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27 28 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

## EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 01-60484-A-7K DC No. FPS-2

ROBERT NACHO RODRIGUEZ

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE

Debtor. MOTION TO AVOID LIEN

A hearing was held January 27, 2006, on the motion to avoid lien filed by the debtor. Creditors Commercial Trade Bureau of California, Woody E. Bryant, and Washburn, Briscoe & McCarthy ("Creditors") opposed the motion. Following the hearing, the court took the matter under submission. This memorandum contains findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure This is a core proceeding as defined in 28 U.S.C.  $\S157(b)(2)(A)$  and (0).

Background Facts.

Robert Rodriquez had an earlier chapter 7 case. In 1998, he was a debtor in a chapter 7 case, and his discharge was denied.

On November 14, 2001, Mr. Rodriguez filed the present chapter 7 case. Prior to that time, on June 21, 1999, he obtained title to his residence, located at 7308 Calle Los Batiquitos, Bakersfield, California, (the "Residence").

On October 7, 1999, Woody E. Bryant recorded a judgment lien

in the amount of \$710,698.41, and on November 10, 1999, his assignee recorded a judgment lien in the same amount in the official records of Kern County.

Creditors filed an adversary proceeding against Mr.

Rodriguez in the 2001 case, and the court determined that the obligation of Rodriguez to Creditors is nondischargeable.

After reopening the bankruptcy case he filed in 2001, Mr. Rodriguez moved to avoid the judgment liens of Creditors under Bankruptcy Code § 522(f). Mr. Rodriguez testified that at the time he filed his 2001 bankruptcy petition, the fair market value of the Residence was \$270,000; it was encumbered by a deed of trust in the amount of \$219,000; and he had claimed an exemption of \$75,000. Thus, doing the calculations required by Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(2), the liens impaired Mr. Rodriguez's exemption and should be avoided.

Creditors make several arguments in support of their objection to the lien avoidance motion. First, they say that because the debt has been determined to be nondischargeable, the lien may not be avoided. Second, they assert that the debtor refinanced the Residence in 2003. They assert that as a result of this refinance, he waived his declared homestead, and therefore the judgment lien has priority. According to Creditors, they are now in first position on the Residence. Creditors also assert that the current value of the Residence is in excess of \$600,000. Finally, Creditors assert that Rodriguez has no standing to bring the lien avoidance motion because he deeded the property to his wife as her sole and separate property in 2004. Additionally, although not set forth in Creditors'

written opposition, at oral argument Creditors' attorney posited that the debtor had waived any right to avoid the lien because of delay.

## Legal Conclusions.

Creditors' arguments must fail. Creditors place a great deal of reliance on a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision, <u>In re Chiu</u>, 266 B.R. 743 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. BAP 2001). In that case, the debtors owned property subject to a homestead exemption at the time they filed their bankruptcy case. They later sold it. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reasoned that in order to have standing to pursue a lien avoidance motion, the debtors must have some kind of economic interest in the proceeds of the sale of the homestead property. Creditors argue here that because Rodriguez claims no present economic interest in the Residence, he had no standing to bring the lien avoidance motion.

However, Creditors ignored the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Chiu. In re Chiu, 304 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2002). In affirming the result in Chiu, the Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion about standing. The court stated that under § 522(f)(1), a debtor may avoid a lien if three conditions are met. First, there has to be a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor on property. Second, such lien must impair an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled. Third, the lien must be a judicial lien. Id. at 908. The court then phrased the issue as whether for purposes of applying § 522(f)(1), "the debtor must have an interest in the exempt property at the time of moving to avoid the lien, at the time of

filing for bankruptcy, or at the time when the lien 'fixed' or 'attached.'" <u>Id.</u> The court concluded that the critical inquiry was whether the debtor possessed the interest to which the lien attached before the lien in fact was attached. The debtor need not have an interest in the property subject to the lien at the time the debtor moves to avoid the lien. Therefore, Rodriguez had standing to move to avoid the lien.

The nondischargeability of the debtor's obligation to Creditors does not prevent the debtor from avoiding the Creditors' lien. Section 522(c) first states the general rule that property exempted under 522 is not liable for a debt that arose before the commencement of the case. Section 522(c) then sets forth exceptions to that general rule. None of those exceptions applies to Creditors here. A Washington bankruptcy court has analyzed the question of whether liens securing nondischargeable prepetition debts not described in § 522(c) may be avoided under § 522(f). In re Slater, 188 B.R. 852 (Bankr.

E.D. WA. 1995). The Washington bankruptcy court stated:

"We find most persuasive, the argument . . . that because 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) specifically enumerates certain non-dischargeable pre-petition debts for which exempt property is liable, Congress clearly intended the avoidance powers of § 522(f) to be used to avoid judicial liens on exempt property secured by non-dischargeable debts not specifically protected by § 522(c)." <u>Id.</u> at 856.

Therefore, the fact that the judgment lien secures a nondischargeable debt does not prevent the debtor here from avoiding it.

Similarly, the fact that the debtor, after filing this chapter 7 case, refinanced the Residence and then transferred it to his wife, does not preclude avoidance of the lien. He did

have an interest in the Residence at the time the lien affixed, and he had an interest in the Residence at the time he filed his chapter 7 case. In re Chiu, 304 F.3d at 908.

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The only remaining issue is whether Creditors were prejudiced by the two years between the closing of the present bankruptcy case and the filing of the motion to avoid the lien. There is no deadline to bring a motion to avoid a lien under § 522(f). The bankruptcy case must be open, or the debtor must reopen it, in order to avoid a lien. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(d). Nonetheless, a creditor may argue that laches prevents reopening a case and granting a motion to avoid a lien if the lapse of time caused unfair prejudice to the creditor. The Ninth Circuit has addressed this question in In re Chabot, 992 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1993). The court observed that absent a prejudicial delay, an avoidance action might be brought at any time. Id. at 893. court observed that the key factor in allowing the late avoidance of a lien under § 522(f) is whether the creditor is sufficiently prejudiced so that it would be inequitable to allow avoidance of the lien. <u>Id.</u>, citing <u>In re Ricks</u>, 89 B.R. 73, 75-76 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. BAP 1988).

But the court cannot find that there was prejudice to Creditors here. The case was closed on February 26, 2004. The Debtor did not transfer the interest in the Residence to his wife

¹The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) to overrule the holding in <u>Chabot</u> that a judgment lien will be avoided only to the extent it is secured by the debtor's property on the bankruptcy petition date. See, e.g., <u>Jones v. Heskett</u>, 180 B.R. 575, 577 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. BAP 1995). That does not affect the <u>Chabot</u> court discussion of prejudice referred to herein.

until June 2004. During that time, Creditors could have executed on their lien. Of course, had they commenced lien enforcement proceedings, the Debtor would likely have earlier reopened the bankruptcy case to move to avoid the lien. Creditors have not come forward with any evidence of any prejudice. The lapse of time in and of itself is not sufficient prejudice.

For all the foregoing reasons, the debtor's motion to avoid lien will be granted. Counsel for the debtor may submit a separate form of order consistent herewith.

DATED: March 6, 2006.

WHITNEY RIMEL, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court