the bankruptcy case, has not made required payments, or is using bankruptcy as a means to delay payment or foreclosure. *In re Harlan*, 783 F.2d 839 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985). The court determines that cause exists for terminating the automatic stay because the debtor and the estate have not made post-petition payments. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1); *In re Ellis*, 60 B.R. 432.

The court shall issue an order terminating and vacating the automatic stay to allow Movant, and its agents, representatives and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, to repossess, dispose of, or sell the asset pursuant to applicable nonbankruptcy law and their contractual rights, and for any purchaser, or successor to a purchaser, to obtain possession of the asset.

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) stays an order granting a motion for relief from automatic stay for fourteen days after the order is entered, unless the court orders otherwise. Movant requests, for no particular reason, that the court grant relief from the Rule as adopted by the United States Supreme Court. With no grounds for such relief specified, the court will not grant additional relief merely stated in the prayer.

Movant has not pleaded adequate facts and presented sufficient evidence to support the court waiving the fourteen-day stay of enforcement required under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3), and this part of the requested relief is not granted.

## REQUEST FOR PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Movant makes an **additional request stated in the prayer**, for which no grounds are clearly stated in the Motion. Movant's further relief requested in the prayer is that this court make this order, **as opposed to every other order issued by the court**, binding and effective despite any conversion of this case to another chapter of the Code. Though stated in the prayer, no grounds are stated in the Motion for grounds for such relief from the stay. The Motion presumes that conversion of the bankruptcy case will be reimposed if this case were converted to one under another Chapter.

As stated above, Movant's Motion does not state any grounds for such relief. Movant does not allege that notwithstanding an order granting relief from the automatic stay, a stealth stay continues in existence, waiting to spring to life and render prior orders of this court granting relief from the stay invalid and rendering all acts taken by parties in reliance on that order void.

No points and authorities is provided in support of the Motion. This is not unusual for a relatively simple (in a legal authorities sense) motion for relief from stay as the one before the court. Other than referencing the court to the legal basis (11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) or (4)) and then pleading adequate grounds thereunder, it is not necessary for a movant to provide a copy of the statute quotations from well

known cases. However, if a movant is seeking relief from a possible future stay, which may arise upon conversion, the legal points and authorities for such heretofore unknown nascent stay is necessary.

As noted by another bankruptcy judge, such (unsupported by any grounds or legal authority) for relief of a future stay in the same bankruptcy case:

[A] request for an order stating that the court's termination of the automatic stay will be binding despite conversion of the case to another chapter unless a specific exception is provided by the Bankruptcy Code is a common, albeit silly, request in a stay relief motion and does not require an adversary proceeding. Settled bankruptcy law recognizes that the order remains effective in such circumstances. Hence, the proposed provision is merely declarative of existing law and is not appropriate to include in a stay relief order.

Indeed, requests for including in orders provisions that are declarative of existing law are not innocuous. First, the mere fact that counsel finds it necessary to ask for such a ruling fosters the misimpression that the law is other than it is. Moreover, one who routinely makes such unnecessary requests may eventually have to deal with an opponent who uses the fact of one's pattern of making such requests as that lawyer's concession that the law is not as it is.

*In re Van Ness*, 399 B.R. 897, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (citing *Aloyan v. Campos (In re Campos)*, 128 B.R. 790, 791–92 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991); *In re Greetis*, 98 B.R. 509, 513 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1989)).

As noted in the 2009 ruling quoted above, the “silly” request for unnecessary relief may well be ultimately deemed an admission by Bank of America, N.A. and its counsel that all orders granting relief from the automatic stay are immediately terminated as to any relief granted Bank of America, N.A. and other creditors represented by counsel, and upon conversion, any action taken by such creditor is a *per se* violation of the automatic stay.

No other or additional relief is granted by the court.

The court shall issue a minute order substantially in the following form holding that:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the Civil Minutes for the hearing.

The Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay filed by Bank of America, N.A. (“Movant”) having been presented to the court, and upon review of the pleadings, evidence, arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing,

**IT IS ORDERED** the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) are vacated to allow Movant, its agents, representatives, and successors, and all other creditors having lien rights against the Vehicle, under its security agreement, loan documents granting it a lien in the asset identified as a 2013 Baystar 3012, VIN ending in 5641 (“Vehicle”), and applicable nonbankruptcy law to obtain possession

of, nonjudicially sell, and apply proceeds from the sale of the Vehicle to the obligation secured thereby.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the fourteen-day stay of enforcement provided in Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(a)(3) is not waived for cause.

No other or additional relief is granted.