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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 11-22755-D-11

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

CURTIS A. WESTWOOD, Docket Control No. MLG-7 Debtor. January 11, 2012 Date: Time: 10:00 a.m. Dept:

This memorandum decision is not approved for publication and may not be cited except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case or the rules of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

On August 31, 2011, Meyers Law Group, P.C. ("MLG") filed a fist and final application for compensation and reimbursement of expenses for services rendered to the former debtor-inpossession, Curtis A. Westwood, in this case (the "Application"). Comerica Bank ("Comerica"), the largest creditor in this case; Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America ("Travelers");1 and Jon Tesar, the trustee appointed in this case (the "Trustee"), oppose the Application (collectively, the "Objecting Parties").

^{1.} When Travelers filed its joinder to the Comerica objection, it concurrently filed a statement of opposition. "Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America's Joinder to Comerica Bank's Opposition to First and Final Fee Application of Meyers Law Group, P.C. for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses," filed October 5, 2011. Travelers appeared at the initial hearing and has not withdrawn its separate opposition.

I. AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION REQUESTED

MLG seeks an award of attorney's fees in the amount of \$324,102.00 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of \$5,426.31, for a total of \$329,528.31. MLG seeks approval of these amounts for services rendered from February 2, 2011 through September 28, 2011.

On an interim basis, the court entered an order on November 8, 2011 allowing compensation in the amount of \$162,051.00 and reimbursement of expenses in the amount of \$2,713.16, for a total interim award of \$164,764.16 (the "Interim Award"). For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the Application in part.

II. BACKGROUND

Curtis A. Westwood (the "Debtor") filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code² on February 2, 2011 (the "Petition Date"). The Debtor operated a real estate development business through various entities in which he controlled and maintained partial ownership interests. The Debtor's interests in the entities include the following:

- a 51% interest in Westwood Homes, Inc., a California corporation ("WHI");
- a 50% interest in Lucille Westwood LTD ("LWL");
- a nominal interest in Sierra de Montserrat Loan Fund LLC ("Loan Fund"); and

^{2.} Unless otherwise indicated, all Code, chapter, and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. All Rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rules 1001-9037.

a 4% interest in Westwood Montserrat LTD ("WML").

WHI is the general partner of an entity called Westwood Promontory LTD ("WPL"), and prior to February 10, 2010, was the general partner of WML. Together, these entities will be called the "Westwood Entities." The purpose of the Westwood Entities was to develop and construct various real estate projects. WML had the specific purpose of developing a residential project formally known as Sierra de Montserrat, and a related vineyard (collectively, the "Montserrat Project").

Comerica provided secured financing for the Montserrat Project in the approximate amount of \$23,000,000. Prior to the Petition Date, WML defaulted on the Comerica loan, triggering Comerica's foreclosure upon its collateral and pursuit of the guarantors. On the eve of the Debtor's bankruptcy, Comerica obtained a judgment against the Debtor in state court in the amount of \$14,753,781.40, based on Comerica's alleged deficiency claim and the Debtor's guarantee on the loan. Faced with Comerica's enforcement of the judgment, the Debtor commenced this case. The Debtor disputes Comerica's claim and has appealed the state court judgment.

The Debtor and WHI were also entangled in a separate dispute over construction bonds, issued for the Montserrat Project prior to the Petition Date. Specifically, Travelers provided the construction bonds, obtaining indemnification for the bonds from WHI and the Debtor, and securing the indemnity obligations with the personal property of each. In 2007, WML became embroiled in a dispute with a subcontractor of the Montserrat Project, ARB, Inc. ("ARB"), and its general contractor, De Silva Gates ("DSG").

When ARB asserted a claim of damages of over \$4,000,000 in a state court action (the "ARB Action"), Travelers became a party by virtue of the construction bonds. This event, in turn, implicated WHI and the Debtor's obligation to indemnify Travelers. Since the ARB Action was pending on the Petition Date, Travelers held a contingent, unliquidated secured claim against the Debtor based on the secured indemnity obligation that the Debtor owed to Travelers.

III. THE CHAPTER 11 CASE

On February 16, 2011, the court entered an order approving MLG's employment.³ MLG assisted the Debtor in fulfilling his basic duties as a debtor-in-possession; the Debtor timely filed his schedules of assets and liabilities and statement of financial affairs, and the Debtor attended meetings of creditors and filed monthly operating reports. As described below, a source of significant controversy in the case was the appropriateness of certain cash outlays made by the Westwood Entities; the Objecting Parties base much of their opposition to the Application on the disbursements made by the Westwood Entities to various third parties following the Petition Date, but before the appointment of the Trustee (the "Affiliate Outlays").⁴

^{3.} Prior to the Petition Date, MLG had received from the Debtor several retainer payments totaling \$500,000. As of the Petition Date, the remaining balance of the retainer was \$394,227.46. The Interim Award authorized MLG to pay to itself

^{\$394,227.46.} The interim Award authorized MLG to pay to itself \$164,764.16 from the balance of the retainer.

^{4.} Comerica was aware of the Debtor's relationship to the Westwood Entities and the inter-company indebtedness well before the Petition Date. Nevertheless, when Comerica was served with (continued...)

The Westwood Entities are account debtors of the Debtor because certain receivables were generated when the Debtor made pre-petition loans to the Westwood Entities. The face amount of the receivables from the Westwood Entities exceeds \$2,000,000.5 Because of "limited marketability," the Debtor discounted these receivables by 25% to 50% from face value.6 After accounting for the discounts, the total value of the receivables stands at \$1,110,382.50.7 Of import, the Debtor and his sister own and control the Westwood Entities.8

On May 18, 2011, Comerica filed a motion for an order directing the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee (the "Trustee Motion"). On June 29, 2011, the court granted the Trustee Motion based on a concern that there was an inherent conflict created by the Debtor's ownership and control of the Westwood Entities and the Debtor's duty to collect the aforementioned receivables --

^{4.(...}continued)

MLG's employment application, it did not object to MLG's employment.

^{5.} Exhibit B-16 to the Debtor's Schedule B, filed February 16, 2011 and amended on November 28, 2011. The face value of the Debtor's interest in the receivables breaks down as follows:

a secured note issued by WML - \$70,781; an unsecured note receivable issued by WHI - \$1,426,847;

an unsecured note receivable issued by LWL - \$493,800; an unsecured note receivable issued by WPL - \$68,000; an unsecured note receivable issued by WHI for the benefit of a tax credit trust - \$27,550; and

an unsecured note receivable issued by WML for the benefit of a family trust - \$132,145.

^{6.} Id.

^{7.} Id.

^{8.} As to some of the Westwood Entities, the Debtor's wife is also a part owner.

the most significant non-exempt assets of the chapter 11 estate. The court accepted at face value the Debtor's representations that he had been candid in disclosing information regarding the Westwood Entities and the extensions of credit. Notwithstanding, the court found "cause" under § 1104(a), and entered a minute order granting the Trustee Motion. Subsequently, on July 11, 2011, the court entered an order duly appointing the Trustee.

When it granted the Interim Award, the court noted that it lacked sufficient information to assess whether the Affiliate Outlays were improper or inappropriate. To better understand these transactions, the court requested that the Trustee investigate the propriety of the Affiliate Outlays, and allowed further briefing.

After conducting his investigation, the Trustee filed a report on December 5, 2011 that set forth the Trustee's position regarding the Affiliate Outlays. In essence, the Trustee stated that he would not have authorized some of the post-petition payments made by the Westwood Entities, based on his belief that some of the Affiliate Outlays would impede the estate's recovery of the receivables. At the same time, the Trustee appreciated the complex interrelationships among the Westwood Entities, some of whom continue to operate a business. The court finds that

^{9.} Report of Chapter 11 Trustee Jon Tesar on Post-Petition Activity of Affiliated Entities, filed December 5, 2011 ("Trustee's Report") at 3:13-15 ("[WHI and LWL] ... continue to conduct business. ... I understand they service homeowner claims and continue searching for ways to liquidate certain real estate assets"); and 7:18-21 ("The 5 Entities are relatively complicated intertwined ventures. I probably do not completely understand the interrelationships and motivations of these entities. ... As a result, not all of the spending decisions make sense to me.")

the Affiliate Outlays reflect payments made on outstanding obligations that predated this case as well as payments permitted in the ordinary course of operating a real estate development business. 10 Although the Trustee has indicated that he believes some of the Affiliate Outlays were imprudent, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the Affiliate Outlays were fraudulent or that other wrongful activity occurred in this case. As explained below, the court will not penalize MLG solely for representing a debtor-in-possession, who, incidentally, owns and controls non-debtor entities that are indebted to the Debtor's estate.

As a result of the conflict that existed among the Westwood Entities, the Objecting Parties argue that MLG's compensation should be reduced, across the board, by 35%. In particular, the Objecting Parties seek these across—the—board reductions in MLG's fees for the following services: (1) the preparation of the Debtor's Motion for Authority to Obtain Secured Postpetition Financing and Grant Postpetition Liens, filed June 15, 2011, Docket Number 129 (the "Financing Motion Services"); (2) the drafting of the Debtor's plan and disclosure statement (the "Plan Services"); (3) the settlement of the ARB Action involving Travelers (the "Travelers Settlement Services"); (4) the services performed after the Trustee was appointed (the "Post—Trustee Services"); and (5) the services performed in defending the Debtor's claim of exemptions (the "Exemption Defense Services").

^{28 10. &}lt;u>See, e.g.</u>, Trustee's Report at 4, ¶ 2; 5, ¶¶ 4-5; 6, ¶

For the reasons stated below, the court will not implement an across-the-board reduction, but will (1) deny the fees requested for the Financing Motion Services; (2) reduce by 30% the fees requested for the Plan Services; (3) reduce by 30% the fees requested for the Travelers Settlement Services; (4) deny fees requested for the Post-Trustee Services to the extent such services do not pertain to preparation of the Application; and (5) approve the fees requested for the Exemption Defense Services to the extent such services were rendered before the Trustee was appointed.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standards for Evaluating Fee Applications

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The Application is brought pursuant to § 330. Section 330(a)(3) sets out the standards by which courts should determine the reasonableness of compensation of professional persons. Reasonableness is determined by considering the nature, extent, and value of the services rendered, taking into account all relevant factors, including the time spent; the rates charged; whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the time they were rendered toward the completion of, the case; whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; whether the professional is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field; and whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation of comparably skilled attorneys in other types of cases. § 330(a)(3); see <u>In re Eliapo</u>, 298 B.R. 392, 401 (9th

Cir. B.A.P. 2003), <u>rev'd in part on other grounds</u>, 468 F.3d 592 (9th Cir. 2006).

The applicant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that it is entitled to the fees and costs requested under § 330.

Roderick v. Levy (In re Roderick Timber Co.), 185 B.R. 601, 606 (9th Cir. 1995)(citing In re Travel Headquarters, Inc., 140 B.R. 260, 261 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1992)). Based on the records presented, the court determines, in its own discretion, the reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered and expenses incurred. Travel Headquarters, 140 B.R. at 262; § 330(a)(1)(A)-(B).

The court shall not allow compensation for unnecessary duplication of services or services that were not reasonably likely to benefit the estate or necessary to the administration of the case. § 330(a)(4). All fees previously allowed on an interim basis remain subject to review at a later stage in the case. See § 330(a)(5). 11

B. Nature, Extent, and Value of the Services

From the outset, considering the interrelationships among the Westwood Entities and the pending state court litigation, MLG's representation of the Debtor was not always a straightforward task; the court appreciates the difficulty encountered by MLG in shepherding the Debtor through the process / / /

^{11.} The Objecting Parties do not object to the quality of the services rendered or the time spent and the rates charged. Rather, the Objecting Parties focus their opposition on whether the particular services were necessary or beneficial to the bankruptcy case.

of meeting his fiduciary duties to the estate, while the Debtor maintained management positions with the Westwood Entities.

MLG competently handled the administration of this case and helped the Debtor navigate through the chapter 11 process until the Trustee was appointed. Notwithstanding the Objecting Parties' general grievance that MLG's services were tainted by a conflict of interest, the court declines to deny fees to MLG in a blanket fashion. With that said, however, not all of MLG's services were necessary to the administration of the case, or beneficial at the time they were rendered. The court will now address the Objecting Parties' objections in detail.

C. The Objections

The court will first address the Objecting Parties' general contention that MLG's services were fatally infected with conflicts, such that a 35% across-the-board reduction in fees is warranted. The court is mindful that it granted the Trustee Motion and appointed the Trustee based, in part, on the inherent conflict created by the Debtor's ownership and control of the Westwood Entities and the Debtor's duty to collect accounts receivable from those entities. In the context of evaluating the Application, however, this conflict and that the Trustee was appointed does not per se warrant an across-the-board reduction. Absent an indication that MLG turned a blind eye to conduct clearly detrimental to the estate, or was representing the interests of the Westwood Entities while simultaneously

at 5:7-6:23.

^{12.} Comerica Bank's Opposition to First and Final Application of Meyers Law Group, P.C. for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses, filed October 5, 2011 ("Opposition")

representing the Debtor as debtor-in-possession, an across-theboard reduction is not warranted.

The abstract concept of a debtor-in-possession -- as distinguished from a debtor -- presents an inherent tension in every reorganization case. The reasoning of the court in <u>In re Bonner Mall P'ship</u>, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993) is instructive. In addressing the argument that allowing a debtor-in-possession to run the business in lieu of a trustee encourages self-dealing, the court responded as follows:

"[T]he very purpose of the Code's creation of the debtor-inpossession was to increase the power of those in control of the debtor during the reorganization process. Bankruptcy law is very formalistic in that it treats the debtor, the debtor-in-possession, and old equity as legally distinct entities when in reality they may all be one and the same. The risk of self-dealing among these entities at the expense of creditors is a risk created by the Code itself."

Bonner Mall, 2 F.3d at 915 (emphasis added).

Granted, the court appointed the Trustee because of the problems created by the Debtor's ownership of and authority over the Westwood Entities. In so doing, the court recognized that the creditors in this case had a crisis of confidence in the Debtor's ability to faithfully maximize the value of the estate. As a result, the court concluded that it was in the interests of creditors to appoint the Trustee to ensure maximum recovery on the accounts receivable owing from the Westwood Entities.

Having said that, the court notes that the dual rights and duties of a debtor-in-possession and individual debtor often

^{13.} Although the <u>Bonner Mall</u> case decided the viability of the "new value" exception in the chapter 11 "cramdown" context, its comments are helpful in addressing the Objecting Parties' conflict argument.

create a situation that is conflict-ridden. As the court in Bonner Mall aptly stated, the conflict is created by the Code itself, and it is with that understanding that the court evaluates the Application. Therefore, the court finds that a 35% blanket reduction in MLG's fees is not warranted.

Next, the court will address the Objecting Parties' grievances as to certain categories of services rendered by MLG. The court will deny MLG's fees in whole with respect to the Financing Motion Services. That motion sought court approval to borrow up to \$50,000 from WHI on a secured basis in order to compensate certain valuation experts. The court finds that such a proposal was manifestly unreasonable at the time the Financing Motion Services were rendered. The court agrees with the Objecting Parties' argument that "[t]he Debtor's attempt to borrow money from WHI on a secured basis rather than simply authoriz[e] WHI to repay a small fraction of its obligations to the estate in no way served creditors' interests."14 Considering WHI's substantial obligation to the Debtor's estate and the overall relation between the Debtor and WHI, the court finds that MLG's decision to go forward with the Financing Motion Services was unreasonable. 15 Accordingly, the court will deny MLG's requested compensation in the amount of \$10,694 for the Financing Motion Services.

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^{14.} Opposition at 7:12-14.

^{15.} Although the pursuit of financing to pay the contemplated experts may have been necessary at the time, the specific proposal under the Financing Motion Services was simply inappropriate.

The court will approve in part MLG's fees with respect to the Plan Services. The Objecting Parties argue that following the filing of the Trustee Motion, MLG should have abandoned work on the Plan Services because it became apparent that the landscape of the case would change if and when a chapter 11 trustee was appointed. The Objecting Parties question whether MLG should be paid from the estate for preparing a "never-filed" plan and disclosure statement when MLG was representing a debtor-in-possession with "dual roles ... which constituted a manifest and disqualifying conflict." 17

The ultimate goal of a chapter 11 debtor is to confirm a plan. While that is true, the court recognizes that MLG may also have had certain strategic objectives in mind when continuing work on the Plan Services. Namely, MLG may have wanted to counter the Trustee Motion and rebut arguments against the Debtor's good faith by having a plan on file. Therefore, the court will not penalize MLG for continuing the Plan Services notwithstanding the filing of the Trustee Motion. Nevertheless, the court shares the Objecting Parties' concern that the Debtor never filed a plan and disclosure statement. Thus, the court does not have the benefit of evaluating the documents to ascertain the necessity and reasonableness of the Plan Services.

"The lodestar approach is the primary, not exclusive method for calculating fees, and [] the court could employ an alternative formula where the court could not realistically

^{16.} Opposition at 7:23-8:2.

^{17. &}lt;u>Id.</u> at 9:1-6.

quantify to numerical precision the lodestar calculation." In re

Auto Parts Club, Inc., 211 B.R. 29, 35 (9th Cir. B.A.P.

1997)(citing Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Puget Sound Plywood,

Inc., 924 F.2d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 1991)). "If a fee application
is inadequate, the court should not be forced to wade through it
in order to calculate a lodestar." Id. When it was presented
with difficulties of calculation, the court in Puget Sound
abandoned the lodestar approach, and instead, awarded counsel
only one third of requested fees.

Here, the court is presented with the difficulty of determining the reasonable value, and the benefit to the estate, of the Plan Services, when the plan and disclosure statement were never even presented to the court. This makes it very difficult for the court to assess the necessity and reasonableness of the Plan Services. Therefore, the court will step outside of the lodestar approach in evaluating the Plan Services. Because the court finds that there may well have been a valid and reasonable motivation behind the Plan Services, yet lacks the benefit of reviewing the documents, the court will reduce by 30% MLG's requested compensation in the amount of \$70,512 for the Plan Services, and thus, the reduced amount that the court will approve is \$49,358.40.

The court will approve in part MLG's fees with respect to the Travelers Settlement Services. MLG was engaged in extensive settlement efforts arising from the ARB Action: the dispute involved "close to ten parties in interest." The Objecting Parties agree that the Travelers Settlement Services "had the

^{18.} The Application at 9:23.

indirect benefit of significantly reducing the contingent, purportedly secured, claim of Travelers against the Debtor's estate based on an [i]ndemnity [a]greement," which would ultimately reduce Travelers's claim.

The problem lies in the Debtor's choice to condition the settlement on confirmation of a plan of reorganization proposed by the Debtor. As a result of this decision, the settlement was never approved, nor even made its way before the court. The court observes, and as the Objecting Parties have noted, the settlement could likely have been approved by a Rule 9019 compromise motion even if it involved the transfer of assets. The court appreciates that, for purposes of plan confirmation, the Debtor may have been attempting to obtain an impaired accepting class as required by § 1129(a)(10), and understands that the Debtor may have had strategic reasons for structuring the settlement in the way he did.

As to the Travelers Settlement Services, the court is again presented with the difficulty of determining the benefit to the estate of the Travelers Settlement Services, when the settlement was never even presented to the court through a compromise motion or a plan. This makes it very difficult for the court to assess the necessity and reasonableness of the Travelers Settlement Services. Therefore, the court will step outside of the lodestar approach in evaluating the Travelers Settlement Services.

Accordingly, the court will reduce by 30% MLG's requested compensation in the amount of \$59,923 for the Travelers

Settlement Services, and thus, the reduced amount that the court will approve is \$41,946.10.

The Objecting Parties also take issue with the Post-Trustee Services. They argue that compensation for MLG's services rendered on or after July 12, 2011 should not be approved. The court agrees, but only to the extent that the Post-Trustee Services were not in regard to preparing the Application.

The Supreme Court has clearly stated that "§ 330(a)(1) does not authorize compensation awards to debtors' attorneys from estate funds, unless they are employed as authorized by § 327," and "[i]f the attorney is to be paid from estate funds under § 330(a)(1) in a Chapter 7 case, he must be employed by the trustee and approved by the court." Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538-39 (2004). Lamie's "underlying rationale turned on cessation of status as debtor in possession[, which] indicates that there is no reason to doubt that [Lamie] applies equally to chapter 11 cases in which a trustee is appointed." In re Johnson, 397 B.R. 486, 490 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2008).

When the Trustee was appointed in this case, the Debtor ceased to be a debtor-in-possession. As such, MLG's representation authorized under § 327 terminated as of the Trustee's appointment. The following services were rendered by MLG on or after July 12, 2011: preparation of the Application, certain aspects of case administration, and a portion of the Exemption Defense Services. The court will consider and discuss these categories separately below.

^{19.} MLG seeks a total of \$20,821.00 for the Post-Trustee Services. MLG seeks a total of \$19,007 for the time spent preparing the Application, all of which was generated in the post-Trustee period. MLG seeks a total of \$9,072 for the case administration category, \$806 of which was generated in the post-Trustee period. MLG seeks a total of \$19,860 for the Exemption Defense Services, \$1,008 of which was generated in the post-Trustee period.

The court will approve all of MLG's requested compensation in the amount of \$19,007 for time spent preparing the Application. "[B]ankruptcy counsel are entitled to compensation for time and effort spent in preparing fee applications." In re Nucorp Energy, Inc. 764 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir. 1985). To require attorneys to file fee applications, yet "refuse to award compensation [to them] for the time spent preparing or litigating fee applications," would result in the dilution of the attorney's rate for services. Id. The compensation of professionals in the bankruptcy arena is a peculiar practice. To be paid, Rule 2016 requires the professional to prepare and present an extensive fee application. Lest the dilution of deserved fees, the court will not deny compensation for time and effort MLG spent in preparing the Application.

As stated above, the Supreme Court in Lamie emphasized that an attorney can only be paid if he or she is employed by the trustee and approved by the court. From February 2, 2011 through July 11, 2011, MLG was authorized under § 327 as the representative of the debtor-in-possession. However, MLG's time spent in preparing the Application should not be discounted merely because most of it was prepared in the post-Trustee period, as the Bankruptcy Code and Rules require the preparation of the Application. Lamie's requirement that the representative be authorized under § 327 does not compel this court to deny substantially all of MLG's fees for the preparation of the Application. On the other hand, MLG's services pertaining to case administration and the Exemption Defense Services in the post-Trustee period will be denied, because these were either

services rendered on behalf of the estate's representative -- the Trustee -- when the Trustee had not retained MLG pursuant to § 327, or services rendered on behalf of the Debtor. Thus, the court will deny \$806 of MLG's services performed in the case administration category and \$1,008 for the Exemption Defense Services.

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The Objecting Parties' last specific objection concerns the Exemption Defense Services. As stated above, \$1,008 of the \$19,860 requested by MLG for these services will be denied since that portion of the fees was generated in the post-Trustee The court will approve, however, the rest of those fees because the Exemption Defense Services were not only reasonable but fundamental to the representation of an individual in chapter 11 proceedings, and rendered at a time when the Debtor was a debtor-in-possession. As stated earlier, when the debtor is an individual there often is an inherent tension that arises from the Bankruptcy Code's creation of the debtor-in-possession entity. A debtor-in-possession owes a fiduciary duty to creditors to maximize the value of the estate. Paradoxically, a debtor who is an individual enjoys the benefits of exemptions provided by the Bankruptcy Code that are -- by definition -designed to reduce recovery for creditors. Based on this reasoning, the court finds that although the Exemption Defense Services benefitted the Debtor, they also assisted the overall administration of the case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will limit MLG's fees to \$272,463.50. The court will also award MLG its costs, in the

amount requested of \$5,426.31. Thus, the total award will be in the amount of \$277,889.81. Reducing the Interim Award amount of \$164,764.16 from the total award amount, the total adjusted amount of the award is \$113,125.65. The court will issue an appropriate order. Dated: February 6, 2012 United States Bankruptcy Judge